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INTRODUCTION
LARRY A. BLOSSER, BEN S COTT, JEANNINE KENNEY, G ENE
KIMMELMAN, AND G LENN B. M ANISHIN
S UMMARY
Consu m er Fed eration of Am erica, Free Press and Consu m ers Union
have prod u ced a Compendium of Public Interest Research on M edia Ownership,
Diversity and Localism in response to the Com m ission’s requ est for pu blic
comment on the continued importance of media ownership rules.1 Applying a
w id e lens, w e have analyzed and presented the basis of law , econom ics, and
social science that lies at the fou nd ation of the pu blic interest lim its on m ed ia
ow nership. Taken together, these m u ltiple and com prehensive stud ies
u nd erscore the essential link betw een d em ocracy and an open, local, d iverse,
com petitive, and ind epend ent m ed ia. We u rge the Com m ission to avoid its
prior errors and ad opt m ed ia ow nership ru les that cu ltivate localism ,
encou rage a d iversity of view points, and preserve a com petitive m arketplace
of ideas for American communities.
This proceed ing carries extraord inary consequ ences for the fu tu re of
the Am erican m ed iascape and the health of ou r political system . The only
w ay d em ocracy can truly w ork is if there is a free flow of new s and
information from d iverse and ind epend ent sou rces. The pu blic d epend s
u pon su ch open sources to inform itself of pressing political issues at both the
national and local levels. This is the bed rock principle of the First
Am end m ent that rem ains as tru e tod ay as w hen it w as conceived by the
Founders.
Changes in technology d o not elim inate the need for m ed ia
ow nership lim its. Even w ith the explosion of the Internet and cable channels,
most people still rely on their local newspapers and local television stations as
the most important sources of local news and information. Those sources thus
have d isproportionate im pact on pu blic opinion. Access to local, ind epend ent
new s sou rces is alread y a precious com m od ity, and fu rther consolid ation
w ou ld be highly problematic. Tod ay, people living in all bu t a hand ful of the
very largest cities generally have access to only one local new spaper and at
most four local television stations producing local news.
Med ia ow nership ru les trad itionally have protected d em ocracy by
keeping sou rces of new s and inform ation d iverse and com petitive. Attem pts
to relax these ru les require satisfying a very heavy bu rd en of proof nam ely,
1

Fu rther N otice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC 06-93 (“N PRM”), Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”), published in the Federal Register on August 9,
2006 (71 Fed. Reg. 45511) by Order, DA 06-1663 (rel. Sept. 18, 2006).
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d em onstrating that d oing so w ill not im plicate fu nd am ental constitu tional
principles. The com pend iu m of stu d ies accom panying these joint com m ents
show that the vast w eight of evid ence su pports, at a m inim u m, retaining the
new spaper/ broad cast cross-ow nership and local TV-ow nership ru les. If
fu rther concentration is perm itted through relaxation or elimination of these
rules, the diversity of local news and information will fall to unacceptably low
levels. Cashiering a vibrant m arketplace of id eas to su it the interests of a
sm all nu m ber of consolid ated corporations is sim ply not in the pu blic
interest. American com m u nities can ill afford m ed ia concentration that
im poverishes the valu es of localism and gives vertically integrated
corporations in horizontally concentrated m arkets u nd u e influ ence over the
public through control over sources of news and opinion.
Ou r stu d ies also d em onstrate that perm itting greater med ia
consolid ation d irectly conflicts w ith the Com m ission’s statu tory obligation,
u nd er Section 309(j) of the Com m u nications Act of 1934, to d issem inate
licenses am ong a w id e variety of bu sinesses, inclu d ing bu sinesses ow ned by
m em bers of m inority grou ps and w om en. Racial and ethnic m inorities are
d ramatically u nd errepresented as m ed ia ow ners. The Com m ission has a
responsibility to broad en, not u nd erm ine, the d iversity of m ed ia ow ners in
ord er to facilitate a d iversity of view point and representation. It cannot fu lfill
that obligation by sim u ltaneou sly relaxing m ed ia ow nership ru les. Em pirical
evid ence show s that minority ow ners better serve their com m u nities,
reinforcing the broad principle that the d ispersion of ow nership to m inorities
serves the public interest. Ou r research also show s that relaxing ow nership
limits undermines the goal of promoting minority ownership.
Perhaps m ost significantly, ou r econom ic analysis of m arket
stru ctu res show s u nequivocally that the Com m ission m u st preserve sensible
lim its on m ed ia ow nership. It m u st prohibit m ajor new spapers from bu ying
u p local television stations; and it shou ld not expand the num ber of TV
stations a single com pany m ay ow n in one m arket. Even in the largest cities
in Am erica, the television m arket is alread y concentrated . Permitting fu rther
m ergers w ill raise concentration levels w ell above threshold s that w ou ld
trigger antitru st oversight in any marketplace. The m ed ia m arketplace m ust
be held to the highest standard in order to protect a diversity of viewpoint.
Ou r stu d ies of law and social science offer further su pport for
retaining media ownership limits. The Supreme Court has a clear track record
on this issu e – the FCC’s m ed ia ow nership rules, authorized by Congress, are
not only constitu tional, they are necessary to preserve and im plem ent First
Am end m ent valu es. Reasonable m ed ia ow nership lim its can ensu re that the
pu blic w ill continu e to have access to local new s and information, encou rage
m ore m inority ow nership of m ed ia ou tlets, and ensu re that d iverse
viewpoints will get heard.
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Finally, ou r econom ic and other stu d ies also d em onstrate that if the
Com m ission relies u pon appropriate local m arket analysis that correctly
d efines prod u ct and geographic markets, and accounts for the influence of
local media outlets, it cannot rationally justify relaxing media ownership rules
even in the nation’s largest m ed ia m arkets. It is necessary in the pu blic
interest to prohibit major newspapers from buying up local television stations
and thereby stifling local new s prod u ction, and also to preserve the existing
lim its on the nu m ber of television stations a single com pany m ay ow n in one
market.
Reasonable m ed ia ow nership lim its help ensure that the pu blic w ill
continu e to have access to local new s and inform ation, encou rage m ore
m inority ow nership of m ed ia ou tlets, and ensu re that d iverse view points w ill
get heard . An open and robu st m ed ia is the lifeblood of our d em ocracy
because it can serve as a check and balance to governm ent and corporate
excess. Thus, there is an essential connection betw een d em ocracy and a
d iverse, local, com petitive and ind epend ent m ed ia. We u rge the Com m ission
to ad opt m ed ia ow nership ru les that encou rage a d iversity of view points in
both ow nership of ou tlets and sou rces of content, cu ltivate localism , and
preserve competitive ou tlets. This is the lifeblood of ou r d em ocratic system
and a matter of singular importance to the American people.
THE TASKS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The ow nership ru les u nd er review in this proceed ing w ere ad opted
to prom ote the d iversity of view points presented to the pu blic throu gh
new spapers and broad cast stations (both television and rad io). The N PRM
asks w hether the regulations now in force rem ain “necessary in the pu blic
interest” in light of changes in the m ed ia m arketplace. On each of the three
previou s occasions w hen the Com m ission’s efforts to m od ify its m ed ia
ow nership rules w ere review ed by fed eral appellate cou rts, the m od ifications
were not affirmed, but rather reversed, remanded or vacated.2
In Prom etheu s, the m ost recent rem and , the Third Circu it w as
particularly harsh in its criticism of the methodology used by the Commission
to evalu ate the state of com petition in local m ed ia m arkets. The Cou rt
d eclined to uphold the Com m ission’s Cross-Ow nership Limits because the
Com m ission failed to provid e a reasoned analysis to su pport the lim its that it
chose, w hich led to plainly arbitrary results (su ch as the Du tchess Cou nty,
N ew York local UH F station receiving more w eight for d iversity and localism

2

Fox TV Stations v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sinclair Broadcast Group v. FCC,
284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3rd Cir.
2004), cert denied, 125 S. Ct. 2903 (2005).
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pu rposes than the N ew York Tim es) and em ployed internally contrad ictory
reasoning.3
In these com m ents and in the attached Com pend iu m of Pu blic
Interest Research on Med ia Ow nership, Diversity and Localism , w e d escribe
how citizens, inclu d ing m inority grou ps, use the m ed ia as a m eans of
d ischarging their civic responsibilities as participants in ou r d em ocratic
society. We also present em pirical evid ence of cu rrent m ed ia m arket
cond itions and the econom ic forces influencing pu blishers and m ass m ed ia
prod u cers and d istribu tors. We believe that once the Com m ission evaluates
this information, it will conclude (as we have) that it is necessary in the public
interest to prohibit major newspapers from buying up local television stations
and thereby stifling local new s prod u ction, and also to preserve the existing
lim its on the nu m ber of television stations a single com pany can ow n in one
m arket. Even in the largest cities in Am erica, the television m arket is alread y
concentrated.
CONCENTRATION A NALYSIS: A S TARTING POINT
In rem and ing the Cross-Ow nership Lim its, the Prometheus cou rt
recognized the legitimacy of concentration analysis as a starting point for the
Com m ission’s review . Bu t the cou rt also cau tioned that the Com m ission’s
statu tory public interest m and ate, as w ell as a consistent line of ju d icial
preced ent, requires the Com m ission to exam ine issu es that are beyond the
narrower scope of antitrust enforcement.
The Com m ission ensu res that license transfers serve pu blic goals of
d iversity, com petition, and localism , w hile the antitru st au thorities have a
d ifferent pu rpose: ensuring that m erging com panies d o not raise prices above
com petitive levels. See, e.g., Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (restraining
m ergers that w ou ld lessen com petition in a m arket); Dep't of Ju stice and
Fed eral Trad e Com m 'n, H orizontal Merger Guid elines § 0.1 (1997 rev. ed .)
("Merger Gu id elines") (seeking to protect consu m ers by ensu ring m ergers d o
not result in anticompetitive prices).”4
The logic of the cou rt w as sou nd . There are im portant d ifferences
betw een m arkets as d efined for antitru st pu rposes and the “m arketplace of
id eas.” The form er is concerned w ith the ability of a firm (e.g., a prod u cer of
“w id gets”) to m aintain a su pra-com petitive price over a su stained period .
But ideas are not widgets. An unfettered media market is not likely to present
a fu ll range of d iverse and antagonistic view s that inform and enlighten the

3

4

Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 408 (3rd Cir. 2004).
Id., at 414.
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citizenry. This is particularly tru e as large firm s concentrate their hold ings
and market power through vertical and horizontal integration.5
Med ia as a prod u ct in a concentrated m arket is not likely to be
prod u ced in the service of d em ocratic valu es, su ch as an inform ed electorate
and robust d ebate on issu es of pu blic im portance, and w ill not serve all
au d iences efficiently and fairly. Med ia prod u cers, especially for broad cast
d istribu tion, have a strong incentive to prod u ce content for the “low est
com m on d enom inator,” i.e., the largest nu m ber of consu m ers, presenting
m aterial that serves, and d oes not offend , prevailing m ajority tastes.6 The
econom ic characteristics of m ed ia m arkets lead natu ral market forces to
d iscrim inate against the preferences of m inorities – racial, ethnic, and any
other relatively small groups whose tastes in media differ from the majority’s.
Med ia is a pu blic good and possesses significant “positive
externalities.” Like clean air and national d efense, benefits accru e to society at
large that cannot be captu red by the m arket. For exam ple, investigative
journalism uncovering governm ent w aste or consu m er frau d benefits all
citizens—even those w ho d o not read the new spaper or ad vertise on its
pages.
Com m u nications and First Am end m ent ju rispru d ence squarely and
for d ecad es has su pported the proposition that acceptable m ed ia policy is
abou t m ore than econom ics 7 and requires concern for preservation of a
vigorous d ebate 8 that includ es the presentation of a d iversity of view s 9 on a
broad array of issues.10
Moreover, in the “m arketplace of id eas” there is a need to consider
both the potential long-term and short-term (or transitory) effects of
5

Compendium Stu d y 17, at 267-269, d iscu sses the available em p irical evid ence on the
tend ency tow ard oligop oly in contem p orary m ed ia m arkets. Compendium study 3, at
52-58, d escribes how the contem p orary, concentrated com m ercial m ass m ed ia fail to
provide the broad and positive discourse that democracy needs.
6
Compendium Stu d y 17, at 269-274 review s the available evid ence on the tend ency to
u nd er serve m inorities, w hile Stu d y 12, at 195-196, p resents new evid ence. Sru d y 11
show s the d rastic u nd errep resentation of m inorities and w om en am ong ow ners of TV
stations.
7
A ssociated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Fox Television Stations, Inc., v.
FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Compendium Study 3, at 45-52, exam ines the
show s that the reliance on the m arket to m eet society’s inform ation need s is a recent
theory that is inconsistent w ith the context and im p lem entation of the First
Amendment in the young American republic.
8
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 US 367, 390 (1969) (hereinafter Red Lion). Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994).
9
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
10
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 US 367, 390 (1969). Compendium Study 3, at 42-47,
review s First Am end m ent scholarship that conclu d es the narrow view of the First
Amendment adopted by the Commission is inconsistent with its origin and intent.
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concentration.
Long-term effects inclu d e censorship, either by the
government or by a private monopoly or oligopoly. But the short-term effects,
thou gh perhaps less obviou s, are equally pernicious.11 The last few d ays and
w eeks prior to a local election or referend u m , w hen voters focu s their
attention and m ake d ecisions, are particu larly cru cial tim es for the
com m u nication of d ivergent view s. This tem poral d im ension (short voter
attention span, short shelf life/ volatility of issu e-centric inform ation)
necessitates a m ore conservative approach w hen d ealing w ith m ed ia
ownership than when addressing other goods and services.
For all these reasons, the d evelopm ent of the Com m ission’s media
ow nership ru les should begin, bu t cannot perm issibly end , w ith
concentration analysis.12 Other things being equ al, a m ed ia m arket w ith 50
rad io stations, 16 TV stations and five new spapers is less likely to be “at risk”
for excessive concentration than a smaller market. H ow ever, any ind ex or
quantitative m etric shou ld only u sed as a screening d evice to id entify
transactions need ing special scru tiny – a “yellow light” or cau tion signal. An
ind ex shou ld never be u sed as the basis for giving a transaction an au tomatic
“green light,” becau se an ind ex m ay only m easu re one aspect of “d iversity”
(e.g., d iversity of ow nership), w hile neglecting or giving too little w eight to
other aspects of d iversity (“view point d iversity” and “sou rce d iversity”) that
the FCC is obligated to preserve and prom ote. When one review s the
language used by the Supreme Court over the course of half a century and the
Cou rts of Appeals in the last d ecad e,13 there can be little d oubt that the
concern w ith “u nd u e concentration of econom ic power”14 is an im portant bu t
nonetheless sm all part of the broad er goal of First Am end m ent policy 15 to
prevent “an inord inate effect on public opinion,” 16 achieve a “vigorou s

11

Compendium Stu d y 6, at 87-97, exam ines the broad im p act of television on the
p olitical p rocess and the u niqu e characteristics of elections that heighten the influence
of the m ed ia d u ring cam p aigns. Stu d y 18, at 281-293, d iscu sses the influ ence of the
m ed ia on p olitical p rocesses m ore generally. Both su ggest that the antitru st stand ard
for econom ic m arket p ow er – a significant, non-transitory increase in p rice – is too
narrow for the broader concerns about influence in the political marketplace.
12
Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 402-403 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“We d o not object in p rincip le to the
Com m ission’s reliance on the Dep artm ent of Ju stice and Fed eral Trad e Com m ission’s
antitru st form u la, the H erfind ahl-H irschm ann Ind ex (“H H I”),as its starting p oint in
measuring diversity in local markets.”).
13
Compendium Study 1 provides a thematic review of this history.
14
FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978).
15
See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 28 (1945); Fox, 280 F.3d at 1047 (D.C.Cir. 2002).
16
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 148 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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debate”17 and access to “controversial issu es,18” and “su itable access to social,
political, aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences.19”
THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF LOCALISM IN THIS PROCEEDING
Far from being rend ered irrelevant by the profu sion of cable and
satellite channels and the Internet, localism is m ore im portant than ever in
our increasingly d iverse society.20 The late H ou se Speaker, Thom as P. “Tip”
O’N eill, once fam ously rem arked “All politics is local.” N ot only are ou r
representatives to state and fed eral legislatu res elected on a local basis, bu t
m any pu blic policy d ecisions vital to the quality of life and the fabric of ou r
society, inclu d ing ed u cation, land use, law enforcem ent and em ergency
services, are made predominantly at the local level.21
While the political d im ensions of localism are im portant, the pu blic’s
need for local news and information transcends politics. Localism also plays a
vital role in both ou r crim inal and civil ju stice system s. Juries are selected
locally, and rend er d ecisions on issu es ranging from sim ple negligence (the
“reasonable person” stand ard ) to obscenity and ind ecency (the
“contem porary com m u nity stand ard s” criterion), applying w hat are
fu nd am entally local stand ard s. Citizen interaction at the local level, in the
political, social and cu ltu ral spheres, provid es the basis for com m u nity
involvement, identity formation and civic action.22
The Com m ission’s ow n research has d em onstrated w hat Am ericans
have long know n intu itively—locally ow ned broad cast stations provid e m ore
local and com m u nity new s than non-locally ow ned stations.23 This is a
conclusion the Com m ission w as reticent to conced e. An FCC stu d y
cond u cted in early 2004, pu blicly released only after it w as leaked to U.S.
Senator Barbara Boxer tw o years after it w as d rafted ,24 conclu d ed ju st that.25
This is a real-w orld d ifference that shou ld inform and d rive the d ecision to
hold ownership limits in place to promote localism.

17

Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385 (1969).
Id.
19
Id., at 390.
20
Compendium, Stu d y 4, at 67-71, d iscu sses the increasing d iversity of the Am erican
population over the past thirty years.
21
Compendium Study 2, at 31-32.
22
Compendium Studies 2, at 32-35, 4, at 63-65.
23
Compendium Study 16, at 239-242, reviews the record and the new evidence.
24
See Letter from FCC Chairm an Kevin Martin to Sen. Boxer, Sep t. 18, 2006, available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-267475A1.pdf
25
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission, “Do Local Owners Deliver M ore Localism?
Some Evidence from Local Broadcast News,” June 2004,
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-267448A1.pdf.
18
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TELEVISION AND D AILY N EWSPAPERS D OMINATE LOCAL M EDIA M ARKETS
The Com m ission’s 2002 Biennial Review Order d id not cite a single
su rvey asking the key questions: “What m ed ia d o people rely on m ost for
local new s and inform ation?;” and “What m ed ia m ost influ ence people’s
opinions abou t local pu blic affairs?” 26 The answ ers m atter because they are
factors in d eterm ining the w eight of each m ed ia ou tlet in analyzing the
impacts of further consolid ation, factors the Com m ission failed to consid er in
its 2002 Biennial Review Order and one of the reasons for the Prometheus court’s
remand.
Stu d ies 7 and 8 of the Compendium present answ ers to these
qu estions. In tw o su rveys, cond u cted in 2004 and 2006, w e asked consu m ers
to id entify the local new s sou rces that they used m ost often and those they
consid ered m ost im portant. Local new spapers and television are far and
aw ay the most im portant sou rces, each cited by abou t one-third of the
respondents.27 Rad io and local w eeklies w ere each m entioned by abou t ten
percent of respond ents. Ou r results are consistent w ith other research,
review ed in Stu d ies 7 and 8, w hich carefully seeks to id entify the sou rces of
news and information that the public uses.
Only a very sm all percentage of the popu lation (4% first m ention, 7%
second m ention) regard s the Internet as a frequ ently u sed source of local
new s and inform ation.28 Even those w ho rely on the Internet for local new s
overwhelmingly go to web sites of traditional media – local newspapers, local
TV and national TV – w hich generally u tilize “repurposed ” content
su bstantially id entical to their trad itional d istribu tion form ats. Am ong the
11% of respondents say that the Internet is their most frequent or second most
frequ ent source of local new s, the w ebsites of local TV stations and local
new spapers accou nt for abou t half of the sites they visit m ost frequ ently.29
Sites not affiliated with traditional media outlets (blogs, list serves, alternative
news sites and others – inclu d ing aggregators) accou nt for 17% of the sites
visited most and second most.
26

Compendium Study 7, at 99-101.
Compendium Study 7, at 102-106.
28
Compendium Study 8, at 111-119.
29
As the Prometheus cou rt observed : “There is a critical d istinction betw een w ebsites
that are ind ep end ent sou rces of local new s and w ebsites of local new sp ap ers and
broadcast stations that merely republish the information already being reported by the
new sp ap er or broad cast station cou nterp art. The latter d o not p resent an
‘ind ep end ent’ view p oint and thu s shou ld not be consid ered as contribu ting d iversity
to local m arkets. Accord ingly, the Com m ission shou ld have d iscou nted the
resp ond ents w ho p rim arily rely on these w ebsites from its total nu m ber of
respondents who indicated that they use the Internet to access local news.” Prometheus,
373 F.3d at 405-06 (3rd Cir. 2004)
27
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When asked abou t the cred ibility of w eb sites, the overw helming
m ajority (abou t 70%) of online new s u sers said that an association betw een a
w eb site and a trad itional sou rce of new s w ou ld m ake the w ebsite m ore
cred ible. The evid ence on preferences for w eb sites and the com plem entarity
and linkages betw een trad itional ou tlets and Internet sites provid e su pport
for the Prometheus cou rt’s criticism of the Com m ission’s treatm ent of the
Internet in developing the Diversity Index.30
That the Internet plays a sm all role in provid ing new s and
information abou t local pu blic affairs shou ld not be su rprising w hen one
exam ines the fu nction of Internet w eb sites and bloggers, as w e have in Stu dy
8, at 121-123. They simply d o not u nd ertake the reporting and ed iting
fu nctions that typify jou rnalism as trad itionally d efined . The Prometheus
cou rt offered ju st su ch a penetrating analysis of the role of the m ed ia and its
characterization is ju st as tru e tod ay as it w as three years ago.31 If w e are
concerned abou t the d issem ination of inform ation, not ju st opinion, abou t
local public affairs, traditional local outlets remain the dominant sources.
THE D IVERSITY INDEX: A FLAWED S NAPSHOT OF M EDIA M ARKETS
In its m ost recent N otice, the Comm ission tentatively conclu d es,
given the fund am ental flaw s revealed on appeal from its 2002 proceed ing,
that the Diversity Ind ex “is an inaccurate tool for m easu ring d iversity.” 32 The
Prometheus cou rt accepted the id ea that a single ind ex d raw n from the general
antitru st fram ew ork could be created , but nevertheless fou nd fault w ith the
Com m ission’s im plem entation. Ind eed , all three cou rts exam ining the
30

A sep arate stu d y cond u cted by Pew , also su m m arized in Stu d y 8, focu ses on
bloggers, Stu d y 8, at 132-134. The resu lts of the Pew stu d y p rovid e fu rther su p p ort for
the Prometheus court’s observation that w ebsites of ind ivid u als and organizations
cannot be viewed as “media outlets” for viewpoint diversity purposes.
31
Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 407 (3rd Cir. 2004) (internal citations om itted ). (“In term s of
content, ‘the med ia’ p rovid es (to d ifferent d egrees, d ep end ing on the ou tlet) accu racy
and d ep th in local new s in a w ay that an ind ivid u al p osting in a chat room on a
p articu lar issu e of local concern d oes not. Bu t m ore im p ortantly, m ed ia ou tlets have
an entirely d ifferent character from ind ivid u al or organizations’ w ebsites and thu s
contribu te to d iversity in an entirely d ifferent w ay. They p rovid e an aggregator
fu nction (bringing new s/ inform ation to one p lace) as w ell as a d istillation fu nction
(m aking a ju d gm ent as to w hat is interesting, im p ortant, entertaining, etc.)
Ind ivid u als… and entities… m ay u se the Internet to d issem inate inform ation and
op inions abou t m atters of local concern… bu t … are not, them selves… ‘m ed ia ou tlets’
for view p oint-d iversity p u rp oses. Like m any entities, they ju st hap p en to u se a
p articu lar m ed ia ou tlet – the Internet – to d issem inate inform ation. Sim ilarly,
advertiser-d riven w ebsites su ch as hvnet.com … hard ly contribu te to view p oint
diversity.”)
32
NPRM at ¶32.
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Com m ission’s ru les since 2002 that have rem and ed regu lations accepted the
proposition that w e m u st cou nt “voices” w ithou t regard to their content and
su bstitu tability, and ad opted the principle that the Com m ission m u st fashion
an approach that is consistent, logical and rational, lead ing to a result that
reasonably reflects media market reality.
The Prometheus cou rt id entified three principal problem s w ith the
Diversity Ind ex. First, the Com m ission assu m ed that all ou tlets w ithin a
m ed ia type had equ al market shares. Second , it assigned w eights to d ifferent
m ed ia types that w ere both inconsistent and not based on sou nd em pirical
m easu res. Finally, the link the Com m ission established betw een the ind ex
and the merger approval rule was tenuous at best.33
In Compendium Studies 19 and 20, w e review the critiqu e of the
Com m ission’s m ethod ology and follow the Prometheus cou rt hold ing to
construct a reasonable measure of market structure. In Studies 25 through 27,
w e present analyses of approxim ately 50 m arkets. We begin in Stu d y 25 w ith
a com parison across ten m arkets (the sam e ten m arkets the Com m ission
review ed in d etail) of the results of the Com m ission’s Diversity Ind ex and an
alternative approach
one that seeks to respond to the principal criticism s
the Prometheus cou rt leveled against the Diversity Ind ex. The w eights
assigned to each m ed ia type are based on the resu lts of a national rand om
sam ple su rvey cond u cted in Au gu st 2006. Available ind u stry d ata on m arket
shares of ind ivid u al firm s w ere used in place of the Com m ission’s “equal
m arket shares” assu m ption that the cou rt fou nd cou nter-intu itive and
irrational.
In 2002, Com m ission’s approach yield ed u nrealistically low
estim ates of m ed ia m arket concentration. The FCC fou nd only one of the ten
m arkets to be above the concentrated threshold and none above the highly
concentrated threshold . H ow ever, w hen au d iences of the m ed ia ou tlets are
properly factored in, the results are d ram atically d ifferent: every m arket is
above the concentrated threshold and eight of the ten are above the highly
concentrated threshold.34
In Compendium Stu d y 26 w e exam ine the im pact of new spaper-TV
m ergers on the m arket stru ctu re of the ten FCC sam ple m arkets. In Stu d y 27,
w e exam ine the im pact of TV-TV m ergers on 15 m arkets. Ou r analysis
conclu d es that in every case, the increase in concentration caused by the
mergers would exceed the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines.
CONCENTRATION OF O WNERSHIP U NDERMINES LOCALISM AND D IVERSITY
Several of the stu d ies includ ed in the Compendium d ocu m ent how the
d eleteriou s effects on localism and d iversity flow from concentration of
33
34

See Compendium Studies 19, at 301-304; and 20, at 307-320.
Compendium Studies 25-27, examine over 50 markets.
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ow nership w ithin local markets,35 consolid ation of m ed ia into national chains,
and conglomeration across media types.
We review an extensive bod y of qu antitative and qualitative
evid ence. N ational chains and conglom erates red uce local-oriented content.
The trend in com m ercial m ass m ed ia, particularly television, is tow ard a
red u ction in new s coverage of local issu es in the period lead ing u p to
elections.36 Local pu blic affairs program m ing is notable by its absence on
m ost television stations.37 Recent stu d ies based on FCC d ata confirm m u ch of
the earlier research. Consolid ation and conglom eration give rise to a “largest
m arket share/ low est comm on d enom inator” ethic that u nd ercuts stations’
ability to d eliver cultu rally d iverse programm ing, locally-oriented
programming and public interest programming.38
We ad d ress in d etail the role that ow nership plays in the view points
presented in m ass m ed ia ou tlets. Acad em ic and anecd otal evid ence com piled
since the Com mission’s 2002 Biennial Review Order convincingly d em onstrates
that m ed ia ow nership matters.39 The ow ners of m ed ia ou tlets influ ence w hat
and how events are covered . Ow ners m ay seek to influence policy processes.
They m ay also exhibit “slant” or “bias,” and m ay not serve the need s of all
m em bers of the com m u nity.40 Slant or bias affects not only the tone of
coverage, bu t also the quantity of coverage and the su bjects on w hich m ed ia
outlets choose to editorialize.41
We also note the system ic problem s that econom ic pressures ind u ced
by concentrated ow nership cau se in new sroom s. Prod u cing local new s,
supporting in-depth investigative journalism, and offering extensive coverage
of local politics is costly.42 The econom ic logic of consolid ation is to red u ce
labor costs by centralizing content prod u ction, red u cing reporting
expend itu res, repu rposing content across m ed ia platform s, and filling the
new s hole w ith low -bu d get content su ch as coverage of w eather, crim e, and
accid ents. Meanw hile, coverage of local politics and elections has reached
35

Stu d ies 4, at 65-71; 6, at 99-103; 10, at 159-168; and 16, at 239-242, review and p resent
qu alitative and qu antitative evid ence that ad d resses variou s asp ects of the im p act of
concentration and conglom eration on localism , d iversity and the qu ality of new s and
inform ation that reach the p u blic. Compendium Stu d ies 15, at, 229-234, and 16, at 247261, d em onstrate that concentration d oes not im p rove the qu ality or increase the
quantity of local news and public affairs programming.
36
Compendium Study 4, at 63-67.
37
Compendium Studies, 4, at 63-67; and 16, at 242-245.
38
Compendium Study 17, at 267-274.
39
Stu d ies 5, at 71-75; and 17, at 267-274, review the literatu re. Stu d y 16, at 239-242,
review s analyses based on the Com m ission’s d ata that show s that consolid ations,
conglomeration and concentration detract from localism and diversity.
40
Compendium Studies 5, at 77-86; and 17, at 267-274.
41
Compendium Studies 5, at 86-88; and 17, at 274-280.
42
Compendium Study 17, at 274-280.
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crisis levels of inad equacy. Yet, Compendium Stud y 9 show s that d isinvesting
in good journalism accelerated the spiral of decline, rather than reversing it.43

CONCENTRATED O WNERSHIP: RISKY BUSINESS FOR M EDIA COMPANIES
We examine the econom ics of tod ay’s new spaper and television
ind ustries in Compendium Stu d y 9. When the Comm ission voted to relax its
cross-ow nership rules in 2003, it gave su bstantial w eight to the argu m ent that
u nless m ed ia ow ners w ere perm itted to engage in consolid ation and
conglom eration in pu rsu it of scale econom ies, local m ed ia ou tlets w ou ld be
seriou sly w eakened or u nable to survive.44 Bu t over the past three years, the
prem ise that consolid ation and conglomeration are necessary to the econom ic
well-being of media companies has been challenged by reality.
Data d erived from recent sales of m ed ia properties, as w ell as
evid ence from other sou rces, inclu d ing trad e and acad em ic literatu re as w ell
as the popu lar press, show that new spaper and television properties are
selling at healthy mu ltiples of cash flow and experiencing profit m argins
com parable to other m ed ia bu sinesses.45 Large conglom erates and chains
w hich have em phasized centralization, the realization of synergies and staff
cu ts
are stru ggling, bu t sm aller chains and stand -alone properties w ith a
focus on quality news and locally produced content have been thriving.46
Consequ ently, althou gh trad itional med ia ou tlets face econom ic
challenges tod ay as their au d iences and ad vertisers m igrate to the Internet,
m ore conglom eration and consolid ation w ill not solve the problem .
Therefore, the Com m ission shou ld not rely on the spu riou s claim that m ore
concentration in ow nership is the key to local m ed ia su rvival as ju stification
for relaxing m ed ia ow nership rules. The actu al d ata sim ply d o not su pport
that conclu sion. As the Prometheus cou rt explained , the Comm ission has
d iscretion to d raw lines, bu t w hen it d oes so mu st have a quantitative basis in
actual evidence, not mere suppositions or anecdotes.47
Consolidation and Conglomeration D o N ot Yield Improvements in the
Quality or Quantity of Local News and Information.
Compendium Stu d ies 15 and 16 offer a critical exam ination of the
record evid ence relied u pon by the Com m ission in the 2002 Biennial Review
Order in su pport of its conclu sion that m ed ia cross-ow nership can enhance
43

Compendium Studies 9, at 139-142 and 10, at 159-168.
For example in 2002 Biennial Review Order ¶¶ 360, 366.
45
Compendium Study 9, at 139-149.
46
Compendium Studies 9 at 139-149 and 10 at 168-177.
47
Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 407 (3rd Cir. 2004).
44
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quality. N either of the tw o stu d ies relied on by the Com m ission a stu d y by
the Project on Excellence in Journalism and another by the Commission’s own
Med ia Ow nership Working Grou p (MOWG) stu d y 7 provid es a valid basis
for reaching the stated conclusion.
In paragraph 32 of the cu rrent N PRM, the Com m ission asks for
com m ents on how it shou ld approach cross-ow nership lim its, inclu d ing
w hether the new spaper/ broad cast cross-ow nership rule and the
rad io/ television cross-ow nership rule are necessary in the pu blic interest as a
result of com petition. We provid e a com prehensive answ er: although the
Com m ission previou sly reached , and the Prometheus cou rt accepted , the
wrong conclusion based on an inadequate evidentiary record, it is not too late
to reverse cou rse. There is no cred ible evid ence that consolid ation and / or
conglom eration have positive effects.48 On the contrary, su bsequ ent rigorou s
em pirical evid ence show s that new spaper/ TV combinations and d u opolies
d o not resu lt in increases in the quantity or quality of local new s and
information available to the pu blic. The very d ata on w hich the Com m ission
relied to lift the new spaper-TV cross-ow nership ban, w hen reanalyzed by its
own staff, contradicts its earlier conclusion.49
Media Concentration Does Not Increase Diversity
or Produce More Innovation
In the 2002 Biennial Review, the Com m ission fou nd that concentration
of the m ed ia is good for consu m ers.50 It d id so by relying on tw o theories:
Peter Steiner’s argu m ent that concentrated m ed ia com panies provid e greater
diversity,51 and Joseph Schu m peter’s theory that m onopolists prod u ce m ore
innovation. It is d ebatable w hether these theories, first articulated m ore than
50 years ago, w ere ever valid ly applied to m ed ia m arkets.
Bu t not
unsurprisingly, the actual data once again contradict the Commission’s earlier
presumptions.
Part 7 of the Compendium evalu ates the qu estion of consu m er benefits
of d iversity and innovation and from m ed ia consolid ation and conclu d es that
consolid ation prod u ces irreparable consu m er harms.52 It is overw helm ingly
clear that they d o not apply to 21st centu ry Am erican mass m ed ia. Profitm axim izing behavior increases bias. N ew s coverage and political speech tend
to be targeted tow ard the larger and m ore d esirable d em ographic grou ps,
leaving m inority aud iences u nd er-served . The phenom ena of targeting,
48

Compendium Studies 15, at 229-234 and 16, at 239-261.
Compendium Study 16, at 239-242.
50
2002 Biennial Review Order ¶¶ 194, 396, claim ed econom ic efficiencies bu t the like to
the public interest goals is lacking.
51
2002 Biennial Review Order ¶ 188.
52
Compendium Study 17, at 267-280.
49
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slanting and spinning, particularly in political d iscourse, have been
extensively d ocu m ented in the literature.53 Com petition m atters. There w ill
probably alw ays be partisan m ed ia ou tlets and a natu ral tend ency for m ed ia
organizations to stake ou t positions at the extrem es. Com petition betw een
m ass m ed ia is im portant, regard less of w hether it red u ces bias, or m erely
exposes conscientious readers and viewers to a wider range of news sources.54
M EDIA O WNERSHIP LIMITS PROVIDE A N EEDED COUNTERWEIGHT TO
M ARKET FORCES TENDING TOWARD EVER-INCREASING CONCENTRATION
The m arket stru ctu res of com m ercial mass m ed ia in the first d ecad e
of the 21st centu ry have m oved far from atom istic com petition in the
d irection of oligopoly and m onopolistic com petition. Am ong the factors
contribu ting to this trend are econom ies of scale and strong d ifferences in
preferences betw een pop u lation groups, w hich tend to d rive com m ercial
m ass m ed ia to target program m ing tow ard larger social grou ps and u nd erserve m inorities. N ational chains and m ed ia conglom erates have amassed
m arket pow er su fficient to enable their ow ners to pu rsu e their political
preferences, both throu gh econom ic pow er and the ow ners’ control over
staffing d ecisions and ed itorial policy.55 Ad vertisers reinforce the trend by
targeting com m ercial m essages to preferred d em ographics and by avoid ing
sponsorship of program s that m ight be view ed by their target au d ience as
controversial or discomforting.56
The literatu re57 establishes that a m ore com petitive m arket stru ctu re,
particularly one characterized by d iversity of ow nership across geographic,
ethnic and gend er lines, w ou ld increase the d iversity of program m ing.
Minority ow ners have been show n to be m ore likely to serve the need s of
their com m u nities.58 Pu blic policies prom oting ow nership d iversity are
necessary to cou nteract the loss of d iversity resu lting from m ed ia
concentration.59
Evid ence in the record , su m m arized in Compendium Stu d y 15,
d em onstrates that had the Com m ission cond u cted a proper analysis of the
programming market and the impact of concentration of ownership on source
d iversity, it w ou ld have conclu d ed that the restrictions on d u opolies and
53

Compendium Study 18, at 283-293.
Compendium Study 18, at 283-293.
55
Compendium Studies 10 at 168-177, and 17, at 267-274.
56
Compendium Studies 5, 86-88 and 17, at 274-278.
57
Compendium Study 17, at 274-280.
58
Compendium Studies 4, at 63-65, and 12, at 195-196.
59
Compendium Stu d ies 4 at 65-67; and 13, at 201-207. Compendium Stu d y 14 p resents a
case study that shows the vastly different perspectives portrayed by local and national
papers of a major event.
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triopolies shou ld be m uch m ore stringent because the concentration of
ow nership of ou tlets u nd erm ines d iversity by red u cing the ability of
independent programmers to produce content.
THE COMMISSION M UST CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF ITS O WNERSHIP
RULES ON N EW ENTRANTS, INCLUDING WOMEN AND M INORITIES
The Prometheus cou rt rebuked the Comm ission for failing to consid er
the effects that the repeal of the Failed Station Solicitation Rule would have on
potential minority station ow ners.60 As previou sly noted , Part V of the
Com pend ium conclu d es that m inority-ow ned full-pow er television stations
are m ore likely to prod u ce local new s content than their non-minority-owned
cou nterparts; sim ilarly w e find that m inority and fem ale station ow ners are
m ore likely to focus on the need s of the local com m u nity. Compendium Stud y
11, w hich corrects m any flaw s in the FCC d ata on TV licenses held by w om en
and m em bers of minority grou ps, paints a trou bling pictu re of the sm all and
d eclining percentage of full-pow er com m ercial television stations ow ned by
female and minority owners:
Women comprise 51 percent of the U.S. population, but own a total of
only 67 stations, or 4.97 percent of the total.
Minorities comprise 33 percent of the U.S. population, but own a total
of only 44 stations, or 3.26 percent of the total.
We find that by stand ard m easu res of perform ance and in
comparison to other areas of the econom y, broad cast television is one of the
w orst perform ing areas of Am erican life w hen it com es to m inority
ownership.
In Stu d y 12, w e reaffirm the find ing that m inority ow ners d o a better
job of serving their com m u nities.61 In Stu d y 13 w e d em onstrate em pirically
that m inority ow ners tend to thrive in m ore com petitive (less concentrated )
m arkets and that relaxation of m ed ia ow nership limits in the past have led to
less minority ow nership, rather than more.62 Conversely, the likely ou tcom e
of fu rther ind u stry consolid ation and concentration w ill be few er m inorityow ned stations, in general, and few er m inority-ow ned stations airing local
news content.
The Com m ission is obligated by statu te to eliminate “m arket entry
barriers for entrepreneu rs and other sm all bu sinesses” and to d o so by
“favoring d iversity of m ed ia voices.” 63 H ow ever, the Com m ission has show n
little interest in tu rning the raw ow nership d ata it gathers from stations on a
rou tine basis via an au tom ated process into u sefu l reports. A thorou gh and
60

Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 431-32 (3rd Cir. 2004).
Compendium Study 12, at 195-196.
62
Compendium Study 13, at 207-212.
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47 U.S.C. §257, §309(j).
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com prehensive stu d y of the cu rrent and historical ow nership of all broad cast
stations (radio as well as television) should be undertaken by the Commission
and the results of the stu d y, as w ell as the raw d ata, m ad e available to the
pu blic before the Com m ission consid ers the ad option of fu rther revisions to
its m ed ia ow nership ru les. It is clear that if the Comm ission w ishes to perm it
fu rther m ed ia consolid ation, it m u st explain how that resu lt d oes not
u nd erm ine its ability to m eet its statu tory obligation to promote m inority
ownership.
LIMITATIONS ON M EDIA O WNERSHIP A RE N EEDED TO
PRESERVE AND ENHANCE S OURCE D IVERSITY
In the 2002 Biennial Review Order, the Com m ission failed to treat
source diversity as a separate goal and it failed to analyze the role and state of
sou rce d iversity in d etail.64
It failed to examine the ow nership of
program m ing and ignored the evid ence in the record that the ow nership and
control of programming in the television market is concentrated. These errors
contribu ted to the Com m ission’s d ecision to relax the d u opoly ru le, tripling
the nu m ber of m arkets in w hich m ultiple stations cou ld have been ow ned by
a single entity had the rules not been remanded.
Stu d ies 23 and 24 provid e a great d eal of ad d itional evid ence that
policy changes in the 1990s u nd erm ined source d iversity. Stu d y 22 examines
the im pact of three m ajor policy changes in the early and mid -1990s on the
prod u ction and d istribu tion of vid eo content, prim arily broad cast television
programming in Am erica: the repeal of the Financial Interest / Synd ication
ru les and the enactm ent of both the Cable Act of 1992 and the
Telecom m u nications Act of 1996. It show s that these policy changes led to
the form ation of a vertically integrated , tight oligopoly in television
entertainm ent and a d ramatic shrinkage of the role of ind epend ent prod u cers
of content.
By tw o w id ely accepted econom ic m easu res of m arket
concentration, the H erfind ahl-H irschman Ind ex (H H I) and the market share
of the top fou r firm s (the 4 Firm Concentration Ration or CR-4), the vid eo
m arket has becom e a concentrated , vertically integrated , tight oligopoly. The
policy changes and resulting alterations in m arket stru ctu re and behavior
w ere not lim ited to the prim e tim e, first-run broadcast sector, how ever. They
also affected the synd ication m arket, cable television and theatrical m ovies
because prime tim e program m ing plays a critical role in the overall vid eo
entertainment product space.
Stu d y 24 consid ers how the prod u ction and d istribu tion of television
and movie content for broad cast and cable TV, as w ell as theatrical release
w ere affected by the em ergence of this vertically integrated tight oligopoly.

64

See Study 22.
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This oligopoly engages in a nu m ber of pred atory business practices that both
limit com petition from ind epend ents and d eprive the pu blic of new , fresh
voices. They foreclose the m arket to ind epend ents by leveraging their vertical
m arket pow er and by self-su pplying prod u ct. They exercise their m arket
pow er as buyers of content (m onopsony pow er) w ith tw o practices that are
especially d am aging to com petition from ind epend ent prod u cers. The first is
that netw orks often d emand that they be given an equity participation in an
ind epend ently d eveloped television series in ord er for it to be placed on the
prim etim e sched u le. The second is that basic cable channels ow ned by
m em bers of the oligopoly w ill not pay license fees that are com m ensu rate
w ith the prod u ction values and the scope of licensed rights they d emand in
ind epend ently prod u ced TV m ovies. Stu d y 24 conclu d es that, if not
am end ed , these sam e policy changes cou ld have a m ajor im pact u pon the
ability of ind epend ents to offer prod u ct throu gh the Internet and other
developing digital platforms, including the rapidly approaching digital multicast channels.
LIMITS ON M EDIA O WNERSHIP A RE N EEDED TO PROTECT D IVERSITY,
LOCALISM & COMPETITION
As the actual m arket and au d ience d ata analyzed in the Compendium
d em onstrates, tod ay’s m ed ia m arketplace, d om inated by a hand fu l of m egacorporations, allow s a sm all nu m ber of organized private interests to
circu m scribe the lim its of pu blic d ebate, to m arginalize the view s of
u nprofitable or politically u nd esirable speakers by d enying them access to
high-im pact m ainstream m ed ia, and to u nd erm ine com petition. It is the
Com m ission’s responsibility to tem per private control over the med ia system
throu gh the ad option of pu blic policies that promote a d iversity of voices,
expand ing the m arketplace to inclu d e all voices, and safeguard ing citizens’
ability to d eliberate w ith all view points. Limits on m ed ia ow nership are
necessary, as are policies d esigned to expand ow nership of m ed ia ou tlets and
viewpoint diversity.
The Compendium provid es the Com m ission w ith a num ber of specific
proposals for econom ic m ethod ology for u se in its review . We d raw special
attention to our model of market structure analysis. In the Compendium Study
20, w e su ggest m ethod ology that serves as a u seful su ccessor to the failed
Diversity Ind ex and w hich rigorou sly com plies w ith the Prometheus court’s
rem and ord er. It com bines the sam e general approach to geographic m arkets
em ployed by the Com m ission in its earlier review , bu t also incorporates
u sage d ata d erived from com m ercial sou rces and on su rvey d ata that
appropriately w eight the influ ence of each type of m ed ia. This m easu re
prod u ces a ranking that reflects reality, ad d resses the cou rt’s criticism s, and
eliminates the absurd results that the Commission’s Diversity Index produced

18 BLOSSER, SCOTT, KENNEY, KIMMELMAN AND MANISHIN
in several markets, inclu d ing N ew York. We also recom m end that althou gh
stand ard m easu res of concentration from the Departm ent of Ju stice and the
ind ustrial organization literatu re are used in the analysis, the Com m ission
shou ld apply a higher stand ard in recognition of the im portance of m ed ia to
pu blic d iscou rse. H ow ever, the attached Compendium stu d ies of specific
m arkets find that even u sing trad itional and inad equate antitru st gu id elines,
any m ergers of d om inant local m ed ia violate those gu id elines. Using the
Compendium’s proposed m ethod ology, the conclusion that the Com m ission
cannot and m u st not allow m ergers in concentrated m ed ia markets becom es
inescapable.
In ord er to properly ad d ress the remand from the Prometheus court
and to u phold its statu tory obligations to serve the pu blic interest, the
Commission must engage in a thorough review of the available economic and
social scientific evid ence. This evid entiary record m u st be vetted and
scru tinized to d eterm ine its reliability and consequ ences, and then to fashion
the proper course of action.
The Compendium provides a robust and well-researched starting point
for the Com m ission’s analysis. Moreover, the Com m ission m u st expansively
and m eaningfu lly involve the pu blic. We strongly su pport the initiation of
pu blic hearings w hich began in October of 2006, and w e tru st that these w ill
continu e throu gh the com ing m onths. To m eet that goal, the Com m ission
m u st also release a further notice of proposed ru lem aking provid ing the
pu blic w ith d etailed proposals for any m ed ia ow nership ru le changes and the
opportunity to comment prior to making any rule changes final.
The Com m ission m ust also cond u ct a thorou gh review of minority
and female ow nership of broad cast stations prior to issu ing any m ed ia
ow nership ord er. It is to the consid erable sham e of the Com m ission that it
has neither perform ed su ch a stu d y in recent years, nor collected d ata
su fficient to accu rately analyze the question. N o consolid ation shou ld be
perm itted in any form prior to the com pletion of a Com m ission stu d y of
m inority ow nership in rad io and television and a ju stification as to how
m ed ia consolid ation and an expansion of m inority ow nership of broad cast
stations can coexist.
Dem ocracy requires a free flow of inform ation from d iverse and
ind epend ent sou rces. Most people look to their local new spapers and local
television stations for the local new s and inform ation they u se to inform
them selves of pressing political issu es. Local new s m arkets are alread y
highly concentrated . The Com m ission bears a heavy bu rd en of proof to
d em onstrate that any ru le change it makes is in the pu blic interest. The
evid ence su bm itted into the record throu gh the Compendium m akes clear it
cannot be met.
The Com m ission m u st preserve sensible limits on m ed ia ow nership.
It m u st prohibit cross-ow nership of local d om inant new spapers and local
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television stations, in ord er to prevent one com pany from gaining excessive
control over one com m u nity’s new s and information. It shou ld not expand
the nu m ber of TV stations a single company can ow n in one m arket. Even in
the largest cities in Am erica, the television market is alread y concentrated .
There is no ju stification in law , econom ics, or social policy for perm itting
fu rther m ed ia consolid ation and inflicting its harm fu l resu lts on local
communities.
Reasonable m ed ia ow nership lim its can ensu re that the pu blic w ill
continu e to have access to local new s and inform ation, encou rage m ore
m inority ow nership of med ia ou tlets, prom ote com petition, and ensu re that
d iverse view points w ill get heard . A d iverse, antagonistic and com petitive
local m ed ia is the lifeblood of our d em ocracy because it serves as a check
against governm ent and corporate excess and against com petitor abu ses, and
provid es m ultiple sou rces for local new s, information and view points so
essential for a w ell-informed electorate. The cou rts have recognized there is
an essential connection betw een d em ocracy and a d iverse, local, com petitive
and ind epend ent m ed ia. As the Comm ission proceed s, w e u rge it, too, to
recognize and preserve that same principle.
In su m , the Com m ission shou ld ad opt m ed ia ow nership rules that
encou rage a d iversity of view points, cu ltivate localism , and preserve
com petitive ou tlets. Su ch ru les are vital to ou r d em ocratic system and a
matter of singular importance to the American public.
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STUDY 1:
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE SUPPORTS
MEDIA OWNERSHIP LIMITS
M ARK COOPER
LAW AND POLICY: INTRODUCTION
Three tim es in the past half-decade Fed eral Appeals Courts have
rem and ed Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission (FCC) ow nership rules for
lack of a coherent analytic approach or a sound empirical basis.1 The first two
cases, d ealing w ith ind ivid u al ow nership ru les, w ere d ecid ed by the Fed eral
Appeals Court for the District of Colum bia. In Fox the Cou rt overtu rned the
ru le that limited the nu m ber of stations a netw ork cou ld ow n nationw id e (the
national cap). In Sinclair the sam e Court overtu rned an FCC rule that lim ited
the nu m ber of m arkets in w hich one ow ner could hold tw o TV broad cast
licenses (the duopoly rule).
The third case, heard by the Third Circu it in Prometheus w as the first
to involve the fu ll array of m ed ia ow nership rules at one tim e. In ad d ition to
the tw o TV ru les that had been overtu rned earlier, it involved ru les that
banned the ow nership of a TV station and a new spaper in the sam e market
(newspaper-TV cross-ow nership and new spaper-rad io cross-ow nership), as
w ell as several ru les affecting rad io station ow nership. This case w as
im portant, not only becau se it involved m any rules, bu t also because it
em bod ied the first attempt of the Com m ission to respond to the earlier
rem and s of its ru les. This w as the first tim e that the Com m ission had
endeavored to articulate and implement a full fledged empirical methodology
for assessing the level of concentration in m ed ia m arkets as a basis for
adopting ownership limits and merger policy.
The Third Circu it ru led that the FCC had failed m iserably to m eet the
legal standard, not because the task is too difficult, but because the FCC made
inconsistent and contrad ictory argu m ents and u nfou nd ed , u nrealistic
assu m ptions in its analysis.2 Bu ild ing on the earlier criticism of the FCC
1

Prom etheu s Rad io Project. v. FCC 373 F.3d 372 (3rd Cir. 2004) (hereafter Prometheus);
Fox Television Stations, Inc., v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Fox); Sinclair
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (hereafter Sinclair).
2
Frank, Ahnrens. “’Sold ier’s Ethic’ Gu id es Pow ell at the FCC.” W ashington Post,
October 15, 2003 at E-4, qu otes FCC Chairm an Michael Pow ell com p laining “The issu e
is very com p lex; have you heard the op p osition exp ress their criticism in a com p lex
w ay? N o. It’s a lot easier to blast the m essenger than d eal w ith the su bstance of the
issue.”
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approach by the D.C. Circu it Cou rt of Appeals, the Cou rt in Prometheus
provid es a com prehensive fram ew ork for analyzing m ed ia markets and
writing rules that will pass legal and constitutional muster.
The terrain of m ed ia ow nership policy is clear. Diversity and
localism rem ain focal points of pu blic policy. Ow nership lim its are a
reasonable approach to prom oting both. Television rem ains an im portant
m ed iu m for new s and inform ation and a m ajor influence on the political
process becau se broad cast signals are still extrem ely scarce. The stand ard s to
prom ote d em ocratic d iscou rse u nd er the Com m u nications Act are higher
than under the antitrust laws.
In ord er to grasp the fram ew ork that the Prometheus Cou rt laid ou t,
w e m u st start from the fou nd ation of m ed ia policy in First Am end m ent
ju rispru d ence. N one of the Appeals Cou rt cases have been taken u p by the
Su prem e Cou rt on appeal. Each of them cited prior Su prem e Cou rt rulings
on the natu re of the m ed ia and FCC regu lations that w ere u pheld . In other
w ord s, the law is settled , here, notw ithstand ing repeated attem pts by
broadcasters to convince the court to break with prior Supreme Court rulings.
Thu s, the logical w ay to u nd erstand the legal context for this proceed ing is to
start from Prometheus, then to m ove to Fox and Sinclair, conclud ing w ith the
broader body of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
CONTEMPORARY FIRST A MENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE ON
M EDIA O WNERSHIP LIMITS
The Prometheus Cou rt reiterated the principle that Congress and the
FCC can im pose limitations on ow nership by hold ers of licenses to broad cast
TV and rad io signals. Using the broad language of the Su prem e Cou rt, the
Third Circu it Cou rt noted the long held view that “d iversification of m ass
m ed ia ow nership serves the pu blic interest by prom oting d iversity of
program and service view points as w ell as by preventing u nd u e
concentration of economic power.”3
These tw o central themes of Su prem e Cou rt ju rispru d ence –
prom oting d iversity and preventing und u e concentration and influence –
w ere prom inent in the other recent cases as w ell. In Fox the D.C. Circu it
stated that pu blic policies to prom ote a m ore d iverse m ed ia land scape are
constitu tional, even if they red u ce econom ic efficiency. The D.C. Appeals
Cou rt continu es to articu late the proposition that “the Congress could
reasonably d eterm ine that a m ore d iversified ow nership of television stations
w ou ld likely lead to the presentation of m ore d iverse points of view .” 4 It

3

Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 383 (citing FCC v. N at' l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
775,(1978)
4
Fox. 280 F.3d at 1047.
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w ent on to ou tline the logic of ow nership lim its. “By lim iting the nu m ber of
stations each netw ork (or other entity) ow ns, the … Ru le ensu res that there
are more owners than there would otherwise be.”5
In Sinclair the D.C. Circuit conclu d ed that in ord er to ensu re that
d iscou rse is balanced it is perm issible for policy to prevent u nd u e
concentration of econom ic pow er and excessive influ ence. The D.C. Circuit
Cou rt in Sinclair restated the broad pu rpose in promoting the pu blic interest
w hen it stated “the greater the d iversity of ow nership in a particular area, the
less chance there is that a single person or grou p can have an inord inate
effect, in a political, ed itorial, or similar programm ing sense, on pu blic
opinion at the regional level.”6
These rulings reflect a line of Su prem e Cou rt cases ru nning through
the m id d le half of the tw entieth centu ry, from rou ghly 1927 to 1978. In those
cases, the Supreme Court articulated a bold aspiration for the First Amendment
in the age of electronic media.
The unique characteristics of broadcast media were recognized by the
Congress early in the century and the airwaves (radio spectrum) were defined
as a pu blic resou rce.7 Pu blic policies w ere repeated ly u pheld by the Cou rt to
ensu re that the im m ense pow er of the new m ed ia be u tilized to prom ote
democratic debate and the free flow of information.
The aspiration for the First Am end m ent w as given its m od ern
form ulation by Justice Black in 1945 in the sem inal case, A ssociated Press v.
United States. H e conclu d ed that the First Amend m ent “rests on the
assumption that the w idest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.”8
In A ssociated Press Ju d ge Learned H and painted a pictu re of d iversity
that w as properly com plex, noting that a new spaper “serves one of the m ost
vital of all general interests: the d issemination of new s from m any d ifferent
sou rces, and w ith as many d ifferent facets and colors as possible” because “it
is only by cross-lights from varying d irections that fu ll illu m ination can be
secured.”9

5

Id.
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 160 .
7
Bagd ikian, Ben, 2000, The M edia M onopoly (Boston: Beacon Press).; McChesney,
Robert, 2000, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times (New
York: N ew Press, 2000); p rovid e history and p rogressive critiqu es of the d evelop m ent
of this policy.
8
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (hereafter Associated Press).
9
United States v. Associated Press, Inc. 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
6

26

COOPER

Since then, the Su prem e Cou rt has reaffirm ed this view w ith respect
to new spapers and has unflinchingly applied it to all forms of m ass m ed ia,
including broadcast TV10 and cable TV.11
In Red Lion, the Cou rt ru led that d iscou rse m ust be fu ll and open
because “[i]t is the right of the view ers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, w hich is param ou nt…the right of the pu blic to receive su itable
access to social, political, aesthetic, m oral and other id eas and experiences…
[T]he ‘pu blic interest’ in broad casting clearly encom passes the presentation of
vigorous d ebate of controversial issu es of im portance and concern to the
public.”12
In FCC v. N ational Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,13 a 1978 case, the
cou rt u pheld lim itations on cross-ow nership of TV stations and new spapers
“on the theory that d iversification of mass m ed ia ow nership serves the pu blic
interest by prom oting d iversity of program and service view points, as w ell as
by preventing undue concentration of economic power.”14
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IS A S ECONDARY CONCERN
The D.C. Circu it d ecision in Fox highlighted the trade-off betw een
d iversity and efficiency. Econom ic efficiency is not the only, or even the
primary, goal of policy affecting electronic media.
An ind u stry w ith a larger nu m ber of ow ners m ay w ell be less efficient than a
m ore concentrated ind u stry.
Both consu m er satisfaction and p otential
op erating cost savings m ay be sacrificed as a resu lt of the Ru le. Bu t that is not
to say the Ru le is u nreasonable becau se the Congress m ay, in the regu lation of
broad casting, constitu tionally p u rsu e valu es other than efficiency – includ ing
in p articu lar d iversity in p rogram m ing, for w hich d iversity of ow nership is
p erhap s an asp irational bu t su rely not an irrational p roxy. Sim p ly p u t, it is not
unreasonable – and therefore not u nconstitu tional – for the Congress to p refer
having in the aggregate more voices heard.15

This u nd erscores a them e articu lated by Ju stice Frankfu rter in
concurring in Associated Press,
A free p ress is ind isp ensable to the w orkings of ou r d em ocratic society. The
bu siness of the p ress, and therefore the bu siness of the Associated Press, is the
10

Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (hereafter Red Lion); FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (hereafter NCCB).
11
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994) (hereafter Turner
I); Time W arner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (hereafter
Time Warner III).
12
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 385 (1969).
13
NCCB,.436 U.S. 775 (1978)
14
Id., at 780.
15
Fox, 280 F.3d at 1047(D.C. Cir. 2002).
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p rom otion of tru th regard ing p u blic m atters by fu rnishing the basis for an
u nd erstand ing of them . Tru th and u nd erstand ing are not w ares like p eanu ts
and p otatoes. And so, the incid ence of restraints u p on the p rom otion of tru th
throu gh d enial of access to the basis for u nd erstand ing calls into p lay
consid erations very d ifferent from com p arable restraints in a coop erative
enterprise having merely a commercial aspect.16

S PEECH IS THE PRIMARY CONCERN AND BROADCAST V OICES ARE S CARCE
The d istinction betw een the com m ercial m arketplace and the foru m
for d em ocratic d iscourse becom es read ily apparent w hen w e respond to the
ad vice frequently given by the m ost ard ent ad vocates of pu re econom ics in
the face of com plaints abou t m ed iocrity in the m ed ia – “If you d o not like
w hat is on the tu be, tu rn it off.” This reply, w hich w e can w ithstand from a
consu m er stand point, is d evastating for citizens. It may be perfectly
acceptable to force consu m ers to vote w ith their d ollars and tu rn off
com m ercial entertainm ent, bu t it is not acceptable for citizens to be tu rned off
by su bstand ard civic d iscou rse w ith no com parable alternative to w hich they
can tu rn. As Justice Brand eis explained in his concu rrence in W hitney v.
California,
Those w ho w on ou r ind ep end ence believed that the final end of the State w as
to m ake m en free to d evelop their facu lties; . . . that the greatest m enace to
freed om is an inert p eop le; that p u blic d iscu ssion is a p olitical d u ty; and that
this should be a fundamental principle of American government. 17

The d esire for active participation and the d u ty to d iscuss have
im portant implications. Justice Brand eis’ ad m onition against tu rning citizens
into passive ‘cou ch potatoes’ reinforces the d istinction betw een citizen and
consu m er suggested by Justice Frankfu ter.18 It rem ind s u s that citizens m u st
enter the d ebate not sim ply as passive consu m ers (listeners or view ers), bu t
also as active speakers. One goal is to ensu re that they are w ell inform ed ,
receiving good , d iverse inform ation; but an equ al if not higher goal is that
citizens must have the opportunity to speak and be heard.19
In Red Lion, the sem inal television case, the Cou rt expressed a similar
sentim ent, noting that “speech concerning pu blic affairs is m ore than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.”20 The d esire for active
participation and the d u ty to d iscuss have im portant im plications. In
particular, citizens m u st enter the d ebate not sim ply as listeners or view ers,
bu t also as speakers. One goal is to ensu re that they are w ell inform ed ,
16

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. at 28 (1945).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927).
18
Sunstein, Cass, Republic.Com (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 46-47.
19
Id., p. 115.
20
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (1969).
17
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receiving good , d iverse inform ation. But an even higher goal is to have them
engage actively as participants in civic d iscou rse. The First Am end m ent
im plications of policies shou ld not only be abou t how m u ch citizens have to
listen to, but also about their opportunities to speak and be heard.
The Prometheus Cou rt notes the d ilemm a that broad casting poses
from the point of view of the speaker’s orientation of the First Am end m ent.
Even in a 500-channel w orld , spectru m, and therefore broad cast voices are
scarce from the speakers’ point of view . The increase in alternative m ed ia
does not reverse that fact.
Even w ere w e not constrained by Su p rem e Cou rt p reced ent, w e w ou ld not
accep t the Deregu latory Petitioners’ contention that the exp ansion of m ed ia
ou tlets rend ered the broad cast sp ectru m less scarce. In NCCB, the cou rt
referred to the ‘p hysical’ scarcity of the sp ectru m – the fact that m any m ore
p eop le w ou ld like access to it than can be accom m od ated . The abu nd ance of
non-broadcast voices does not render the broadcast spectrum any less scarce.21

The need to license spectru m is one of the bases on w hich pu blic
obligations can be im posed on the hold ers of licenses. Starting w ith a 1943
radio case, N ational Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 22 and continuing throu gh
the m ost recent cases, the Su prem e Cou rt fou nd that “w here there are
su bstantially m ore ind ivid uals w ho w ant to broad cast than there are
frequ encies to allocate, it is id le to posit an u nabrid geable First Am end m ent
right to broad cast com parable to the right of every ind ivid u al to speak, w rite,
or publish.”23
Opponents of a bold aspiration for the First Am end m ent w ou ld like
to see this scarcity as the sole basis for pu blic policy so that they can d eclare
an abu nd ance of cable and satellite channels available and escape their pu blic
interest obligations.
The claim is w rong becau se it is a listener/ view er
analysis, not a speaker analysis. Even if hundreds of channels are available to
citizens as listeners, this does not empower them as speakers. Broadcasting is
still a powerful electronic voice granted by government license.
In fact, cable and satellite ow ners control all of the channels, so they
are a single powerful voice. It is not the scarcity of spectru m that m atters, bu t
the scarcity of voices. In a nation of alm ost 300 m illion people, the nu m ber of
channels is still far exceed ed by the num ber of persons w ishing to broad cast.
The number of holders of broadcast licenses and cable franchises is minuscule
com pared to the total popu lation. The possession of this governm ent granted
rights to speak confers an immense advantage on the holder of the license.

21

Prometheus, 372 F.3d at 402 (3rd Cir. 2004)..
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
23
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388 (1969).
22
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O WNERSHIP PLAYS A CRITICAL ROLE IN D IVERSITY POLICY
In Fox, the D.C. Circuit noted the connection betw een ow nership and
d iversity, opining that in attem pting to prom ote “d iversity in program m ing,
for w hich d iversity of ow nership is perhaps an aspirational bu t su rely not an
irrational proxy,” it is not unreasonable – and therefore not unconstitutional –
for the Congress to prefer having in the aggregate more voices heard.24
This proposition has been central to limitations on med ia ow nership
by hold ers of broad cast licenses for w ell over half a centu ry. Ind eed , the
Su prem e Cou rt u pheld ow nership limits even before the land mark case in
w hich it articu lated the aspiration of the “w id est possible d issem ination of
information from d iverse and antagonistic sou rces.” In u phold ing the ban on
cross-ow nership of d ifferent types of med ia, the Su prem e Cou rt conclu d ed it
w as “a reasonable m eans of prom oting the pu blic interest in d iversified mass
communications.”25
In the recent m ed ia ow nership ord er the FCC restated its
commitment to this fundamental principle, concluding that
the balance of the evid ence, althou gh not conclu sive, ap pears to su p p ort ou r
conclu sion that ou tlet ow nership can be presu m ed to affect the view point
exp ressed on that ou tlet…. A larger nu m ber of ind ep end ent ow ners w ill tend
to generate a w id er array of view p oints than w ou ld a com p aratively sm aller
number of owners.”26

Althou gh the FCC expressed som e u ncertainty abou t the em pirical
relationship betw een ow nership and view point d iversity, it w ent on to offer
tw o im portant ad d itional observations that reinforced its conclusion. The
FCC noted that taking a point of view is to be expected, declaring
w e d o not p ass ju d gm ent on the d esirability of ow ners u sing their ou tlets for
the exp ression of p articu lar p oints of view … w e have alw ays p roceed ed from
the assu m p tion that they d o so and that ou r ru les shou ld encou rage d iverse
ow nership p recisely becau se it is likely to resu lt in the exp ression of a w id e
range of diverse and antagonistic viewpoints.27

This com bined w ith the im portance of m ed ia ou tlets in d em ocratic
d iscou rse pushes pu blic policy to lean tow ard s policies that take extra
precautions in regard to media ownership limits.

24

Fox, 280 F.3d at 1047(D.C. Cir. 2002)..
NCCB, 436 U.S. at 802 (1978).
26
Federal Communications Commission, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules A dopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13711-47 (2003), ¶27. (hereafter
Order)
27
Id., ¶30.
25

30

COOPER
Fu rther, ow ners of m ed ia ou tlets clearly have the ability to affect pu blic
d iscou rse, inclu d ing p olitical and governm ental affairs, throu gh their coverage
of new s and p u blic affairs. Even if ou r inqu iry w ere to find that m ed ia ou tlets
exhibited no ap p arent “slant” or view p oint in their new s coverage, med ia
outlets possess significant potential power in our system of government.28

CONCLUSION
In each of the Appeals Court rulings that have struck down the FCC’s
m ed ia limits the Cou rts have restated the Su prem e Cou rt ju risprud ence. The
Su prem e Court has not taken u p any of these d ecisions. The bold aspiration
for the First Am end m ent, that seeks vigorou s d ebate that d raw s citizens in
and recognizes the pow erfu l voice that a broad cast license conveys to its
holder remains firmly in place.

28

Id., ¶28.
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STUDY 2:
THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL BASES FOR LOCALISM
ARE STRONGER THAN EVER
M ARJORIE H EINS AND M ARK COOPER
LOCALISM REMAINS CENTRAL TO BROADCASTING
Broad casting is by its natu re a local phenom enon, and serving the
d iverse need s of local com m u nities has long been an intrinsic part of
Am erican broad cast policy. The im portance of localism as a core policy goal
can be traced to the 1927 Rad io Act.1 Over the years, not only the Fed eral
Com m u nications Com m ission bu t the Su prem e Cou rt and Congress have
recognized the im portance of local broad cast stations serving local
communities, “‘as an outlet for local self-expression.’”2 As the Supreme Court
explained in 1994, “Congress designed this system of allocation to afford each
com m u nity of appreciable size an over-the-air sou rce of information and an
ou tlet for exchange on matters of local concern. … [T]he im portance of local
broad casting ‘can scarcely be exaggerated , for broad casting is d emonstrably a
principal source of inform ation and entertainm ent for a great part of the
nation’s popu lation.’” 3 H ere as elsew here in U.S. broad casting policy, “the
people as a w hole retain their interest in free speech by rad io and their
collective right to have the m ed iu m function consistently w ith the end s and
pu rposes of the First Am end m ent. It is the right of the view ers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”4
More recently, the D.C. Circuit Court in the case of Sinclair v. The FCC
restated the broad pu rpose and the local focu s in prom oting the pu blic
interest w hen it stated “the greater the d iversity of ow nership in a particu lar
area, the less chance there is that a single person or grou p can have an
inord inate effect, in a political, ed itorial, or sim ilar program m ing sense, on
public opinion at the regional level.”5

1

See, e.g., N ap oli, Philip . Fou nd ations of Com m u nications Policy: Princip les and
Process in the Regu lation of Electronic Med ia. Cresskill, N J: H am p ton Press, 2001, p.
203.
2
United States v. Sou thw estern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 174 (1968) (qu oting H .R. Rep . N o.
1559, 87th Cong.., 2d Sess., 3).
3
Tu rner Broad casting System , Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (qu oting in p art
U.S. v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 177).
4
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
5
Sinclair Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 160 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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The goal of localism is inseparable from the other pillar of Am erican
broad cast policy: d iversity. Diversity d oes not ju st m ean program m ing from
d ifferent corporate prod ucers; it m eans d iversity in the content and viewpoint
of program ming.6 Thus, ten or even tw enty new scasts that all serve u p the
sam e su perficial, if-it-bleeds-it-lead s sou nd bites d o not constitu te d iversity.
Serving local interests is meaningless if the d iverse elem ents in a com m u nity
– cultural, social, and political – are not represented on the airwaves.7
It is im portant also to d efine the geographic param eters of localism.
The Com m ission has long equated localism w ith broad cast m arkets. Bu t as
these markets expand through increased power levels and other technological
advances, the needs of local communities get lost. There are more than 80,000
governm ent u nits in the U.S., inclu d ing school d istricts, tow n d istricts, and
cou nty d istricts, and w hat happens at these local levels of governance is not
often consid ered new sw orthy to com m ercial broad casters operating in large
metropolitan areas.
THE FEDERAL S YSTEM D EPENDS O N LOCALISM
While cou rts have repeated ly affirm ed the constitu tional and legal
basis for policies prom oting localism and d iversity, the political com m itm ent
to these policies is constantly u nd er attack. Moreover, becau se broad casters
have First Am end m ent rights, w hich are affected by policies to prom ote
localism and d iversity, it is im portant that there be an evid entiary basis to
conclu d e that these policies are necessary and actually d o prom ote the pu blic
interest.

6

See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389-95. .
H u ffington, Arianna, ”Blog H eaven.” The Am erican Prosp ect, Ju ly 1, 2004. See also
Leanza, Cheryl. 2004. “Monolith or Mosaic: Can the Fed eral Com m u nications
Commission Legitimately Pursue a Repetition of Local Content at the Expense of Local
Diversity?” 53 Am erican U. L. Rev. 597, 603, 610 (fau lting the Com m ission’s 2003
m ed ia ow nership p roceed ings for ignoring “d iversity at the local level”; “[f]u tu re
analysis of this question cannot rightly consider diversity and localism as two separate
goals that are analytically d istinct”). Evid ence that increasing the nu m ber of ou tlets
d oes not necessarily increase d iversity can be fou nd in Dejong, A.S. and B. J. Bates
1991. "Channel Diversity in Cable Television." Jou rnal of Broad casting and Electronic
Med ia 35: 159-66; Grant, A. E. 1994. "The Prom ise Fu lfilled ? An Em p irical Analysis of
Program Diversity on Television." The Jou rnal of Med ia Econom ics 7:1: 51-64;
H ellm an, H eikki and Martin Soram aki, 1994. “Com p etition and Content in the U.S.
Vid eo Market.” Jou rnal of Med ia Econom ics 7 ; Lin, C. A. 1995. “Diversity of N etw ork
Prime-Time Program Formats During the 1980s,” Journal of Media Economics 8: 17-28;
Ku bey, Robert, et al. 1995. “Dem ograp hic Diversity on Cable: H ave the N ew Cable
Channels Made a Difference in the Representation of Gender, Race, and Age?” Journal
of Broadcasting and Electronic Media 39: 459-71.
7
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Localism and d iversity rem ain critically im portant to ou r d em ocracy
and the commercial mass media have not fulfilled, and are not likely to fulfill,
these fundamental goals of communications policy.
In spite of three quarters of a centu ry of Congressional policy to
prom ote localism in the broad cast m ed ia and Su prem e Cou rt acceptance of
these policies, in the recent m ed ia ow nership proceed ing, the chief expert
w itness for the national broad cast netw orks d eclared localism to be an
u nju stified preoccu pation of the Com mission that lacks a coherent basis. In
his words:
The Com m ission’s p reoccu p ation w ith localism is d ifficu lt to exp lain or ju stify.
Why shou ld the governm ent seek to p rom ote local content as op p osed to, and
esp ecially at the exp ense of, any other category of id eas? Once can read ily
im agine categories of id eas m ore central to the p olitical, social, ed u cational,
aesthetic or sp iritu al lives of Am ericans. Fu rther, to fasten on any category of
id eas read ily ru ns afou l of First Am end m ent valu es. In short, a focu s on local
content or local outlets appears to lack a coherent policy basis.8

This statem ent is w rong on every count. To begin w ith, a policy of
promoting localism does not run afoul of the First Amendment. The Supreme
Cou rt has rejected this claim repeated ly over the past seventy-five years.
Second , given ou r fed eral system , local governm ent is in fact ou r central
political institu tion. Third , w e d efine many of ou r social and aesthetic valu es
in local term s. For example, local courts and ju ries d ecid e a w id e range of
civil and crim inal issu es based on w hat are essentially com m u nity
understandings of what a “reasonable man” would think or do, depending on
local cond itions. H aving vibrant local m ed ia ou tlets to prom ote good local
governm ent and strong social ties in local com m u nities is an essential part of
our democracy.9
Congress has ad hered to the localism principle. The legal preced ent
rem ains strong becau se the political and social reality of life in Am erica
continues to demand strong local media institutions. No matter how strongly
8

Ow en, Bru ce N . “Statem ent on Med ia Ow nership Ru les.” Attachm ent to Com m ents
of Fox Entertainm ent Grou p and Fox Television Stations, Inc., N ational Broad casting
Com p any, Inc. and Telem u nd o Grou p , Inc., and Viacom , In the M atter of 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules A dopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications A ct of 1996, Cross
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and N ewspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning M ultiple
Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local M arkets, Definition of Radio M arkets, MB
Docket No. 02-277, MM Dockets 02-235, 01-317, 00-244, 2 January 2003, p. 10.
9
Alexis d e Tocqu eville’s w ell know n celebration of local associations started w ith “the
p erm anent associations w hich are established by law u nd er the nam es of tow nship s,
cities, and cou nties, a vast nu m ber of others are form ed and m aintained by the agency
of p rivate ind ivid u als.” cited in Terchek, Ronald J. and Thom as C. Conte. (Ed s.),
Theories of Democracy (Lanham, MD: Rowan & Littlefield, 2001), cited in p. 27.
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national and international issu es affect ou r society, or how prom inent they
becom e, there is m u ch truth to the saying that all politics in Am erica is local.
This is becau se of the fu nd am ental fed eral stru ctu re of ou r national
government.
Even national elections are essentially local.
The extrem e
concentration of the 2004 presid ential election in so-called “battlegrou nd ”
states rem ind s u s that w e elect the Presid ent on a state-by-state basis. We
elect Senators on a state-w id e basis and ou r Representatives on the basis of
small single-member districts.10 These are local races.
More im portantly, w e reserve a host of pu blic policy d ecisions that
are vital to the qu ality of life and the fabric of ou r society – police, em ergency
services, ed ucation, land -use – for local u nits of governm ent. Only d efense is
solely national policy and even here the national d efense has com e to rely
significantly on the National Guard, which is a state level institution.
Three-quarters or m ore of spend ing on ed u cation, police, and parks
and recreation is accou nted for by state and local governm ents, m ostly at the
local level. Abou t tw o-third s of all governm ent spend ing on com m u nity
d evelopm ent and natu ral resou rces are spent by state and local governm ents,
equally divided between state and local.11 Personal transfer payments – social
and incom e secu rity and w elfare – are also largely fed eral, bu t incom e
security and welfare too have many state and local variations.
S OCIAL BASES OF LOCALISM
A host of social processes are grou nd ed in the local com m u nity. The
prim ary referent for id entity and com m u nity has trad itionally been, and
rem ains, significantly local.12 A prim ary focu s on political participation and
m obilization captu res the m ost critical aspect for med ia policy. There are
both sociological and psychological reasons w hy local ties su pport
participation.
Being em bed d ed in netw orks w here one can influ ence or be
influ enced by action is psychologically gratifying and a spur to action. Social
identity is d efined , and political activity is instigated , on the basis of grou p

10

Keyssar, Alexander. The Right to Vote. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
U.S. Censu s Bu reau , Statistical A bstract of the United States: 2002 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Department of Commerce, 2002), Tables 414-416, 453.
12
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Age of Access. New York, Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, 2000, pp. 79. Dew ey, John. The Public and its Problems. Athens, Ohio: Sw allow Press, 1954;
Sirianni, Carm en and Lew is Fried land . Civic Innovation in A merica: Community
Empowerment, Public Policy, and the M ovement for Civic Renewal. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001, especially Chapter 5.
11
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id entity and affiliation.13 Grou ps are d efined by the perm eability and
perm anence of their bou nd aries and their location in the social hierarchy.14
The social context helps to d eterm ine w hich organizations and m essages are
effective. Som e contexts provid e greater cred ibility and opportu nities to
persuad e voters. Segmentation, separation, or sorting of organizations
facilitates the garnering of com m itm ent and su pport and m akes m essage
management easier.
The salience of the organization’s id entity to the m em bers is d efined
by several factors – the clarity and strength of the shared u nd erstand ing of
the organization’s location in society and the m otivation to act on that shared
social id entity are param ou nt. Sociological theories stress the importance of
the interaction betw een the m em bers of the organization to create solid arity.15
Intervening social processes affect participation16 since “frequent discussion of
politics and the partisan com position of an ind ivid u al’s netw ork influ ence
participation.”17
“For a comm u nity, frequ ent cooperation by its m em bers lead s to
tighter social linkages and increased trust in one another – a ‘virtu ou s circle’
of participation and trust.” 18 Repetition 19 and connection betw een the speaker
13

H echter, Michael. 2004. “From Class to Cu ltu re.” Am erican Jou rnal of Sociology
110:2; Wright, Step hen C., Donald M. Taylor and Fathali M. Moghad d am . 1990.
Responding to Membership in a Disadvantaged Group: From Acceptance to Collective
Protest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58.
14
Id.
15
The im p act of conversational netw orks in chu rch and w ork settings on p articip ation
is to a significant d egree m ed iated by the d ifferent view p oints that ind ivid u als are
exp osed to w hen they d iscu ss p olitics in these settings.” Scheu fele, Dietram A., et al.
2004. Social Stru ctu re and Citizenship : Exam ining the Im p acts of Social Setting,
Network H eterogeneity, and Inform ational Variables on Political. Political
Communication 21: 315; Mutz, Diana C. 2002. “Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing
Democratic Theory in Practice.” American Political Science Review 96.
16
H u ckefeld t, Robert and John Sprague. Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication:
Information Influence in an Election Campaign. N ew York: Cam brid ge University Press,
1995; McLeod , Jack M., Dietram A. Scheu fele and Patricia Moy. 1999. Com m u nity,
Com m u nications, and Particip ation: The Role of Mass Med ia and Interp ersonal
Discu ssion in Local Political Particip ation. Political Communication 16; Scheu fele,
Dietram A., Matthew C. N isbet and Dom iniqu e Brossard . 2003. Pathw ays to
Particip ation? Religion, Com m u nication Contexts and Mass Med ia, International
Journal of Public Opinion Research 15.
17
Scheu fele,et al. 2004. p . 317; Knoke, David . 1990. “N etw orks of Political Action:
Tow ard Theory Constru ction.” Social Forces 68; Knoke, David . Organizing for Collective
Action: The Political Economies of Associations. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1990b.
18
Scheu fele, et al., 2004: 318; Brehm , John and Wend y Rahn. 1997. Ind ivid u al Level
Evid ence for the Cau ses and Consequ ences of Social Cap ital. A merican Journal of
Political Science; Pu tnam , Robert D. M aking Democracy W ork: Civic Traditions in M odern
Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Scheu fele, Dietram A. and Dhavan V.
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and listener m ake m essages m ore effective. Personal familiarity, positive
feelings and respect for the speaker increase thou ght abou t the m essage and
its overall persuasiveness.20 Face-to-face interactions are particularly w ell
suited to benefit from these conditions for persuasion.21
From a practical point of view , for exam ple, getting ou t the vote
thrives on local connections.22 Know led ge of the local area and local
ind ivid uals are vastly su perior as resources for m obilizing participation. The
sociability of the political participation – w orking together, voting together –
provides social reinforcement, trust and psychological gratification.
Local m ed ia that focu s on local issu es, cu ltu res, and interests are a
critical part of this equation. As law professor and m ed ia scholar Ed w in
Baker points ou t, for the m ed ia to m eet the d iverse need s of the pu blic, they
must
p erform several tasks. First, the p ress shou ld p rovid e ind ivid u als and
organized grou p s w ith inform ation that ind icates w hen their interests are at
stake. Second , the m ed ia shou ld help m obilize p eop le to p articip ate and
p rom ote their d ivergent interests… Third , for p lu ralist d em ocracy to w ork
inform ation abou t p op u lar d em and s m u st flow p rop erly - that is, given the
p ractical gap betw een citizens and p olicym akers, the p ress shou ld m ake
policymakers aware of the content and strength of people's demands.23
Shah. 2000. Personality Strength and Social Cap ital: The Role of Disp ositional and
Inform ational Variables in the Prod u ction of Civic Particip ation. Communication
Research 27.
19
Weiss, R. F. and B. Pasam anick. 1964. N u m ber of Exp osu res To Persu asive
Com m u nication in The Instru m ental Cond itioning of Attitu d es. Journal of Social
Psychology 63; Verba, Sid ney, Lehm an Schlozm an and H enry Brad y. V oice and Equality:
Civic Volunteerism in American Politics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
20 Scheufele, Dietram A., Matthew C. Nisbet. Dominique Brossard, and Erik C. Nisbet.
2004. Social Stru ctu re and Citizenship : Exam ining the Im p act of Social Setting,
N etw ork H eterogeity, and Inform ational Variables on Political Particip ation. Political
Communications 21, H u ckfeld t, R., Johnson E. and J. Sp ragu e. 2002. Political
Environm ents, Political Dynam ics and the Su rvival of Disagreement. Journal of Politics
62.
21 Niven, 2004; Green, Donald P. and Alan S. Gerber. 2000. Getting Out the Vote in Youth
V ote: Results for Randomized Field Experiments. N ew H aven: Institu tion for Social and
Policy Stu d ies, Yale University; Green, Donald P. and Alan S. Gerber. 2001. The Effect
of a Nonpartisan Get Out the Vote Drive: An Experimental Study of Leafleting. Journal
of Politics 62:3; Kilgard, 1999; Reams and Ray, 1993; Jason, 1984.
22 H anson, John Mark. “The Majoritarian Im p u lse and the Declining Significance of
Place.” in Gerald M. Pom p er and Marc D. Weiner. (Ed s.), The Future of A merican
Democratic Politics. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003.
23 Baker, C. Ed w in. “Giving Up on Dem ocracy: The Legal Regu lation of Med ia
Ow nership .” Attachm ent C, Com m ents of Consu m ers Union, Consu m er Fed eration of
Am erica, Civil Rights Foru m , Center for Digital Dem ocracy, Lead ership Conference
on Civil Rights and Med ia Access Project. In the M atter of Cross Ownership of Broadcast
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The broad cast m ed ia cannot fu lfill this critical role if they are not
rooted in local com mu nities. Broad cast television has an im m ense im pact
because of its key role in the social and psychological processes of d em ocratic
d iscou rse.
Broad cast television is a primary sou rce of inform ation,
particularly for local issues.24 Television is also the prem ier m ed iu m for
advertising25 and efforts to influ ence pu blic opinion.26 Visual im ages are
particularly pow erful in conveying m essages.27 The d ictates of the television

Station and N ewspaper/Radio Cross-Ownership W aiver Policy: Order and N otice of Proposed
Rulemaking, MM Docket N o. 01-235, 96-197, Decem ber 3, 2001, p . 16 (hereafter,
CFA/CU Comments).
24 Coop er, Mark. “When Law and Social Science Go H and in Glove.” in Philip N ap oli
(Eds.), Media Diversity: M eaning and M easurement. Mahw ah, N J: Law rence Earlbau m ,
2006.
25 H ansen Glenn J. and William Benoit, 2002. Presid ential Television Ad vertising and
Pu blic Policy Priorities, 1952 –2002. Communications Studies 53: 285; Patterson, Thom as
E. and R.D McClu re, The Unseeing Eye: The M yth of Television Power in N ational Politics.
New York: Putnam, 1976; Kern, M. 30 Second Politics: Political Advertising in the Eighties.
N ew York: Praeger, 1988; Brians, C. L. and M. P. Wattenberg, Cam p aign Issu e
Knowled ge and Salience: Com p aring Recep tion for TV Com m ercials, TV N ew s, and
Newspapers. American Journal of Political Science 40: 172-93, 1996.
26 Kim , Sei-H ill, Dietram A. Scheu fele and Jam es Shanahan. 2002. Think Abou t It This
Way: Attribu te Agend a Setting Fu nction of the Press and the Pu blic’s Evalu ation of a
Local Issu e. Journalism and M ass Communications Quarterly 79:7, 2002; Chaffee, Steven
and Stacy Frank. 1996. H ow Am ericans Get Their Political Inform ation: Print versu s
Broad cast N ew s. The A nnals of the A merican A cademy of Political and Social Science 546;
McLeod , Jack M., Dietram A. Scheu fele, and Patricia Moy. 1999. Com m u nity,
Com m u nications, and Particip ation: The Role of Mass Med ia and Interp ersonal
Discu ssion in Local Political Particip ation. Political Communication 16. For a fu ller
exp lanation of the im p act of television, see the sep arate Com m ents of the Consu m er
Federation of America and Consumers Union filed in this NOI.
27 Dom ke, David , David Perlm u tter and Meg Sp ratt. 2002. The Prim es of Ou r Times?
An Exam ination of the ‘Pow er’ of Visu al Im ages. Journalism3:2: 131-59. The au thors
present a detailed social psychological and even neurological discussion of the reasons
w hy and w ays in w hich visu al im ages have a greater im p act, bu t the p olitically
oriented research that they cite as consistent w ith their find ings inclu d e Krosnick, J. A.
and D. R. Kind er. 1990. “Altering the Fou nd ation of Su p p ort for the Presid ent
Throu gh Prim ing.” A merican Political Science Review 84: 497-512; Pan Z. and G. M.
Kosicki, “Prim ing and Med ia Im p act on the Evalu ation of the Presid ent’s
Perform ance,” 24 Communications Research 3-30, 1997; Ju st, M.R., A. N . Crigler and W.
R. N eu m an. Cognitive and Affective Dim ensions of Political Concep tu alization. in A.
N . Crigler (ed s.), The Psychology of Political Communications. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1996.
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new s prod u ction process also affect the process of issu e form ation and
debate.28

CONCLUSION
Localism is intrinsically related to d iversity in m ed ia sou rces, med ia
ou tlets, m ed ia institu tions, and the actu al content of m ed ia program m ing. In
this section, w e d escribe these variou s form s of d iversity and emphasize w hy
all are needed to advance the fundamental goal of communications policy – to
provid e the w id est possible pu blic access to and participation in a rich and
vibrant marketplace of ideas.
Diversity and antagonism in civic d iscou rse are neither easy to
achieve nor easy to m easure. Opponents of policies to enrich civic d iscou rse
com plain that the im precision of the ou tcom e m akes it d ifficu lt, if not
im possible, to m easu re success. This m erely reflects the fact that the goal of
having an inform ed citizenry is inherently qualitative and com plex. Most
social and psychological relationships have nu m erou s highly intertw ined
causes; there is no reason that know led ge and participation in public policy
formation should be otherwise.

Graber, Doris. M ass M edia and A merican Politics. Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Qu arterly, 1997; Gans, H erbert J. Democracy and the N ews. Oxford : Oxford University
Press, 2003.
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STUDY 3:
A BROAD, POSITIVE VIEW OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
BEN S COTT
IN TRODUCTION
The bold aspiration for the First Amendment that we have articulated
in earlier stud ies has a d irect link to a m ore fu nd am ental d ebate over the
natu re of the First Am end m ent. The narrow , negative view ad vocated by the
broad casters, and ad opted by the Fed eral Com mu nications Com m ission
(FCC), stand s in sharp contrast to the broad positive view taken by the
Su prem e Cou rt. The view taken of the First Am end m ent d eeply influ ences
the policy that is pursued in consideration of limits on media ownership.
In the FCC’s analysis of the cross-ow nership regu lations ou tlined in
the 2003 Ru le & Ord er (R&O),1 w e believe that fund am ental attribu tes of
pu blic First Am end m ent rights w ere not su fficiently consid ered , if ind eed
they w ere brou ght to the attention of the Com m ission at all. There is an
u nqu estioned assu m ption that the First Am end m ent’s role in this proceed ing
is m erely to negatively prohibit any abrid gem ent of any one speaker, as
opposed to a positive responsibility to expand the d iversity of voices from all
speakers. It is of critical im portance that the Com m ission now take u p a
seriou s intellectu al inquiry into the constitu tional basis that su pports its
interpretation of which policies best serve the goals of the First Amendment.
The absence from the ru ling of these essential id eas concerning the
pu blic’s constitu tional rights provid ed by the free press contribu tes to a
general misu nd erstand ing of the historical d evelopm ent of com m ercial
jou rnalism in the United States and its relationship to citizenship and pu blic
service. To correct this problem , these com m ents w ill qu estion the
Com m ission’s assu m ptions abou t constitu tional rights and m ake broad
argu m ents that point to p rofou nd ly d ifferent policy goals and end s. It is of
necessity an historical argu m ent. An accu rate account of the com position of
the First Amendment in the early Republic and its implications for the history
of jou rnalism point to rad ically d ifferent conclusions w ith regard to the
stand ard s and threshold s of pu blic service, d iversity, localism , and
competition than those espoused by the Commission in its Rule and Order.
These conclu sions requ ire a thoroughgoing reevalu ation of the
analytical, constitu tional, econom ic and legal premises u pon w hich the 2003
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission, 2002 Biennial Regu latory Review – Review of
the Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and Other Ru les Ad op ted Pu rsu ant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13711-47 (2003),
1

40

SCOTT

ruling is based and upon which the current proceeding is conducted. In short,
policies that favor the d om inant m arket interests in the local new s m ed ia are
not com m ensu rate w ith either the pu blic interest need s of a locality or the
First Am end m ent responsibilities of the governm ent. The m echanism of
market-based regulation in the m ed ia system is a poor solu tion for the
protection of First Am end m ent rights. Su rvival of the fittest in oligopoly
markets is hardly a recipe for providing a free, fair, and comprehensive public
d ebate. We require here a positive view of the First Am end m ent w hich goes
beyond sim ply gu ard ing the speech rights of any given speaker. Protecting
the free speech of the few d oes not provid e it for the m any—on the contrary,
it may well impede it. This follows from a fundamental contradiction between
the goals of d em ocracy and those of m arket com petition. Markets logically
prod u ce w inners and losers and fu nction m ost efficiently w hen inequality
betw een players is w id e. Dem ocracy fu nctions best w hen all speakers have
the opportunity to be heard and inequality in debate is narrow. An analysis of
public rights to a free press as conceived by the Founding Fathers and the first
generations of Am erican governm ent bears ou t this argu m ent. The history of
jou rnalism further reinforces the point by persuasively d em onstrating that
regulation throu gh the m arketplace is a relatively new phenom enon in
Am erican journalism that has been d ispu ted from its inception as neither free
nor commensurate with First Amendment ideals.
In an effort to specify ou r concerns as m u ch as possible, w e shall
respond to instances in the 2003 ru ling that w e believe require
reconsid eration in light of a m ore com prehensive review of historical and
theoretical analyses. Listed below are three statem ents from the R&O that w e
feel capture the concepts w e w ish to ad d ress. In particu lar, w e w ou ld like to
d raw attention to principles su pporting the Com m ission’s u nd erstand ing of
the m arketplace of id eas, the m arket as the arbiter of pu blic political
com m u nication, the First Am end m ent, and the relationship of these id eas to
the history of commercial journalism.
¶ 352 “N or it is particularly trou bling that m ed ia properties d o not
always, or even frequently, avail themselves to others who may hold contrary
opinions. N othing requires them to d o so, nor is it necessarily healthy for
pu blic d ebate to pretend as though all id eas are of equ al valu e entitled to
equal airing….Ind eed , the very notion of a marketplace of id eas presu pposes
that som e id eas w ill attract a follow ing and achieve w id e currency, w hile
others quietly reced e having failed to conqu er the hearts and m ind s of the
citizenry. Ou r Constitu tion forbid s governm ent action to pre-select the
w inners in this com petition or to gu arantee the circu lation of any particu lar
set of ideas.”
¶ 353 “N or is it trou bling that m ed ia properties m ay allow their new s
and editorial decisions to be driven by “the bottom line.” Again, the need and
d esire to prod u ce revenu e, to control costs, to su rvive and thrive in the
m arketplace is a tim e honored trad ition in the Am erican m ed ia. Ind eed , it
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w as not u ntil new spaper pu blishers learned to m arket their papers as tools of
com m erce that the press becam e a force in the pu blic d ebate that lead to the
framing of our Constitution.”
¶ 354 “In short, to assert that cross-ow ned properties w ill be engaged
in profit m axim izing behavior or that they w ill provid e an ou tlet for
view points reflective of their ow ner’s interests is m erely to state tru isms,
neither of w hich w arrants governm ent intru sion into preciou s territory
bou nd ed off by the First Am end m ent. To the contrary, w e are engaged in this
exercise precisely becau se w e seek to encou rage the airing of d iverse and
antagonistic view points. It w ou ld be od d ind eed if ou r rules w ere stru ctu red
to inhibit the expression of view points or to prom ote only an accepted set of
ideas.”
These statements all appear in the R&O in the section concerning
cross-m ed ia ow nership. We feel that this is the m ost im portant ru le at issue,
and so w e have chosen to focus ou r d iscu ssion here. Fu rther, w ithin these
statem ents are clearly d isplayed the positions and assu m ptions gu id ing the
Com m ission w ith regard to the First Am end m ent, the natu re and history of
commercial journalism, and the marketplace of ideas.
From ¶ 352, it appears to us that the Com m ission interprets the First
Am end m ent as prim arily, if not exclu sively a negative right—i.e. the
governm ent w ill protect free speech from being abrid ged , bu t it has no
responsibility to prom ote d iversity. From ¶ 353, it appears to u s that the
Com m ission u nd erstand s the First Amend m ent to have been conceived and
shaped in an explicit environm ent of com m ercial med ia operating in a selfd efined marketplace of id eas. Moreover, the im plication is that the Fou nd ers
u nd erstood the m ed ia system in this w ay, a sm aller and yet formally sim ilar
version of the system w e cu rrently have. It is this ongoing system of
com m ercial jou rnalism that the Com m ission refers to as the “tim e honored
tradition” of the American media marketplace.
Finally, from ¶354, we understand the Commission to be arguing that
the m arket is the primary, exclu sive, and best m echanism to govern the
ou tpu t of the pu blic m ed ia system . By prom oting efficiency in the
m arketplace, the Com m ission appears to believe that it is prom oting the
d egree of d iversity, localism , and com petition d em and ed by the pu blic
throu gh their patterns of consu m ption. By rem oving regulation and allow ing
the fittest voices to su rvive in the m ed ia m arket, the Com m ission states that it
has m ost firm ly guaranteed that the governm ent plays no role in either
inhibiting or promoting any particular viewpoint.
In the follow ing, w e argu e that these u nd erstand ings of the
m arketplace of id eas, the First Am end m ent, the circu m stances of the
Fou nd ers, and the history of jou rnalism are seriously flaw ed and lead to
u nju stified conclu sions. We w ill argu e that the com m ercial m ass m ed ia
system is not a tim e honored trad ition of Am erican jou rnalism d ating from
the 18th centu ry, bu t rather a m ore recent d evelopm ent. Fu rther, w e w ill
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d em onstrate that the Found ers certainly d id not und erstand com m ercial
jou rnalism and the m arketplace of id eas in the w ay that w e d o now . Finally,
w e w ill cou ch all of these argu m ents in a d iscussion of the First Am end m ent
w hich asserts an alternative u nd erstand ing of its principles w hich w e believe
are a m ore appropriate read ing of the legacy of the Bill of Rights – a positive
view of the First Am end ment. It is this positive view w hich should guid e the
Commission’s analysis of public interest limits on media ownership.
THE N ARROW, N EGATIVE V IEW OF THE FIRST A MENDMENT
The Well-Oiled Marketplace Assumption
The starting point for d eveloping a balanced view of how the First
Am end m ent shou ld gu id e com m u nications policy is a d econstru ction of the
prevailing concept of negative rights and the concom itant conception of the
relationship betw een the press, its public, and their com m on governm ent.
[H ere w e shou ld u nd erstand press to refer to the med ia system as a w hole].
The pillars arou nd w hich these relationships are bu ilt are the First
Amendment and the marketplace of ideas.
The conventional position on the relationship betw een the press, the
pu blic, and the governm ent m irrors the m od el of laissez-faire econom ics. The
press is seen as a m arketplace of inform ation provid ers d epend ent u pon
consu m er interest to su rvive and flou rish. The pu blic is seen as a grou p of
political consu m ers each in search of the best presentation and interpretation
of facts and id eas to assist in his or her political d ecision making on pu blic
affairs, i.e. how they shou ld vote every tw o to fou r years (or increasingly,
w hether they shou ld bother), and w hich social and political institu tions
w arrant su pport and w hich antipathy. The press provid es the raw m aterials
for d ebate, and each view point is given a fair hearing. The pu blic read ership
follow s and engages the battle in a “m arketplace of id eas” by selecting and
advocating particular positions. The result is the truth, or what the majority of
the pu blic has ord ained as the people’s opinion of the tru th. This inform ed
consensus then form s the fou nd ation of representative d em ocracy, the
sentim ent that elects officials and gu id es the form u lation of pu blic policy
between elections.
Conventional w isd om provid es that the system is a w ell-oiled
m achine. The role of the governm ent is m erely to m ake sure none of the
voices in the marketplace of ideas are prevented from speaking. The public is
served by a large array of m ed ia channels, all of w hich are d epend ent for
m arket su ccess on their d egree of relevance to pu blic interest. From this
vantage point, the best any good regulator can d o is stay ou t of the w ay and
let the com petition of id eas provid e for a free and fair pu blic d ebate and
u ltimately a tru thful representation of pu blic opinion. Any governm ent
intervention m erely am ounts to a politically m otivated intent to su ppress and
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influ ence d evelopm ents in the pu blic sphere. This sim plistic bu t pow erful
m od el of the m ass med ia and the government’s First Am end m ent
responsibilities begins to fall apart under scrutiny.
A m arketplace w orks best w hen it is u nfettered , gu id ed only by the
invisible hand of efficiency and com petition. The governm ent’s role, in this
view, is to stay out of the conditions of production and see to it that the health
of the marketplace is nu rtu red and perpetu ated . Any d egrad ation of pu blic
service is d ue to m arket inefficiency and can be corrected through econom ic
m easu res. In this m od el, the m arketplace of id eas is conflated w ith the
m arketplace for m ed ia content. Citizens are treated as consu m ers. The
prim ary concern is w hat an ind ivid ual m ay buy in the m ed ia m arketplace,
not w hat public services are offered by the m ed ia system to the citizenry.
When consum er and civic behavior are blend ed into a single set of
marketplace transactions betw een political id eas (w here pu blic interest is
d eterm ined com petitively rather than d eliberatively), the FCC has mad e a
very specific m ove in conceiving the natu re of the relationship betw een press,
public, and government.
Beneath this portrait of the cu rrent ad m inistration of the m ed ia
m arketplace and the governm ent’s regu latory apparatu s lies the First
Am end m ent. Every u nd erstand ing of the interrelationship betw een
press/public/government assumes an interpretation of the freedom of speech
and the press. These liberties have historically proven hard to d efine. The
u nd erstand ing of how free speech and a free press shou ld be d eployed in
society has alw ays been influ enced by the cu rrent assum ptions of
contem porary policy makers abou t history, legal theory, and d em ocracy’s
relationship w ith m ed ia. Despite these historical vagaries, the core valu es of
press and speech freed om are w oven into the fabric of the Am erican political
system.
The m od el of the press regu lator as m arketplace facilitator rests on a
solid base of case law that has consistently focused on First Am end m ent
rights as negative freed om , i.e. the freed om from interference, w hich applies
prim arily to the ind ivid ual. It is a legal philosophy of the m old shaped by
John Milton, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill. The central prem ise is that the
absolu te protection of every ind ivid u al’s political speech w ill natu rally
provide for a free and full public debate—as no one with a mind to speak will
be prevented from d oing so and the rational m erits of each ind ivid ual
statement will determine its fate. Conventionally, the portrait of constitutional
thinking about the First Amendment ends there, although there is much more
to consider.
This concept of free speech for the ind ivid u al has fed and been fed by
the popular conflation of the market and American democracy as interlocking
(if not interchangeable) id eals. Com petition in the m arketplace, the d e facto
im propriety of governm ent interference, and blind faith in the natu ral forces
of an u nencum bered m arket system to yield only the best ou tcom es—these
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are valu es that have com e to stand astrid e Ad am Sm ith’s econom ic legacy as
well as Thomas Jefferson’s political tradition of free speech.
The Reality of Contemporary Commercial Mass Media
However, w e m ake a grave m istake w hen w e u nreflectively assu me a
fit betw een 18th centu ry political thought and 21st centu ry m ed ia econom ics.
The relationship betw een d em ocracy and m ed ia markets has changed over
tim e, and the id eal of negative speech rights in the m arketplace of id eas has
been used to paper over the obvious economic conditions that now inhibit the
d iversity of view points the pu blic requires. The id eals of the freed om of the
press become shibboleths that m ask d ysfu nction w hen the m arketplace of
id eas is neither fair nor d iverse. There is nothing in the Constitu tional
trad ition of the m arketplace of id eas that w ou ld su ffer the d om inant m arket
pow er of the firm s that controls our m ed ia system tod ay. The notion that w e
have a m ed ia system that gives equ al treatm ent to all voices is no longer
defensible.
Conceptu ally, the highly concentrated , oligopoly m arkets for the
m ass m ed iation of m od ern political comm u nication has been squashed into a
town-m eeting hall in colonial Massachu setts. This is a gross
m isrepresentation of Jefferson’s political thinking, the historical d evelopm ent
of free speech rights, and the stru ctu re of the m od ern political econom y. The
Fou nd ers could not have conceived the m ed ia in the form it cu rrently hold s,
and they would almost certainly have framed the debate over the free press in
d ifferent w ays had they the slightest notion of w hat w as to com e.
N onetheless, the historical resonance of the “marketplace of id eas” as a
political philosophy associated w ith the Fou nd ing Fathers and the ju d icial
ed icts of the First Am end m ent titans of the libertarian bench—most notably
Ju stices H olm es and Black—has cau sed these id eas to seep into the political
cu ltu re as d ogm atic constitu tional interpretations. Moreover, the
contem porary political rhetoric m erging the market and d em ocratic
governm ent has blend ed w ith this trad ition to prod u ce a pow erful bloc of
blind su pport for libertarian speech and press rights. Despite the d epth of
entrenched fortification beneath these d octrines, they are bad ly flaw ed . We
have essentially applied a political philosophy of the free press d esigned to
accom m od ate one historical period and its m ed ia econom ics and applied it
into a totally d ifferent fu tu re context w ithou t consid ering the ensu ing
problem s. In this u ncritical id eological zone, the id ea of the governm ent as
the m arket facilitator m akes perfect sense. In practice, the Am erican pu blic
u rgently d eserves a thorou ghgoing review of how the legacy of the First
Am end m ent can regain its position as the cham pion of view point d iversity
rather than the handmaiden of the marketplace.
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THE BROAD, POSITIVE V IEW OF THE FIRST A MENDMENT
What d o w e m ean by First Am end m ent rights? The key analytical
problem here is to id entify the central pu rpose of the Am end m ent. What
rights and liberties follow from forbid d ing Congress to interfere w ith speech?
What are the cond itions sufficient to provid e free speech and w hich are
merely necessary?
Ou r belief is that the conventional w isd om abou t the First
Am end m ent m istakes a necessary cond ition for a su fficient one in the
gu arantee of free speech rights, and in so d oing elid es the very fou nd ation of
its intention and im portance. More specifically, negative freed om (the
absolu te protection of ind ivid ual speakers from interference) has pu shed ou t
positive freed om (the provision of a pu blic sphere in w hich the pu blic has a
right to hear all speakers) as the central right protected by the law . It is
necessary for all ind ivid uals to have the right to speak freely, bu t that is not
sufficient to gu arantee that the pu blic m ay hear all voices. A prohibition on
interference does not account for the social, economic, and political conditions
in society w hich stru ctu rally im ped e certain voices w hile am plifying others.
Whereas an active responsibility to provid e for free speech w ou ld d emand
that pu blic pow er rem ove these obstructing cond itions w henever possible.
“Freedom from” has distracted us from “freedom for”.
Am ong the m ost d am aging results of this m isu nd erstand ing have
been fu rther m isconceptions em bed d ed in the primary one. For exam ple, the
protection from pu blic censorship (governm ent pow er), a necessary cond ition
for com plete negative freed om bu t not a sufficient one (as there are
su bstantial form s of private pow er w hich have the pow er to censor), has also
been m istaken for a sufficient cond ition for com plete negative freed om of
speech. And w orst of all, the positive freed om w hich guarantees to prom ote
and sustain the stru ctu re of pu blic hearings has been d ism issed as neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition, but rather an automatic result of negative
freed om . In its m ost w id ely u nd erstood form, then, the First Am end m ent
m eans m erely the protection of ind ivid u al speech from governm ent
interference. By this reasoning, private entities may law fully d isru pt the
pu blic’s ability to hear the fu ll spectru m of social speakers by self-interestedly
gate-keeping the primary forums for public speech.
The over-com m itm ent to a negative view of the First Am end m ent to
the exclu sion of a positive view stem s from a sim plification of history. By this
read ing, the Fou nd ing Fathers inau gu rated the great experiment in selfgovernm ent by breaking w ith the trad itions of English com m on law w hich
protected speakers and printers from prior restraint, bu t prosecu ted them
su bsequently if their u tterances w ere fou nd objectionable. Am erican law
w ou ld protect all speech from prior restraint and from su bsequ ent
prosecu tion, the id ea being that the benefits of com pletely free speech w ould
ou tw eigh the d am ages of the occasional libel and perniciou s falsehood . These
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libertarian thinkers recognized that a free society d epend ed u pon free, fair,
and open d iscu ssion in the pu blic sphere in ord er to formu late a w ell
d eliberated pu blic opinion to guid e representatives in the government. A law
w hich expressly prohibited Congressional interference w ith public speech
would make this public sphere of deliberation sacrosanct.
H ow ever, recent historical inqu iry has show n the 18th centu ry roots
of the libertarian trad ition to be qu estionable. There is evid ence to su ggest
that the libertarian trad ition w as not particularly prevalent am ong the
Fou nd ers. Moreover there is evid ence to su ggest that they u nd erstood and
valu ed positive freed om w ith an equal, if not greater passion than negative
freed om . The u nearthing of an alternative trad ition of First Am end m ent
thinking am ong the Fou nd ers has begun to topple the theoretical scaffold ing
hold ing u p m u ch of m ore contem porary libertarian legal and social thinking
on the issu e. The alternative trad ition allow s for a profou nd ly d ifferent
understanding of the First Amendment with impressive implications.
To begin w ith, no one know s exactly w hat the Fou nd ers had in m ind
w hen they d rafted the First Am end m ent. Like m u ch of the Constitu tion, the
Framers w ere blessed , in Leonard Levy’s apt phrase, w ith a “genius for
studied imprecision.”2 In other words, there is good reason to believe they did
not precisely com m it to one interpretation or another becau se they expected
su bsequent generations to require room for m aneu ver. The d ocu m ented
context of the w riting of the First Am end m ent is m u rky and leaves few clu es.
It is not at all clear what they thought, and it seems most likely that they were
not all that su re them selves. In su ch a case, it w ou ld seem critical for
historians to explore the record to search for alternative or complem entary
understandings of the First Amendment to broaden our perception of original
intent as well as its historical legacy.
In his recent stu d y of the period , legal scholar Akhil Reed Am ar
argu es that “[t]he essence of the Bill of Rights w as m ore stru ctural than not,
and m ore majoritarian than cou nter.” 3 Or in other w ord s, the first ten
am end m ents to the Constitu tion w ere less abou t protecting m inority rights—
less a fou nd ation for a libertarian trad ition—than they w ere a positive plan
for prom oting m ajoritarian rights. H e argu es that even thou gh the Bill of
Rights has trad itionally been read as a list of inalienable rights guard ing
m inorities from the tyranny of the m ajority, its original intent w as quite
different. He makes a powerful case that structural concerns, i.e. those dealing
w ith the sanctity of the pu blic’s collective right to self-governm ent, w ere
forem ost in the m ind s of the Found ers, not the inalienable rights of
individ uals. The great concern w as protecting the pu blic and the m eans of
self-governm ent from they tyranny of ru ling elites. This m ajority protection,
Leonard W. Levy. Emergence of a Free Press. N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1985,
p. 348.
3 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), xiii.
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he argu es, w as the d riving principle behind the Bill of Rights in its original
historical setting.
With regard to the First Am end m ent, this m eans that the freed om of
expression shou ld be broad ly conceived as the protection of the pu blic’s right
to hear all points of view in a free, fair, and full sphere of d eliberation. It is
only second arily an ed ict protecting the speech of all ind ivid ual speakers.
Minority rights to expression are thu s a fu nction of the m ajoritarian principle.
By prohibiting the pow er of governm ent from interfering w ith pu blic speech
in general, the stru ctu ral integrity of the pu blic sphere w ou ld be preserved .
This is not to say that the Fou nd ers w ou ld have countenanced private pow er
(econom ic, political or religious) d isru pting the pu blic sphere. Quite sim ply,
in the late 18th centu ry the only pow er strong enou gh to cu rb the freed om of
expression in the pu blic sphere w as the governm ent. If a law w as created to
forbid that interference, the possibility of m inority pow er corru pting selfgovernm ent w ou ld be thw arted .4 The Fou nd ers saw the d ire necessity of
keeping the pu blic inform ed , engaged , and active in political society.
Jefferson’s w arning of the consequ ences of a d e-politicized pu blic resonates
w ith the prim ary threat of elite u surpation of pow er: “If once they [the
people] becom e inattentive to the pu blic affairs,” he w rote his friend Ed w ard
Carrington, “you and I, and Congress and Assemblies, Judges and Governors,
shall all become wolves.”5
If the First Am end m ent is seen as a law protecting m ajoritarian rights
to self-governm ent throu gh free expression, the id ea that it is lim ited to the
prohibition of governm ent interference w ith ind ivid ual speech is clearly
inad equ ate. For exam ple, if the integrity of the public sphere w ere to be
threatened by a private power, the First Amendment would have jurisdiction.
Or if the pu blic sphere cou ld be prom oted , m aintained , or em pow ered
throu gh governm ent action, this also w ou ld fall u nd er First Am end m ent
principles. The law forbid s the governm ent from abrid ging free expression,
bu t it says nothing abou t a prohibition on governm ent prom otion of free
expression. Moreover, a m ajoritarian interpretation im plies that it is not only
not forbidden, but that it is positively obliged.6

Am ar, 18-21. Am ar argu es that it w as the 14th Am end m ent w hich tu rned the tid e of
First Am end m ent thinking into a libertarian cam p . This is a p ersu asive claim , bu t it
d oes not change the original intent of m ajoritarian rights nor the valid ity of the
theoretical tradition, which hails from it.
5 Ad rienne Koch and William Ped en, ed . The Life and Selected W ritings of Thomas
Jefferson. N ew York: Mod ern Library, 1944, 412. Qu ote taken from a letter to Ed w ard
Carrington, January 16, 1787.
6 Am ar, 41. Am ar also su ggests that Article IV of the Constitu tion su p p orts this
position.
4
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THE H ISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE FIRST A MENDMENT
Recent scholarship on the character of the press in Revolu tionary
Am erica grants u s a very im portant insight w ith regard to the pu blic sphere
and the freed om of expression. N ew spapers at the fou nd ing of the nation
fu nctioned like a tow n m eeting on paper, to be circu lated throu ghou t
ed u cated society.7 This notion is very helpfu l in the assessm ent of w hat early
Am ericans perceived that the press ou ght to be. Recalling that the revolu tion
and the nascent repu blican policies of the governm ent greatly expand ed the
press system and its role in pu blic life, w e can expect that the institu tion
experienced a kind of social red efinition as m ore people cam e into frequ ent
contact w ith it. As might be expected , the society thou ght of the new in terms
of the old , i.e. the bu rgeoning press w as conceived in relation to a w ellu nd erstood form of pu blic political com m u nication, pu blic m eetings in the
tow n hall. It w as to be a foru m for d eliberative d emocracy located betw een
civil society and the state w herein all citizens (d efined quite strictly in the
18th centu ry) cou ld contribu te as anonym ou s equals (free of the biases and
encu m brances of econom ic fortu nes and social entanglem ents) to the crafting
of pu blic policy w hich aim ed at prod u cing the com m on good . The id ea of a
rational d iscou rse am ong citizens w ho have d iscard ed their personal interests
to collectively pu rsu e the com m on good pervad ed the thinking of the
Revolu tionary generation—even if su ch an id eal could never actu ally
m anifest itself. Thu s there is a strong, id ealistic fou nd ation for u nd erstand ing
the free press as the m ajoritarian, stru ctu ral right to participate in this foru m
w hich d raw s on this bu rgeoning self-conception of the Fou nd ers. “Printers
thou ght of their new spapers as the infrastru ctu re to the pu blic sphere and
presented them as com m on carriers for the information and d eliberations of a
rational citizenry.”8
Far from using the new spapers as “tools of com m erce” to engage the
political sphere, as the R&O interprets this historical period (¶ 353), the m ed ia
system of the early Republic w as explicitly non-com m ercial and explicitly
public, political, and regu lated by the state. Colonial new spapers w ere begu n
as quasi-governm ental organs: they characterized them selves as “pu blic
prints” and often bore the phrase “Printed by Au thority” on their m asthead s.
Their printer/ ed itors w ere often postm asters, and a m ajor sou rce of incom e
for colonial printers w as printing the law s and other governm ent d ocu m ents.9
In the years lead ing u p to the Revolution, and in the period that follow ed
printers u nd erstood them selves as part of a m ovem ent and as having a

Kevin Barnhu rst and John N erone, The Form of N ews: A History (N ew York: Gu ilford
Press, 2001).
8 Barnhurst and Nerone 46-48, quotation on 48.
9 Charles E. Clark. The p u blic p rints: the new sp ap er in Anglo-Am erican cu ltu re, 16651740. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
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special responsibility to represent the pu blic. Both printers and political
lead ers view ed the press as the stru ctu re of the pu blic sphere, as provid ing a
neu tral forum for pu blic d eliberation. They contrasted the “liberty of the
press” w ith “licentiou sness,” by w hich they m eant the pu rsu it of private
political or com m ercial goals at the expense of the com m on good . They
understood that licentiousness would undermine the republic.10
Ind eed , the press of the early Repu blic w as overw helm ingly political
and explicitly d riven by pu blic resou rces and guid elines. Pu blic policy, both
official and unofficial, supported the press. Officially, local, state, and national
governm ents all su bsid ized the press by paying for the printing of the law s
and other public d ocuments.11 Later, one of the first official acts of the fed eral
Congress w as to pass postal legislation w hich includ ed heavy su bsid ies for
newspapers.12
Meanw hile, u nofficially, politicians su bsid ized printers to su pport
their political positions and cand id acies.13 As a resu lt of the integration of the
press into the political and governm ental system , the press in the US grew far
faster than m arket forces w ou ld have allow ed . The press in tu rn becam e an
engine of growth for other sectors of the economy. Until the second half of the
nineteenth centu ry, the press u nd erstood itself as political m ore than
commercial.14
Althou gh printers w ere often canny entrepreneu rs, they w ere
sim ultaneou sly citizens and political lead ers. Moreover, they u nd erstood
com m erce and politics to be in tension, and insisted on m oral and ethical
gu id elines to prevent their com m ercial interests from overcom ing the
com m on good . Until the second half of the nineteenth centu ry, the First
Am end m ent gu arantees of freed om of speech and press w ere u nd erstood to
be limited by the concerns of the pu blic good and the health of the pu blic
sphere. The press d id not com e to be u nd erstood as a singular institu tion in a
common commercial marketplace until the mid-nineteenth century.

Step hen Botein. 1975. “Meer Mechanicks' and an Op en Press: The Bu siness and
Political Strategies of Colonial Printers.” Perspectives in A merican History IX: 127-225;
Step hen Botein, “Printers and the Am erican Revolu tion.” in Bernard Bailyn and John
B. H ench, (ed s.) The Press & the A merican Revolution. Worcester: Am erican Antiqu arian
Society, 1980; Leonard Levy. Emergence of a Free Press. N ew York: Oxford University
Press, 1985; John N erone. V iolence against the Press: Policing the Public Sphere in US
History New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
11 For more on this, see Culver Smith. The press, politics, and patronage : the American
governm ent's u se of new sp ap ers. 1789-1875. Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1977.
12 Richard R. John. Spreading the News. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995.
13 Jeffrey L. Pasley. “The tyranny of printers”: newspaper politics in the early American
republic. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001.
14 Barnhurst and Nerone, chapters 1-4.
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Sau l Cornell, in his stu d y of the Constitu tional d ebates, gives special
em phasis to the relationships betw een the press and the pu blic sphere. “N ot
only w as the d ebate over the Constitu tion an im portant phase in the
evolu tion of the pu blic sphere in Am erica, bu t the contest over it focused
u npreced ented attention on the politics of the pu blic sphere itself.” 15 The id eal
of free and fu ll pu blic access to a rational d ebate over the com m on good —
stripped so far as possible from the pu rsu it of private ad vantage—em erges in
the w ritings of m any of the early republic’s best ed itorialists (w ho of cou rse
w rote anonym ou sly in keeping w ith the spirit of the pu blic sphere). Cornell
notes that Philad elphia ed itorialist, “Centinel” (probably Samu el Bryan)
“envisioned the pu blic sphere of print as an im portant m eans of cem enting
the nation together. Print afford ed a m eans of achieving social cohesion
w ithou t a strong coercive au thority.” 16 Far from an econom ic m arketplace, the
press in its finest form would embody its function as the basis for deliberative
self-governm ent. Of cou rse, there w ere a hand ful of papers that pu blished
scand al and pitched their content at sales rather than service. These w ere a
su bstantial m inority w ith sm all influ ence. Jefferson blasted these papers,
referring to them as “polluted vehicles.”17
We can see these u nd erstand ings in action in the postal policy of the
new fed eral governm ent w hich reflected the Fou nd ers com m itm ent to the
right of the citizenry to as a w id e a circulation of pu blic inform ation as
possible. Richard John d escribes w hat he calls the “ed u cational rationale for
postal policy” ad opted into the Post Office Act of 1792. Essentially, it w as the
intent of the Fram ers to create a postal system that best facilitated the
d istribu tion of pu blic inform ation to the citizens active in the self-governing
of the society. Were it not for consid erations of local markets and d elivery
gu arantees, new spapers w ou ld likely have been d istribu ted for free as a
m atter of principle. Law m akers certainly consid ered it before opting to grant
new spapers fu ll access to the postal system w ith extrem ely favorable rates.
These low rates ensu red the feasibility of w id e d istribu tion and resu lted in a
hu ge expansion of the press system . The policy acted as a pu blic su bsid y for
the prom otion and circu lation of pu blic inform ation for the pu rposes of
cultivating the values of self-government.18
The Postal Act represented a governm ent regu lation d esigned to
prom ote m ajoritarian rights to free speech by expand ing and enriching the
pu blic sphere. Sim ilarly the Fou nd ers su pported pu blic libraries and
educational institutions. The public right to have access to, and the capacity to

Sau l Cornell. The Other Founders. Chap el H ill: University of N orth Carolina Press,
1999, p. 21.
16 Cornell, 104.
17 Koch and Ped en, 581. These lines are taken from a letter to John N orvell, Ju ne 11,
1807.
18 John, 30-37.
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know, the truth were a critical part of the Enlightenment understanding of the
pu blic sphere.19 The governm ent cou ld certainly sponsor a free press, i.e.
m ake law s to positively enhance it, even as, conversely, it cou ld not
negatively curtail it.
The expansion of the press system after the Revolu tion elevated
new spapers into “the m atrix of the fu nction of popular governm ent and the
protection of civil liberties.” 20 That is, pu blic opinion em braced the free
circulation of pu blic inform ation and the freed om of expression as an
im portant part of governm ental society. N ew spapers w ere evolving into the
4th Estate, “an informal or extra constitu tional fou rth branch that fu nctioned
as part of the intricate system of checks and balances that exposed pu blic
m ism anagement and kept pow er fragm ented , m anageable, and
accountable.”21 The im portance of pu blic engagem ent and participation in the
ongoing d ebates in the press w as not only a central legal right bu t a
functional, practicable goal.
The nu m ber of papers in proportion to the nu m ber of eligible voters
(d efined rather strictly in those d ays) w as im pressive, and access for speakers
and read ers alike w as not a problem . Jefferson eloqu ently su mm arizes the
principles at stake: “The basis of our governm ents being the opinion of
people,” he wrote, “the very first object should be to keep that right; and were
it left to m e to d ecid e w hether w e shou ld have a government w ithou t
new spapers, or new spapers w ithou t governm ent, I shou ld not hesitate a
m om ent to prefer the latter. Bu t I shou ld m ean that every m an should receive
those papers, and be capable of read ing them .” 22 This is an oft-quoted
passage; bu t its final sentence, often omitted , w arrants special attention here.
The im plication is that it is not enou gh to negatively protect the press system .
It m u st be actively promoted to ensu re u niversal d istribu tion of all pu blic
information to all citizens. In other w ord s, the pu blic’s right to hear all voices
and properly digest their messages is the central platform of a democracy.
In the history of the First Am end m ent, then, the key qu estion is not
w here and w hen strict libertarian concepts of free expression w ere ad opted ,
nor w here the bou nd aries of the pu blic sphere or the 4th Estate w ere d raw n.
The im portant conclu sion is that this arena of pu blic d iscou rse w as of central
im portance to the Fram ers of a d em ocratic experim ent. The stru ctu ral
integrity of the press system, the institutions of town hall meetings and public
assem blies, and the ability of anyone w ith an opinion to set u p a soap box on
a street corner w ere all generally recognized as the tru e m eaning behind the

Smith, 44-46.
Levy, 273. See also Barnhurst and Nerone, 43-5.
21 Levy, 273. See also John N erone. The Culture of the Press in the Early Republic (N ew
York: Garland Publishing,1989), 19.
22 Koch and Ped en, ed ., 411-12. Qu ote taken from a letter to Ed w ard Carrington,
January 16, 1787.
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freed om of expression. The im portant thing for them w as not the specifics of
protecting each ind ivid ual speaker, bu t rather ensu ring that the system as a
w hole remained operational and effective in the d issem ination of all id eas to
all citizens. This analysis highlights the contention that for the Fram ers of the
freed om of the press, the stru ctu ral issu es w ere more im portant than the
individual ones.
THE CONTEMPORARY LOGIC OF A POSITIVE V IEW OF THE FIRST A MENDMENT
Given this review of history w hich qualifies and revises trad itional
accou nts of First Am end ment origins, it follow s that the d evelopm ent of legal
and theoretical id eas abou t the freed om of the press shou ld also reflect a
d ifferent logic. The theoretical postulate w hich w e m ay take from the
id entification of m ajoritarian rights as prim ary to ind ivid ual rights can be
d irectly m apped onto the id ea that positive freed om or affirm ative freed om
assu m es and preced es negative freed om or prohibitive freed om . That is to
say, the protection and su stenance of the m ajority’s right to a free, fair and
fu ll pu blic sphere is not gu aranteed sim ply by prohibiting governm ent from
interfering with individual speech.
First Am end m ent scholar Zechariah Chafee eloqu ently explained
w hy negative freed oms are insu fficient: “To us this policy is too exclusively
negative. For example, what is the use of telling an unpopular speaker that he
will incur no criminal penalties by his proposed address, so long as every hall
ow ner in the city d eclines to rent him space for his m eeting and there are no
vacant lots available?” Chafee argu es that the pu blic m u st m ake available to
all willing speakers the means to speak their mind, “for otherwise the subjects
that m ost need to be d iscussed w ill be the very su bjects that w ill be ru led ou t
as u nsuitable for d iscussion…We m u st d o m ore than rem ove the
d iscou ragements to open d iscussion. We m u st exert ou rselves to su pply
active encouragements.”23
In a m ore recent treatm ent of this negative/ positive freed om d ebate,
Owen Fiss distinguished two primary treatments of the First Amendment, the
“au tonom y principle” and the” pu blic d ebate principle.” The “au tonom y
principle” is the libertarian trad ition w hich hold s that ind ivid u al speech
rights, properly protected , w ill au tomatically yield a fu ll and free pu blic
d ebate if left u nencu m bered . The “pu blic d ebate principle” is the m ajoritarian
trad ition w hich d enies that au tonom y is fu lly instrum ental in provid ing for
the pu blic’s rights and au thorizes an active state to cu ltivate and prom ote the
stru ctu ral cond itions of an “u ninhibited , robust, and w id e-open” pu blic

Zechariah Chafee. Free Speech in the United States (Cam brid ge: H arvard University
Press, 1941), p. 559.
23

BROAD VIEW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

53

d ebate, to qu ote from Justice Brennan’s ru ling in N ew Y ork Times Co. v.
Sullivan (1964).24
The positive freed om w hich obliges the state to m ake law s that aid
rather than abrid ge free expression rejects the ad equ acy of pu rely negative
rights. Moreover, it recognizes the corollary responsibilities of the state that
are not qu estioned as “infringem ents” on First Am end m ent freed om s thou gh
they unquestionably aid in its promotion. Alexander Meiklejohn’s position on
this distinction is worth quoting at length:
“First, let it be noted that, by those w ord s [the text of the First Am end m ent],
Congress is not d ebarred from all action u p on freed om of sp eech. Legislation
w hich abrid ges that freed om is forbid d en, bu t not legislation to enlarge and
enrich it. The freed om of m ind w hich befits m em bers of a self-governing
society is not a given and fixed p art of hu m an natu re. It can be increased and
established by learning, by teaching, by the u nhind ered flow of accu rate
inform ation, by giving m en health and vigor and secu rity, by bringing them
together in activities of comm u nication and m u tu al u nd erstand ing. And the
fed eral legislatu re is not forbid d en to engage in that p ositive enterp rise of
cu ltivating the general intelligence u p on w hich the su ccess of self-government
so obviou sly d ep end s. On the contrary, in that p ositive field the Congress of
the United States has a heavy and basic resp onsibility to p rom ote the freed om
of speech.”25

In this interpretation, flou ting the legitimacy of affirm ative
governm ent action in the realm of pu blic speech on the grou nd s that it
violates the speech rights of ind ivid u als m isu nd erstand s the priority of
m ajority over m inority rights and the stru ctu ral basis of the First
Amendment.
Pau l Stern d efines the Meiklejohnian “political interpretation of
speech” further, w riting “that ou r protection of free speech is ground ed in its
fu nction of su staining a fram ew ork of u nconstrained pu blic d iscou rse in
w hich agents can d eliberately d efine their pu rposes by reciprocally w eighing
the m erits of opposing positions.” 26 The “framew ork” m u st retain its
stru ctu ral integrity, mu st ad here to the “pu blic d ebate principle” of Ow en
Fiss, becau se it is the fou nd ation of d eliberative self-governm ent. Withou t it,
d em ocracy falls apart, and pu blic pow er d evolves to private speakers w hose
liberties are permitted to corrupt the majoritarian right to a full public sphere.
To the extent that private speech (or more to the point, private control
of the system s of com m u nication) d oes not serve or contrad icts a pu blic
fu nction, it is not protected by the First Am end m ent, and in som e cases m u st
be actively resisted to preserve the forms of speech w hich are constitu tionally

Owen M. Fiss. “Why the State?” Harvard Law Review 100, no. 4 (1987): 785.
Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (New York: Harpers, 1960), pp. 19-20.
26 Pau l G. Stern. “A Plu ralistic Read ing of the First Am end m ent and Its Relation to
Public Discourse.” Yale LawJournal 99, no. 4 (1990): 925.
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m and ated . This resistance d oes not com e in the form of su ppressing speech,
bu t rather in the form of em pow ering m ore speech to m atch the ad vantage
gained by a d isproportionately am plified private speaker in the pu blic
sphere.
This is an absolu tely central point w ith regard to the m od ern press.
Gone are the d ays w hen the tow n m eeting and the com m u nity foru m cou ld
stand for the pu blic d ebate. The m ass m ed ia is the general arena of
d eliberation. The press, once conceived as a part of the pu blic sphere and a
player in the pu blic d ebate, has becom e the m ed iator of that d ebate as w ell as
its prim ary player. When that m ed iator, u sing its accu m ulated econom ic
pow er, volum e and control, begins to ad vocate from a position of private
interest, the principles of the First Am end m ent’s stru ctu ral protections, its
majoritarian rights, are weakened.
CONTEMPORARY COMMERCIAL M ASS M EDIA
Moving ou t into the realm of the political cultu re, if the intent of a
m ed ia channel is not prim arily to serve the pu blic, bu t rather to sell papers,
increase ratings, scoop rivals, or d eliver u p content w hich d raw s the
au d iences m ost d esirable for sale to ad vertisers—or m ore controversially, if
the intent is to pu sh a particular political position or om it a particularly
political position—the m ajoritarian principles of the First Am end m ent are
undermined.
We are not argu ing that the governm ent shou ld take an overly
intru sive hand in the ed itorial rooms of com m ercial m ed ia, bu t rather that the
com m ercial m ed ia system itself is at od d s w ith the principles of the First
Am end m ent in im portant w ays. Either the governm ent m u st take a hand in
expand ing speech to includ e that w hich is exclud ed by the private m asters of
the pu blic d ebate, or it m u st regu late the stru ctural ad m inistration of the
pu blic sphere to facilitate entry into the m arketplace of u nd errepresented
voices. More to the point, w e can no longer be satisfied w ith a d efinition of
the First Am end m ent that rests exclu sively w ith the form s of negative
freedom universally applied.
Arguing that the press has tu rned aw ay from its pu blic m ission d oes
not mean that it should be muzzled or censored. It means that the media must
bear the bu rd en of regulation d u e a system of pu blic d ebate institutionalized
into a com m ercial system for private gain. The pu blic rights stripped ou t by
m arket forces m u st be reinstated by pu blic policy. The spirit of the First
Am end m ent w ou ld ind icate that the solu tion lies in re-pu blicizing the pu blic
sphere. Private control of the system and its m ajor voices can only be
cou ntered by the pu blic protection of the system throu gh the ad vocacy and
su bsid y of m ore speech, specifically from those speakers w ho are not
permitted or able to gain access to the current media.
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Congress and the FCC have the responsibility to positively protect
the right to pu blic speech by ensuring a free, fu ll, fair, and d eliberative space
for pu blic d ebate. William H ocking d escribed his proposals to “provid e
presu m ptive bu t not prescriptive rou tes” to a satisfactory pu blic sphere as
“m eans to freed om ” not obstru ctions to it.27 Therefore, they m u st open u p the
m ed ia to ensu re that all opinions may be heard . That this cannot easily be
d one in a com m ercial system d oes not m ake it less necessary. As fam ou sly
put by the Hutchins Commission in 1947 whose report reads just as relevantly
today as it did half a century ago: “Freedom of the press means freedom from
and freed om for…The freed om of the press can remain a right of those w ho
pu blish only if it incorporates into itself the right of the citizen and the pu blic
interest.”28
Given the im portance of the stru ctu re of the m ed ia system to the
gu arantee of the First Am end m ent, w e m u st investigate the structu re of the
com m ercial m arketplace of id eas. There are major problem s w ith m apping an
exchange mod el of m arketplace com petition onto the pu blic sphere of
political communication.
The concept of the m arketplace of id eas d id not exist in the 18th
centu ry. The Fou nd ers had another stru ctu ral m od el in m ind : the pu blic
sphere. It sou nd s a lot like the m arketplace of id eas, bu t there are key
d ifferences. To get at these d ifferences, w e m u st u nd erstand early Am erican
thinking on organized pow er and free expression. In the libertarian trad ition
of First Am end m ent thou ght, the prohibition of organized pu blic pow er from
activity in the arena of public speech is the fou nd ation of the right. Perhaps
because of this beginning, this trad ition has rarely consid ered other form s of
organized pow er w hich might threaten the pu blic’s right to free expression,
such as privately organized power. It seems a logical move to make, but it has
not often been m ad e in mainstream legal theory. Yet w e shou ld take note that
the Fou nd ers argu ed against pu blic pow er not to explicitly exem pt private
pow er, bu t because no privately organized pow er then existed that had the
capacity to topple free and full public debate.
Of course, in modern times, this is no longer the case. There are many
seats of privately organized pow er w ith the ability to topple free expression.
Bu t the theory of the stru ctu re of pu blic speech has not taken this fully into
accou nt. In large part, this is because the m arketplace of id eas has replaced
the pu blic sphere as the id eal type at the center of theory on the First
Am end m ent. The pu blic sphere d em and s protection from all organized
pow er, internal and external. N o minority interests may control the system of
com m u nication and no voice w ithin the pu blic sphere shou ld have a
William Ernest H ocking. Freedom of the Press. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1947, p. 96.
28 Robert M. H u tchins. A Free and Responsible Press. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1947, p. 18.
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stru ctu ral ad vantage over another. In the m arketplace of id eas, it is only the
external intervention of public pow er w hich is prohibited . N o restrictions are
placed on internal private pow er. H ence the private censor m ay replace the
public censor without breaking the rules.
This strikes u s as a bitter irony. Essentially, the zeal of the First
Am end m ent d efend ers of the private right to u ninhibited speech has led
d irectly to the ability of minority speakers to d istort the m arketplace of id eas,
box ou t u nw anted speakers in the m ost m ainstream channels to w hich
everyone has access, and d efend their actions as inalienable constitu tional
rights. It is the d irect resu lt of the conflation of ind ivid u al, negative speech
rights w ith the m arketplace m od el—to the exclu sion of pu blic, affirmative
speech rights and the id eal of the pu blic sphere. In tod ay’s m ed ia
m arketplace, d om inated by a hand ful of m ega-corporations, a grou p of
organized private interests can gate-keep the m arketplace, d eterm ine the
param eters of pu blic d ebate, and marginalize u nprofitable or politically
u nd esirable speakers by d enying them access to the high-im pact, m ainstream
m ed ia. The m arketplace has no ru les and no theoretical problem s w ith a
hom ogenou s bloc of political comm u nication in the center of pu blic
communication, banishing the bulk of diversity to low traffic media like small
circulation print pu blications and little know n w ebsites. When w e grant
absolu te freed om to private m ed ia operators to d o as they choose w ith their
channels, w e give them the constitu tional right to ignore their constitu tional
duty—to give all pu blic id eas a pu blic hearing. Why should w e fear pu blic
tyranny and em brace its private form ? Ow en Fiss lam ents precisely:
“Au tonom y provid es the proponents of d eregu lation w ith a constitu tional
platform that is ill-deserved.”29
There have been occasional legal attem pts to recognize and rectify
this state of affairs. For exam ple, in A ssociated Press v. United States (1945), the
Su prem e Cou rt ru led that AP cou ld not w ithhold new s from pu blic m ed ia
channels w ho w ished to take ad vantage of the w ire service. Justice Black
w riting for the Cou rt ru led : “Freed om of the press from governm ental
interference u nd er the First Am end m ent d oes not sanction repression of that
freed om by private interests.” 30 Ju stice Frankfurter affirm ed this sentim ent:
“A pu blic interest so essential to the vitality of ou r d em ocratic governm ent
m ay be d efeated by private restraints no less than by pu blic ow nership.” 31
This is a clear vind ication of pu blic over private rights to freed om of
expression, affirm ative stru ctu ral rights tru m ping negative ind ivid u al rights.
By im plication, any private m ed ia organization’s actions (d espite falling

Fiss, 790. Perhap s the best statem ent of this irony is in Jerom e A. Barron. 1967.
“Access to the Press--a N ew First Am end m ent Right.” Harvard Law Review 80:8: 164178.
30 Quoted in Barron, 1654.
31 Quoted in Hocking, 172
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u nd er First Am end m ent protection) w hich infringe u pon the fu ll and free
pu blic d ebate are su bject to pu blic regulation by virtu e of the higher law of
public rights to a free and full debate.
Scholars have su bsequ ently w ond ered w ith astonishm ent how a
preced ent failed to be set in this case to protect the pu blic interest from
private appropriation.32 The m u ch cited H u tchins Com m ission Report (1947)
on the press is replete w ith instances and w arnings abou t the contrad iction of
preventing governm ent from hind ering the press even w hile end orsing the
very sam e tyranny in the form of private m ed ia com panies w ith a
stranglehold on the marketplace.
The H u tchins Com m ission reflected on new broad cast technology,
m arket forces, and the natu re of the m od ern press and cam e to om inou s
conclu sions. Essentially, the pu blic importance of the press w as increasing as
the m ass m ed ia increased the range and d epth of m arket penetration. Yet the
natu re of m ass com mu nication m eant few er speakers and vastly few er
operators of the m ajor m ed ia d u e to the apparent necessity of econom ies of
scale in these ind ustries. Fu rther, the vast m ajority of the speakers w ere
engaged in com m ercial service, not pu blic service, rend ering the pu blic
interest a distant second as a priority.33
In large part, this shou ld not have been su rprising, as the com m on
know led ge abou t freed om of the press allow ed for absolu te freed om for
m ed ia channels and the gu aranteed provision of public service throu gh the
invisible hand of the m arketplace. Withou t overtu rning, or at least trou bling,
these two pillars of First Amendment orthodoxy, no progress would be made.
The H u tchins Com m ission cam e to precisely this conclu sion—althou gh their
recom m end ations fell far short of im plem enting their critiqu e in any
meaningful w ay. “Since the consu m er is no longer free not to consu m e, and
can get w hat he requ ires only throu gh existing press organs,” the
Com m issioners w rote, “protection of the freed om of the issu er is no longer
su fficient to protect au tomatically either the consu m er or the comm u nity. The
general policy of laissez faire in this field must be reconsidered.”34
Reconsid ered in reference to w hat, w e m ight ask? The expansive
d efinition of First Am end m ent rights has historical roots, legal theory, and
political cu rrency to back it u p. The “pollu ted vehicles” of the early repu blic
have becom e the pollu ted system of m od ern tim es. Gone is even the pretense
of the pu blic sphere as the Fou nd ers envisioned it.35 A few points of su m m ary
See for exam p le, H ocking, 172 and Lee C. Bollinger. Images of a Free Press. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 111.
33 See Bollinger, 28-29; Hutchins, 1.
34 Hutchins, 125.
35 See for exam p le, C. Wright Mills. The Power Elite. N ew York: Oxford University
Press, 1956.; Jerom e Barron. 1967. "Access to the Press--a N ew First Am end m ent
Right." Harvard Law Review 80:8: 1641-78; Ed w ard H erm an and N oam Chom sky.
M anufacturing Consent. N ew York: Pantheon Books, 2002 [1988].; Robert W.
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w ill suffice to connect the m ajor argu ments with the current discussion on the
history, theory, and political conceptions of the First Amendment.
CRITIQUE OF M ARKET-PRIMARY IN FEDERAL POLICY
Essentially, there is a d angerou s fallacy in assum ing that the
m arketplace of id eas is com m ensu rate w ith the pu blic sphere of d eliberative
d em ocracy. The id ea that a laissez-faire regu latory schem e that ced es all
control of mass med iated pu blic d ebate to com m ercial m ed ia concerns w ill
som ehow m agically yield a representative sample of pu blic id eas and
interests is bankru pt. Perhaps one cou ld equate the tw o in a tow n hall
m eeting in an 18th centu ry Massachu setts farming com m u nity w hose citizens
had access to a d ozen d ifferent m ainstream new spapers of varying partisan
stripes; but no longer. Not only does the current system invite corruption and
the d istortion of pu blic representation for private gain, it absolutely ignores
the im perative at the fou nd ation of the First Am end m ent that the freed om of
the press is the pu blic right not only to contribu te to the pu blic d ebate, bu t
also to consu m e and consid er a free and representative variety of pu blic
opinion. The m arket w ill natu rally favor som e voices over others, som e topics
over others, and transform citizens into political consu m ers. This process has
proceeded blithely apace for so long that w e appear to have forgotten ou r
roots. In this context, w e note that the very apathy of d isillu sion is now held
up as proof of satisfied customers, or rather, citizens.
The critiqu e follow s tw o central tracks. First, as m ed ia firm s
consolid ate and concentrate ow nership in the m arketplace, the nu m ber of
voices in the pu blic sphere d im inishes. This phenomenon is the d irect resu lt
of fed eral d eregu lation based on libertarian, free market conceptions of First
Am end m ent d u ties. Diversity gives w ay to hom ogenized content calcu lated
for the econom ic and political benefit of m inority interests at the expense of
the m ajority. Market pow er is based on the id ea of red ucing com petition,
stream lining prod u ction, leveraging pre-existing m arket ad vantages, and
selling for the m axim u m price w hat may be prod u ced for the m inim u m cost.
Any pu blic benefit that accru es from this process is largely incid ental. The
m arket is sim ply a poor m echanism for arbitrating pu blic d ebates. Jerom e
Barron’s savage explanation is a hand y blu eprint: “There is inequality in the
pow er to com m u nicate id eas ju st as there is inequality in econom ic
bargaining pow er; to recognize the latter and d eny the form er is quixotic. The
‘m arketplace of id eas’ view has rested on the assu mption that protecting the

McChesney. Rich Media, Poor Democracy. New York: New Press, 2000; Leonard Downie
Jr. and Robert G. Kaiser. The N ews A bout the N ews. N ew York: Alfred A. Knop f, 2002;
and Robert W. McChesney and John N ichols. Our M edia, N ot Theirs. N ew York: Seven
Stories, 2002.
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right of expression is equivalent to provid ing for it.” 36 The failu re of that
postu late to d eliver is manifest in the continu ed d e-politicization of m od ern
society and the d eep-seated problem s w e face from u nd er-representation of
minority viewpoints in the mainstream media.
The second track of the critiqu e ad d resses a prod uct of this system
and represents its m ost visible form : the content of the m ed ia system . At the
m ost basic level, mainstream m ed ia has hom ogenized to an unprecedented
extent. Stand ard ized fare is cheaper to prod u ce and m ore easily m anipulated
politically than a d iverse m arketplace. Moreover, even if a political m otive is
not im m ed iately apparent, the d rive to place profit before public service
inevitably prod u ces content that satisfies the m inim u m threshold of the
lowest common denominator of public taste.
The First Am end m ent is not m eant to sanctify the m arketplace of
id eas, it is m eant to ensu re to every citizen “the fu llest possible participation”
in the w orking throu gh of social problem s. “When a free man is voting, it is
not enou gh that the tru th is know n by som eone else, by som e scholar or
ad m inistrator or legislator. The voters m u st have it, all of them . The prim ary
pu rpose of the First Am end m ent is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as
possible, u nd erstand the issu es w hich bear u pon ou r com m on life. That is
w hy no id ea, no opinion, no d ou bt, no belief, no cou nter belief, no relevant
information, may be kept from them.”37
It is consent and consensus through informed debate, not competition
and su bm ission throu gh Darw inian d ogfights, w hich is sou ght by the pu blic
spirited intent of the Constitu tion and the affirm ative freed om of expression
provid ed for the Am erican pu blic. The social contract is not an invitation to a
Machiavellian pow er stru ggle bu t a com m itm ent to the com m on good .
Fed eral regu lation that ignores this reality and com mits itself to the service of
m arket forces is d oing the pu blic a profou nd d isservice. As Jerom e Barron
pu ts it: “As a constitu tional theory for the com m u nication of id eas, laissez
faire is m anifestly irrelevant.” 38 The era w hen the First Am end m ent cou ld be
seen primarily as a d efend er of personal liberties in an u nfettered pu blic
sphere is long gone (if it ever existed ). The only w ay to claim the pu blic right
to a d eliberative d iscussion abou t comm on affairs w ith guaranteed access for
all citizens is to tem per the private control over the m ed ia system w ith pu blic
policies that prom ote a d iversity of voices. The only w ay to reinstall an
affirmative right to the stru ctu ral integrity of pu blic com m u nications system s
is to expose the m arketplace as an inad equ ate m ethod of prod u cing fair
treatment for all.
In a m arketplace, ind ivid ual rights (property rights) have preced ence
over pu blic rights (assets com m only held ). In a public sphere, the reverse is
Barron, 1647-8.
Meiklejohn, 73-75.
38 Barron, 1656.
36
37
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tru e. Though the m anifestations of this d ebate are com plex, the basic
qu estions are very sim ple. To w hich victor go the spoils of pu blic policy? The
private interest or the common good?
CONCLUSION
We set ou t to d escribe and critiqu e the statu s qu o of libertarian First
Am end m ent thinking w hich lies at the base of the FCC’s R&O on m ed ia
ow nership and to offer an alternative set of possibilities. The overarching
conclu sion is that this parad igm d oes exist, is easily w ithin reach, and
requires only the w ill of pu blic consid eration to find pu rchase in a regu latory
regim e. It is neither esoteric nor im practical, bu t d raw s from relatively
common sense approaches to history, legal traditions, and public policy.
The pu blic interest w as alw ays the prim ary concern. The Fou nd ers
u nd erstand ing and d iscu ssion of these legal rights are som etim es easy to
m isread , not because their reasoning is u nclear, but becau se the historical
situation in w hich it w as applied is so d ifferent from ou r ow n. Proceed ing
w ith the intent of u ntangling the specificities of historical m om ents, w e begin
to see that the balance of pu blic and private interests in the First Am end m ent
correspond s to a balance of negative and affirm ative liberties. The prohibition
on government power to abridge speech does not prohibit, and in fact obliges,
a com plem entary policy of su pport and enhancem ent of the public sphere.
From this position, w e may then see the inad equ acy of the m arketplace to
achieve the id eals the Found ers intend ed and w hich w e aspire to su stain. On
the contrary, the m arketplace of id eas, w hen taken to its m od ern context of
oligopoly com m ercial m ass m ed ia, prod u ces a scenario w hich tend s tow ard
the exact opposite of the pu blic rights the Fou nd ers intend ed and d em ocratic
society demands.
The Com m ission should base its ru les governing the pu blic interest
lim its on m ed ia ow nership on an affirm ative, majoritarian view of the First
Am end m ent. The consu m er m ed ia m arketplace is no su bstitu te for the
citizens’ pu blic sphere. Public policy shou ld seek to expand the m arketplace
to includ e all voices, to protect the com m on good in the pu blic sphere to
d eliberate w ith all view points. The private pow er to interfere w ith these
comm on rights m u st not be ignored , but m u st be vigilantly cu rtailed . Lim its
on m ed ia ow nership shou ld be maintained and policies u nd ertaken to
expand ownership of media outlets and viewpoint diversity.
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THE PILLARS OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP
LIMITS REMAIN FIRM:
THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF LOCALISM,
MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND TELEVISION

62

LOCALISM AND DIVERSITY 63

STUDY 4
LOCALISM AND DIVERSITY
M ARJORIE H EINS AND M ARK COOPER
THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF LOCALISM
The im portant role of the m ed ia in inform ing citizens abou t local
affairs is w ell d ocu m ented .1 The link betw een localism and d e-concentration
of the m ed ia seem s obviou s. Changes in electronic m ed ia d istribu tion
technologies have not significantly altered this fundamental relationship.2
Wald fogel find s im portant localism effects operating in the med ia
that su pport this view . H e find s that the preference externality operates in
non-prime time programming because it is subject to greater local control and
therefore can be m ore responsive to local market cond itions.3 Concentration
of national and local markets into national chains reinforces the tend encies of
media owners to ignore local needs.4

Kim , Sei-H ill, Dietram A. Scheu fele and Jam es Shanahan. 2002. Think Abou t It This
Way: Attribu te Agend a Setting Fu nction of the Press and the Pu blic’s Evalu ation of a
Local Issu e, Journalism and M ass Communications Quarterly 79: p . 7; Chaffee, Steven and
Stacy Frank. 1996. H ow Am ericans Get Their Political Inform ation: Print versu s
Broad cast N ew s. The A nnals of the A merican A cademy of Political and Social Science 546;
McLeod , Jack M., Dietram A. Scheu fele, and Patricia Moy 1999. Com m u nity,
Com m u nications, and Particip ation: The Role of Mass Med ia and Interp ersonal
Discussion in Local Political Participation. Political Communication 16.
2 Krotoszynski, Ronald J., Jr. and A. Richard M. Blaiklock. 2000.
Enhancing the
Spectrum: Media Power, Democracy, and the Marketplace of Ideas University of Illinois
Law Review 813: 866:“The Com m ission historically has p laced a high valu e on local
control of broadcasting on the theory that local control would result in the provision of
p rogram m ing that better m eets the need s of the com m u nity of license…“A qu ick
p eru sal of cable p rogram m ing p ractices d em onstrates the veracity of the p rop osition.
With the excep tion of PEG channels and leased -access channels, cable program m ing
p resents very little p rogram m ing resp onsive to the need s, w ants, and d esires of local
com m u nities. If you w ant the p rized hog com p etition at the state fair covered live,
you need a local m ed ia p resence. Elections for city, cou nty and even state officers
m ight go u ncovered if left to the netw orks or national cable new s channels. Althou gh
alternative sou rces of inform ation exist, inclu d ing the Internet and local new sp ap ers,
m ost Am ericans continu e to rely u p on local and netw o rk television for their new s
p rogram m ing. With resp ect to local new s, local broad casters are effectively the only
game in town.”
3 Waldfogel, 2001b, p. 13; Waldfogel, 2001a, p. 9.
4 Krotoszynski and Blaiklock, p p . 871…875-876: “The Com m ission’s efforts to p reserve
localism as a featu re of the broad cast m ed ia w ill be effectively thw arted if large,
1
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Wald fogel’s find ings on localism , d erived from the basic economics
of the media, cut across each of the major products.
The local data indicate, to a greater extent than the national prime time or cable
d ata, both the d istance betw een black and w hite p references and the fact that
local p rogram m ing, far m ore than national p rogram m ing, caters to those
preferences.5

While the econom ics of television give rise to strong concerns abou t
localism,6 Wald fogel sees ind ications of sim ilar localism effects in new spaper
m arkets as w ell, su pporting the conclu sion that “content origin matters.” H e
d escribes localism ’s effect on behavior in the find ings of a stu d y on the entry
of a national newspaper into local markets as follows:
H ow d oes national new s m ed ia affect local new s sou rces and local p olitical
participation?
Preliminary results- Increased circulation of national daily affects:
Local paper circulation – reduces targeted audience readership
Local paper positioning – toward local content
Local political participation – reduces voting, less so in presidential years.

Gee and Wald fogel have recently exam ined the im pact of localism on
voter tu rnou t by stu d ying the effect of the availability of Spanish language
television on H ispanic voting. This ties the m ed ia d irectly to the m ost
important political outcome – participation.

corp orate entities are p erm itted to am ass large station hold ings and u se central
p rogram m ing techniqu es to achieve econom ies of scale and scop e… “Com m on
ow nership of m ed ia ou tlets is not cond u cive to com p etition in new s and other local
content p rogram m ing. Consolid ated new s d ep artm ents, like consolid ated m arketing
d ep artm ents, are a com m on featu re of m u ltip le station grou p s. Divid ed control of
m ed ia ou tlets w ithin a com m u nity creates a healthy com p etition am ong new s and
programming sources.”
5 Waldfogel, 2001b, p. 13.
6 Krotoszynski and Blaiklock, p p . 866: “Given econom ies of scale, it m ight be
inefficient to cover the hog com p etition at the state fair. Perhap s Jerry Sp ringer or
Montel William s w ou ld generate higher ratings or cost less to broad cast. From a
p u rely econom ic p oint of view , covering a d ebate betw een cand id ates for local office
m ight be a com p lete d isaster. Many local television and rad io stations nevertheless
p rovid e su ch coverage on a volu ntary basis. Perhap s local com m ercial television
broadcasters do not provide such coverage solely out of the goodness of their hearts or
a keen sense of civic resp onsibility. N evertheless, the fact rem ains that a national
television channel generally w ou ld not cover the lieu tenant governor’s race in Sou th
Dakota absent the most extraordinary and unlikely of circumstances.”
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Many qu estions abou t localism in m ed ia rem ain u nansw ered . Bu t it is clear
from the resu lts of this stud y that at least one asp ect of localism – the
availability of local news – is important….
Television bears a m ixed relationship w ith p olitical p articipation. H istorically,
the sp read of television has been linked w ith d eclining p olitical p articip ation.
Bu t it is im p ortant to d istingu ish the m essage and the m ed iu m . Television
carries both local and national new s. The sp read of television, like other
national inform ation sou rces, can attract p eop le aw ay form local p rod u cts and
local affairs. Bu t television can also inclu d e local content, chiefly local new s,
and w e find that the availability of Sp anish-langu age local television new s
significantly boosts Hispanic voter turnout.7

CONCENTRATION, CONSOLIDATION AND CONGLOMERATION
U NDERMINE LOCALISM AND D IVERSITY
Several recent stu d ies based on FCC d ata show that localism and
d iversity are harm ed by concentration of local markets, consolid ation into
chains and conglom eration across m ed ia types.8 These stu d ies confirm much
earlier research.9 The d ictates of m ass au d iences create a largest m arket
share/ low est com m on d enom inator ethic that u nd ercu ts the ability to d eliver
cu ltu rally d iverse programm ing,10 locally-oriented program m ing,11 and pu blic

Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Joel Wald fogel. “Med ia Markets and Localism : Does Local
N ew s en Esp anol Boost H ispanic Voter Tu rnou t?” Rethinking the Discourse on Race: A
Symposium on How the Lack of Racial Diversity in the Media Affects Social Justice and Policy,
April 28-29, 2006, pp. 13-14.
8 Anonym ou s, Do Local Ow ners Deliver More Localism ? Som e Evid ence from Local
Broad cast N ew s (Fed eral Com m u nication Com m ission, d raft d ated Ju ne 17, 2004), p .
14; Alexand er, Peter J. and Brend an M/ Cu nningham . 2004. Diversity in Broad cast
Television: An Em p irical Stu d y of Local N ew s. International Jou rnal of Med ia
Managem ent 6; Alexand er, Peter J. and Brend an M. Cu nningham . Sam e Story,
Different Channel: Braodcast News and Information. (October 4, 2004).
9
Wald fogel, Television; Wald fogel and George; Wald fogel. Com m ents on
Consolidation and Localism.
10 Stone, V. A.
1987. “Deregu lation Felt Mainly in Large-Market Rad io and
Ind ep end ent TV,” Com m u nicator, Ap ril: 12; Au fd erheid e, P. 1990. “After the Fairness
Doctrine: Controversial Broad cast Program m ing and the Pu blic Interest.” Jou rnal of
Com m u nication, p p . 50-51; McKean, M. L. and V. A. Stone 1991. Why Stations Don’t
Do N ew s RTN DA Com m u nicator Ju ne: 23-24; Stone, V. A., “N ew Staffs Change Little
in Radio, Take Cuts in Major Markets TV, RTNDA Communicator, 1988; Slattery, K. L.
and E. A. Kakanen. 1994. Sensationalism Versu s Pu blic Affairs Content of Local TV
N ew s: Pennsylvania Revisited . Jou rnal of Broad casting and Electronic Med ia, 1994;
Bernstein, J. M. and S. Lacy. 1992. “Contextu al Coverage of Governm ent by Local
Television N ew s.” Jou rnalism Qu arterly 69:2: 329-341; Carroll, R. L. 1989. “Market
Size and TV N ew s Valu es.” Jou rnalism Qu arterly 66: 49-56; Scott, D. K. and R. H .
Gop betz. 1992. “H ard N ew s/ Soft N ew s Content of the N ational Broad cast N etw orks:
7
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interest program m ing.12
N ew s and pu blic affairs program m ing are
particularly vu lnerable to these economic pressu res.13 As market forces grow ,
these types of program ming are red u ced .14 Unfortu nately, the coverage that
disappears tends to deal with schools, localized government affairs, and other
community-strengthening m aterials that enable people to live m ore secu re
and educated lives.15
1972-1987.” Jou rnalism Qu arterly 69:2: 406-412; Ferrall, V. E. 1992. “The Im p act of
Television Deregulation” Journal of Communications; pp. 21... 28... 30.
11 Slattery, Karen L., Ernest A. H akanen and Mark Dorem u s. 1996. “The Exp ression of
Localism : Local TV N ew s Coverage in the N ew Vid eo Marketp lace.” Jou rnal of
Broad casting and Electronic Med ia 40; Carroll, Raym ond L. and C.A. Tu ggle. 1997.
“The World Ou tsid e: Local TV N ew s Treatm ent of Im p orted N ew s.” Jou rnalism and
Mass Com m u nications Qu arterly Sp ring; Fairchild , Charles. 1999. “Deterritorializing
Radio: Deregulation and the Continuing Triumph of the Corporatist Perspective in the
USA.” Med ia, Cu ltu re & Society 21; Layton, Charles and Jennifer Dorroh. 2002 “Sad
State.” Am erican Jou rnalism Review Ju ne; Olson, Kathryn. 1994. “Exp loiting the
Tension betw een the N ew Med ia’s “Objective” and Ad versarial Roles: The Role
Im balance Attach and its Use of the Im p lied Au d ience.” Com m u nications Qu arterly
42:1: 40-41; Stavitsky, A. G. 1994. “The Changing Concep tion of Localism in U.S.
Public Radio.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media.
12 Bagd ikian, Med ia Monopoly, p p . 182...188; Clarke, P. and
E. Fred in. 1978.
“N ew sp ap ers, Television, and Political Reasoning.” Pu blic Op inion Qu arterly
Su m m er; Pfau , M. 1990. “A Channel Ap p roach to Television Influ ence.” Jou rnal of
Broadcasting and Electronic Media 34: 17-36; Cundy, D. T., “Political Commercials and
Cand id ate Image.” in Lynd a Lee Kaid (ed s.), N ew Persp ectives in Political
Ad vertising. Carbond ale, IL: Sou thern Illinois University Press, 1986; O’Keefe, G. J.
1980. “Political Malaise and Reliance on the Med ia” Jou rnalism Qu arterly 57:1: 133128; Becker, S. and H . C. Choi. 1987. Med ia Use, Issu e/ Im age Discrim ination.
Com m u nications Research 14: 267-290; Robinson, J. P. and D. K. Davis. 1990.
Television N ew s and the Inform ed Pu blic: An Inform ation Process Ap proach. Jou rnal
of Com m u nication 40:3: 106-119.; Voakes, Pau l S., Jack Kap fer, David Ku rp iu s, and
David Shano-yeon Chern. 1996. Diversity in the N ew s: A Concep tu al and
Method ological Fram ew ork. Jou rnalism and Mass Com m u nications Qu arterly,
Au tu m n 1996; Bishop , Ronald and Ernest A. H akanen. 2002. In the Pu blic Interest?
The State of Local Television Program m ing Fifteen Years After Deregu lation. Jou rnal
of Communications Inquiry 26.
13 McManu s, J. H . 1992. “What Kind of a Com m od ity is N ew s?” Com m u nications
Research, 19:6:787-805.
14 Bagdikian, pp. 220-221; Paletz, D. L. and R. M. Entmen. Media, Power, Politics. New
York: Free Press, 1981; Postm an, N eil, Am u sing Ou rselves to Death: Pu blic Discou rse
in the Age of Show Bu siness. N ew York: Pengu in Press, 1985.; Lacy, Step hen. 1992.
“The Financial Com m itm ent Ap p roaches to N ew s Med ia Com p etition.” Jou rnal of
Media Economics 5:2: 5-21.
15 Bass, Jack. “N ew sp ap er Monop oly.” in Gene Roberts, Thom as Ku nkel, and Charles
Clayton (ed s.), Leaving Read ers Behind . Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press,
2001; Gish, Pat and Tom Gish, We Still Scream : The Perils and Pleasu res of Ru nning a
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The central fact that all of these discussions share is that market forces
provid e neither ad equate incentives to prod u ce the high qu ality m ed ia
prod u ct, nor ad equate incentives to d istribu te su fficient am ou nts of d iverse
content necessary to meet consumer and citizen needs.
THE LACK OF LOCALISM AND D IVERSITY IN THE COMMERCIAL M ASS M EDIA
The grow ing im pact of hom ogenization in the TV ind u stry,
stim u lated by the lifting of both national ow nership lim its and restrictions on
vertical integration, is unmistakable.16 Local programming has been restricted
or eliminated .17 Stories of local im portance are d riven ou t of the highvisibility hours or off the air.18 Pooled news services reduce the ability of local

Small-Tow n N ew sp ap er. and Ship p , E. R. “Excu ses, Excu ses: H ow Ed itors and
Rep orters Ju stify Ignoring Stories.” in William Serrin (ed s.), The Bu siness of
Jou rnalism . N ew York: N ew Press, 2000. Com p laints abou t the failu re to cover larger
national and international stories also abou nd (see Phillips, Peter and Project
Censored , Censored 2003. N ew York: Seven Stories, 2002; Borjesson, Kristina. Into the
BUZZSAW. Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2002.
16 McChesney, Robert. The Problem of the M edia. N ew York: Monthly Review Press, 2004;
Ben H . Bagd ikian. The N ew M edia M onopoly. Boston: Beacon Press, 2004; Meyer,
Thomas. M edia Democracy. Cam brid ge: Polity Press, 2002; Meyerow itz, J. 1985. N o
Sense of Place: The Effect of Electronic M edia on Social Behavior. N ew York: Oxford ;
Ku nkel, Thom as and Gene Roberts. 2001. The Age of Corp orate N ew sp ap ering,
Leaving Read ers Behind . A merican Journalism Review May. On coverage of the 1996
Telecom m u nications Act see, Gilens, Martin and Craig H ertzm an. "Corp orate
Ow nership and N ew s Bias: N ew sp ap er Coverage of the 1996 Telecom m u nications
Act." p ap er d elivered at the Annu al Meeting of the Am erican Political Science
Association, Au gu st, 1997, p . 8; N etw ork Affiliated Stations Alliance. “Petition for
Inquiry into Network Practices” Federal Communications Commission, 8 March 2001).
17 Layton, Charles, 1999. “What d o Read ers Really Want?” A merican Journalism Review
March. rep rinted in Gene Roberts and Thom as Ku nkel, Breach of Faith: A Crisis of
Coverage in the A ge of Corporate N ewspapering. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas
Press, 2002; McConnell, Bill and Su sanne Au lt. “Fox TV’s Strategy: Tw o by Tw o,
Du op olies are Key to the Com p any’s Goal of Becom ing a Major Local Presence.”
Broadcasting and Cable, Ju ly 30, 2001; Trigoboff, Dan, “Chri-Craft. Fox Moves In: The
Du op oly Marriage in Three Markets Com es w ith Som e Consolid ation.” Broadcasting
and Cable, Au gu st 6, 2001; Trigoboff, Dan. “Rios H ead s KCOP N ew s.” Broadcasting and
Cable, October 14, 2002; Beam , Rand al A. 1995. “What it Means to Be a MarketOriented N ew sp ap er.” N ewspaper Research Journal 16, Beam , Rand all A. 2002. “Size of
Corp orate Parent Drives Market Orientation.” N ewspaper Research Journal 23; Vane,
Sharyn. 2002. “Taking Care of Bu siness.” A merican Journalism Review March; N eim an
Reports. 1999. The Business of News, the News About Business, Summer.
18 E.g., Lacy, Step hen, David C. Cou lson and H u gh J. Martin. 2004. Ow nership Barriers
to Entry in N on-m etrop olitan Daily N ew sp ap er Markets. Journalism & M ass
Communications Quarterly 81, Su m m er; Wim m er, K. A. 1988. “Deregu lation and the
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stations to present local stories and eventually erode the capability to produce
them.19
A recent stu d y from the Project for Excellence in Jou rnalism affirm s
these conclusions. Am ong its find ings w ere that sm aller station grou ps
overall tend ed to prod u ce higher quality new scasts than stations ow ned by
larger com panies—by a significant m argin; and that netw ork affiliated
stations tended to produce higher quality newscasts than network owned and
operated stations—also by a large margin. The Project conclu d ed that
“overall, the d ata strongly suggest regulatory changes that encou rage heavy
concentration of ownership in local television by a few large corporations will
erode the quality of news Americans receive.”20
Ad d itional evid ence gathered by the Com m ission d em onstrates how
the cu rrent stru ctu re of med ia ow nership ill-serves the intertw ined goals of
localism and d iversity. 21 Martin Kaplan d escribed a survey of m ore than
10,000 late new s broad casts that aired d u ring the seven w eeks before the 2002
election in the top fifty U.S. m arkets. Cam paign ad s ou tnu m bered cam paign
new s stories by nearly 4:1. Alm ost 60% of the broad casts contained no
election coverage. N early half the coverage that d id exist focu sed on
horserace or strategy, not issu es. Stations ow ned by large m ed ia corporations
carried a low er percentage of local campaign new s than the national average.
Stations ow ned by sm all or m ed iu m -sized com panies carried a consistently
higher percentage of local news.
Upd ating this research in October 2004, Kaplan fou nd sim ilarly
trou bling patterns in the 2004 election. In battlegrou nd states, cam paign ad s
have ou tnu mbered cam paign stories d uring local new s show s – six m inu tes
to three m inu tes. In non-battlegrou nd states, cam paign ad s occu pied abou t
1.5 m inu tes, w hile election new s stories took u p just over tw o m inu tes. Even
m ore trou bling for localism , the presid ential race received far more attention
than local races. While 80 percent of the new s stories w ere d evoted to the
presid ential cam paign, only 5 percent w ere d evoted to local elections. Even
Fu tu re of Plu ralism in the Mass Med ia: The Prosp ects for Positive Policy Reform .”
Mass Communications Review
19 Alger, Dean. M EGA M EDIA : How Giant Corporations Dominate M ass M edia, Distort
Competition and Endanger Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, 1998.
Chap ter 6, The M edia and Politics N Y: H arcou rt Brace College, 2nd ed ition,
1996; Med ia Stu d ies Center Su rvey, University of Connecticu t, Jan. 18, 1999; Pu blic
Interest.” Journal of Communication, 40.Au letta, Ken. 1998. “The State of the Am erican
Newspaper.” A merican Journalism Review Ju ne; Rabasca, Lisa. 2001. “Benefits, Costs
and Convergence.” Presstime June: p. 3.
20 Project for Excellence in Jou rnalism . Does Ow nership Matter in Local Television
News: A Five-Year Study of Ownership and Quality. Executive Summary,17 February
2003.
21 Kap lan, Martin.
Testim ony. FCC Broad cast Localism H earing. Monterey, CA. 21
July 2004, www.localnewsarchive.org.
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w here senators w ere ru nning, the presid ential election got 75 percent of the
new s coverage – 68 percent in those states w here the senate races are
considered a toss-up. Campaign issues (as opposed to campaign strategy and
the horserace) w ere covered in 42 percent of the stories abou t local elections,
bu t 29 percent of the stories covering the presid ential election.22 Doing the
m ath, w e find that abou t one-qu arter of the cam paign stories on the local
new s covered issu es in the presid ential cam paign, bu t only abou t one-fiftieth
covered local campaign issues.
A recent re-analysis of FCC d ata on TV new s fou nd an average of 24
hou rs of local pu blic affairs programm ing and an average of 19.93 hou rs
com bined local new s and local pu blic affairs program m ing d u ring a onem onth period .23 That is, separating pu blic affairs from new s, TV stations
averaged less than ¼ hou r of local pu blic affairs program m ing in a m onth.
N ew analysis also ind icates a broad failu re of com m ercial TV stations to
present local pu blic affairs program m ing.24 In a tw o w eek sample period ,
only 41 percent of the com m ercial stations aired any local public affairs
program m ing. In sharp contrast, over 90 percent of pu blic stations aired su ch
program m ing.
Com m ercial stations aired ju st 45 m inu tes of su ch
program m ing in the tw o w eek period . Local stations ow ned by the m ajor
national netw orks aired ju st over 37 m inu tes of local pu blic affairs show s,
w hile ind epend ently ow ned stations aired 110 m inu tes.25
Pu blic
(noncommercial) stations aired over 6 hours.
The Pu blic Interest Coalition recently presented specific exam ples of
how rad io ind u stry consolid ation has eviscerated localism and d iversity in
news reporting:

Interim Report Local TV News Ignores Local and State Campaigns (Lear Center
Local News Archive, Oct. 21, 2004),
http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/LCLNAInterim2004.pdf
23
N ap oli, Philip . 2003. Television Station Ow nership and Local N ew s and Pu blic
Affairs Program m ing: An Exp and ed Analysis of FCC Data. p ap er p resented at
Annu al Meeting of International Com m u nication Ass’n, May: 13-14, re-analyzing d ata
in Thom as C. Sp avins, Loretta Denison, Scott Roberts and Jane Frenette. The
Measu rem ent of Local Television N ew s and Pu blic Affairs Program s. Washington,
D.C.: Federal Communications Commission, 2002.
24 Yan, Michael and Philip N ap oli, “Market Stru ctu re, Stations Ow nership , and Local
Pu blic Affairs Program m ing on Local Broad cast Television,” p ap er p resented at the
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, October 2004.
25 The find ing of greater resp onsiveness of local m ed ia to local need s in p rogram
variety has been w ell d ocu m ented in recent years in a series of stu d ies of “p reference
externalities.” see Wald fogel, 2001b; Joel Wald foge and Siegelm an, 2000; Wald fogel
and George, 2000; See also “Su rvey Show s Solid Grow th in TV N ew s and Staffing.”
RTN DA Communicator, Sep tem ber 2004, p . 6 (only 759 TV stations in the U.S. offer any
local news at all).
22
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Rad io p ersonalities p retend to d iscu ss local new s, m ake com m entary on local
events, and critiqu e local nightlife and hot sp ots, all w ithou t ever setting foot
w ithin a thou sand m iles of the transm itter. … Clear Channel au d iences in
Toledo and Lima, Ohio receive newscasts produced in Columbus. And Corpus
Christi resid ents heard new s of a hu rricane from a Clear Channel bu reau
located at least a hu nd red m iles aw ay. … Most d istu rbingly, national grou p
ow ners have p racticed d ecep tions to m ake p rogram m ing ap p ear local w hile in
fact d istribu ting a national service. … References to tim e, d ate and location are
strip p ed from gu est interview s so that they can ap p ear to be “live” w hen aired
in distant locales. Listeners are urged to “call in” to pre-recorded shows.26

In essence, the rad io ind u stry, w hich has been subject to the m ost
u nfettered process of national consolid ation, d em onstrates how local content
can be hom ogenized off the air.27 The ind u stry is focu sed on “perfecting the
art of seeming local” without actually being local.28
In the cu ltu ral realm , the situ ation is equally d istu rbing. A su rvey by
the Fu tu re of Mu sic Coalition in 2002 reported that virtually every rad io
m u sic format is now controlled by an oligopoly. Consolid ated control
com bined w ith shorter play lists m eans “few opportu nities for m u sicians to
get on the rad io,” and “d eprives citizens of the opportu nity to hear a w id e
range of music.” Supposedly distinct formats have as much as 76% overlap in
content, even thou gh listeners say they w ant to hear longer play lists, m ore
variety, and more local musicians.29
Ad d itional evid ence of the parlou s state of local broad casting com es
from research on how w ell the m ass m ed ia are serving racial and ethnic
m inorities. Greater concentration has resu lted in less d iversity of ow nership,
and d iversity of ow nership – across geographic, ethnic and gend er lines – is
correlated w ith d iversity of program ming. Stu d ies by Joel Wald fogel and
others show that overall African-American and H ispanic aud iences are

Com m ents of the Alliance for Better Cam p aigns et al. in Digital A udio Broadcasting
Systems, MM Docket N o. 99-325 (Ju ne 16, 2004), p p . 20-21, and sou rces cited . See also
Leon Lazaroff. “Med ia Firm Accu sed of Dod ging FCC Ru les.” Chicago Tribune 16 Oct.
2004, http :/ / w w w .freep ress.net/ new s/ 5009 (Sinclair Broad casting, w hich ow ns m ore
TV stations than any other com p any, u ses “d istance-casting” from com p any
headquarters to broadcast local news, sports, and weather).
27 Fairchild , Charles. 1999. “Deterritorializing Rad io: Deregu lation and the Continu ing
Triumph of the Corporatist Perspective in America.” Media, Culture and Society 21: 557559; Bachm an, Kathy. “Mu sic Ou tlets Tu ne in More N ew s Rep orts.” MediaWeek, 29
October 2001.
28Wild e Anne Mathew s. “A Giant Rad io Chain is Perfecting the Art of Seem ing Local.”
W all Street Journal, 25 Febru ary 2002, p . A1; Stap les, Brent. “The Trou ble w ith
Corp orate Rad io: The Day the Protest Mu sic Died .” The N ew Y ork Times, 20 February
2003 p. A30.
29 Fu tu re of Mu sic Coalition. Radio Deregulation: Has It Served Citizens and M usicians?
(Ric Dube and Gillian Thomson, eds.) (18 Nov. 2002), pp. 3-5.
26
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under-served , and that com m u nities w ithou t African-American-oriented
m ed ia have low er rates of African-Am erican participation in elections.30 That
is, minority ow ners are m ore likely to present m inority points of view ju st as
fem ales are m ore likely to present a fem ale point of view , in the speakers,
formats and content they put forward.
D EMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE INCREASING N EED FOR
D IVERSITY AND LOCALISM
While it is certainly tru e that there is a great d eal more inform ation
available to m ore ed u cated citizens tod ay than thirty years ago, it is also tru e
that they need m ore inform ation. Over the past 30 years, the m akeu p of the
popu lation that the m ed ia serves has grow n in size and d iversity. Mobility,
globalization of the econom y, internationalization of com m u nications, and
social fragmentation place greater d emand s on the com m u nications netw ork
to enable citizens to be inform ed abou t increasingly com plex issu es, to
express their opinions m ore effectively in civic d iscou rse and to rem ain
connected to their communities.
Cou nting the nu m ber of ou tlets w ithout reference to the popu lation
they serve or the issu es they m u st d eal w ith ignores the need s of the citizenry
for information. It also ignores the grow ing mism atch betw een huge
corporate conglom erates that prod u ce and d istribu te new s and ind ivid u al
citizens that consume it.
The broad param eters of change in Am erican society over the past
three decades have been so profound that we can safely conclude that a much
m ore d iverse set of m ed ia institu tions and ou tlets is need ed to d issem inate
information. We focu s on the past three d ecad es because m any of the ru les
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Joel Waldfogel. Electoral Acceleration: The Effect of
Minority Population on Minority Voter Turnout. NBER Working Paper 8252.
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001. Available from
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8252.pdf; Siegelman and Waldfogel, “Race and
Radio: Preference Externalities, Minority Ownership, and the Provision of
Programming to Minorities.” Advertising & Differentiated Products 73:10 (Michael R.
Baye & Bon P. Nelson eds., 2001). See also Whose Spectrum is it, Anyway? A Historical
Study of Market Entry Barriers, Discrimination, and Changes in Broadcast and Wireless
Licensing. study prepared for the FCC by the Ivy Planning Group, Dec. 2000,
http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb_study/historical_study.pdf; Christine
Bachen, et al., 1999. Diversity of Programming in the Broadcast Spectrum: Is There a Link
Between Owner Race or Ethnicity and News and Public Affairs Programming? (study
prepared for the FCC),
http://www.fcc.gov/opportunity/meb_study/content_ownership_study.pdf;
Christopher Yoo. Architectural Censorship and the FCC Vanderbilt U. Law School
Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 04-10, undated,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=555821.
30
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governing the stru ctu re of m ed ia ow nership w ere ad opted in the early 1970s.
For the purposes of this analysis, w e start w ith the hou sehold as the
consu m ption u nit (see Exhibit 1). TV m arkets are d efined in term s of
households. The bulk of newspaper distribution is home delivery.
The nu m ber of hou sehold s has increased by 67 percent in the past
tw o d ecad es. This is tw ice as fast as the increase in the popu lation. This
reflects a d ram atic change in the com position of hou sehold s u nits. The
nu m ber of m arried fam ilies has d eclined , w hile single parent hou sehold s
have increased sharply.
Exhibit 1: Growing Diversity of the U.S. Population: Gender, Race
and Marital Status
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: (Washington,
D.C.:U.S. Department of Commerce, various years), 2001 -Table 59, 1986 – p. 35. Hispanic
percentage assumed constant between 1970 and 1980.

At the sam e tim e, there has been a d ram atic change in the racial and
ethnic m ake-u p of the popu lation. The share of H ispanics and Asian/ Pacific
Island ers has d ou bled . Com bining these tw o trend s prod u ces a stu nning
increase in the d iversity of the popu lation. While the popu lation has becom e
increasingly d iverse, it has been d raw n m ore tightly into a m ore com plex
w orld . In 1970, exports and im ports equaled abou t eight percent of gross
national prod u ct. In 2000, the figu re w as tw enty percent. Global financial
m arkets, in w hich the U.S. is the lead ing actor, have grow n d ram atically. In
1970, the good s and services prod u ced by the U. S. econom y equaled abou t
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fifteen percent of global financial transactions. By 2000, they equ aled only
two percent.
The increase in diversity is even larger when measured at a local level
(see Exhibit 2). It show s a m easu re of the racial/ ethnic d iversity w ithin each
state. It uses five categories,
White non-Hispanic,
Hispanic,
Black,
Asian and Pacific Islander, and
American Indian, Eskimo and Aleut.

Exhibit 2: Increasing Population Diversity in States: HHI
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Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United
States, Regions, Divisions, and States, Working Paper No. 56 for 1970, database for 2003.

To d escribe the racial/ ethnic d iversity of the popu lation w e calculate
the H erfind ahl H irschmann Ind ex. The H H I takes the share of each grou p in
the total, squares it, and sums across all groups. If everyone in a state fit in the
sam e grou p, the H H I w ou ld be 1. If the popu lation w ere evenly d ivid ed
across all five grou ps, the H H I w ou ld be .2 (.22 + .22 + .22 + .22 + .22 = .2).
Thu s, the low er the H H I the m ore d iverse the popu lation. The great
differences in population across the states are clear, even in 1970.
Several states w ere alm ost perfectly hom ogenou s, w ith an H H I
alm ost equ al to 1, w hile several others w ere m u ch m ore heterogeneou s, w ith
an H H I equ al to .5. At the sam e tim e, there has clearly been an increase in
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heterogeneity in the past three d ecad es. The nu m ber of states w ith an H H I of
.5 or less has increased from 1 to 15. On average, the H H I d eclined by 30
percent.
The HHI can be converted to a standard measure of diversity used by
biologists to d escribe the d istribu tion of species or families in a popu lation.
This m easu re relies on the reciprocal of the H H I (1/ H H I). Divid ing the
reciprocal of the H H I by the nu m ber of categories yield s a m easu re of the
Equitability or Evenness Ind ex (see Exhibit 3). If the popu lation w ere evenly
spread across the grou ps, the Evenness Ind ex w ou ld be equal to 1. If the
popu lation w ere entirely concentrated in one grou p, it w ou ld be .2 (because
there are five grou ps). We observe sm all changes in evenness at the extrem es
(low heterogeneity and high heterogeneity) and large changes in the m id d le.
The increases vary from a low of .01 to a high of .17. Overall, the ind ex
increased from .28 in 1970 to .4 in 2003, a 43% increase.
Exhibit 3: Evenness Index of Population in States
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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Division, Historical Census Statistics on
Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, for the United
States, Regions, Divisions, and States, Working Paper No. 56 for 1970, database for 2003.

Another w ay to m easu re the d iversity in a popu lation that has been
u sed in the analysis of m ed ia is su btract the H H I from 1, this yield s a statistic
called Simpson’s D (D= 1- HHI). This has a useful interpretation.
The d iversity valu e obtained is equ ivalent to the probability that tw o
of the objects of classification (the elem ents), chosen at rand om , w ou ld be in a
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d ifferent category.
If all of the objects are in one category, then the
probability is 0, as is the d iversity m easu re; if all of the objects are in d ifferent
categories, the Sim pson’s D is 1.0, w hich correspond s to the probability that
all the objects are in different categories.31
Exhibit 4 show s the resu lts of this calculation. Of cou rse, the pattern
is the sam e as for the earlier calcu lation. There is a w id e d ispersion of
d iversity across the states and d iversity increased over the period . On a
w eighted average basis, the probability that any tw o people chosen rand om ly
from any given state w ould be m em bers of the same grou p increased from
ju st u nd er 29 percent in 1970 to just und er 46 percent in 2003. Measu red at
the state level, the average Am erican in 2003 lived in a state that w as 60
percent m ore d iverse than the state in w hich the average American lived in
1970.
Exhibit 4: Increasing Population Diversity in States: Simpson’s D
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McDonald , Daniel G. and Shu Fang Lin. 2004. “The Effect of N ew N etw orks on U.S.
Television Diversity.” Journal of Media Economics 17: 2.
31
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STUDY 5
MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND VIEWPOINT
M ARK COOPER
O WNERSHIP POINT OF V IEW REMAINS AN IMPORTANT CONCERN IN THE M EDIA
With the incessant and fierce d ebate and finger pointing abou t bias in
the m ed ia, there w ou ld seem to be little reason for the FCC to d ou bt the fact
that m ed ia ou tlets have a point of view , w hether or not it rises to the level of
slant or bias. The evid ence in the record d id not ju stify the FCC’s hesitation
on this point and evid ence continu es to m ou nt to suggest that m ed ia ou tlets
d efinitely have a point of view . To the extent that the FCC cited u ncertainty
abou t the relationship betw een ow nership and points of view to m ake policy,
as in the cross-ownership rulemaking,1 it erred.
The FCC cited one poorly d one stud y that argu ed there is no
relationship betw een ow nership and view point, bu t acknow led ged that the
flaw s in the research w ere su bstantial. 2 On the other sid e it acknow led ged
several acad em ic stu d ies cited by the Consu m er Fed eration of America (CFA)
that d em onstrated the connection betw een ow nership and view point, one a
case stu d y of a major piece of legislation, the second a statistical stu d y of
cam paign coverage.3 This point is so central to the u nd ertaking of m ed ia
ow nership lim its, w e feel com pelled to revisit the issu e here to erase any
d ou bt that the connection betw een ow nership and view point is real and m u st
be the basis for policy.
1

Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules A dopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13711-47 (2003), ¶361.
2
The FCC’s m inim al effort to ad d ress the issu e of bias, Pritchard , David . Sep tem ber,
2002. View p oint Diversity in Cross-Ow ned N ew sp ap ers and Television Stations: A
Study of News Coverage of the 2000 Presidential Campaign. Federal Communications
Com m ission, involved a very sm all nu m ber of observations and no effort to introd u ce
a com p arison grou p . It fou nd that half of the new sp ap ers and television stations that
w ere cross-ow ned shared a bias. On re-exam ination, Baker, Dean. Decem ber 2002.
Dem ocracy Unhinged : More Med ia Concentration Means Less Pu blic Discou rse, A
Critiqu e of the FCC Stu d ies on Med ia Ow nership Washington, DC: Dep artm ent of
Professional Employees, AFL-CIO, p. 6, concluded that “seven of the ten combinations
had a com m on slant, and only three had a d ifferent slant in their coverage.” This is a
rem arkably high bias and , in ou r view , only u nd erscores the p roblem of ow nership
across the media.
3
Order, ¶34.
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It is interesting to note that the episod e of charge and cou nter of bias
that CFA put in the record w as the early stages of finger pointing in an
ongoing episode that has been cited in a number of recent academic articles as
the anim u s to bring a m ore rigorou s approach to the su bject.4 The very
d ispu te CFA cited is the origin of a cottage ind u stry of both anecd otal
accou nts and acad emic scholarship that d em onstrates how central view point
is to the m ed ia land scape.5 We recall that analysis because it links to so m u ch
m ore d etailed evid ence on the im portance of ow nership and view point that
has come to light since.
BIAS-BASHING (BY THE M OST PROMINENT A MERICAN JOURNALISTIC ICONS)
The “biases” of ow ners are frequ ently know n, as a flap abou t Ru pert
Mu rd och’s new s operations at Fox television attests. The close political
connection betw een Fox’s Roger Ailes and the Repu blican Party w as
u nd erscored by his ad m ission that he had sent a pu blic policy m em o to the
Bu sh Ad ministration.6 The response from Fox to these “charges” of bias w ere
explained in a 2002 best seller by Bernard Gold berg says m ou ntains abou t the
slanting of TV news and commentary across the board.
This is how Roger Ailes… exp lained it in a N ew Y ork Times M agazine p iece in
Ju ne 2001: “There are m ore conservatives on Fox. Bu t w e are not a conservative
netw ork. That d isp arity says far m ore abou t the com p etition.” In other w ord s,
if Fox is alleged to have a conservative bias, that’s only because there are so few
4

Shiffer, Ad am, J. 2006. “Assesing Partisan Bias in Political N ew s : The Case(s) of
Local Senate Election Coverage.” Political Communications 23; Lee, Tien-Tsu ng. 2005.
“The Liberal Media Myth Revisited: An Examination of Factors Influencing Perception
of Med ia Bias” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic M edia 49:1; Gentzow , Matthew
and John M Shap iro, M edia Bias and Reputation, (2004); Mu llainathan, Send hil and
Andrei Shleifer. 2004. The Market for News. American Economic Review 95.
5 The CFA d iscu ssion lau nched from Gold berg, Bernard , Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes
How the M edia Distort the N ews. Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2002. The set of p op u lar
p ress books cited in literatu re inclu d es this as the earliest and then ad d s Cou lter, Ann.
Slander: Liberal Lies about the A merican Right. N ew York: Three Rivers Press, 2003, on
the conservative sid e and Alterm an, Eric. W hat Liberal M edia? The Truth A bout Bias and
the News New York: Basic, 2003 and Franken, Al. Lies and the Lying Liars Who Tell Them:
A Fair and Balanced Look at the Right. New York: EP Dutton, 2003.
6 The story “broke” in the W ashington Post w ith the p u blication of a segm ent of Bob
Woodward’s Bush A t W ar. N ew York: Sim on and Schu ster, 2002, p . 207, w hich Ailes
d isp u ted (see Grove, Lloyd , “The Reliable Sou rce,” W ashington Post, 19 N ovem ber 19
2002). The incid ent reinforced the p ercep tion of Fox N ew s as “The Most Biased N am e
in N ew s: Fox Channel’s Extraord inary Right-w ing Tilt.” Ackerm an, Seth. The M ost
Biased N ame in N ews. (FAIR, Au gu st 2002), a bias that is em bod ied in the “form at,
gu ests, exp ertise, top ic and in-hou se analysts.” Cable N ews W ars: Interviews (PBS,
Online Newshour, March 2002), p. 2.

MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND DIVERSITY 79
conservative voices on the air at ABC, CBS, N BC, CN N and MSN BC. There
7

certainly is a conservative “attitude” at Fox, a conservative sensibility.

The affinity betw een the netw ork and the Repu blican Party had a
historical base. In a paper entitled “The Fox N ew s Effect: Med ia Bias and
Voting” Della Vigna and Kaplan have “analyzed the entry of Fox News.”
Betw een October 1996 and N ovem ber 2000, the conservative Fox N ew s
Channel was introduced in the cable programming of 20 percent of US towns…
We investigate if Rep u blicans gained vote share in tow ns w here Fox N ew
entered . We find a significant effect of the introd u ction of Fox N ew s on the
vote share in Presid ential elections betw een 1996 and 2000. Fox N ew s also
affected the Republican vote share in the Senate and voter turnout.8

They go on to note “the effect w as smaller in tow ns w ith m ore cable
channels w hich is consistent w ith the m od erating effect of com petition.” 9
The effect w as also smaller in m ore hom ogeneou s environm ents – “In
ad d ition, Fox had a sm aller effect in ru ral areas and in Repu blican
congressional d istrict, possibly because in these tow n the share of nonRepu blicans at risk of being convinces w as smaller.” 10 Both of these effects –
com petition and heterogeneity – play an im portant role in the acad emic
research on bias as discussed below.
Gold berg end s his d iscu ssion of bias in the TV m ed ia, w hich begins
w ith and focu ses on an op-ed piece abou t liberal bias in the TV m ed ia he had
pu blished in the W all Street Journal, w ith a d iscussion of bias in the print
media in a second op-ed on the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal.
Consid er this: In 1996 after I w rote abou t liberal bias on this very p age, Dan
[Rather] w as fu riou s and d u ring a p hone conversation he ind icated that
p icking the W all Street Journal to air m y view s w as esp ecially ap p alling given
the conservative view s of the p ap er’s ed itorial p age. “What d o you consid er
the N ew Y ork Times?” I asked him , since he had w ritten op -ed s for that p ap er.
“Middle of the road,” he said.
I cou ld n’t believe he w as seriou s. The Times is a new sp ap er that has taken the
liberal sid e of every im p ortant social issu e of ou r tim e, w hich is fine w ith m e.
Bu t if you see the N ew Y ork Times ed itorial p age as m id d le of the road , one
thing is clear: You don’t have a clue.

11

Goldberg, Bernard. Bias. Washington, DC: Regnery, 2002, p. 190.
Della Vigna, Stefan and Ethan Kap lan. “The Fox N ew s Effect: Med ia Bias and
Voting.” N BER W orking Paper 12169. Cam brid ge, MA: N ational Bu reau of Econom ic
Research, 2006, p. i.
9 Id., p. 1.
10 Id., p.2-3.
11 Gold berg, 2002. p . 222, citing “On Med ia Bias, N etw ork Stars Are Rather Clu eless,”
W all Street Journal, 24 May, 2001.
7
8
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There are m any w ho w ou ld d ebate the “liberal” bias of the N ew Y ork
Times, bu t it is clear that there is little love lost betw een the N ew Y ork Times
and Mr. Ailes and Fox’s su pporters. Within a w eek of the revelation of Mr.
Ailes’ m em o to the White H ou se, the N ew Y ork Times chastised Ailes in an
ed itorial, pointing ou t that giving ad vice to the Presid ent w ou ld be fine, w ere
Mr. Ailes still in the bu siness of ad vising political cand id ates, bu t as a top
execu tive of a new s organization he shou ld know better than to offer private
counsel to Mr. Bush.
Mr. Ailes’ action seem s esp ecially hyp ocritical for som eone w ho has sp ent
years tru m p eting the fairness of Fox and the p artisanship of ju st abou t
everybod y in the new s bu siness. Fox’s p rom otional slogan is: “We rep ort, you
d ecid e.” Bu t the new s channel has a Rep u blican tilt and a conservative
agenda.137

The acad emic evid ence on the slant of the N ew Y ork Times is m ixed .
One stu d y exam ined the prom inence of issu es given em phasis d u ring
presid ential years from 1946 to 1997, controlling for the party of the
incumbent president. Prior to 1960,
the N ew Y ork Times gives more em p hasis to top ics that are ow ned by the
Dem ocratic Party (civil rights, health care, labor and social w elfare), w hen the
incu m bent Presid ent is a Rep u blican. This is consistent w ith the hyp othesis
that the N ew Y ork Times has a Dem ocratic p artisanship , w ith som e “w atchd og”
asp ects, in that d u ring the p resid ential cam p aign it gives m ore em p hasis to
issu es over w hich the (Rep u blican) incu m bent is w eak. In the p ost-1960 period
the Times d isp lays a m ore sym m etric typ e of w atchd og behavior, ju st because
d u ring p resid ential cam p aigns it gives m ore coverage to the typ ically
Rep u blican issu e of Defense w hen the incu m bent Presid ent is a Dem ocrat, and
less so when the incumbent is a Republican.12

This analysis rem ind s u s that slant m ay consist of a nu m ber of
factors, the m ost com m only stu d ied of w hich are tone and frequ ency of
reporting, with tone being more difficult to measure than frequency.
The friction betw een the N ew Y ork Times and Fox, can be u nd erstood
in light of the results of a stu d y entitled “A Measu re of Med ia Bias.” 13 The
stu d y u sed ADA rankings of m em bers of Congress to estim ate the
“conservative/ liberal” bias of the new spapers and think tank reports that the
Congressm en cited in their statem ents. Times and Fox w ere at the opposite
ends of the spectru m on every m easu re. Fox w as abou t 15 points m ore
conservative than the m ean and the N ew Y ork Times being abou t 15 points
above it on the preferred m easu re of bias, w hich w as an ad ju sted m easu re of
Pu glisi, Ricard o. Being the N ew Y ork Times. Political Econom y and Pu blic Policy
Series, Suntory Centre, April 2006.
13 Groseclose, Tim othy and Jeff Milyo. 2005. “A Measu re of Med ia Bias.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics 120.
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the nu m ber of sentences d evoted to think tanks. This points to another
im portant m easu re of point of view – the am ou nt of space d evoted to an
issue.
In the d ispu te that played ou t in the press, Pau l Kru gm an (certainly a
Dem ocrat, if not a liberal) w riting in the N ew Y ork Times, repeated Al Gore’s
complaint that the “liberal media” had gone very conservative.
This week Al Gore said the obvious. “The media is kind of weird these days on
p olitics,” he told The N ew York Observer, “and there are som e m ajor
institu tional voices that are, tru thfu lly sp eaking, p art and p arcel of the
Republican Party.
The reaction from m ost jou rnalists in the “liberal Med ia” w as em barrassed
silence. I d on’t qu ite u nd erstand w hy, bu t there are som e things that you ’re
not supposed to say, precisely because they are so clearly true.14

The treatm ent of the Gore cam paign by the press is the su bject of a
Kenned y School of Governm ent Case stu d y that seeks to qu alitatively
exam ine som e of the m ajor stories that played prom inent roles in the
campaign,15 w hich also cites a quantitative stu d y by the Com m ittee of
Concerned Jou rnalists and the Project for Excellence in Jou rnalism .16 Both
su ggest that there w as som ething to the com plaint. One of the interesting
observations that has im plications for und erstand ing the stru ctu ral cau ses of
bias is the concern that
the m eta-narrative tend ed to “tru m p the rep orters’ ju d gm ent,” m aking it
“d ifficu lt for an ind ivid u al rep orter to w rite a story that d iffers from the
p op u lar m eta-narratives.” For another, it led to p roblem s w ith “w hat to do
with facts that betray the meta-narrative.”17

Michael Kelly, a conservative colum nist, cou ld not let the
Gore/ Kru gman com plaint pass w ithout com m ent.18 H e cites abou t a d ozen
“m ajor su rveys on the political beliefs and voting patterns of m ainstream
print and broad cast jou rnalists” from 1962 to 2001, w hich show abou t a threeto-one ratio (46 to 15) of liberals to conservatives. H e answ ers the rhetorical
qu estion, “Does a (still) largely liberal new s m ed ia (still) exhibit a largely
liberal bias?” with a resounding “Sure.”19 He cites S. Robert Lichter, president
of the independent Center for Media and Public Affairs, who observes that,
Krugman, Paul. “In Media Res.” New York Times, 29 November 2002, p. A39.
Scott, Ester. Al Gore and the “Em bellishm ent“ Issu e:Press Coverage of the Gore
Presid ential Cam p aign. Kennedy School of Government Case Program, c15-02-1679.0,
October 2003.
16 The Last Lap: How the Press Covered the Final Stages of the Campaign, 31 October 2000.
17 Scott, p. 26, citing The Last Lap.
18 Kelly, Michael. “Left Everlasting.” The Washington Post, 11 December 2002, p. A33.
19 Kelly, Michael. “Left Everlasting (Cont’d).” The W ashington Post, 18 Decem ber 2002,
p. A35.
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[J]ou rnalists tell the tru th – bu t like everyone else, they tell the tru th as they see
it. Even the m ost conscientiou s jou rnalists cannot overcom e the su bjectivity
inherent in their p rofession, w hich is exp ressed throu gh su ch everyd ay
decisions as whether a topic or source is trustworthy.20

A stud y by Lee d ocu m ents the flip sid e of this statem ent.21 Ju st as
jou rnalists tell the tru th as they see it, consu m ers hear the tru th as they see it.
According to this study,
Peop le are m ore likely to believe the m ed ia cannot be tru sted if they are m ale
and conservative, d isagree that m ost p eop le are honest, bu t believe that honest
p eop le cannot be elected to high office. Cynicism at both the p ersonal and
p olitical levels is the strongest p red ictor of a m ed ia bias p ercep tion, accord ing
to the Life Style d ata. Fu rther, accord ing to the N ES d ata, m ed ia d istru st is
p red icted by being conservative and Rep u blican, p artisanship extrem ity, and
political cynicism.22

An Annenberg stud y fou nd the “Public and Press Differ abou t
Partisan Bias, Accu racy and Press Freed om .” 23 Eighty six percent of
jou rnalists think new s organizations get their facts straight, com pared to 45
percent of the public. Only 16 percent of journalists think it is “a good thing if
som e new s organizations have a d ecid ed ly political point of view in their
coverage of news,” compared to 45 percent of the public.
The attitu d es the audience brings into the media market, called priors
in the academic literature, and the incentives journalists have, both play a part
in the expanding analysis of media bias.
The im portant and u navoid able lesson is that ed itorial preferences
are d eeply em bed d ed in com m ercial m ass m ed ia not only on the ed itorial
pages, bu t also on the new s pages. In a sense, this is the essence of the
concept of antagonism . Rather than claim that m any ou tlets ow ned by a
single entity w ill present a neu tral, objective, or balanced pictu re, pu blic
policy shou ld recognize that d iversity and antagonism of view points com es
from d iversity of ow nership. Ind eed , Lichter entered the fray w ith a letter to
the editor pointing out,
In som e cases, the coverage of social and p olitical issu es clearly coincid es w ith
the perspectives of journalists. But such correspondence is not guaranteed, and
it cannot be reliably predicted to operate in particular instances.141

Id.
Lee, pp. 51-52.
22 Id., p. 51.
23 May 24, 2005.
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Systematic Empirical Evidence
There is a grow ing bod y of research that d em onstrates the tend ency
of m ed ia ou tlets to take a point of view . The CFA analysis pu t forw ard tw o
d ifferent types of analysis. The first w as qu antitative assessm ents. CFA cited
an article from the Ju ne 2002 A merican Political Science Review that m akes it
clear that ow nership (em bod ied in the ed itorial position of the ou tlet) m atters
in reporting the news.24
One of the essential elem ents of an im p artial p ress in the United States is the
“w all of sep aration” betw een the ed itorial p ages and the p ages d evoted to the
new s. While the p olitical beliefs of new sp ap er ow ners and ed itors are clearly
articu lated on op inion p ages, their view s are not su p p osed to infiltrate the
rep orting of the new s. The analysis p resented in this p ap er raises qu estions
abou t this claim . We exam ine new sp ap er coverage of m ore than 60 Senatorial
cam p aigns across three election years and find that inform ation on new s p ages
is slanted in favor of the cand id ates end orsed on the new sp ap er’s ed itorial
pages. We find that the coverage of incumbent Senators is most affected by the
new sp ap er’s end orsem ent. We exp lore the consequ ences of “slanted ” new s
coverage by show ing that voters evalu ate end orsed cand id ates m ore favorably
than cand id ates w ho fail to secu re an ed itorial end orsem ent. The im p act of the
end orsem ent d ecision on voters’ evalu ations is m ost p ow erfu l in races
receiving a great d eal of p ress attention and am ong citizens w ho read their
local newspapers on a daily basis.

25

This article provid ed a m ethod ology that w as follow ed by others.
Dru ckman and Parkin use the sam e approach to content analysis to evaluate
relative slant focu sing on a single senate race and tied the reporting to
electoral behavior.26
Combining comprehensive content analysis of the newspapers with an Election
Day exit p oll, w e assess the slant of cam p aign coverage and its effect on voters.
We find com p elling evid ence that ed itorial slant influ ences voter’s d ecisions.
Ou r resu lts raise seriou s qu estions abou t the m ed ia’s place in d em ocratic
process.27

In short, slant in the media affected voting.

Kahn, Kim Frid kin and Patrick J. Kenny. 2002. The Slant of N ew s: H ow Ed itorial
End orsem ents Influ ence Cam p aign Coverage and Citizens’ View s of Candidates.
American Political Science Review 96: 381.
25 Ad d itional sou rces cited in su p p ort of this p rop osition inclu d e Page, Benjam in I.
W ho Deliberates. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996; Row se, Ed w ard . Slanted
News: A Case Study of the Nixon and Stevenson Fund Stories. Boston: Beacon, 1957.
26 Dru ckm an, Jam es N . and Michael Parkin. 2005.
The Imp act of Med ia Bias: H ow
Editorial Slant Affects Voters. Journal of Politics, 67:4.
27 Id., p. 1030
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Systematic stu d ies of coverage of local issu es fou nd that “objectivity
violations in all 20 stories w ere classified as serving the self-interest of the
new s organization or its parent corporation.” 28 Ad d itional stu d ies in this vein
have d ocu m ented the extent and im pact of point of view in a variety of types
of m ed ia and covering a w id e range of su bjects. Shiffer d istinguishes
betw een partisan bias and stru ctu ral bias and find s both in the coverage of 95
senatorial cam paigns.29 Stru ctu ral bias is d efined as follow s: “some things are
selected to be reported rather than other things because of the character of the
m ed iu m or because of the incentives that apply to com m ercial new s
program m ing instead of partisan preju d ices held by new sm en.” 30 Moreover,
som e of the stru ctu ral factors m ay be non-id eological ow nership factors, su ch
as the case of m arket forces w here new spapers slant the new s to “reflect the
ideology of their states.”31
The d ynam ics of the new sroom relationships betw een ed itors and
reporters create a tendency to produce stories that are unbalanced.
While partisan balance may have existed over the course of the entire coverage,
ind ivid u al stories w ere seld om balanced . In fact, the view er had only a one in
fou r chance of seeing an ap p roxim ately balanced story, w hile 40 p ercent of the
tim e the view er w as likely to see a story that w as stru ctu rally im balanced in
every m easu red w ay. Bu t this research also ind icates that this w ou ld vary
depending on the station and the day the viewer was watching.32

Slant or bias is m easu red not only in the tone of coverage, bu t also in
the quantity of coverage or the su bjects on w hich m ed ia ou tlets choose to
ed itorialize. Thu s, H allock fou nd that a change in ow nership, from a local
family to a chain, resu lted in “red u ced em phasis on local issues.” 33 Magu ire
found a change in ownership resulting in a change in the quality and quantity
of coverage, w ith local stories su ffering m ost in the shift from local fam ily
ownership to large chain ownership.34
The study of slant in reporting has been applied to a number of topics
beyond campaign coverage and end orsem ents, w ith a consistent find ing of
McManu s, J. 1991. H ow Objective is Local Television N ews? M ass Communications
Review 18:3:21-30.
29 Shiffer, Adam, J. 2006. “Assesing Partisan Bias in Political News: The Case(s) of Local
Senate Election Coverage.” Political Communications 23.
30 Id,, p. 29.
31 Id., p. 31.
32 Carter, Su e, Fred erick Fico, and Joycelyn A. McCabe. 2002. Partisan and Stru ctu ral
Balance in Local Television Election Coverage. Journalism and M ass Communications
Quarterly 79.
33 H allock, Steve.
2005. “Acqu isition by Gannett Changes Pap er’s Ed itorials.”
Newspaper Research Journal 25: 2.
34 Magu ire, Miles. 2005. “Change in Ow nership Affect Qu ality of Oshkosh Pap er.”
Newspaper Research Journal 26: 4
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bias. The topics inclu d e coverage of the presid ent,35 econom ic events,36
important political issues,37 and calling states on election night.38
The second type of stu d ies picks a single issu e and exam ines how it
was handled in the media. The example CFA chose was particularly relevant,
a stu d y of the reporting of coverage of the Telecom m u nications Act of 1996,
in w hich the m ed ia had a d irect stake. This stu d y by Jam es Snid er and
Benjam in Page looked at the d ecision to allow TV stations to have ad d itional
digital spectrum without paying for it, while other parts of the spectrum were
being auctioned for other commercial uses.39 The ed itorial positions of m ed ia
corporations that ow ned new spapers and had significant TV station
ow nership (at least 20% of revenu es from that sou rce) w ere com pared to the
ed itorial stand s on the spectru m give-away/auction issu e of new spapers
ow ned by com panies having little or no TV station ow nership. The find ings
were striking:
The resu lts on ed itorials are very strong and highly significant [statistically]; in
fact, am ong new sp ap ers that ed itorialized on the su bject, every one w hose
ow ners got little TV revenu e ed itorialized against the sp ectru m ‘giveaw ay,’
w hereas every one w ith high TV revenu es ed itorialized in favor of giving
broadcasters free use of spectrum.40

CFA provid ed other exam ples of self-interested action by m ed ia
ow ners in several case stud ies of cross-ow ned papers inclu d ing exam ples in
of prom otion of projects or local initiatives in w hich the ow ner had a stake 41
Groeling, Tim and Sam u el Kernell. 2005. Is N etw ork N ew s Coverage of the
President Biased? Journal of Politics 60:4
36 Lott, John R., and Kevin A. H assett. Is N ewspaper Coverage of Economic Events
Politically Biased? Washington, D.C.: American Enterp rise Institu te, 2004; Dyck,
Alexand er and Lu igi Zingales. 2003. The Med ia and Asset Prices. University of Chicago,
NBER & CEPR.
37 Ansolabehere, Step hen, Erik C. Snow berg, and
Jam es M. Snyd er, Jr. 2005.
Unrep resentative Inform ation: The Case of N ew sp ap er Rep orting on Cam p aign
Finance Reform. Public Opinion Quarterly 69: 2
38 Mixon, J. Wilson, Am it Sen, and E. Frank Step henson. 2004.
Are the N etw orks
Baised? ‘Calling States in the 2000 Presidential Election. Public Choice 118.
39 Snid er, Jam es H ., and Benjam in I. Page. 1997. “Does Med ia Ow nership Affect Med ia
Stand s? The Case of the Telecom m u nications Act of 1996.” Pap er d elivered at the
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April.
40 Id., pp. 7-8.
41 Consu m er Fed eration of Am erica, Consu m ers Union, Center for Digital Dem ocracy
and the Med ia Access Project, “Initial Com m ents” In the M atter of 2002 Biennical
Regulatory Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
A dopeted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications A ct of 1996, Cross-ownership of
Broadcast Stations and N ewspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning M ultiple Ownership of
Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets and Definition of Radio Markets, Docket Nos. MB
02-277, MM 01-235, MM 01-317’ and MM 00-244, January 2, 2003, pp.231-234.
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and cases in w hich criticism of the co-ow ned ou tlet w as d ampened or
eliminated.42
The 2004 election prod uced a bevy of incid ents that w ere
d ebated as exam ples of slant, d riven by the point of view of the outlet ow ner.
Am ong the m ost prom inent w ere Sinclair’s on-again, off-again airing of
“Stolen H onor,” 43 and the effort of a broad caster to d onate free air tim e to one
candidate as a personal contribution.44
Theory Links Concentration to Bias
The intense stu d y of bias in the m ed ia has spaw ned a second
d evelopm ent of note – the d evelopm ent of theoretical m od els to explain the
persistence of bias. The theoretical approach has sou ght to u nd erstand the
stru ctu ral cond itions of m ed ia bias. There are both su pply-sid e and d em and side theories of why viewpoints permeate the media space.
The su pply-sid e theories of bias are the m ost fam iliar. They launch
from a variety of factors – the id eological beliefs of ow ners/ ed itors,45 the
career interests of journalists,46 or the economic interests of advertisers.47 Here
w e focus on the im plications of this research on consolid ation and
com petition in m ed ia markets. The theory su pports the concern abou t
consolidation. While these are theoretical papers, they cite empirical research
that comports with and therefore validates their models.
An exam ination of potential m erger im pact reached the follow ing
conclusion:
The cleanest resu lt abou t the effect of m ergers on the amount of p ersu asion…
says that if, in then no-merger equilibrium, both outlets are owned by the same
typ e, and if there w ill in fact be a m erger w hen m ergers are p erm itted , then
total p ersu asion (all of the typ e p referred by ow ners) w ill increase. That is, if
Id., pp. 227, 230
For a flavor of the controversy, contrast the ed itorial in the W all Street Journal,
Sinclair and a Dou ble Stand ard , October 13,2004 to the Boston Globe, Sinclair’s Slander,
October 15, 2004. It shou ld com e as no su rp rise that this becam e bou nd u p in m ore
than Presid ential p olitics, as Legg Masson’s Telecom & M edia Insider p ointed ou t that
“Sinclair Move Risks Backfiring by Com p licating Com p any’s (and Ind u stry’s)
Deregulatory Agenda,” October 15, 2004.
44 Pappas Communications in Los Angeles. The FCC required the time be considered a
personal contribution.
45 Bagdikian, Ben. The Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon, 2000; McChesey, etc.
46 Dyck and Zingales.
47 Ellm an, Mathew and Fabrizio Germ ano. 2004. What Do Pap ers Sell? UPF Economics
and Business W orking Paper N o. 800; Reu ter, J. and Zitzw itz. 2006. Do Ad s Influ ence
Ed itors? Ad vertising and Bias in the Financial Med ia. Quarterly Journal of Economics
121; H am ilton, Jam es T. A ll the N ews That’s Fit to Sell. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003; Baker, C. Ed w in. A dvertising and a Democratic Press. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994.
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there is a d om inant m ed ia id eology w hen m ergers are p rohibited , and if
p erm itting m ergers w ill actu ally lead to a m erger, then the d om inant id eology
will become stronger.48

An examination of how com petition w ou ld im pact reporting bias
caused by advertisers reached the following conclusion:
First and foremost, it shows how media competition can prevent harmful effect
of advertising on news reporting.49

An examination of reporting on company financial performance
reached the following conclusion:
Interestingly, w e find that m ed ia sp in tend s to follow the sp in p rom oted by the
com p any. This is m ore so the few er alternative sou rce of inform ation abou t a
com p any are available, the more d em and for inform ation there is, and the less
reputable a newspaper is.50

The d em and -sid e theories are less fam iliar. On the d em and sid e, one
approach is to ask w hether pand ering is profitable, or m ore d elicately pu t
whether outlets “cater to the prejudices of their readers.” 51 The motivation is
to maximize profits by telling readers what they want to hear. The conclusion
is that “on topics w here read er beliefs d iverge (su ch as politically d ivisive
issues), newspapers segment the market and slant toward extreme positions.”
52
“Powerful forces motivate news providers to slant and increase bias, rather
than clear up confu sion,” so “greater com petition typically results in m ore
aggressive catering to su ch preju d ices as com petitors strive to d ivid e the
market.”53 In the presence of heterogeneous, conscientious readers, however,
“the biases of individual media sources tend to offset each other, so the beliefs
of the conscientious read er becom e m ore accu rate than they are w ith
hom ogeneous read ers…. Greater partisanship and bias of ind ivid u al m ed ia
ou tlets m ay result in a m ore accu rate picture being presented to a
conscientiou s read er.” 54 H eterogeneity interacts w ith com petition in this
view to produce the outcome.

Balan, David J., Patrick DeGraba, and Abraham L. Wid kelgren. 2003. Med ia Merges
and the Ideological Content of Programming. Bureau of Economics FTC .
49 Ellman and Germano, p. 25.
50 Dyck and Zingales, p. 1.
51 Mu llainathan, Send hil and And rei Shleifer. 2004. The Market for N ew s. American
Economic Review 95, p. 1.
52 Id., p. 1.
53 Id., p. 6…20.
54 Id. p. 5
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Others start from the d em and sid e proposition that “firm s w ill tend
to d istort inform ation to make it conform w ith consum ers’ prior beliefs” 55 bu t
factor in supply side considerations.
When a m ed ia firm is concerned w ith m aintaining a rep u tation for accu racy,
this force tends to produce slanting towards the preexisting beliefs of the firm’s
cu stom ers. Even if the firm believes that the tru th contrad icts these beliefs, it
w ill be relu ctant to rep ort contrad ictory evid ence becau se consu m ers m ay infer
that the firm has inaccu rate inform ation. The m ore p riors favor a given
p osition, the less likely the firm becom es to p rint a story contrad icting that
position.56

This is the problem of coping w ith the m eta-narrative id entified by
the Project on Excellence in Jou rnalism ’s analysis of the reporting on the 2000
campaign.
The key d ynam ic in this m od el, at the level of firms, is that as the
likelihood of ex-post feed back abou t the state of the w orld improves, the
am ou nt of bias occu rring in equ ilibriu m d ecreases.” 57
In this view ,
“ind epend ently ow ned ou tlets can provid e a check on each others’ coverage
and thereby lim it equ ilibriu m bias, an effect that is absent if the ou tlets are
jointly owned.”58
Com petition m ay d iscipline m ed ia ou tlets, or ad vertisers on the
supply-sid e. It m ay provid e conscientiou s read ers a richer field in w hich to
form opinions. It m ay d o all of these things. In any case, these m od els fit
w ithin the parad igm articu lated in Suprem e Cou rt ju rispru d ence that relies
on the “cross-lights” of “d iverse and antagonistic sou rces.” Ow ners have
significant control over the color, d irection and intensity of the lights that are
shined on public policy issues.

Gentzkow , Matthew and Jesse M. Shap iro. “Med ia Bias and Rep u tation.” University
of Chicago, Graduate School of Business and NBER, 14 September 2005, p. 3.
56 Id., pp. 3-4.
57 Id., p. 4.
58 Id. p. 33.
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STUDY 6:
TELEVISION REMAINS A DOMINANT MEDIUM
IN DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE
M ARK COOPER
M EDIA INFLUENCE AND POLICY
If a cottage ind u stry has grow n u p arou nd the stud y of bias in the
m ed ia in the past few years, a fu ll blow n ind ustrial sector has existed for a
cou ple of d ecad es in the stu d y of the im portance of m ed ia, in general, and
television, in particular, in the policy and political process.
Writing in 2000, Mille and Krosnick pointed out that
Du ring the last tw o d ecad es, how ever, it has becom e clear that the m ed ia d o
ind eed shap e p u blic op inion. N ot only have investigations u sed im p roved
m ethod s to d ocu m ent p ersu asion, bu t new m ed ia effects have been id entified
as w ell, inclu d ing agend a setting and new s m ed ia p rim ing. Agend a setting
occu rs w hen extensive m ed ia attention to an issu e increases its p erceived
national im p ortance. Prim ing occu rs w hen m ed ia attention to an issu e cau ses
people to p lace sp ecial w eight on it w hen constru cting evalu ations of overall
presidential job performance.1

Walgrave and Aelst note that the ability of the m ed ia to influ ence
pu blic opinion has been stu d ied and varies in tw o broad ly d ifferent situ ation
– “rou tine tim es” and d uring elections.2 Exhibit 1 su m m arizes the find ing of
19 m ajor stud ies they id entified d ealing w ith the m ed ia’s impact d u ring
rou tine tim es. It d istingu ishes the level of im pact, tim e period of the stu d y
and nation of the stu d y. The m ost recent stu d ies show strong im pacts. The
issu es covered in the stu d ies that find strong effects in recent years involve
the m ajor policy concerns of the past cou ple of d ecad es inclu d ing econom ic
issu es like jobs, taxes, inflation and econom ic grow th, pu blic health, crim e,
education, foreign affairs, and environmental issues like global warming.
The branch of the literatu re that focu ses on politics and political
campaigns is even larger and generally just as strong in its findings. Not only
is “Mass med ia coverage… generally believed to affect pu blic opinion
ind irectly throu gh phenom ena such as agend a setting and prim ing,” bu t

Miller, Joanne and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. N ew s Med ia Im p act on the Ingred ients of
Presid ential Evalu ations: Politically Know led geable Citizens are Gu id ed by Tru sted
Sources. American Journal of Political Science 44:2: 295.
2 Walgrave, Stefann and Peter Van Aelst. 2006. The Contingency of the Mass Med ia’s
Political Agend a Setting Pow er:
Tow ard a Prelim inary Theory. Journal of
Communications 56.
1
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there is grow ing evid ence that “m ed ia coverage d irectly influences the vote
intention of campaign deciders.”3
Exhibit 1: Media Impact Studies
Prior 1990
1996
to
to
to
1990's 1995 present
None
1
0
0

Impact All Nations

Hardly any

2

2

0

Weak
Strong/
Considerable

0

2

4

3

3

6

None

1

0

0

2

0

0

0

2

0

3

3

4

Hardly any
Impact United States Weak
Strong/
Considerable

Source Walgrave, Stefann and Peter Van Aelst. 2006. The Contingency of the Mass Media’s
Political Agenda Setting Power: Toward a Preliminary Theory.
Journal of Communications 56.

Walgrave and Aelst argu e that “the short cam paign period of several
w eeks before Election Day is fu nd am entally d ifferent from rou tine period s:
the behavior of political actors, their reaction on m ed ia coverage, and even
the d ynam ic of m ed ia coverage itself follow d ifferent logics in both period s.” 4
They argu e that the forcefu l efforts of political parties and cand id ates w ho
“have daily press briefings, stage their own (pseudo) events, incessantly flood
the m ed ia w ith press releases, and continu ou sly m ake provocative
statem ents… m ake it m ore d ifficu lt for the m ed ia to set the political agend a.” 5
Fou rnier, Patrick, Richard N ad eau , Anre Blais, Elisabeth Gid engil and N eil N evitte.
2004. Tim e-of-voting Decision and Su scep tibility to Cam p aign Effects. Electoral Studies
23:4: 12. The m ore recent stu d ies that the au thors cite in su p p ort of the d irect effect
inclu d e , Miller, J. M. and J. A. Krosnick. “N ew s Med ia Im p act on the Ingred ients of
Presid ential Evalu ations: A Program of Research on the Prim ing H yp othesis.” In D.C.
Mu tz, P.M. Snid erm an, and R.A. Brod y. Political Persuasion and A ttitude Change. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996; and Zaller, J. “The Myth of Mass Med ia
Im p act Revived : N ew Su p p ort for a Discred ited Id ea.” In D.C. Mu tz, P.M. Snid erm an,
and R.A. Brod y, Political Persuasion and A ttitude Change. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1996
4 Walgrave and Aelst, 2006, p. 96.
5 Id., p. 97.
3

TELEVISION

91

They ad d that “the m ed ia d evote m ore attention to politics,” and that the
m ed ia is “m ore balanced in election tim es.” 6 They ad d that m ed ia can affect
the outcome by
follow ing the agend a of p arty A m ore closely than that of p arty B, give m ore
attention to issu e X than to issu e Y. The agend a setting pow er of jou rnalist in
election tim es lies m ore in their d iscretion to inclu d e or exclu d e inform ation of
political actors than in their autonomous selection of issues. To be sure, besides
agend a setting, the m ed ia can influ ence p olitics in m any other w ays d u ring the
campaign.

The d ifferent w ays in w hich the m ed ia m ay influ ence the political
process, d epend ing on the context is u nd erscored by recent find ings from a
stu d y of prim aries. Barker and Law rence argue that “given that nom ination
cam paigns are one-party contests, jou rnalists may be less paranoid regard ing
accusations of partisan or id eological favoritism , w hich m ay lead to m ore
interpretive coverage.” 7 They argu e that the im portance id eological
d ifferences, w hich are strong factors in m ost stu d ies of m ed ia influence, are
d im inished in one party prim aries, so voters are m ore “receptive to other
cues.”8 Sequ ential votes also allow the m ed ia to play u p “m om entu m ” as a
factor to influ ence pu blic opinion. They find “consid erable support for a
d irect effects m od el of influ ence, in that new s consu m ption is pred ictive of
perceived value congruence.”9 They also found that “bombastic, unabashedly
biased ‘new m ed ia’ can have a significant im pact over the attitu d es of even
those consumers who are predisposed to disagree with the message source.” 10 The
“new media” they have in mind, is talk radio. We observe the mix of partisan
and general media that interacted in the discussion of bias in Study 5.

THE D OMINANT ROLE OF TELEVISION
The im portance of TV rests on m ore than its role as an im portant
sou rce of inform ation, as d iscu ssed earlier. TV has com e to d ominate mass
m ed ia in political d iscou rse11 by influ encing on attitu d es and behaviors,12
Id., pp. 97-98.
Barker, David , C. and Ad am B. Law rence. 2006. Med ia Favoritism and Presid ential
Nominations: Reviving the Direct Effects Model. Political Communications 23: 42.
8 Id., p. 42.
9 Id., p. 48.
10 Id., p. 48.
11 Albarran, Alan B. and John W. Dim m ick. 1993. An Assessm ent of Utility and
Com p etitive Su p eriority in the Vid eo Entertainm ent Ind u stries. Journal of M edia
Economics 6; Bennett, W. Lance and Regina G. Law rence. 1995. N ew s Icons and the
Mainstream ing of Social Change. Journal of Communications 45; McLeod , Dou glas M.
1995. “Com m u nicating Deviance: The Effects of Television N ew s Coverage of Social
Protests.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic M edia 39; Dim m ick, John B. 1997. “The
6
7
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especially in election cam paigns. Television and rad io have long been
recognized as occu pying d ifferent prod u ct spaces 13 althou gh rad io’s role m ay
yet be changing.14 Generally, rad io is seen as having less of an im pact than
television.15 The d ifference betw een TV and rad io may be in citizen exposu re
to political ad vertising on TV, w hile rad io talk show s have a d ifferent, m ore
intim ate impact.16
Still, broad cast d oes not com pete effectively w ith
newspapers in the news function.17

Theory of the Niche and Spending on Mass Media: The Case of the Video Revolution.”
Journal of M edia Economics 10; Sp arks, Glenn G., Marianne Pellechia, and Chris Irvine.
1998. Does Television N ew s Abou t UFOs Affect View ers’ UFO Beliefs?: An
Experimental Investigation. Communication Quarterly 46; Walma, Julliete H., Tom H. A.
Van Der Voort. 2001. The Im p act of Television, Print, and Au d io on Child ren’s Recall
of the News. Human Communication Research 26.
12 Wilkins, Karin Gw inn. 2000. “The Role of Med ia in Pu blic Disengagem ent from
Political Life.” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 44.
13 Clarke, Pere and Eric Fred in. 1978. N ew sp ap ers, Television and Political Reasoning.
Public Opinion Quarterly Su m m er; Robinson, John P. and Mark R. Levy. 1996. N ew
Media Use and the Informed Public: A 1990s Update. Journal of Communications Spring
14 The role of rad io talk show s is the new d evelop m ent. Johnson, Thom as J., Mahm ou d
A. M. Braim a, and Jayanthi Sothirajah. 1999. Doing the Trad itional Med ia Sid estep :
Com p aring Effects of the Internet and Other N ontrad itional Med ia w ith Trad itional
Med ia in the 1996 Presid ential Cam p aign. Journalism & M ass Communication Quarterly
76, find that nontrad itional m ed ia d o not have an im p act on a variety of m easu res of
know led ge and p ercep tions abou t the 1996 p resid ential cam p aign and to the extent
they d o, it w as sp ecifically rad io talk show s, influ encing view s of Clinton negatively
(see also Moy, Patricia, Michael Pfau, and LeeAnn Kahlor. 1999. Media Use and Public
Confidence in Democratic Institutions. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 43).
15 Berkow itz, D., and D. Pritchard . 1989. Political Know led ge and Com m u nication
Resources. Journalism Quarterly 66; Chaffee, Steven H . Xinshu Zhao and Glenn
Leshner. 1994. Political Know led ge and the Cam p aign Med ia of 1992. Communications
Research 21, Sp ring; Drew , Dan and David Weaver. 1991. Voter Learning in the 1988
Presidential Election: Did the Media Matter? Journalism Quarterly 68.
16 Johnson, Braim a and Sothirajah, 2000, ju xtap ose the earlier find ing of a lack of
influ ence for rad io w ith m ore recent find ings that rad io talk show s have an im p act.
See also, Johnson, Braim a and Sothirajah, 1999, and Stam m , K., M Johnson and B.
Martin. 1997. Differences Am ong N ew sp ap ers, Television and Rad io in their
Contribu tion to Know led ge of the Contract w ith Am erica. Journalism and M ass
Communications Quarterly 74.
17 Step p , Carl Sessions. 2001. “Whatever H ap p ened to Com p etition.” American
Journalism Review Ju ne.“Wasn’t it television and rad io that w ere going to kill
new sp ap ers? “I d on’t really consid er them com p etition in that old -school w ay,”
stresses Florid a Su n-Sentinel ed itor Earl Mau cker. “They reach a d ifferent kind of
au d ience w ith a d ifferent kind of new s…Pu blisher Grem illion, a form er TV execu tive
him self, second s the p oint, “I d on’t believe p eop le are w atching TV as a su bstitu te for
read ing the new sp ap er…” …Many new sp ap ers are increasingly w riting off local TV
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The ascend ance of television as the prem ier political m ed iu m can be
seen in a num ber of recent stu d ies. For exam ple, in the Baker and Law rence
stu d y that fou nd both a d irect effect of m ed ia on voting and a partisan m ed ia
effect, the general “nonpolitical new s exposu re factor score” that w as u sed in
the analysis w as overw helm ingly d efined by television, w ith local new s
netw orks the m ost im portant. 18 Local netw ork new s had a factor load ing of
.91; national netw ork new s had a factor load ing of .57, and politics in
newspapers has a load ing of .17. Of cou rse, this w as a national issu e, played
ou t sequ entially in state prim aries, so that it is likely to get attention in all the
media.
Sim ilarly, a stu d y of the 2004 presid ential election fou nd that
“attention to television new s, televised d ebates, and now Internet new s are
im portant pred ictors, or at least correlates, of voter learning of cand id ate
issue positions and voter interest in the election campaign.”19 The effect of TV
new s attention on cam paign interest w as alm ost as large as exposu re to the
Presid ential d ebates and over three tim es as large as attention to new spapers
or the Internet. Review ing a nu m ber of stu d ies, they conclu d e that television
new s view ing has the largest and m ost consistent effects on variou s m easures
of engagement with the presidential election.20
Sim ilarly, the influ ence of broad cast television on the N ew
H am pshire prim ary, w hich plays a pivotal role in selecting presid ential
cand id ates, has been w ell d ocu m ented . One recent stu d y “fou nd powerful
netw ork new s effects, particu larly w ith respect to “horse race” reports on
w hich cand id ate gained and fell back bu t also w ith respect to televised
evalu ations of m ore substantive matter su ch as character and issu e
positions.”21 There rem ains a d ebate over w hich m ed ia has the greatest
new s as a seriou s threat, treating local stations instead as p otential p artners w ho can
help spread the newspapers’ brand name to new and bigger audiences.”
18 Baker and Lawrence, 2006, p. 59.
19 Drew and David, 2006, p. 25.
20 Id ., p p. 26-27, citing Ju n, Son You n and Kim , Su ng Tae. 1995. “Do the Med ia Matter
to voters? Analysis of Presid ential Cam p aigns, 1984-1996.” Pap er p resented to the
Political Communication Division of the International Communication A ssociation,
Washington, D.C.; Zhao, Xinshu and Steven Chaffee. 1995. Cam p aign Ad vertisem ents
versu s Television as Sou rces of Political Issu e Inform ation. Public Opinion Quarterly
Spring 59; Chaffee, Steven H . Xinshu Zhao and Glenn Leshner. 1994. Political
Know led ge and the Cam p aign Med ia of 1992. Communications Research 21, Sp ring;
Weaver, David and Dan Drew . 1995. Voter Learning in the 1992 Presid ential Election:
Did the ‘N ontrad itional’ Med ia and Debates Matter? Journalism & M ass Communication
Quarterly 72, Sp ring; Sotirovic and Jack M. McLeod . “Know led ge as Und erstand ing:
The Inform ation Processing Ap p roach to Political Learning.” in Lynd a L. Kaid (ed s.),
Handbook of Political Communications Research. Mahwah: NJ, Erlbaum, 2004.
21 Farnsw orth, Step hen J. and S. Robert Lichter. 2003. The 2000 N ew H am p shire
Dem ocratic Prim ary and N etw ork N ew s. A merican Behavioral Scientist 46:5: 588. The
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im pact and w hether d ifferent types of med ia have d ifferent effects,22 bu t there
is general agreem ent that television has a significant influ ence on pu blic
opinion and perception of issues. For exam ple, Rom er, Jamieson, and Ad ay,
in a stu d y more recent than the 19 review ed by Walgrave and Aelst, fou nd
“strong su pport for the television-exposu re hypothesis.” 23 Riffe, in a stu d y of
perception of environm ental risk, w hich also post-d ates the Walgrave and
Aelst note that that “respond ents w ho m ost frequ ently read and view m ed ia
reports abou t the environm ent are m ore likely to rate their ow n
environm ental risks as higher,” 24 although in this stu d y, new spapers had a
slightly larger effect than television.
Gentzkow has looked at the im pact of the spread of television on
elections. H e argu ed that as television d isplaced new spapers and rad io, it
had the effect of lowering voter turn out.
The estim ated effect is significantly negative, accou nting for betw een a qu arter
and a half of the total d ecline in tu rnou t since 1950. I argu e that su bstitu tion
aw ay from other m ed ia w ith m ore p olitical coverage p rovid es a p lau sible
m echanism for linking television to voting. As evid ence from this, I show that
the entry of television in a market coincide with sharp drops in consumption of
au thors cite su p p ort for the im p ortance of television in the N ew H am p shire Prim ary
Moore, D.W. 1984. “The Death of Politics in N ew H am p shire.” Public Opinion 7;
Farnsw orth, Step hen J. and S. Robert Lichter. 1999. N o Sm all Tow n Poll: N etw ork
Coverage of the 1992 N ew H am p shire Prim ary. Harvard International Journal of
Press/Politics, 4; Bu hr, T. “What Voters Know Abou t Cand id ates and H ow they Learn
It: The 1996 N ew H am p shire Rep u blican Prim ary as a Case Stu d y in W.G. Mayer
(Eds.), In Pursuit of the W hite House 2000: How W e Choose Our Presidential N ominees,
Chatham: NJ, Chatham House, 2001; and Farnsworth, Stephen J. and S. Robert Lichter.
2002. The 1996 N ew H am p shire Rep u blican Prim ary and N etw ork N ew s. Politics and
Policy 30.
22 Sotirovic, Mira. 2003. “H ow Ind ivid u al Exp lain Social Problem s The Influ ences of
Med ia Use.” Journal of Communications March, p . 122 find s “active p rocessing of
national television p u blic affairs content increases, w hile active p rocessing of
new sp ap er p u blic affairs content d ecreases the likelihood of ind ivid u alistic
exp lanations” of crim e and w elfare. The au thors cite Iyengar, S. Is A nyone Responsible.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991 and Mcleaod , J. M., S. Su n, A. Chi, and Z.
Pan. 1990. "Metap hor and Med ia." A ssociation for Education in Journalism, Au gu st, as
demonstrating the differential impact of media types.
23 Rom er, Daniel, Kathleen H all Jam ieson, and Sean Ad ay. 2003. Television N ew s and
the Cu ltivation of Fear of Crim e. Journal of Communications March 2003, p . 99. The
fram e the issu e as follow s (p . 88): “Why has the p u blic p ersisted in believing that
violent crim e is a w id esp read national p roblem in the U.S. d esp ite d eclining trend s in
crim e and the fact that crim e is concentrated in u rban locations?...The resu lts ind icate
that across a w id e sp ectru m of the p op u lation and ind ep end ent of local crim e rates,
viewing local television news is related to increased fear of and concern about crime.
24 Riffe, Dan. 2006. “Frequ ent Med ia Users See H igh Environm ental Risks.” Newspaper
Research Journal 27:1: 48.
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new sp ap ers and rad io, and in p olitical know led ge as m easu red by election
su rveys. I also show that both the inform ation and tu rnou t effects w ere largest
in off-year congressional elections, w hich receive extensive coverage in
newspapers but little or no coverage on television.25

Interestingly, u sing a sim ilar d ata set on the introd u ction of
television, Gentzkow and Shapiro d o not find a generally negative effect of
preschool television exposu re on stand ard ized test scores latter in life.26 This
su ggests that it is not the m ed iu m , bu t the m essage that m atters. The failu re
to d evote attention to coverage of politics is the key. Wald fogel and George
have reached a sim ilar conclu sion w ith respect to national new spaper
outlets.27 As national ou tlets siphon read ers aw ay from local ou tlets, tu rnout
in local elections d eclines m u ch m ore than tu rnou t in national elections
(which are covered in national outlets).
Framing and Agenda Setting
The broad cast m ed ia play a special role in influencing the agend a of
pu blic policy issu es and the pu blic’s perception of those issu es.28 The agend a
setting and influence of perception that takes place during election campaigns
fram es issu es.29 There is a fierce struggle, a d ance, betw een cand id ates and
Gentzkow , Matthew . “Television and Voter Tu rnou t.” University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business, 28 October 2005,p. 1.
26 Gentzkow , Matthew and Jesse M. Shap iro. 2006. Does Television Rot You r Brain?
New Evidence From the Coleman Study. NBER Working Paper 12021, February.
27 Wald fogel, Joel. W ho Benefits W hom in Local Television M arkets? Philad elp hia: The
Wharton School, November 2001.
28 Kim , Sei-H ill, Dietram A. Scheu fele and Jam es Shanahan. 2002. Think Abou t It This
Way: Attribu te Agend a Setting Fu nction of the Press and the Pu blic’s Evalu ation of a
Local Issu e. Journalism and M ass Communications Quarterly 79:7 Chaffee, Steven and
Stacy Frank. 1996. H ow Am ericans Get Their Political Inform ation: Print versus
Broad cast N ew s. The A nnals of the A merican A cademy of Political and Social Science 546;
McLeod , Jack M., Dietram A. Scheu fele, and Patricia Moy. 1999. Com m u nity,
Com m u nications, and Particip ation: The Role of Mass Med ia and Interp ersonal
Discu ssion in Local Political Particip ation. Political Communication 16; Scheufele,
Dietram A. 2000. “Agend a-setting, Prim ing and Fram ing Revisited : Another Look at
Cognitive Effects of Political Com m u nications.” M ass Communications & Society 3; and
Macom b, Maxw ell. 1972. The Agend a-Setting Fu nction of Mass Med ia. Public Opinion
Quarterly 36.
29 Valentino, N icholas A., Vincent L. H u tchings and Ism ail K. White. 2002. Cu es that
Matter: H ow Political Ad s Prim e Racial Issu es Du ring Cam p aigns. A merican Political
Science Review 96: 75; Ed sall, Thom as B. and Mary D. and Ed sall. Chain Reaction: The
Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes on A merican Politics. N ew York: N orton, 1991;
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. Dirty Politics: Deception, Distraction and Democracy. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992; Gilens, Martin. 1996. “Race Cod ing and White
Opp osition to Welfare,” A merican Political Science Review 90; Mend elberg, Tali,
25
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the media over the agenda of the campaign, because setting the agenda has an
im pact on how people perceive the cand id ates and vote.30 The m ost intense
agenda setting battles have frequently revolved around issues like crime31 and
race. Stud ies have show n that su btle race cu es in cam paign comm u nications
m ay activate racial attitud es, thereby altering the fou nd ations of m ass
political d ecision-making.32 While race m ay be a particu larly prom inent case
of influ ence over attitu d es and agend a-setting, the m ed ia plays a pow erful
role across a broad range of issues.33

“Execu ting H ortons: Racial Crim e in the 1988 Presid ential Cam p aign,” Public Opinion
Quarterly, 61, 1997, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit M essages and the N orms of
Equality. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001; Valentino, N icholas A. 1999.
“Crim e N ew s and the Prim ing of Racial Attitu d es Du ring the Evalu ation of the
President.” Public Opinion Quarterly 63.
30 Ted esco, John, C. “Issu e and Strategy Agend a Setting in the 2004 Presid ential
Election: Exp loring the Cand id ate-Jou rnalist Relationship .” Journalism Studies
6:2;N orton, Michael I. and George R. Goethais. 2004. Sp in (and Pitch) Doctors:
Cam p aign Strategies in Televised Debates. Political Behavior 26:3; Granato, Jim and
M.C. Su nny Wong. 2004. Political Cam p aign Ad vertising Dynam ics. Political Research
Quarterly 57; Dam ore, David . 200. “The Dynam ics of Issu e Ow nership I Presid ential
Campaigns.” Political Research Quarterly, 57:3; Herrson, Paul, S. and Kelly D. Patterson.
“Agend a Setting and Cam p aign Ad vertising in Congressional Elections.” in Jam es A.
Thu rber, Cand ace N elson (ed s.), Crowded A irwaves: Campaign A dvertising in Elections.
Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2000.
31 H olian, David B. 2004. “H e’s Stealing My Issu es! Clinton’s Crim e Rhetoric and the
Dynamics of Issue Ownership.” Political Behavior 26:2.
32 The references cited in su p p ort of this p rop osition inclu d e Mend elberg, 2001;
Coltrane, Scott and Melind a Messineo. 1990. The Perp etu ation of Su btle Preju d ice:
Race and Gend er Im agery in the 1990’s Television Ad vertising. Sex Roles 42; Entm an,
Robert M., and And rew Rojecki. The Black Image in the W hite M ind: M edia and Race in
America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000; Gray, H erm an. W atching Race
Television and the Struggle for Blackness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995;
Dixon, Travis, L. and Daniel Linz. 2000. Overrep resentation and Und errep resentation
of African Am ericans and Latinos as Law breakers on Television N ew s.
Communications Research 50; Gilliam , Franklin D. Jr. and Shanto Iyengar. 2000. “Prim e
Su sp ects: The Influ ence of Local Television N ew s on the View ing Pu blic.” American
Journal of Political Science 44; Peffley, Mark, Tod d Shield s and Bru ce William s. 1996.
The Intersection of Race and Television. Political Communications 13.
33 Kim , Sheu fele and Shanahan, p . 381. Graber, Doris. M ass M edia and A merican Politics.
Washington, DC: Congressional Qu arterly, 1997;Paletz, David L. The M edia in
A merican Politics: Contents and Consequences. N ew York: Longm an, 1999; Ju st, Marion,
R., Ann N . Crigler, Dean F. Alger, Tim othy E. Cook, Montagu e Kern, and Darrell M.
West. Crosstalk: Citizens, Candidates and the M edia in a Presidential Campaign. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996; Kahn, Kim F. and Patrick J. Kenney. The Spectacle of
U.S. Senate Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999; Iyengar, Shanto and
Donald R. Kind er. N ews That M atters: Television and A merican Opinion. Chicago:
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The im portance of visual im ages in priming the au d ience has been
affirm ed , w hile the u nd erstand ing of the m echanism s throu gh w hich the
effect operates grows.
Find ings su ggest that visu al new s im ages (a) influ ence p eop le’s information
p rocessing in w ays that can be u nd erstood only by taking into accou nt
ind ivid u al’s p red isp ositions and valu es, and (b) at the sam e tim e ap p ear to
have a p articu lar ability to trigger consid eration that sp read throu gh one’s
mental framework to other evaluations.34

The special role of television in provid ing inform ation and
influ encing elections is w ell recognized . Research attention now focu ses on
how television affects election cam paigns and pu blic opinion. “[V]oters d o
learn abou t cand id ates and their position on issu es (policy) from cand id ate
advertising.”35
Advertising
The impact of television is pervasive throughout all elections.36
Television has becom e society’s p rim ary sou rce of inform ation, and local
television new s is m ore likely to be u sed by view ers than national new s

University of Chicago Press, 1987; McCom bs, Maxw ell E. and Donald Shaw . 1972. The
Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36.
34 Dom ke, David , David Perlm u tter and Meg Sp ratt. 2002. The Prim es of Ou r Tim es?
An Examination of the ‘Power’ of Visual Images. Journalism 3: 131. The authors present
a d etailed social p sychological and even neu rological d iscu ssion of the reasons w hy
and w ays in w hich visu al im ages have a greater im p act, bu t the p olitically oriented
research that they cite as consistent w ith their find ings inclu d e Krosnick, J. A. and D.
R. Kind er. 1990. Altering the Fou nd ation of Su p p ort for the Presid ent Throu gh
Priming. A merican Political Science Review 84; Pan, Z. and G. M. Kosicki. 1997. Prim ing
and Med ia Imp act on the Evalu ation the Presid ent’s Perform ance. Communications
Research 24; Ju st, M. R., A. N . Crigler and W. R. N eu m an. “Cognitive and Affective
Dim ensions of Political Concep tu alization.” in A. N . Crigler (ed s.), The Psychology of
Political Communications. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996; Iyengar and
Kinder.
35 H ansen, Glenn J. and William Benoit. 2002. Presid ential Television Ad vertising and
Public Policy Priorities, 1952 –2002. Communications Studies 53: 285. The studies cited in
su p p ort of this p rop osition inclu d e Patterson, T. E., and McClu re, R. D. The Unseeing
Eye: The M yth of Television Power in N ational Politics. N ew York: Pu tnam Books, 1976;
Kern, M. 30 Second Politics: Political A dvertising in the Eighties. N ew York: Praeger,
1988; Brians, C. L. and M. P. Wattenberg. 1996. Cam p aigns Issu e Know led ge and
Salience: Comp aring Recep tion for TV Com m ercials, TV N ew s, and N ew sp ap ers.
American Journal of Political Science 40.
36 Brazeal, LeAnn M, and William L. Benoit. 2001. A Fu nctional Analysis of
Congressional Television Spots. Communications Quarterly 49: 346-437.
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broad casts. Therefore, how su ch election new s is relayed on local television is
increasingly important in our political system.
Cand id ates and cam p aign consu ltants believe that television ad vertising is
pivotal to winning a state-level campaign…
Research confirm s that television sp ots influ ence election ou tcom es at all
levels.37

The im pact of television is not only in new s coverage, bu t also, and
perhaps even m ore im portantly, in ad vertising and the interaction betw een
ad vertising and new s. TV in general, and netw ork TV in particular, has
becom e the p rem ier vehicle for political ad vertising. The d ifferential im pact
of television advertising is clear.
Clearly, television is a u niqu e com m u nications m ed iu m u nlike any other,
inclu d ing p rint, rad io, and trad itional p ublic ad d ress. Unlike m ost other
m ed ia, television incorp orates a significant nonverbal com p onent, w hich not
only serves to su p p ress the im p ortance of content bu t also requ ires little
deliberative message processing…
A nu m ber of em p irical stu d ies have conclu d ed that reliance on inform ation
from television lead s to less u nd erstand ing of p olicy issues than new sp ap ers.
Stu d ies also ind icate that w hen p eop le u se television for p olitical new s, they
em erge less inform ed than those of equ al ed u cation and p olitical interest w ho
avoid the medium.38

Certainly the hu ge am ou nts spent on TV ad vertising by cand id ates
attests to its im portance. The au d ience that is m ost su sceptible to ad vertising
and new s coverage by this accou nt is precisely the aud ience on w hich general
elections focu s – the u nd ecid ed m id d le – thereby ju stifying the spend ing.
Whereas cand id ates m ust focus on the com m itted , active party base in
prim aries, they m u st shift their attention to the less aw are, less com m itted
middle of the political spectrum to get elected. 39

Carter, Fico and McCabe, 2002, p . 42.. In su p p ort of this statem ent the au thors cite
Joslyn, R. 1981. “The Im p act of Cam p aign Sp ot Ad vertising Ad s.” Journalism Quarterly
7; Mulder, R. 1979. “The Effects of Televised Political Ads in the 1995 Chicago Mayoral
Election.” Journalism Quarterly 56; and Pfau, M. and H. C. Kenski. Attack Politics. New
York: Praeger, 1990.
38 Sinclair, Jon R. 1995. “Reforming Television’s Role in American Political Campaigns:
Rationale for the Elim ination of Paid Political Ad vertisem ents.” Communications and
the Law March.
Gw iasd a, Gregory W. 2001. “N etw ork N ew s Coverage of Cam p aign Ad vertisem ents:
Med ia’s Ability to Reinforce Cam p aign Messages.” A merican Politics Research 29: 461
Kaid, L. L., et al. 1993. Television News and Presidential Campaigns: The Legitimation
of Televised Political Ad vertising. Social Science Quarterly 74; Ansolaehere, S and S.
Iyengar. 1995. “Rid ing the Waive and Claim ing Ow nership Over Issu es: The Joint
Effect of Ad vertising and N ew s Coverage in Cam p aigns.” Public Opinion Quarterly 58;
37
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TELEVISION AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
There is yet a m ore fu nd am ental m anner in w hich television affects
political d ialogu e. Many m ed ia critics across the political spectru m have
argu ed that hyper com m ercialism , com bined w ith the expansion of m ed ia
ou tlets, d eeply affects the new s reporting process, particu larly as it relates to
politics. The m ed ia ow nership proceed ing d oes not d irectly ad d ress the
question of hyper com m ercialism . H ow ever, m ed ia ow nership ru les should
be cognizant of the u nd erlying forces that affect the m ed ia. We believe that
the negative effect that m ed ia processes have on political d iscou rse reinforces
the case for d iversity of institu tions and sou rces. H yper com m ercialism w ill
not go aw ay w ith a m ore concentrated m ed ia m arket, bu t its negative effects
w ill be heightened if the market becom es m ore concentrated and institu tional
diversity withers.
The News Production Cycle of Commercial Mass Media
On the one hand , there are m ore television ou tlets need ing to fill
m ore space than ever before.40 On the other hand , these ou tlets need to attract
m ore view ers than ever to be profitable. The m ed ia’s sched ule and perpetu al
new s cycle becom e the d riving force, em phasizing speed , simplicity and
routinization.41 The news production process is transformed.
The p roblem s stem largely from the very natu re of com m ercially sup p lied
new s in a big cou ntry. N ew s organizations are resp onsible for su p p lying an
always-new p rod u ct to large nu m bers of p eop le, regu larly and on tim e. As a
resu lt, new s m u st be m ass-p rod u ced , virtu ally requ iring an ind u strial p rocess
that takes place on a kind of assembly line.42

Lem ert, Jam es B. William R. Elliott, and Jam es M. Bernstein. N ews V erdicts, the Debates,
and Presidential Campaigns. N ew York: Praeger, 1991; H ansen and Benoit, p . 284. While
Zaller, J. R. The N ature and Origins of M ass Opinion. N ew York: Cam brid ge University
Press, 1998 is cited as the origin of the hyp othesis on effect, the au thor d oes note that
Joslyn, M. and S. Cecolli. 1996. “Attentiveness to Television N ew s and Op inion
Change in the Fall of 1992 Election Cam p aign.” Political Behavior 18, find that the m ost
attentive are m ost influ enced . Benoit, William L. and Glenn H ansen. 2002. Issu e
Ad ap tation of Presid ential Television Sp ots and Debates to Prim ary and General
Audiences. Communications Research Reports 19.
40 Kovach, Bill and Tom Rosenstiel. W arp Speed: A merica in the A ge of M ixed M edia. New
York: The Century Foundation Press, 1999.
41 Gans, H erbert J. Democracy and the N ews. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003, p .
50; Kovach and Rosentsteil, 1999, p. 6.
42 Gans,2003, p. 49.
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The tight sched u les and com petition for attention pu t their stamp on
the new sgathering and reporting process.43 Reporting becom es highly
cond ensed and selective.44 Planned events and personalities are the easiest to
cover. Short pieces requ ire extrem e sim plification. Stories becom e stylized so
they can be easily conveyed . Tim e pressures create a tend ency to not only
ru n quickly w ith a story bu t to u ncritically pass throu gh manu factu red
news.45 Entertainm ent and aesthetic valu es d ictate the nature of the pictu re
and getting good vid eo images becom es a critical need .46 Staging gives the
news the predictability it needs, but results in typecasting and posing.47
Com petition d rives new s ou tlets to seek blockbuster scoops and to
play the big story more intensely and longer, to hold the larger audiences that
have been attracted .48 The search to find and m aintain the au d ience’s
attention d rives the m ed ia tow ard s exaggeration and em otionalism at the
expense of analysis.
Fou r types of new s are id eally su ited to perform this fu nction.
Celebrity personalities becom e a centerpiece becau se of the easy point of
focu s on highly visible ind ivid u als.49 Scand al attracts au d iences so the
personal travails of prominent figu res in titillating circu m stances are grist for
the m ed ia m ill, attracting attention w ithou t threatening the au d ience. This
new s may not be happy, bu t it fills the preference for happy new s becau se it
involves someone else’s trou bles of no d irect relevance to pu blic policy or the
pu blic’s w elfare. The horse race and hoopla – the gam e fram e – is another
easy w ay to fram e the new s and to prod u ce constant u pd ating of w ho is
ahead.50 Who w ins and loses is m u ch easier to portray than the complexity of
w hat is at stake. Verbal d u els 51 and lou d , often one-sid ed argum ents find
au d iences more easily than reasoned , balanced d ebates.52 Talk show pu nd its

Street, John. Mass Media, Politics and Democracy. New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 36-52.
Graber, Doris A. 2003. “The Rocky Road to N ew Parad igm s: Mod ernizing N ew s and
Citizenship Standards.” Political Communication 20,113-114.
45 Kovach and Rosentsteil, 1999, p. 21, 44.
46 Meyer, Thomas. Media Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p. 32-35.
47 Meyer, 2002, p . 67; Graber, 2003, p . 112-114; Jones, N icholas. Soundbites and
Spindoctors: How Politicians M anipulate the M edia – and V isa V ersa. Lond on: Cassel,
1995.
48 Kovach and Rosentsteil, 1999, p. 7-8.
49 Street, 2001, p. 47-49; Meyerowitz, J. No Sense of Place: The Effect of Electronic Media on
Social Behavior. New York: Oxford, 1985.
50 Street, 2001, p . 47; Graber, p . 111-112; Gitlin, T. “Bits and Blip s: Chu nk N ew s, Savvy
Talk and the Bifu rcation of Am erican Politics.” in P. Dahlgren and C. Sp arks (ed s.),
Communications and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere. Lond on: Rou tled ge,
1991, p. 119-136.
51 Meyer, 2002, p. 35; Kovach and Rosenstiel, 1999, p. Ch. 7; Street, 2001, p. 44
52 Barker, David, C. Rushed to Judgment. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
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grab attention w ith extrem e positions, u su ally negative attacks on targets that
are not in the room to defend themselves.
The Impact on Journalism and Politics
Both jou rnalism and politics su ffer as a resu lt of this process.
Pressu res to su bm it to heavy profit-m axim izing strategies that foster financial
gain at the expense of journalistic values prevail. As a result, “There has been
an enorm ous increase in expend itu re on pu blic relations by both governm ent
and business… these powerful institutions subsidize the cost of gathering and
processing the new s in ord er to influ ence positively the w ay they are
reported.”53
Politicians conform and cater to the demands of the media, while they
leverage their ability to m anipulate their pu blic im age. The politicians
acquiesce in a Faustian bargain. “In exchange for their ‘tactical’ submission to
the media rules, political actors gain a well-founded expectation that they will
be invited to help shape the w ay the m ed ia portray them.”54 Their interaction
w ith the m ed ia becom es a form of extracted pu blicity as photo-ops and other
prem ed itated activities that place them in the m ost favorable theatrical light
serve their interests. Political entities subm it to the m ed ia’s d ictatorship over
the d epiction of parties and personalities, “in w hich both politics and the
m ed ia recognize only images of them selves, thereby losing sight of the real
world.”55
Jou rnalism d egenerates into a d ance56 betw een reporters and political
hand lers in w hich the spinm eisters have the u pper hand . Spinm eisters
becom e gatekeepers w ho can pu nish or rew ard w ith access to politicians and
w ho control the sched uling of events. They can stonew all som e or give
exclusives to others. As a resu lt, “top-d ow n new s tu rns journalists into
m essengers of the very political, governm ental, and other lead ers w ho are…
felt to be u ntru stw orthy and u nresponsive by significant nu mbers of poll
respondents.”57 The m ed ia prod u ces a blend of new s and free ad vertising for
the cand id ates.58 As w ith all ad vertising, the point m ay be to give a
m isim pression rather than convey accurate information. H ence, jou rnalistic

Levine, Peter. “Can the Internet Rescue Democracy? Toward an On-Line Commons.”
In Ronald H ayu k and Kevin Mattson (ed s.), Democracy’s M oment: Reforming the
A merican Political System for the 21st Century. Lanham , ME: Row m an and Littlefield ,
2002, P. 124.
54 Meyer, 2002, p. 58.
55 Meyer, 2002, p. 133; Gans, 2003, p. 47-48.
56 Sp arrow , Bartholom ew H . Uncertain Guardians: The N ews M edia as A Political
Institution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999: 28-38.
57 Gans, 2003, p. 49.
58 Meyer, 2002, p. 53; Dorner, A. Politainment. Frankfurt/Main: Surhkamp, 2001.
53
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valu es are m arred .59 Depend ence on w ell-connected sou rces and pressu res to
get a story ou t first short-circu it the application of trad itional stand ard s of
reporting. Discourse d egenerates into a stream of stage-managed,
entertainment-oriented, issueless politics.60
The w atchd og fu nction is short-circu ited by close relationships.61 This
aw ard s too m u ch attention to too few political figures and view s and sets the
stage for politicians to manage their public identities through manipulation of
the m ed ia’s tend encies. Parties and ord inary grou p affiliations reced e, as
individuals and lead institutions become the center of attention.
The fashion in w hich stories are selected and the tim e-fram e w ithin
w hich these stories are d eveloped , in accord ance w ith m ass m ed ia’s pursuit
of big head lines and profits, have u nd ercu t politicians’ ability to realize
legitim ate political agend as.62 Instead , parties and political players shape
their d ecisions and actions w ithin the framew ork of how the m ed ia w ill
present them.63
Withou t an ongoing d ialogu e of the cond itions that enable the
reported events to take place, the pu blic cannot ad equately form u late
opinions; hence, they cannot act or m obilize in an ed u cated m anner. Pu blic
involvem ent in policy form ation suffers not only because of the shift in focu s
fostered by the m ed ia, bu t also becau se of the short tim e-fram e d em and ed by
the m ed ia. The recognition of the new s as being reported ‘ou tsid e of time’
highlights the trou bling d ifference betw een the med ia’s tim eline and the
timeline necessary for political agendas to be carried out.64
The critical elem ents of responsibility, causality and connected ness
betw een events are lost. “Abbreviating the tim e interval norm ally d em and ed
by the political process d ow n to w hat the m ed ia’s prod u ction sched ule
perm its m eans abrid ging the entire process by d eleting the proced u ral
com ponents that qu alify it as d em ocratic.” 65 Insisting that politicians’ ru sh to
get their views to their constituents before they can be swayed in an opposing
d irection fu rther tru ncates d ebate.66 The rapid -fire sequ ence of sim ple,
em otional snapshots staged to increase popu larity replaces d iscou rse as the
basis of politics.

Graber, 2003, p. 88.
Gans, 2003, p. 50-51.
61 Curran, James. Media and Power. London: Routledge, 2002, p. 150.
62 Street, 2001, p. 57-58, 83, 90.
63 Gans, 2003, p . 83; Cook; Cook, Tim othy E. Governing with the N ew: The N ews M edia as
a Political Institution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998
64 Meyer, 2002, p. 24.
65 Meyer, 2002, p. 106.
66 Meyer, 2002, p. 104.
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Implications
Institu tional d iversity can play an important role. To m ost m ed ia
analysts in ou r d em ocracy, institu tions play a critical role in m ed iating
betw een ind ivid uals and the political process. Som e d raw the link between
the institution and the investigative role.
Dem ocratic governance requ ires a free p ress not ju st in the sense of a d iversity
of exp ression. It requ ires the institution of a free p ress. It requ ires m ed ia w ith
the financial w herew ithal and p olitical ind ep end ence to engage in su stained
investigative jou rnalism , to exp ose the errors and excesses of governm ent and
other powerful political and economic actors…
Ou r best hop e for d em ocratic governance in this w orld is far m essier than the
id eal rep u blic of yeom en. It requ ires m ed iating institu tions and associations,
p rivate and p u blic concentrations of w ealth and p ow er, and varied
m echanism s to m aintain m u ltip le balances of p ow er w ithin governm ent,
within civil society, and between government and civil society.
One of the central benefits of p rom oting d econcentrated and d iverse m ed ia
m arkets is to p rovid e a self-checking fu nction on the m ed ia. The m ed ia need s
to be accountable to the public, but that function cannot, as a general matter, be
provided by government action in our political system. It can best be provided
by the m ed ia itself, as long as there is vigorou s antagonism betw een sou rces of
news and information.

Institu tional d iversity reflects the special expertise and cu ltu re of
certain m ed ia, such as the new spaper trad ition of in-d epth investigative
jou rnalism . Institu tional d iversity is grou nd ed in the w atchd og fu nction.67
The quality of investigative reporting and the accessibility of d ifferent types
of institu tions to lead ers and the p u blic are prom oted by institu tional
d iversity. Institu tional d iversity involves d ifferent stru ctu res of m ed ia
presentation (d ifferent business m od els, jou rnalistic cu lture and trad ition)
and these institu tions often involve d ifferent ind epend ent ow ners and
viewpoints across media. To promote institutional diversity, like other forms
of d iversity, the institu tions m u st be ind epend ently ow ned . Yet even in
ind epend ently ow ned conglom erates, the journalistic ethic can be
overw helm ed .
Institu tional d iversity is im pacted by conglom eration.

Baker, C. Ed w in. M edia, M arkets and Democracy. Cam brid ge: Cam brid ge University
Press, 2001, p . 85: argu es as follow s: “To p erform these, d ifferent societal su bgrou p s
need their ow n m ed ia. Ad m itted ly, these su bgrou p s (or their m em bers) m ay not
necessarily need to ow n or control their ow n ind ep end ent m ed ia. Avenu es of regu lar
and effective media access might suffice. Still, much greater confidence that the media
w ill serve the d em ocratic need s of these grou p s w ou ld be ju stified if ow nership or
control was so distributed.”
67
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Institu tional d iversity is also extrem ely im portant for the broad er pu blic
policy issue of noncommercial sources of news.
CONCLUSION
The extrem e im portance of television as a sou rce of information for
citizens and influ ence on pu blic opinion and voting behavior has been
d em onstrated strongly over the past d ecad e in the social science literatu re.
Stu d y 7, d ocu m ents that the pu blic still relies on television as its prim ary
sou rce of new s and inform ation. The loop has been closed by ad d ing the link
between media and politics to the link between media ownership and point of
view . The d ram atic interaction betw een political cam paigns, political process
and the media underscores the critical importance of media policy.

105

PART III:
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STUDY 7
MEDIA USAGE:
TRADITIONAL OUTLETS STILL DOMINATE
LOCAL NEWS AND INFORMATION
M ARK COOPER
CORRECTING THE FLAWS IN THE FCC A PPROACH
In establishing new stand ard s for w hen a local broad caster m ay ow n
new spapers in a com m u nity, the FCC highlighted the need to und erstand
w hat m ed ia people actu ally use the m ost 1 to obtain local new s and
information, 2 to ensu re that its rules accu rately reflect the influence of each
m ed iu m in local markets. Unfortu nately, the Comm ission never cond u cted
or fou nd a su rvey that asked the m ost im portant qu estion: w hich m ed ia
people rely on most for local new s and information. This u nfortunate lack of
data was a correctible error that the FCC chose to ignore.
Therefore, in Janu ary of 2004, a national rand om sample su rvey w as
cond u cted to assess the relative im portance of m ed ia sources for new s and
information abou t national and local events.3 The su rvey w as d esigned in
part to address the critical methodological flaw in the FCC’s analysis of media
sources4 w hich w as cond u cted as one of the Med ia Ow nership Working
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. 2003. 2002 Biennial Regu latory Review –
Review of the Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and Other Ru les Ad op ted
Pursu ant to Section 202 of the Telecom m u nications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620,
13711-47¶ 409. (hereafter Ord er). “We have conclu d ed that variou s m ed ia are
su bstitu tes in p rovid ing view p oint d iversity, bu t w e have no reason to believe that all
m ed ia are of equ al im p ortance. Ind eed the resp onses to the su rvey m ake it clear that
som e m ed ia are m ore im p ortant than others, su ggesting a need to assign relative
weights to the various media,”
2 Order, at ¶ 32, “Althou gh all content in visual and au ral med ia have the p otential to
exp ress view points, w e find that view p oint d iversity is m ost easily m easu red throu gh
new s and p u blic affairs p rogram m ing. N ot only is new s p rogram m ing m ore easily
m easu red than other typ es of content containing view p oints, bu t it relates m ost
d irectly to the Com m ission’s core p olicy objective of facilitating robu st d em ocratic
d iscou rse in the m ed ia. Accord ingly, w e have sou ght in this p roceed ing to m easu re
how certain ownership structures affect news output.”
3 The su rvey instru m ent w as ad m inistered by the Op inion Research Corp oration as
p art of their Caravan Su rvey, w hich consisted of a national sam p le of 1011
respondents.
4 Coop er, Mark. 2003. A bracadabra! Hocus Pocus! M aking M edia M arket Power Disappear
with the FCC’s Diversity Index. Washington, D.C.: Consu m er Fed eration of Am erica,
Consumers Union.
1
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Grou p (MOWG) projects.5 In ou r su rveys, w e correct this and other m ajor
errors in the FCC’s survey approach to media weights.6
Distinguishing Between Local and National News and Information
In its effort to id entify the m ost im portant sou rces of new s, the FCC
asked a qu estion that com bined both national and local new s. “What single
sou rce d o you u se m ost often for local or national new s and current affairs?”
This, of cou rse, d estroys the possibility of u sing this qu estion to specifically
assess the importance of local m ed ia. Instead , the FCC fell back on a m u ch
w eaker qu estion abou t local sou rces of new s. “What sou rce, if any, have you
u sed in the past 7 d ays for local new s and cu rrent affairs?” 7 This question
d oes not necessarily tell u s anything abou t w hat people u se or rely u pon the
m ost for local new s and inform ation in the broad sense. It belittles the
im portance of the local new s question by not only shrinking the scope of
consid eration for respond ents (“in the past 7 d ays”), bu t also by being itself
dismissive of the question altogether (“What source, if any…”).
We corrected this problem in our surveys. In the first survey we used
the id entical w ord ing of the FCC, bu t w e ask separate qu estions abou t
national and local sou rces of new s. To d istinguish the national from the local
object of the qu estion, w e gave exam ples. Fu rthermore, because the criticism
of the FCC approach stem s in part from its reliance on a “w eak” qu estion
abou t frequency of u se that failed to d irectly ad d ress the importance of
sou rces, w e asked a second qu estion abou t each sou rce that w as intend ed to
pinpoint the importance of the sources in determining public opinion.8
N ielsen Med ia Research. 2002. “Consu m er Su rvey On Med ia Usage.” Media
Ownership Working Group Study No. 8, September.
6 More technical and d etailed d iscu ssions of the su rvey flaw s ad d ressed in this p ap er
as w ell as other technical flaw s in the FCC ap p roach can be fou nd in Coop er, Mark N .
2003. M edia Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Information A ge. Palo Alto: Center
for Internet and Society, Chapters 7 and 8.
7 The FCC also asked the qu estion in an u nbalanced m anner. That is, it d irectly asked
all the resp ond ents w ho m ention a given m ed ia in response to the first qu estion,
w hether they had gotten any new s from each of the other sou rces. The few er the
resp ond ents w ho gave a m ed iu m in resp onse to the first qu estion, the greater the
nu m ber w ho w ere d irectly p rom p ted abou t it on the second rou nd . The FCC then
gave equ al w eights to the first and second resp onses. This has the effect of artificially
increasing the w eight of the lesser sou rces (since more p eop le are p rom p ted )
especially when the question is about weak exposure to a source.
8 Moy Patricia, Marcos Torres, Keiko Tanaka, and Michael R. McClu skey. 2005.
Know led ge or Tru st? Investigating Linkages betw een Med ia Reliance and
Participation. Communications Research 32:1, p . 62 note that in d escribing “the constru ct
of m ed ia d ep end ency and its op erationalization… reliance [is] grou nd ed in intensity
(w hether and how m u ch an au d ience m em ber relies on a p articu lar m ed iu m for a
5
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Handling Multiple Responses
The FCC com pou nd ed the problem by m ishand ling the responses to
its w eak question. This w as an open-end ed qu estion in w hich respond ents
w ere allow ed m u ltiple responses. Sou rces they m ention first clearly cam e to
their m ind s. One m ight infer that w hat they recall reflects the im portance of
the sou rces to them . Unfortu nately, the FCC d id not sim ply accept these
responses. It follow ed u p w ith a prompted question d irected only at those
w ho d id not m ention a specific source. The FCC asked those people w ho
failed to m ention a sou rce w hether they had u sed it. The FCC then com bined
the answ ers to the tw o questions, giving them equal w eight. This approach
w as certain to overw eight the less prevalent and im portant sou rces by asking
m any m ore people abou t those sou rces a second tim e w ith a prom pted
question.
In ord er to accom m od ate m u ltiple sou rces of inform ation, w e
ad opted the approach used by the Pew Research Center for People and the
Press.9 The Interview er read s a list of potential sou rces and record s the
sou rces cited first and second as m ost frequ ent and as m ost im portant. The
resulting list of questions is as follow:
N ow thinking abou t national issu es, like the Presid ential election or the w ar in
Iraq, what single source do you use most often for news and information?
And what do you use second most often?
Which single sou rce is m ost im p ortant in d eterm ining you r op inion abou t
national issues?
And what source is second most important?
Now thinking about local issues, like the a city council election or school, police
and fire d ep artm ent services, w hat single sou rce d o you u se m ost often for
news and information?
And what do you use second most often?
Which single source is m ost im p ortant in d eterm ining you r op inion abou t local
issues?
And what source is second most important?

specific political issue) and exposure as frequency (how often an individual watches or
read s abou t p olitics).”
They cite Miller, M.M. and S.D. Reese. 1982. Med ia
Dep end ency as Interaction: Effects of Exp osure and Reliance on Political Activity and
Efficacy. Communications Research 9.
9 Pew Research Center Su rvey. 2004. “Perception of Partisan Bias Seen as Grow ing—
Esp ecially
by
Dem ocrats.”
11 Jan.
Available from
http :/ / p eop lepress.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=200.
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Identifying Media Types
The FCC survey also failed to properly d istingu ish betw een the
d ifferent types of TV d elivery. The FCC asked abou t broad casting v. cable,
bu t w ith over 80% of all hou sehold s su bscribing to cable or satellite and
receiving the broad cast netw orks in the su bscription, the broad cast/ cable
d istinction becom es confusing. The FCC acknow led ged that it had problem s
with the responses to these questions on its survey instrument, noting that
[a]lthou gh the resp onses to one su rvey qu estion in MOWG [Med ia Ow nership
Working Grou p ] stu d y N o. 8 su ggests that cable is a significant sou rce of local
new s and cu rrent affairs, other d ata from the stu d y casts som e d ou bt on this
resu lt… Ou r exp erience su ggests that the local cable new s resp onse is too
high.”10

The problem w as their failu re to d istingu ish national from local
sources.
In ou r first su rvey, w e u sed a qu estion sim ilar to the FCC that
distinguished cable from broadcast, allowing the national v. local issues to cut
throu gh the confu sion. H aving show n that the pu blic d oes d istinguish
betw een national and local TV sou rces of new s and inform ation, w hen given
separate qu estions, as d iscu ssed below , w e changed the w ord ing in the
second su rvey to reflect the u nd erlying d istinction – national v. local TV and
d aily new spapers. This follow s the Pew w ord ing in TV choices. The choice
sets for media sources in the two surveys are as follows:
Broadcast TV channels
Cable or satellite news channels
A daily newspaper
A local weekly newspaper

Local TV news
National TV news
A local daily newspaper
A national daily newspaper
A local weekly newspaper

Radio
The Internet
Magazines
OTHER [SPECIFY]
NONE
DON’T KNOW
REFUSED

Radio
The Internet
Magazines
OTHER [SPECIFY]
NONE
DON’T KNOW
REFUSED

The u ltimate goal of this exercise is to prod u ce the m ost highly
refined and cau tiou s estim ate of local sources of new s. Ultim ately, in ou r
analysis of local m ed ia m arket stru ctu re, w e base ou r m ed ia w eights on local
10

Order, ¶¶413-414.
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TV, local d ailies, local w eeklies, and rad io, w hich are the d om inant sou rces of
local new s by far, bu t w e also treat national new s outlets and the Internet as
ad d itional new s sou rces. H ow ever, as the results show , they have little
weight in local news.
TRADITIONAL S OURCES OF LOCAL N EWS D IFFER D RAMATICALLY FROM
S OURCES OF N ATIONAL N EWS
We begin the analysis by review ing the evid ence that w as at the core
of the rem and ed rules. We then bring in the resu lts of ou r m ost recent
survey.
The 2002-2004 Surveys
To begin the analysis, w e com pare ou r w ord ing and approach to the
Dec. 19, 2003 – Jan. 4, 2004 su rvey resu lts obtained by The Pew Research
Center for The People & The Press.
For national issu es the resu lts for both the first m entions and the total
m entions are very sim ilar in the tw o su rveys. For national new s, television
(cable plu s broad cast) d om inates in both su rveys, getting the first m ention
over 60% of the time (see Exhibit 1). Newspapers are next, with first mentions
in the m id -teens. Rad io and the Internet garner approximately 10%,
sometimes slightly less.
In both su rveys, new spapers m ove u p as a percentage of total
m entions, to the m id -twenties, w hile TV d eclines to arou nd or slightly below
50%. Throughou t this analysis, w henever w e show the su m of first and
second mentions, we present them as a percentage of the total mentions. This
is essentially w hat the FCC d id by creating an ind ex that su m m ed to 100%.
Radio and the Internet remain at around 10%.
In fact, these national resu lts have been quite stable for over a d ecad e
(see Exhibit 2). Over the cou rse of the past d ozen years, the Internet appears
to have red uced new spapers, rad io and other sou rces by a few percentage
points.
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Exhibit 1: National Sources of News – CFA Compared to Pew

PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS
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FIRST MENTION
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Source: Consumer Federation of A merica/Consumers Union Poll, January 2004; Pew Research
Center for the People & the Press. 2003. “Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented
Political N ews Universe.” Pew Research Center. 11 January 200, 3The Pew Research Center
For The People & The Press, Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political N ews
Universe, January 11, 2003.
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PERCENT OF TOTAL MENTIONS

Exhibit 2: Trends of Most Used Media: Early in Presidential Election Years
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Source: Sources: Graber, Doris A., Graber, Doris. Processing Politics. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2001Processing Politics: Learning from Television in the Internet A ge
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 3; N ielsen M edia Research. 2002. “Consumer
Survey On M edia Usage.” M edia Ownership W orking Group Study N o. 8, September
N ielsen, Consumer Survey on M edia Usage (Federal Communications Commission, M edia
Ownership Working Group, September 2002). Pew Research Center for the People & the Press.
2003. “Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political News Universe.” Pew Research
Center. 11 January 2003The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, Cable and
Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political N ews Universe, January 11, 2003; Source:
Consumer Federation of A merica/Consumers Union Poll., January 2004 Pew Research Center
For The People & The Press. 2003. “Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political
N ews Universe.” Pew Research Center. 11 January 2003; The Pew Research Center For The
People & The Press, Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political N ews Universe,
January 11, 2003.

H ow ever, a careful analysis of major sou rces for local new s and
information tells a very d ifferent story (see Exhibit 3). Ou r su rvey show s that
the d ifference betw een sou rces of national and local new s is quite d ram atic
and consistent with widely recognized patterns of media usage.
N ew spapers are a m u ch m ore im portant sou rce of local new s. Local
new spapers (d ailies plu s w eeklies) are the first m entions of 57% of the
respond ents com pared to only 15% for national new s. Television d rops from
62% (for national new s) to 27% (for local new s). N ote, how ever, that
broad cast television rem ains qu ite im portant. The Internet d rops from 10%
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(for national news) to 2% (for local news). Radio is constant at just under 10%
for both national and local news.
Exhibit 3: 2004 Survey, Frequency of Use and Importance of Sources of
Local and National News and Information
(% of Respondents)

MOST
OFTEN
USED

Dailies
Weeklies
Broadcast
Cable
Internet
Radio
Magazines

Dailies
Weeklies
Broadcast
MOST
Cable
IMPORTANT
Internet
Radio
Magazines

FIRST MENTION
Local
National
35
14
22
3
21
27
6
35
2
10
7
9
0
1
34
18
21
6
3
8
0

16
3
24
30
10
9
2

TOTAL MENTIONS
Local
National
30
21
20
6
24
23
9
25
4
12
13
11
0
2
29
17
24
10
5
14
0

22
6
20
23
9
10
1

Source: Consumer Federation of America/Consumers Union Poll. January 2004Consumer
Federation of America/Consumers Union Survey, Poll, January 2004.

For total mentions we found the same pattern. Newspapers are much
m ore frequ ently m entioned for local new s, TV and the Internet less so.
Broad cast TV is cited at rou ghly the sam e level for both local and national
news. Radio is relatively constant.
The results for the responses to the question asking abou t “the m ost
im portant new s sou rce” track the results for the responses to “the m ost often
u sed new s sou rce” qu ite closely. For national new s, TV is m ost frequ ently
cited , follow ed by new spapers, rad io and the Internet. N ote that television is
som ew hat less likely to be cited as important (54% of first m entions) than
m ost u sed (62% of first m entions). For local new s, the pattern of first
m entions is alm ost id entical to that for m ost u sed . Broad cast television is the
second m ost often cited sou rce on influence. It is relatively constant across
local and national.
The ability of respond ents to d istingu ish betw een d ifferent m ed ia for
d ifferent types of new s is reinforced by their nu anced responses to the
television qu estion.
The cable/ broad cast d ifference is critical for
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understanding the role of the media in civic discourse. Repeated claims about
the abu nd ance of program m ing available affected the fram ew ork in w hich
m ed ia ow nership rules w ere w ritten by the FCC. Ou r su rvey show s that the
FCC’s references to an abu nd ance of national entertainm ent channels –
“hu nd red s of choices” – are largely irrelevant to the Com m ission’s central
obligation to prom ote d iversity and com petition in local sou rces of new s and
information.
Approxim ately 35% of respond ents listed cable as their first m ention
for national new s, bu t only 6% listed it as their first m ention for local new s.
In contrast, broad cast TV w as given as the first m ention for national new s by
27% of the respond ents and 21% m entioned it first for local new s. This is
consistent w ith the evid ence in the FCC’s m ed ia ow nership record that cable
d oes not provid e a significant ind epend ent sou rce of local new s, w hile
broadcast remains a very significant source of local news.
The 2005-2006 Surveys
The results of the 2006 survey parallel those of the 2004 survey closely
(see Exhibit 4). For exam ple, the su m of TV in the national qu estion on first
m entions is 59 percent, com pared to 62 percent in the earlier su rvey. There is
also a sharp d ifference betw een the source and im portance of d ifferent m ed ia
types d epend ing on the type of new s being ad d ressed . TV plays a m u ch
m ore prom inent role in national new s, prim arily because of national TV. The
m ain im pact of changing the w ord ing of the qu estions appears to have been
to increase the relative importance of local TV, perhaps because of the earlier
w ord ing of “broad casting” or “cable and satellite” d id not clearly id entify
local TV.
Local new spapers have a m u ch larger role in local new s, as in the
earlier su rvey. Dailies w ere 35 percent of first m entions for local in 2004; they
are 37 percent in 2006.
Local dailies and weeklies have a much smaller role in national issues
than in local issu es. The reliance on and im portance of local d aily
new spapers is abou t the sam e in the 2006 su rvey as they w ere in the 2004
su rvey. The reliance and im portance of w eekly new spapers and their
importance is much lower in the 2006 survey.
The other m ajor find ing from the prior earlier su rvey that is
replicated here is that the Internet is a mu ch less frequ ent or im portant source
of local new s than national new s. These resu lts w ill be exam ined in d etail in
the section on the Internet.
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Exhibit 4: 2006 Survey, Frequency of Use and Importance of Sources of
Local and National News and Information
(% of Respondents)

MOST
OFTEN
USED

Local Dailies
National Dailies
Local Weeklies
National TV
Local TV
Internet
Radio
Magazines
Other

FIRST MENTION
Local
National
37
10
1
3
12
31
2
38
33
21
3
14
6
10
0
14
2
1

Local Dailies
34
National Dailies
2
Local Weeklies
10
National TV
6
MOST
Local TV
30
IMPORTANT
Internet
4
Radio
8
Magazines
1
Other
2
Source: Consumer Group Survey, August 2006.

12
5
2
35
14
13
10
2
1

TOTAL MENTIONS
Local
National
31
16
1
5
11
4
4
30
33
20
5
14
12
10
1
3
2
1
29
2
10
6
31
6
12
1
2

16
5
3
30
17
13
11
3
1

While there is great sim ilarity in the overall m entions of m ore
frequ ent and m ost im portant sou rces of new s, it shou ld be noted that there
are d ifferences at the ind ivid u al level, as pred icted by the political science
literatu re, w hich shed s som e light on the local sources. Exhibit 5 show s the
sou rces cited as m ost im portant w ithin each m ed ium that w as cited as m ost
frequ ent. The d iagonals show the consistent responses. For exam ple, 44
percent of the respond ents w ho said local TV w as their m ost frequ ent sou rce
of news on national issues also said local TV was the most important source.
The results for im portance of the m ed ia track those for frequ ency of
u se qu ite closely in the aggregate (see Exhibit 5). The sou rces rank in the
sam e ord er as for u se and the percentages are sim ilar. It is also notable that
the d ailies are cited as the m ost u sed and m ost im portant sou rce of local
new s, su rpassing TV by 4 % for both u se and im portance, bu t that TV gets
m any m ore second m entions. Sim ilarly, local w eeklies exceed rad io in first
mentions, but radio gets more second mentions.

Exhibit 5: Most Frequent Source Compared to Most Important Source (Percent of Respondents)
MOST IMPORTANT

National
Issues

Local
Issues

Local TV
National TV
Radio
The Internet
Magazines
Local Daily
National Daily
Local Weekly
Other
Off Diagonal Avg.

Local
TV
44
6
3
2
13
6
5
39
11
11

National
TV
28
64
7
12
27
16
10
13
29
18

Radio
5
4
65
2
0
6
6
4
11
5

59
6
6
Local TV
42
29
6
National TV
22
2
43
Radio
30
2
8
The Internet
50
13
0
Magazines
14
4
4
Local Daily
6
11
0
National Daily
15
5
5
Local Weekly
0
16
3
Other
22
7
4
Off Diagonal Avg.
Source: Consumer Group Survey, August 2006.

MOST FREQUENTLY USED
Local National
Internet Magazines
Daily
Daily
4
2
9
2
6
1
7
4
8
2
4
2
64
2
6
5
0
33
0
0
3
2
53
6
3
6
15
48
9
0
4
4
0
0
0
6
4
2
6
4
4
0
5
39
13
3
0
3
0
4

1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1

17
13
12
6
25
65
39
15
10
17

1
4
3
5
0
2
39
4
0
2

Local
Weekly
3
2
1
1
0
4
2
13
0
2
4
2
7
1
0
4
6
51
3
6

Other

Total

0
1
2
1
0
1
0
4
28
1

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
-

6
0
2
1
0
2
0
1
42
2

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
-
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In contrast, 59 percent of those w ho said local TV is their most frequ ent
source of local news also said it was the most important. For newspapers, 53%
of those w ho said national new spapers w ere the m ost frequ ent sou rce of
national new s also said they w ere the m ost im portant. For local new s, 65% of
those who said local newspapers were the most frequent source also said they
were the most important.
The d iagonals are su bstantial, especially for the TV and new spapers.
H ow ever, note that the d iagonals are larger for national issu es than for local
issu es prim arily because local TV and local d ailies get a lot m ore off d iagonal
m entions. For exam ple, 42% of those w ho said national TV w as the m ost
frequ ent sou rce of local new s said local TV w as the m ost im portant sou rce.
For new spapers, 39% of those w ho said national papers w ere the m ost
frequent source of local news said local papers were the most important.
The fou r trad itional sou rces – local TV, local d ailies and w eeklies and
radio – d om inate the local new s land scape m entioned by 88 % of the
respond ents as the m ost frequently u sed sou rce and 72 % for second m ost
frequ ent. They are cited as m ost im portant by 82 % of the respond ents and
second m ost im portant by 71 %. Local new spapers and local TV are abou t
equal, each accou nting for abou t one-third of the m entions. Rad io and local
weeklies are about equal, each accounting for about 10 % of mentions.
The Internet is at best a su pplem ent for local new s and inform ation
that is relied u pon by a very sm all percentage of the popu lation (4 % first
mention, 7 % second mention).
Even those who rely on the Internet, overwhelmingly go to web
sites of traditional media, local TV and daily newspapers and
national TV.
Among the 11% of respondents who say that the Internet is their
first or second most frequent source of news, the websites of local
TV and daily newspapers account for about half (51%) of the
p rimary sites they visit most frequently. Sites not affiliated with a
traditional media outlet (blogs, list serves, alternative news sites and
others, including aggregators) account for only 17% of the sites
visited most and second most.

A recent survey by the Rad io-Television N ew s Directors Fou nd ation
(RTN DF) reaches similar conclusions to the surveys d iscu ssed above.
Unfortu nately, it d oes not d istinguish betw een national and local new s.
H ow ever, it find s that local TV new s and local new spapers are “people’s
major sources of news.”
________________________________
11

Radio-Television News Directors Foundation. 2006 Future of News Survey. September 2006.

12 Id., p. 7
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Exhibit 6 com pares the percentage of people w ho id entified a m ed iu m as a
m ajor sou rce of new s in the RTN DF stu d y to w ho id entified it as the m ost
im portant sou rce in ou r su rvey. The RTN DF gave respond ents three choices,
w e allow ed only tw o. We also d istingu ished local from national new s, w hich
the RTN DF d id not. We inclu d e the average of the responses to the local and
national qu estions in ou r su rvey to the RTN DF results. The rank ord er of the
sou rce is id entical and the im portance of d istinguishing national from local
news is underscored.
Exhibit 6: Comparison of RTNDF and Consumer Group Surveys on
Major, Most Important Sources of News
Source of News
Local TV
Local Newspaper
National TV
Local Radio
Internet
National Newspaper

RTNDF
Consumer Groups, Most or Second Most
3 Choices
National
Local
Average
66
39
61
50
28
31
57
44
28
57
8
33
15
20
22
21
11
28
10
19
4
8
2
5

Sources: Radio-Television News Directors Foundation, 2006 Future of News Survey,
September 2006; Consumer Group Survey, August 2006.

120

COOPER

INTERNET AND LOCAL NEWS

121

STUDY 8:
THE INTERNET AND LOCAL NEWS AND
INFORMATION
M ARK COOPER
THE INTERNET AS A S OURCE OF N EWS AND INFORMATION
In both of our surveys w e have noted that the Internet is cited m uch
less frequ ently as a sou rce of local new s and information than for national
new s. The im pact of the Internet on the d issem ination of new s and
information w as a central issu e in the Cou rt case. The Cou rt d rove hom e the
critical factor that d iversity com es from ind epend ent sou rces of information,
som ething the Internet, w hich carries very little ind epend ent new s, hard ly
provides.
There is a critical d istinction betw een w ebsites that are ind ep end ent sou rces of
local news and websites of local newspapers and broadcast stations that merely
rep u blish the inform ation alread y being rep orted by the new sp ap er or
broad cast station cou nterp art. The latter d o not p resent an “ind ep end ent”
view p oint and thu s shou ld not be consid ered as contribu ting d iversity to local
markets.1

The d istinction betw een local and national sou rces w as also
emphasized in the Internet discussion.
The Com m ission d oes not cite, nor d oes the record contain, p ersu asive
evid ence that there is a significant p resence of ind ep end ent local new s sites on
the Internet… And the exam p les the Com m ission d oes cite – the Dru d ge
Report and Salon.com – have a national, not local, news focus.a/
Moreover, the Dru d ge Rep ort is an “aggregator” of new s stories from other
new s ou tlets’ w ebsites and , as su ch, is not itself norm ally a “sou rce” of new s,
national or local.2
a/

These survey results provid e strong support for the Cou rt’s lengthy
d iscu ssion of the Internet. They confirm that the Internet is not a m ajor
sou rce of local new s, a fact that w as repeated ly d em onstrated in the FCC
proceed ing, bu t ignored by the FCC w hen it created its Diversity Ind ex. We
examined this in detail.

1
2

Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 U.S. 372, 406 (3rd Cir. 2004).
Id.,at 406, n.34.
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The 2002-2004 Surveys
While the Internet is m u ch m ore likely to be a sou rce of national
new s, that is only tru e of you nger respond ents (see Exhibit 1). We find that
the Internet is abou t three tim es as likely to be cited as a sou rce of national
new s by younger respond ents as by the rem aind er of respond ents – abou t
three tim es as often. A contem poraneou s national new s for you nger
respondents. H ow ever, the Internet d rops off d ram atically as a sou rce of
local new s even am ong this you nger age group (see Exhibit 2). The
percentage of respond ents age 18-24 w ho m entioned the Internet first d rops
from 23% for national news to 3% for local news.
Exhibit 1: Internet Use for National News Varies Strongly By Age Group

PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS

25

20
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10
5

0
18 to
24

Under
30

25 to
34

30 to
49

35 to
44

45 to
54

50 to
64

55 to
64

65 or
more

AGE GROUP
CFA MOST USED, 1ST MENTION

PEW REGULAR USE

Source: Consumer Federation of America/Consumers Union Poll. January 2004; Pew Research
Center For the People & the Press. 2003. “Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented
Political News Universe.” Pew Research Center. 11 January 2003.The Pew Research Center
for the People & the Press, Cable and Internet Loom Large in Fragmented Political News
Universe, January 11, 2003.
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Exhibit 2: Internet Use for Local News is Low Across Age Groups
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65 or more
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NATIONAL

LOCAL

Source: Consumer Federation of America/Consumers Union Poll, January 2004.

The 2005-2006 Surveys
The 2006 su rvey show s a sim ilar pattern (see Exhibit 3). The Internet
plays a much larger role on national issues and younger respondents exhibit a
m u ch greater reliance on the Internet for national than local new s. For the
local issu es, there is little d ifference betw een the age grou ps becau se there is
not much local information on the Internet.
When they go online, respond ents tend to go to the w eb sites of
trad itional m ed ia. N ational m ed ia are very strong on national issu es (see
Exhibit 4). For those w ho go on the Internet for inform ation, w eb sites of
traditional sources still dominate, especially for local issues. Even those who
rely on the Internet as their first or second m ost frequent sou rce of local
information overw helm ingly go to w eb sites of trad itional m ed ia, local TV
and d aily new spapers and national TV. Am ong the 11% of respond ents w ho
say that the Internet is their first or second m ost frequ ent sou rce of new s, the
w ebsites of local TV and d aily new spapers accou nt for alm ost half (51%) of
the prim ary sites they visit m ost frequ ently. Sites not affiliated w ith a
trad itional med ia ou tlet (blogs, list serves, alternative new s sites and others,
inclu d ing aggregators) accou nt for only 17% of the sites visited m ost and
second most.
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Exhibit 3: Internet Usage by News Type, Frequency of Use and Age Group
60
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Source: Consumer Group Survey, August 2006
.
The Pew analysis show s that although people have expand ed their
u se of online d istribu tion, the sou rce d ata remains the same. Alm ost
everyone relies on the trad itional ou tlets – TV, new spapers, rad io. When
people go online, they are m u ch m ore likely to go to the w ebsite of a
trad itional m ed ia ou tlet. While aggregation service or portals are also
popular online, these portals sim ply red istribu te stories from other sou rces.
They are not ind epend ent sou rces of new s. The genu ine alternatives, blogs,
alternative news sites and list serves, have a much lower level of usage.
The bottom line for Pew is striking.
The w eb serves m ostly as a su p p lem ent to other sou rces rather than a p rim ary
sou rce of new s. Those w ho use the w eb for new s still sp end m ore tim e getting
new s from other sou rces than they d o getting new s online. In ad d ition, w eb
new s consu m ers em p hasize sp eed and convenience over d etail. Of the 23%
w ho got new s on the internet yesterd ay, only a m inority visited new spap er
w eb sites. Instead , w ebsites that inclu d e qu ick u p d ates or m ajor head lines,
such as MSNBC, Yahoo, and CNN, dominate the web-news landscape.

Exhibit 4: Where Users Frequently Get News Online
(Percent of those who Get News Online; Usage: Pew is Yesterday, CFA is 1st Mention Most Often)

All Online Users
CFA
Type of Site

Pew
National

Local
1

2

National TV
Local TV
Traditional
National Daily
Media
Local Daily
Radio

16
8
6
9
2

56
5
7
3
3

19
15
2
15
2

36
17
4
12
3

Portal/Other
Int’l News Site
New Media
Alternate News
List serves

14
3
2
2

13
6
4
3

10
1
1
1

27
2
2
1

Heavy Users
CFA
Pew
1st or 2nd Mention
Broadband
Local
National
1
2
21
52
26
21
3
27
8
7
3
11
6
25
3
2
2
17
3
2
2

15
6
6
5

10
3
3
2

55
14
13
20
7
39
8
3
1

Sources: Horrigan, John B. “For Many Home Broadband Users, the Internet is a Primary News Source.” Pew Internet and American
Life Project, 22 March 2006Horrigan, John B., For Many Home Broadband Users, the Internet is a Primary News Source, Pew Internet
and American Life Project, March 22, 2006, p. 12; Consumer Group Survey, August 2006.
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The rise of the internet has also not increased the overall new s consu m p tion of
the Am erican p u blic. The p ercentage of Am ericans w ho skip the new s entirely
on a typ ical d ay has not d eclined since the 1990s. N or are Am ericans sp end ing
any m ore tim e w ith the new s than they d id a d ecad e ago, w hen their choices
were much more limited.3

Exhibit 5 d em onstrates the basis for this conclu sion in d ramatic
fashion. It show s the frequ ency w ith w hich respond ents u se offline
trad itional and online sources, as w ell as the d estinations to w hich they go
online. Trad itional offline ou tlets still are still vastly m ore im portant and the
online outlets of those sources dominate the online destinations.
Exhibit 5: Traditional Media Still Dominate As the Source of News
Do your ever get news or information from…?
Did you happen to get news or information from this source YESTERDAY?
Percent of Respondents
EVER YESTERDAY
OFFLINE: Traditional Outlet (National or local TV, Newspaper or Radio)
Web site of a Traditional Outlet
ONLINE: Web portals (Google news, Yahoo news)
Alternative web site (Blog, Alternative News, List serve)

100%

95.4%

43.1%
25.4%
10.2%

16.5%
10.5%
3.7%

Source: Pew Internet and American Life Project. 2005. RDD Tracking Study, Nov/Dec. Pew
Internet and American Life Project Nov/Dec 2005 RDD Tracking Study

Recognizing that portals are not ind epend ent sou rces of new s, bu t
sim ply aggregate existing source, w hich are generally from trad itional
sou rces, there is very little ind epend ent content accessed . To the extent that
portals m ake sou rces that w ou ld not have been available in the offline w orld
available, they d o increase availability. H ow ever, for local new s the am ou nt
of such content is slim.

The Belo Survey
A su rvey of online users cond u cted by the Dallas Morning N ew s strongly
reinforces these observations (Exhibit 6). First, w eb sites affiliated w ith
trad itional new s organizations are the overw helming favorites for online
new s u sers. Alm ost 9 ou t of 10 respond ents give the w eb site of a local TV
station or new spaper as the preferred d estination. Web portals garner only 3
%, w hile the other/ d on’t know category garners 7 %. The you nger
respond ents, w ho are generally consid ered the m ost w eb savvy, exhibit the
same tendencies.
________________________________
3

Kohu t, And rew , et. al. “Matu ring Internet N ew Au d ience – Broad er than Deep .” The
Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, 20 July 2006, p. 2.
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Exhibit 6: Web Sites Affiliated With Traditional News Organizations
Are the Preferred Source for Local News
(Internet web site would go to first for details about local news story)

Age
15-25
26-34
35-34
45-54
55-64
65+

Local
TV
Paper
43
41
48
39
55
29
59
29
61
21
68
16

National
News
DK/
Portal
Other
TV
Paper Magazine
6
2
1
3
4
3
0
0
2
8
2
1
0
5
8
1
1
0
3
7
4
1
0
5
9
6
0
3
4
3

Source: Belo Interactive. Online Credibility Survey. 9-19 July 2004 Belo Interactive,
Online Credibility Survey, conducted July 9-19, 2004.
Second , respond ents w ere asked about their interest in new s abou t
various topics (see Exhibit 7). The strongest interest was expressed in news
Exhibit 7: Interest in News about Various Topics
80
70

PERCENT

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ALL

15-25

26-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

AGE GROUP
Local

National

International

Enterterainment

Business

Sports

Fashion

Family

Sources and Notes: Belo Interactive. Online Credibility Survey. 9-19
July 2004lo Interactive, Online Credibility Survey, June 2004.
Interest in News about: Where you live = Local, from Around the Country = National, from
Around the World = International, In Entertainment and Personalities = Entertainment,
About Business and Careers = Business, In Sports = Sports, About Fashion, Lifestyles &
Health = Fashion, In Relationships, Family and Friends = Family;
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“abou t w here you live.” It w as the only category that exceed ed 50 % saying
(~57%) this new s is very im portant; second w as national new s (~44).
International new s and entertainm ent new s w ere generally cited by 30 to 40%
of respond ents. The other types of new s have mu ch low er percentages. Only
in the 26-34 age grou p d id national new s have a higher percentage of
respond ents saying it w as very im portant. This is prim arily because of a lack
of interest in local (not a heightened interest in national) news.
Third, in this survey newspapers have a huge advantage in credibility
over other sou rces (see Exhibit 8). The Internet is generally second in
cred ibility in this su rvey, interestingly, w ith m u ch low er levels of cred ibility
among the younger respondents. The respondents were also asked about the
impact of an association
Exhibit 8: Newspapers Have an Advantage in Credibility
(Which Medium Provides the Most Credible Information?)
50
45
40

PERCENT

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
15-25

26-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

AGE GROUP

Radio

Internet

Television

Newspaper

Don't Know

Source: Belo Interactive. Online Credibility Survey. 9-19 July 2004Belo Interactive, Online
Credibility Survey, June 2004.

betw een a w eb site and a trad itional sou rce of new s (see Exhibit 9). The
overw helm ing m ajority of respond ents (abou t 70%) said this w ou ld m ake the
w eb site m ore cred ible. Interestingly, the you nger respond ents w ere m ore
likely to respond in the affirmative than the older respondents.
This evid ence on the preferences for w eb sites and the
com plem entarity and linkages betw een trad itional ou tlets and Internet sites
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su pports the Prometheus Cou rt’s reasoning on the treatm ent of the Internet in
the determination of the Diversity Index.
Exhibit 9: Link Between Traditional Source
And Internet Site Boosts Internet Credibility
(An Internet news site is more credible if associated with
a familiar print or television organization)
90
80
70

PERCENT

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
15-25

26-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

AGE GROUP
Y es

No

Don't Know

Source: Belo Interactive. Online Credibility Survey. 9-19 July 2004Belo Interactive, Online
Credibility Survey, June 2004.
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The analysis presented in this stud y and the stu d y on Internet u se for
national and local inform ation is based on the sequ ence of qu estions
described in Study 7. That is, we asked people where they go for national and
international new s and inform ation first and w hich sou rces influence their
opinion, national and international new s second . Then w e asked the
qu estions abou t local new s and inform ation. The d istinction betw een the
subjects – national vs. local is im portant because the m ed ia ow nership
proceeding is focused on local news. We also asked the question about where
people go on the Internet for new s and inform ation for anyone w ho had the
Internet at hom e. We provid ed a list of ind epend ent sou rces and d id not
inclu d e pu re aggregators. This, too, is consistent w ith the fram ew ork of the
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Court ruling. To the extent that respondents only go to aggregator sites, they
would have said “other.”
To exam ine the im pact of these choices on the analysis, w e asked the
qu estions in a d ifferent w ay one a d ifferent d ate of another national rand om
sam ple su rvey. We d id not ask the national/ international questions first, w e
asked only those who said they went online for news (as opposed to everyone
w ho has the Internet) and w e inclu d ed the aggregators in the list of w eb sites
that w ere visited . The respond ents m ove in the d irection that w ou ld be
expected (see Exhibit 10).
Without being asked abou t national and
international new s and inform ation first, m ore respond ents say they go to
national sites for local news.
Exhibit 10: Major Sources of News: Different Approaches to Questioning
(Percent of Total Respondents and Mentions)

Source
Local TV
National TV
National Daily
Local Daily
Local Weekly
Radio
Internet

With Prior Question
Without Prior Question
About National News
About National News
1st 1st or 2nd
1st 1st or 2nd
33
61
33
59
2
8
10
23
1
2
2
5
37
57
26
46
12
21
14
14
7
22
10
24
3
10
8
21

Source: Consumer Group Survey, August 2006, September 2006.

Tu rning to the w eb sites that those w ho go online for new s visit, w e
find that the local sites have the largest increase – reflecting the fact that the
national new s qu estion w as not asked first (see Exhibit 11). N ational d ailies
increase. Given the option of aggregators, a larger nu m ber of respond ents
say they w ent to those sites first. Com bining aggregators and other, w e
observe an increase from 5 percent of the total population to 7 percent on first
mentions and a 7 to 13 for first or second mentions.
This d ifference w ou ld have little im pact on the general conclu sions
abou t the frequ ency and im portance of variou s m ed ia ou tlets, certainly w ith
respect to the role of the Internet. Because the percentage of respondents who
give the Internet as a sou rce is so sm all, the shift betw een trad itional sou rces
and aggregators w ou ld have little effect on the overall m ed ia m ap that w as
drawn.
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Exhibit 11:
Different Approaches to Questions Result
in Small Differences in Responses
(Percent of Total Respondents and Mentions)

All Internet at Home/
Website Visited Aggregators not Identified
1st
1st or 2nd
National TV
12
19
Local TV
13
22
National Daily
1
4
Local Daily
10
18
Radio
3
5
Other/Portals
5
7
Blogs
0
1
Alternative News
1
1
International News
1
2
List Serves
1
1

Internet News Users/
Aggregators Identified
1st
1st or 2nd
9
14
2
4
1
3
3
5
1
2
7
13
1
2
1
1
1
2
0
2

Source: Consumer Group Survey, August 2006, September 2006.
THE INTERNET AND JOURNALISM
Media Functions in the Production and D issemination of N ew s and
Information
Althou gh the Internet has provid ed an expand ed arena for
d iscu ssion, the trad itional m ass m ed ia still d om inate the gathering, ed iting
and d issem ination of inform ation abou t local events and pu blic affairs. The
Cou rt gave a nu anced fram ew ork for analyzing the im portance and im pact of
alternative media.
The other Internet issu e that receives a great d eal of attention is the
relationship betw een the Internet as a new s m ed ium and the prod u ction of
news and information. The Prometheus court did not use the term blogs, but it
ad d ressed the heart of the issu e w ith a lengthy and nu anced d iscussion of the
u niqu e characteristics of the “inform ation” that is the object of First
Am end m ent policy in the case. The role of the m ed ia in creating and
protecting the integrity of this information is substantial.
In term s of content, “the m ed ia” p rovid es (to d ifferent d egrees, d ep end ing on
the ou tlet) accu racy and d ep th in local new s in a w ay that an ind ivid u al
posting in a chat room on a particular issue of local concern does not. But more
im p ortantly, m ed ia ou tlets have an entirely d ifferent character from ind ivid u al
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or organizations’ w ebsites and thu s contribu te to d iversity in an entirely
d ifferent w ay.
They p rovid e an aggregator fu nction (bringing
new s/ inform ation to one p lace) as w ell as a d istillation fu nction (m aking a
ju d gm ent as to w hat is interesting, im p ortant, entertaining, etc.) Ind ivid u als…
and entities… m ay u se the Internet to d issem inate inform ation and opinions
abou t m atters of local concern… bu t … are not, them selves… “m ed ia outlets”
for viewpoint-diversity purposes. Like many entities, they just happen to use a
p articu lar m ed ia ou tlet – the Internet – to d issem inate inform ation. Sim ilarly,
advertiser-d riven w ebsites such as hvnet.com … hard ly contribu te to view p oint
diversity.”331

The Cou rt’s view of the d ifference betw een the Internet as a
d istribu tion m ed iu m and the prod u ction of new s and information is right on
and can be linked d irectly to recent analyses of alternative m ed ia (see Exhibit
12). If w e d istingu ish three fu nctions – reporting, ed iting and response – and
three d ifferent w ays of im plem enting each fu nction – not d oing it, u sing a
closed approach , or u sing an open approach – w e can classify the various
types of media. We then get into the debate about whether the new media are
providing the functions of the old. They give a great deal of response, but not
that much reporting and editing.

Blogging
Ou r surveys d id not ad d ress this issu e, except in asking w hether
respond ent used blogs as prim ary or second ary sources of inform ation. For
national new s, few er than 3% of all respond ents (5% of those w ho get online
new s) m entioned blogs as a first or sou rce of inform ation. For local new s
only 1% of all (2% of those w ho get online new s) m entioned blogs as a first or
second source.
Pew cond u cted a recent stu d y 332 that ad d resses som e of these issues
and they su pport the view of the Prometheus Court. From the point of view of
w hat, w hy and how they blog, there is clearly a d ifference betw een
media/journalism as defined by the court and blogging.
The pred om inant reasons for blogging, stated by abou t half of the
bloggers, are self-expression and sharing of personal experiences. N ext m ost
frequent reasons abou t (one-third ) are to stay in tou ch w ith friend s and
family. In fact, abou t half the bloggers believe m ost of their read ers are
people they know . This is an extension of the w ater cooler and backyard
fence aspect of civic discourse.

Prometheus , 372 F.3d at 407 (3rd Cir. 2004)..
Lenhart, Amand a and Su san Fox. “Bloggers: A Protrait of the Internet’s N ew
Storytellers.” Washington, D.C.: Pew Internet & American Life Project, 19 July 2006.
331
332
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“Three in fou r bloggers (77%) told us that expressing them selves
creatively w as a reason that they blog.” 333 Other m ajor reasons given w ere to
d ocu m ent personal experiences (76%), share practical know led ge (64%)
m otivate people to action (61%) and keep in tou ch w ith fam ily and friend s
(60%).
“The largest percentage of bloggers... (37%) say that “m y life and
personal experiences” 334 w as the m ain topic. N ext w as political and
governm ent (11%), follow ed by entertainm ent (7%), sports (6%) new s and
current events (5%), and business (5%).
About one-third of bloggers define themselves as journalists, but only
abou t one third -of bloggers respond ing to the su rvey say they often “spend
extra tim e trying to verify facts,” and ju st over one-third includ e links to
original sou rce m aterial. Only 15% say they “quote other people/ m ed ia
directly.”
In su m , on both the d em and sid e (w here people go for new s) and on
the su pply-sid e, w hat bloggers d o, it seem s clear that blogging d oes not m eet
the Prometheus Cou rt’s d efinition. This is not to say that blogging d oes not
provid e valuable com m unications and netw orking fu nctions, it is just not
local news and information for the vast majority of citizens.

333
334

Id., p. 7.
Id., p. 9.

Exhibit 12:
The Emerging News Media Space
EDITING:

NONE

RESPONSE:

NONE

CLOSED
CLOSED

OPEN

NONE CLOSED

OPEN
OPEN NONE

CLOSED

OPEN

SLASHDOT

INDYMEDIA,
WIKIPEDIA,
GATHER

REPORTING:
NONE

GOOGLE
NEWS

CLOSED

HOMEPAGE,
PODCAST

OPEN

CHAT
GROUP

PUNDITRY
BLOG

GROUP
BLOG

WITNESS
BLOG W/
FEEDBACK

TRADITIONAL
MEDIA

METABLOG

MEDIA
CHANNEL

MEDIA/JOURNALISM with all three functions present
Categories adapted from Bruns, Alex. Gatewatching. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005 Bruns, Alex, Gatewatching (New York:
Peter Lang Publishing, 2005) and Rogers, Richard. Information Politics on the Web. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.Rogers, Richard,
Information Politics on the Web (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004)
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STUDY 9:
LOCAL MEDIA AND THE FAILURE OF THE
CONSOLIDATION/
CONGLOMERATION MODEL
M ARK COOPER
S ETTING THE S TAGE
In the u pcom ing m ed ia ow nership proceed ings at the Fed eral
Com m u nications Com m ission (FCC), Big Med ia w ill sing a song of gloom
and d oom abou t the econom ics of the m ed ia bu siness. As they have d one in
the past, they are likely to insist that consolid ation betw een ou tlets and
conglomeration across media sectors are necessary to save the media industry
from ruin.
Even thou gh m ergers red uce d iversity of ow nership, Big Med ia often
claim s that m ergers preserve ou tlets or im prove their qu ality, w hich is better
than losing the ind epend ent voice altogether or having it be w eak. They w ill
d em and that ru les limiting their ability to bu y up m ed ia properties be
eliminated or dramatically curtailed.
Recent trend s in m ed ia markets suggest that they cannot m ake this
case. Local TV stations and new spapers are still very healthy bu sinesses.
While they m ay not generate the kind s of retu rns that oil com panies enjoy or
hed ge fu nd s seek, they are, in fact, quite profitable com pared to typical
bu sinesses in Am erica and bu yers have been proving that by paying
handsome prides for these properties.
The m ost “startling” aspect of the recent events in the new spaper and
TV sectors is the m essage being sent by the prices recently paid to acquire
newspaper and TV station properties.
There is some good news in the unrest... If the sale price of Knight Ridder – $4.5
billion – w as a referend u m on the health of the ind u stry, the answ er w as
p ositive. The p rice w as higher than m ost exp ected and acknow led ges the fact
that m any new sp ap ers still enjoy p rofit m argins of abou t 20 p ercent – higher
than that of most businesses.1
Desp ite w eak station-grou p stocks, broad cast p rop erties them selves are
fetching su rp risingly high p rices. Deals for m any of Em m is Broad casting’s

1

Ahrens, Frank. “A Pu sh Tow ard Private Control of N ew spap ers.” W ashington Post 17
June 2006, D3.
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stations closed recently at startling valu es. The p lanned sale of broad caster
Liberty Corps. to Raycom is only slightly less impressive. 2

A Ju ne 17, 2006 article by Frank Ahrens in the W ashington Post goes
even farther to d raw a d ramatic lesson from recent events. “The recent
breaku p of the Knight Rid d er Inc. new spaper chain has helped to spark
interest around the cou ntry in retu rning papers to local or private ow nership
after d ecad es of expansion by corporate m ed ia conglom erates.” 3 The issu es
Ahrens sees raised by these recent trend s in the new spaper business feed
d irectly into the issu es that are at the core of the m ed ia ow nership
proceeding:
N ow after tw o d ecad es of circu lation d ecline that have led to strife in
board room s, som e of the very p recep ts that stabilized the bu siness –
new sp ap ers shou ld be p u blicly held com p anies, local ow nership is lim iting,
and bigger is better – are being repudiated.4

The failu re of the consolid ation/ conglom eration strategy shou ld
certainly not be taken to m ean that the local m ed ia ind u stries d o not have
problems; it just means that consolidation/conglomeration is not a solution to
the problem s it faces. The real challenge facing trad itional m ed ia ou tlets like
newspapers and local broadcast stations is that audiences are migrating to the
w eb and ad vertising d ollars are follow ing them there. Consolid ation of the
trad itional, physical, pu sh m ed ia d oes not ad d ress this issu e. Rather, the
bu siness of jou rnalism , print and vid eo, m u st d evelop strategies for online
d istribu tion. Physical w orld consolid ation is neither a sufficient cond ition,
nor even a helpful step in m eeting this larger long term challenge. One part
of the solu tion highlighted by recent d evelopm ents is a change in ow nership
– “With private ownership, shareholders are off your back. A helpful thing as
newspapers take risks to follow their readers to the Internet and beyond.”5
Dem onstrating that the econom ic cond itions d o not call for
consolid ation or conglomeration is critically im portant in the ow nership
proceed ing because the pu blic policy of prom oting d iversity and localism in
the media sets a presumption against consolidation and conglomeration. As a
nation, w e prefer a less concentrated , m ore institu tionally d iverse m ed ia for
the sake of healthy d em ocratic d iscourse. This preference has been enacted
into law by the Congress, im plem ented by the FCC and fou nd constitu tional
by the Su prem e Cou rt. It now appears that policies to prom ote d iversity and
localism are not in conflict w ith the fund am ental econom ics of the industry.

2

H iggins, John M. “N ice Price: Despite Recent Deal Snags, the Station Market is Still
Relatively Strong.” Broadcasting and Cable, 20 February 2006, p. 6.
3
Ahrens, 2006, p. D1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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As a resu lt, restrictions and bans on consolid ation and conglom eration make
perfect public policy sense.
N EWSPAPERS
Tw o factors seem to be fu eling the ongoing tu rm oil in the new spaper
ind ustry. On one sid e is the failu re of the consolid ation/conglomeration
approach of the past cou ple of d ecad es to prod u ce the retu rns that W all Street
seem s to d em and . In the case of Knight Rid d er, “the u pheaval started last
fall, w hen a m ajor sharehold er of the venerable Knight Rid d er chain began
u rging the board to breaku p the company, saying sharehold ers w ere not
getting the best valu e for their stock.” 6 After Knight Rid d er w as su ccessfully
sold , tu rm oil broke ou t at an even larger conglom erate, The Tribu ne, w hen
the second largest sharehold er “accu sed m anagement of pu rsuing a failed
strategy of melding local TV stations and newspapers and failing to keep pace
w ith the ind u stry.” 7 The financially su ccessful sale of the Knight Rid d er
papers and the board room m elod rama at the Tribu ne have pu t the issu e in
the head lines. The Tribu ne’s “content conglom erate” strategy has failed , not
because the ind ivid u al businesses are unhealthy, bu t becau se conglom eration
is not a solution to the problem the industry faces.
Thu s, on the other sid e is the continuing strong perform ance of m any
of the basic new spaper assets. The sale of the Knight Rid d er chain to
McClatchy, w hich su rprised som e, and the im m ed iate resale of tw elve papers
to sm all or m id -sized chains and ind ivid u als su ggest that the new spaper
bu siness is m oving aw ay from the conglom erate “content” m od el that
seem ed fashionable a few years ago. What w e observe is that people w ho
w ant to be in the new spaper bu siness are find ing that they can m ake m oney
in the new spaper bu siness, especially if they figu re ou t how to effectively
d istribu te the prod u ct online. Circu lation is d ow n, bu t read ership m ay not
be8, and ad vertisers are beginning to figu re ou t abou t the new opportu nities
being presented online by local newspapers.
McClatchy sold its recently acquired Knight Ridder papers in markets
it did not choose to enter for between 9.5 and 11.1 times cash flow.9 Those are
6

Id.
Siklos, Richard and Katherine Q. Seelye. “At Tribu ne a Call for a Sp lit.” N ew Y ork
Times, 15 June 2006, C1.
8
The Philadelphia Inquirer and The W all Street Journal both claim increasing read ership
d u e to online read ers. (See von H offm an, N icholas. “Anybod y Want to Bu y a
Newspaper?” The Nation, 2 December 2005.)
9
Dirks, Van Essent & Mu rray. “McClatchy w ill be # 2 – Acqu isition is Largest in Total
Circu lation.” 1st Qu arter Up d ate. 31 March 2006; Saba, Jennifer. “It’s Official:
McClatchy Sells 5 KR Papers – to 4 Companies.” Editor & Publisher, 7 June 2006; Theses
nu m bers w ere a little low er than other d eals as noted in Levingston, Steven and
7
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consid ered healthy nu m bers in the ind ustry. Ind eed , they are the very sam e
nu m bers that w e observe in cable system s and no one su ggests that the cable
business is on the brink of ruin.
Even at the trou bled Tribu ne Com pany, the new spaper bu siness is
quite profitable.
While the com p any d oes not break ou t the m argin for ind ivid u al p ap ers,
analysts estimate that the profit margin at the Times could have been as high as
20 p ercent last year. That is low er than those at other Tribu ne p rop erties bu t
higher than those of many Fortune 500 companies.10

The Project on Excellence in Journalism hypothesized in The State of
the N ews M edia: 2005 that “the species of new spaper that m ay be m ost
threatened is the big-city m etro paper that cam e to d om inate in the latter part
of the 20th centu ry.” 11 The problem is w hat I have called the w heelbarrow
problem.12 Trying to cover a large geographic area, the physical paper simply
becom es too large to give enou gh d etail – either in reporting or ad vertising –
to m eet the need s of ind ivid uals at d ifferent end s of the region. There is so
m u ch to cover that consum ers w ould have to carry their papers arou nd in
wheelbarrows. As the Project on Excellence in Journalism put it:
The top three national new sp ap ers in the U.S. su ffered no circu lation losses in
2005. The losses at sm all new sp ap ers, in tu rn, ap p eared to be m od est. It w as
the big-city m etros that su ffered the biggest circu lation d rop s and im p osed the
largest cu tback in staff. Those big p ap ers are trying to cover far-flu ng su bu rbs
and national and regional new s all at the sam e tim e – trying to be one-stop
news outlets for large audiences.13

Ahrens recently noted this pattern of turmoil in the industry as well.
And even thou gh big-city new sp ap ers are losing circu lations, m any sm all and
mid-size new sp ap ers are grow ing. It w as those Knight Rid d er p ap ers that
caught McClatchy’s eye…
The sm aller p ap ers are grow ing becau se, u nlike in large m ed ia m arkets, they
are either the only or the d om inant ad vertising vehicle in tow n. It is an

Terence O’H ara. “McClatchy’s Pap er Chase.” W ashington Post, 14 March 2006, p . D1,
“Knight Ridder Sold for 9.5 times free cash flow, making the purchase price, on a cashflow basis, cheaper than any other major newspaper deal of the past five years. Recent
deals have priced newspapers at 12 to 14 times their free cash flow.”
10
Siklos, Richard and Katharine Q. Seelye. “Fitfu lly Blend ing Pap ers and TV.” New
York Times, 19 June 2006, p. C4.
11
Project on Excellence in Jou rnalism . 2006. “Overview .” The State of the N ews M edia:
2005, p. 3 (hereafter PEJ).
12
Coop er, Mark N . M edia Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Information A ge. Palo
Alto: Center for Internet and Society, 2003, pp. 127-129.
13
PEJ, 2006, p. 3.
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ad vantage that large p ap ers, su ch as the Philad elp hia Inqu irer, cannot m atch,
as advertisers have more ways to reach consumers there.14

For the big-city papers, the challenges com e from “niche pu blications
serving smaller com m u nities and targeted au d iences,” 15 as w ell as online
revenu es. The Tribu ne’s flagship paper – the Los Angeles Times – exhibits
the problem in the extrem e. “Los Angeles County is mad e u p of 88
ind epend ent cities, a spraw ling region that is d ifficu lt for any one new s
organization to cover in d epth. It has also absorbed a hu ge influ x of people
who do not speak English.”16
Yet, McClatchy held onto four large newspapers and the price fetched
by the Philad elphia new spapers it flipped w as abou t $1,000 per su bscriber, a
figu re equal to that w hich Fox paid for DirectTV. When the su bject of
breaking up the Tribune Company comes up, the price mentioned for the L.A.
Tim es is abou t the sam e. In short, the stand alone new spaper bu siness m od el
appears to be making a comeback.
William Dean Singleton, CEO of privately held Med iaN ew s Grou p
Inc., w hich bou ght fou r of the papers McClatchy flipped to becom e the fou rth
largest new spaper chain in the cou ntry, w ad d ed into the m id d le of the
Tribu ne tu rmoil by com paring the price he w as paying for new spapers to the
cost of Tribune’s plans to bu y back its stock--an effort to pu m p up its stock
price.
They’re bu ying back their stock for 7.9 tim es cash flow or som ething? That’s a
good buy. I’m out paying 12 times [cash flow] to buy newspaper assets. I wish
I could buy them for 7.9, but I can’t.”
Singleton’s p erfectly hap p y to keep bu ying p ap ers on the cheap w hile others
d isp arage the fu tu re of p rint. It’s “still a very, very, very p rofitable p iece of
what we do and will be doing for a long time,” he said, citing the installation of
new presses at four of his papers as testimonial to his confidence17.

Singleton’s lam ent abou t having to pay higher prices for newspaper
properties actu ally extend s to the w hole Knight Rid d er d eal. As an article in
the Washington Post pointed out when the sale to McClatchy was concluded,
Knight Ridder sold for 9.5 times free cash flow, making the purchase price, on a
cash flow basis, cheap er than any other m ajor new sp ap er d eal of the p ast five
years. Recent d eals have p riced new sp ap ers at 12 to 14 tim es their free cash
flow.18
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The ability of McClatchy to flip the papers at prices m u ch closer to
the ind u stry average su ggests that it w as either the size of the chain that w as
pu t u p for sale that w as the problem or the qu ality of m anagem ent at the
Knight Ridder chain.19 The industry in general commands higher multiples.
Im portantly, it is not only the econom ic benefits of conglomeration
that have not panned ou t; the claim s of jou rnalistic benefits have also proven
elusive. John Morgan is cited in the Ahrens article as a “new spaper analyst,”
who
has becom e converted to the retu rn-to-p rivate thinking, w hich he said has its
journalistic benefits.
The fact is, Wall Street is so short-nosed and so dedicated to maximizing return
on investm ent to the exclu sion of alm ost everything else, you ’re going to have
situ ations w here, basically, you have a lot of p u blic sharehold ers w ho have
interests that are inimical to good journalism.20

Ahren’s warns that the impact of the shift will be complex.
Bu t lest a generation of new sp ap er jou rnalists – w ho have w atched corp orate
p arents slash costs throu gh layoffs, bu d get cu ts, bu reau closings and the like –
gets d ew y-eyed over the p rosp ect of local, p rivate ow nership , Singleton
w arned : I d on’t think there’s a lot of d ifference betw een p erform ing w ell to
please your shareholders or performing well to please your bankers.21

The them e is clear. Consolid ation and conglom eration bring sharp
red u ctions in staff bu t fail to prod u ce econom ic benefits. This opens the d oor
for smaller chains and those d ed icated to print jou rnalism to m ove the
ind ustry in a d ifferent d irection, a vision they are backing u p by pu rchasing
assets at healthy prices. The bottom line for the Knight Rid d er-McClatchy
d eal is striking. McClatchy bou ght Knight Rid d er for 9.5 tim es cash flow and
sold a d ozen papers, consid ered to be the least attractive properties from
McClatchy’s point of view for 11 times cash flow to m ore than half a d ozen
owners.
LOCAL TELEVISION
The television sector exhibits a set of characteristics that parallel the
d evelopm ents in the new spaper bu siness to a rem arkable d egree. The range
of prices for new spapers given above su ggests a healthy economic situation
w hile the local broad cast m arket is in even better shape. As an article in
Editor and Publisher qu oting Tom Bu ono of BIA Financial N etw ork noted ju st
prior to the release of the proposed ow nership ru les in May 2003, “The reality
19
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21
Id.
20

FAILURE OF THE CONGLOMERATE MODEL

143

is, broad casting in general is selling for a few m u ltiples [of cash flow ] higher
than new spapers… If new spapers are going for m ultiples of 8 to 12, it’s m ore
like 10 to 14 for TV, and radio is even higher.”22
At exactly the tim e that McClatchy’s pu rchase and resale of the
Knight Rid d er papers caught the attention of the new spaper trad e press, a
sim ilar series of events startled the TV m arket. In an article head lined “N ice
Price,” Broadcasting and Cable recounted a series of TV station sales:
One m ed ia investm ent banker p egs the $987 m illion Liberty Corp . sale at 13
tim es cash flow . Em m is has cu t fou r d eals totaling $859 m illion for stations at
13-16 times annual cash flow…
And the high-p riced d eals w ere generally not trou bled situ ations w here the
buyer was betting on a significant turnaround. 23
Underlying these high prices is a highly profitable business.
So how d o bu yers ju stify their high p rices? The first attraction is that stations
generate lots of cash flow, with margins often hitting 40%-50% (By comparison,
strong new sp ap ers generate 20% m argins). Those earnings are relatively
p red ictable, so lend ers allow high leverage. That help s enhance retu rn on
investment.

Dram a w as not lacking in the TV sector. While the d ram a w as
playing ou t in the board room of the Tribu ne Com pany, Univision, the
nu m ber one Spanish langu age broad caster and the fifth largest broad cast
netw ork in the U.S., w as u p for sale by its private ow ners. The ow ners had
set a high target price and only tw o grou ps of bid d ers cam e forw ard , one of
w hich had trou ble hold ing its team together, w hich garnered head lines. In
the end, the price settled at a very handsome $12 billion.
At $11 billion or $36 a share, Univision is not getting the $40 a share it had
originally signaled that it w as hop ing for w hen it p u t itself u p for sale in
Febru ary. Bu t the p rice rem ains one of the highest m u ltip les p aid for a m ed ia
company in recent memory.24
Univision yesterd ay confirm ed its planned sale to a consortiu m of p rivateequity investors who will pay $12.3 billion and assume $1.4 billion in debt.25

The basic profitability analysis and the challenges noted for
new spapers are sim ilar in the local TV bu siness. The Project on Excellence in
Jou rnalism d escribes local TV broad casting as follow s: “The ind u stry is still
22
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enorm ou sly profitable. Pre-tax profit m argins of 40% to 50% are not
uncommon.”26 A recent article in the W all Street Journal noted that “it is still
not u nu sual for a big-city station to have profit m argins of m ore than 40%.
Even stations in m id -size m arkets can achieve margins that exceed 30%.” 27 In
fact, small m arket prices w ere strong. For exam ple, Disney CEO Bob Iger,
w hen asked abou t beefing u p its sm all station grou p, respond ed , “Every tim e
w e’ve looked at potential acqu isitions in that space, w e felt that the prices
being paid w ere ju st a little bit too high.” 28 The strong valu e of these TV
properties w as affirm ed w hen Med ia General sold four properties in m id sized markets for an average of 15 times cash flow.29
The W all Street Journal d oes note that “Local Stations Stru ggle to
Ad apt as Web Grabs View ers.” 30 The trigger to the challenge is largely a
failure of national networks not local stations. It is a combination of cable and
satellite fragm enting the big national au d iences, national netw orks failing to
prod u ce hits that attract eyeballs, and ad vertisers m oving online. The
su ccessfu l response, su ggested by the case stu d y of WOOD in Grand Rapid s
Michigan, involves the same elements suggested by the newspaper business –
a focus on journalism and the development of effective online models.31
Interestingly, althou gh ad vertising revenu es at local stations are
d ow n, the prod u ction and d istribu tion of local new s rem ains an extrem ely
profitable u nd ertaking. The claim that entertainm ent had to save the new s,
w hich w as the m antra in the past m ed ia ow nership proceed ing, has been
tu rned on its head . N ew s is now lead ing entertainment as a profit center for
local TV stations.
Developing online new s d istribu tion channels that generate revenu e
appears to be the w ay to go. As the Wall Street Journal noted : “N ew s
represents 50% of incom e at WOOD, w hich is typical in the ind ustry. (Local
prime-tim e ad sales make u p another 40%, w ith d aytim e sales accou nting for
the balance).” “Most im portant, accord ing to Ms. Kniow ski, has been a shift
in em phasis from featu re-type stories to hard er new s. The station has largely
aband oned w hat she calls “tou chy feely” stories – su ch as local firefighters
saving a cute kitten from a rooftop.”32
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The attractiveness of local new s has penetrated through the ind u stry,
w ith expand ing coverage. “N ew s is typically good bu siness. Unlike
synd ication, w here stations often split ad tim e w ith the d istribu tor, affiliates
keep all the ad tim e in new s. And som e ad vertisers, su ch as political
campaigns, are most interested in buying time during the news.”33
Paralleling
the
Tribu ne’s
d ifficulty
m aking
cross-media
conglom eration pay off are Sinclair’s trou bles w ith centralized , chain TV
news.
Fou r years ago, Sinclair Broad casting Grou p lau nched a highly controversial
centralized new s op eration that it said w ou ld allow its stations to afford ably
broad cast local new s. Tod ay, the station ow ner is giving the exp erim ent a vote
of no confid ence, shu tting d ow n half a d ozen new scasts at variou s stations and
overhauling its News Central service.34

Sinclair’s problem w as sim ple: TV new s is local and “using
centralized new s, critics say, stripped stations of their localism …Too m u ch of
the new s came from a place w here none of the view ers lived … View ers w ere
told these w ere local new scasts, bu t it d id not pass the small test.” 35 Ironically,
“Sinclair says it w ill continu e to su pply its stations w ith its controversial
ed itorials, called “The Point…” The segm ents have been another flashpoint in
local m arkets, d erid ed by m ed ia activists as ultra-conservative and not
reflective of local issu es and sensibilities. “We w ill continu e to provid e a
point of view… It’s very important to our company.” 36
While local stations have d iscovered that sticking to the new s
bu siness is good bu siness, the national netw orks seem to be head ing in a
d ifferent d irection – “to ad opt the form u la that w orked so w ell in prim e tim e:
not too m any negative stories, w ith attractive people d elivering the new s in a
m ore com pelling w ay.” 37 This raises concerns am ong som e, w ho see the TV
news business better supported by focusing on the news.
Bu t if their new s op erations p u sh the entertainm ent elem ent too far, they w ill
chase aw ay a blu e-chip au d ience that valu es su bstance m ore than style. While
the au d ience for the evening new s cast is aging and d eclining in size, it’s still
substantial, and the shows all generate tens of million in revenues….
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The takeaw ay from all this: Su ccessfu l new s organizations know clearly w ho
they are and w hat their m ission is – and they execu te it, esp ecially w hen it
matters most.38

THE BOTTOM LINE
Thu s, in both the TV and new spaper sectors, companies “generally
continu e to enjoy fat, if flat profit m argins.” 39 Exhibit 1 su m m arizes the
financial num bers that have been cited in recent press accou nts of
acquisitions.
Exhibit 1: Financial Ratios in the Major Mass Media

Newspapers
Local TV Stations
Cable Systems

Cash Flow Multiples
in Recent M&A Activity

Stock Market Prices as
a Cash Flow Multiple

9.5 to 14
10.6 to 16.1
9.4 to 11.1

7.9
7 to 8
8.5

Sources: Levingston, Steven and Terence O’Hara. “M cClatchy’s Paper Chase: Family Owned
Chain to by Knight, Plans to Sell off 12 Dailies.” Washington Post, 14 March 2006, p. D1.

While there is som e consternation in the trad e press over the
d ivergence betw een the cash flow m ultiples paid in m ergers and acqu isitions
and the cash flow multiples implicit in stock price, this appears to be a routine
feature of the m arket for these types of assets. Consid er the follow ing
d iscu ssion from an extrem ely popu lar text, H arold Vogel’s Entertainment
Industry Economics, d ealing w ith the econom ics of these ind u stries. Taken
together, these articles give a comprehensive picture of the media markets.
We can approximate the value of a broadcast (and similarly… a cable) property
in the follow ing m anner: Assign a m u ltip le of cash flow , say in the range of
eight to twelve times, a higher or lower figure depending on prevailing interest
rates and sim ilar recent transaction p rices. Then su btract from the p rod u ct of
the assumed multiple times the cash flow an amount representing “net debt…”
To then arrive at a p er share estim ate, d ivid e the resu lting d ifference by the
nu m ber of shares ou tstand ing…Su ch calcu lations focu s attention on the
d ifference in the valu e of broad cast and cable p rop erties as m easu red by the
going m u ltip le of cash flow (i.e., the so-called p rivate m arket valu e) and the
valu e of the u nd erlying p u blicly trad ed shares. A w id e d ivergence w ill, of
course, enhance takeover prospects.

38
39
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Ju st as in broad casting p rop erties, how ever, p rivate m arket valu es, w hich
inclu d e an im p licit control prem iu m , are norm ally m u ch higher than are seen
in public market trading of shares…
Pu blishing com p anies, like those in other m ed ia-related ind u stries, are valu ed
p rim arily on com p arisons of cash-flow generation cap abilities.
As in
broad casting or cable, a m u ltip le of p rojected cash-flow… is d eterm ined by
taking into consideration the multiples of similar, recently traded properties…
The valu e thu s d erived w ou ld then (as d escribed for cable…) be further
ad ju sted for net d ebt and for the estim ated w orth of off balance sheet item s to
arrive at the p rivate m arket valu e of the prop erty. This is the p rice that a
rational investor m ight p ay to take control of the p rop erty and its cash flow s.
Bu t, in ad d ition, this p rice estim ate m ay also be u sed as a basis for m easu ring
the relative investm ent attractiveness of p u blicly trad ed shares, w hich
normally sell at a significant discount to the private market value estimate.a/
Discou nts to p rivate valu e m ight be as mu ch as 40%, and EBDITA m u ltip les
w ill, in p u blishing, typ ically range from six to ten tim es p rojections – w ith the
long ru n historical average ratio of total m arket valu e to EBITDA for
newspaper publishers at approximately 8.2. 40
a/

These qu otes captu re all of the key elem ents in the financial terrain of
the new spaper and TV (as w ell as the cable) m arkets d escribed in the trad e
press in recent m onths. The m u ltiples observed are in the higher range of
those u sed , as d em onstrated by Vogel. The d iscou nts of pu blicly trad ed
stocks to private m arket valu ations are at the levels id entified .
In short,
these m ed ia properties are profitable properties that com m and “nice prices”
when they are sold.
THE REVENUE CHALLENGE
“Fat bu t flat” is not enou gh for the analysts. So, they ask the
television business, ‘Where d oes earnings grow th com e from ?” insisting that
fou r revenu e stream s are necessary. In ad d ition to ad vertising, there are
retransmission consent, digital channels and the Internet.41
In the new spaper bu siness, “The central econom ic qu estion in
jou rnalism continu es to be how long it w ill take online jou rnalism to becom e
a m ajor econom ic engine, and if it w ill ever be as big as print or television.” 42
The attention is now focu sed on Internet d istribu tion of content prod u ced in
the newsrooms of the traditional media.
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Finally, new sp ap ers are starting to see the Internet as central to their fu tu re. In
2005, new sp aper Internet ad vertising revenu e top p ed $2 billion for the first
time, a 31 percent increase over 2004….
Althou gh “convergence” across new sp ap ers, TV and rad io has been a
cherished ind u stry bu zzw ord for years, the p ortfolio ap p roach focu ses
p rim arily on the Internet and p rint rather than on trad itional rad io and
television… Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission ru les bar new sp ap ers from
owning broadcast stations in the same market… and even if they could, TV and
rad io face the sam e com p etitive p ressu res and d eclining au d iences that
new sp ap ers d o. Instead , m any new sp ap ers are enthu siastically ad d ing new
au d io and vid eo op tions to their w eb sites, from new scasts to stories to
commentary.43
Ms. Kniow ski is going after classified clients of the areas d om inant new sp ap er,
the Grand Rap id s Press, w hich is ow ned by Ad vance Pu blications Inc. “We’ve
got to figu re ou t how to take m oney aw ay from them ,” she says. With the
em ergence of low -cost d igital vid eo, she hop es the station’s Web site m ight
someday sell video ads for something as mundane as pedigreed puppies.
“That ad in their new sp ap er or on their Web site? That shou ld be vid eo and it
should be bought from us.”44

Exhibit 2 show s a recent estim ate of online ad vertising revenues,
grow ing at over 30 percent per year. In the battle betw een new spapers and
TV stations, new spapers have gotten ou t to a hu ge lead . Expectations are for
these numbers to continue to grow at very high rates.
While convergence of offline and online d istribu tion of content
receives a great d eal of attention, cross-ow nership of trad itional TV and
new spaper properties has reced ed . Even in 2003, as the lifting of the ban
loom ed , tw o fu nd am ental concerns w ere being raised , w hich presaged the
d evelopm ents of recent m onths – the econom ic performance of converged
properties w as not stellar and the core com petences of the m ed ia are qu ite
different.
Perhap s the biggest im p ed im ent, how ever, is the p ercep tion that the resu lts
that grand fathered new sp ap ers are getting from broad cast convergence have
so far been, if not a bust, then underwhelming.45
N ew sp ap ers are fu nd am entally abou t new s w hile rad io m akes m oney “by
playing music, which has nothing to do with the business of the newspaper.”46
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Exhibit 2: Online Advertising Revenue
ONLINE ADVERTISING REVENUE
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Source: Romano, Allison. “Bring it Online.” Broadcasting and Cable, 12 December 2005, p. 9,
citing Bollen & Associates.

Moreover, som e fear d evelopm ent of “a kind of ‘cross-ownership
com pu lsion’ that pressures pu re-play new spaper com panies to get into
broad cast convergence, w hether they w ant to or not.” 47 H ow this pressu re
w ou ld play ou t, is u ncertain. Som e w ho have experience w ith crossow nership, su ch as Gil Thelen, pu blisher of the Tampa Tribune, su ggest “if
there is pressu re it w ill be on non-converged m ed ia that w ill find it hard er to
retain em ployees w ho w ant to learn mu ltim ed ia.” Ultimately, a fu nd am ental
problem arises because in m any of these m arkets there is only one
new spaper. The result can be a very d istorted m arket. “More often, the
obstacle is that the major newspaper is aligned with a rival TV affiliate.”48 In
short, the econom ic gain of com plem entaries is u ncertain, at best, w hile the
public policy costs are clear.
A CADEMIC RESEARCH CONFIRMS THE REALITY
While the realization that hu ge conglom erates may not be the answ er
has recently bu rst into the popu lar press, the acad emic press has long charted
the two elements that seem to be roiling the media industries.
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On the one hand , the failu re of conglom erates to generate positive
results w as noted in a broad com parison of variou s types of cross m ed ia
m ergers u nd er the title “Mergers and Acqu isitions in the Med ia Ind ustries:
Were Failures Really Unforeseeable?”
Over the last tw o d ecad es, mergers and acqu isitions (M&A) have becom e the
most preferred strategic tool of firms in the media industry. As still claimed by
analysts and m anagers, M&A d eals are exp ected to generate econom ic
efficiency, especially throu gh size effects (econom ies of scale and scope and
other synergies). H ow ever, it seem s that the hop es p laced in these synergies
are generally d isap p ointed . Ind eed , am ong a sam p le of 11 m ed ia firm s for
fiscal years 1998 and 1999, it ap p ears a firm ’s size and a sim u ltaneou s p resence
in m any bu sinesses of the m ed ia ind u stries d o not im p rove econom ic
p erform ance, nor d oes the p ossession of com p lem entary assets. The existence
of econom ies of scale and scop e, or at least the ability of firm s to im p lem ent
them, has still to be proved.49

A half a d ozen years later, the benefits of consolid ation and
conglom eration rem ain unproven. Stockhold ers seeking short term gains
have run out of patience, triggering turmoil in the industry.
On the other hand , the uniqu e type of profitability that typifies the
new spaper bu siness has been noted in the acad emic literature as w ell. As a
recent stu d y titled “Ow nership Structu re of Pu blicly Trad ed N ew spaper
Companies and Their Financial Performance” concluded
There are characteristics of the new sp ap er ind u stry that m ay m ake it m ore
ap p ealing to these relatively p assive institu tional investors. In general, the
financial p erform ance of new sp ap ers is less volatile than is tru e of m any other
ind u stries. Profit m argins are high, and the ability to rid e ou t econom ic
d ow ntu rns is good . Investm ent in the new sp ap er p rod u ct itself has resu lted in
solid long-term revenu e grow th, w hich m ay serve to red u ce p ressu res of shortterm results regardless of the type of investors in the firm.50

Qu estions abou t the investor style and the com plexity of m otives
have also been id entified in the acad em ic literature. Whether or not one
thinks that “Wall Street Mad e Me Do It,” 51 as one article pu t it, there w ould
49
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appear to be opportu nities to m atch investors and jou rnalistic valu es, as
McClatchy seems to have done.
Fu rtherm ore, it ap p ears that it m ay be p ossible to id entify institutional
investors w ho have longer tim e horizons than others, su ggesting it is p ossible
for new sp ap er com p anies to attem p t to m od ify their sharehold er base in a way
that w ou ld allow m ore room for m aneu ver in p u rsu ing a p u blic service
agend a. At the sam e tim e, how ever, new sp ap er com p anies shou ld be m ind fu l
that a stated objective of long-term investing d oes not necessarily signify that
an institu tional investor w ill ad op t a hand s-off ap p roach or be w illing to
subordinate financial objectives to journalistic ones.52

The Knight Rid d er chain “m od ified its sharehold er base,” w hile the
d ebate at the Tribu ne Com pany is abou t a sim ilarly rad ical change. Ind eed ,
there are apparently nu m erou s ind ivid uals and groups that are “Yearning to
Put Papers Back in Local Hands.”53
The acad emic literature not only su pports the notion of the
profitability of the new spaper bu siness, it also find s that investm ent in the
newsroom increases circulation54 and profits55 in part by improving the quality
of journalism.56
These data indicate that newsroom investment would have been good business
for these 1450 d ailies. N ew sp ap er m anagers w ho continu e to cu t new sroom
investm ent to p reserve higher p rofits m ight ind eed be eating their seed corn…
If the resu lts of this stu d y w ere fou nd to be ap p licable to the new sp ap er
ind u stry, the failu re to invest in the new sroom cou ld be a form of slow -motion
su icid e, w here a com p any’s d isinvestm ent grad u ally alienates core read ers and
red u ces the attractiveness of new sp ap ers as ad vertising ou tlets. This scenario
w ou ld exp lain stu d ies that ind icate Thom son new sp ap ers ran them selves ou t

52

Id., p. 262
H olson, Lau ra M. “Yearning to Pu t Pap ers Back in Local H and s: In Several Cities, a
Pu sh for Dailies Free of Absentee Corp orate Ow ners.” N ew Y ork Times, 1 Ju ly 2006, p .
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of bu siness and that p u blic new sp ap ers tend to d raw m ore w eekly
competition.57

The literature also su ggests a strong conclu sion abou t com petition.
Competition drives investment, improves quality and lowers costs.
Econom ic theory and research p rovid e evid ence that intense com p etition
am ong new sp ap ers w ill resu lt in increased new sroom bu d gets, changes in
content and d ecreases in ad vertising cost p er thou sand … It ap p ears that
com p etition help s new sp ap ers in the long ru n. The resp onse to com p etitors
helps to maintain content quality and keep prices down.”58

Moreover, althou gh Dean Singleton su rm ises that there is little
d ifference in the behavior of privately and pu blicly held new spapers, the
acad em ic literatu re suggests otherw ise. Privately held papers invest m ore in
quality to achieve higher circulation.
Research ind icates that p rivately ow ned d ailies are likely to sp end m ore on
their new sroom s than are p u blicly held d ailies w ith large p rofit m argins. This
resu lts from the need for high-p rofit p u blicly held com p anies to p rod u ce high
short-ru n p rofit m argins that satisfy the d em and s of the stock m arket. This
higher sp end ing su ggests that p rivately ow ned d ailies are m ore likely to have
higher qu ality than high p rofit p u blic p ap ers, w hich help s to keep m ore
readers satisfied and reduces the likelihood that readers will turn to weeklies to
get their news.59

Given recent d evelopm ents in the ind u stry and the long stand ing
acad em ic research on investm ent, com petition and quality, w e w ou ld not
expect to see research results that show significant benefits to journalism from
cross-m ed ia ow nership. In fact, the literatu re is all over the m ap, reflecting
the uncertainties about cross-media operations.
First, mu ch analysis confu ses m u ltim ed ia jou rnalism , the effort to
d istribu te stories on m ore than one m ed iu m ; conglom eration, the m erger of
two trad itional m ed ia types su ch as TV and new spapers; and coord inated
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joint prod u ction of new s for d istribu tion across med ia ou tlets of variou s
types. Definitions are all over the map, too.60
Second , mu ch of the research is qu alitative, focu sing on how
journalists and editors feel about convergence,61 rather than measuring what it
actually does to or for the production of news.
Third , partnerships have not ad vanced very far 62 or yield ed clear
benefits in term s of either financial improvem ent 63 or jou rnalism quality.64
Tw o trend s that are clear are that cross prom otion takes u p a significant
amount of air time and television seems to be the larger beneficiary.
THE CONTINUING S OAP O PERA AT THE TRIBUNE COMPANY
The d rama su rrou nd ing the Tribu ne Com pany has not reached its
conclusion, but the soap opera offers lessons.
The new spaper bu siness is a profitable business. “Across the
ind ustry, profits are actu ally better than the bad head lines suggest.” 65 Even
the Los A ngeles Times, the focal point of m ush of the d ram a at the Tribu ne
Company “enjoys a profit margin of about 20%, lower than that of its parent’s
flagship Chicago Tribu ne, bu t higher than m any m etro papers.” 66 To pu t this
in perspective, the Scripps N ew spapers “cash-flow m argins – 28.9 percent in
the second quarter – were among the highest in the industry.”67
60
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The pu blic and private valu ations of the new spaper assets d iffer
sharply, as has frequ ently been the case in the ind u stry. As one m ajor
investor in the Tribu ne pu t it “the fact that the valu e of the assets exceed s the
current stock price is indisputable.”68
There are m any w ho believe that eating you r seed corn by cu tting
staff is not the w ay to proceed . The Chand ler’s had raised this point in their
initial call for a break u p of the com pany. In an open letter to the board , the
family invoked the trad ition of the new spaper and said fu rther cost cu ts
would damage its quality.”69 The editor and the publisher of the Tribune took
this position in resisting the d em and from corporate head quarters to m ake
m ore cu ts at the Los A ngeles Times. Their sentiment w as expressed in an
article that reported on a letter from civic leaders.
The Los Angeles Tim es qu oted Mr. Baqu et [the Ed itor of the p ap er] on the
p ossibility of m aking fu rther job cu ts. “I am not averse to m aking fu rther job
cu ts,” he told the p ap er. “Bu t you can go too far, and I d on’t p lan to d o that. I
ju st have a d ifference of op inion w ith the ow ners Tribu ne abou t w hat the size
of the staff shou ld be. To m ake su bstantial red u ctions w ou ld significantly
damage the quality of the paper.”
For an ed itor to p u blic d efy m anagem ent over bu d get cu ts isn’t u nheard of.
More rem arkable w as that Mr. Baqu et’s p ublisher, Mr. Johnson, joined him in
resisting the pu sh for cu ts. The article quoted Mr. Johnson saying he agreed
w ith Mr. Baqu et that “new sp ap ers can’t cu t their w ay into the fu tu re. We have
to carefully balance economic reality with serving our readers.”70

The id ea w as expressed by others as w ell. “An Ed itor at the paper
said the article w as prompted by a letter on Tu esd ay from 20 civic lead ers,
w ho called on Tribu ne to pu t m ore m oney into the paper or consid er selling
it”.71 The pu blisher w as u ltimately forced to resign, althou gh the ed itor
stayed on.72
The civic leaders point to the important local role of the newspaper as
their motivation for writing.
“Peop le d on’t like p olicy issues here,” said Brend an H u ffm an, p resid ent of the
Valley Ind u stry and Com m erce Association. “Bu t the fact is that w e are the

68

Seelye, Katherine Q. and Jennifer Steinhau r. 2006. “At Los Angeles Tim es, A Civil
Executive Rebellion,” The New York Times, September 21, p. C12.
69
Id., p. A10.
70
Id., p. A10.
71
Seelye, Katherine Q. 2006. “Los Angeles times Editor Openly Defies Owner’s Call for
Job Cuts,” New York Times, September 15, p. C3.
72
Ku rtz, H ow ard , 2006, “Tribu ne Co. Ou sts Pu blisher at L.A. Tim es: Jeffrey Johnson
Had Fought Budget Cuts,” Washington Post, October 6.

FAILURE OF THE CONGLOMERATE MODEL

155

w orld ’s 17th largest econom y and it is very im p ortant to cover these stories and
educate the population.”73

There w ere a nu m ber of people and grou ps w ho stepped forw ard
w ith offers to bu y the paper, affirm ing the interest in stand alone new spaper
businesses.
While those who seek to buy the paper outright agree with the business leaders
abou t the p ap er’s coverage, they see them selves as the solu tion. The p otential
buyers include three billionaires: David Geffen, the music mogul, Eli Board, the
philanthropist, and Ronald Burkle, the supermarket tycoon.74

Interestingly, there are both com m ercial and non-com m ercial m od els
on the table, all of w hich em phasize that “the paper need s to be locally
owned.”75
Obviously, conglomeration is no panacea for the newspaper business.
In fact, the challenge repeated ly id entified in the analysis of the Tribu ne
situation is the Internet. “Bu t revenu e grow th is d ifficult to com e by am id a
bu m py transition to the Internet, w here there are m yriad rivals for
information and ad vertising that w ere once chiefly the pu rview of print
newspapers.”76
For nearly a centu ry, new sp ap ers w ere u nrivaled in their ability to d eliver
new s and ad vertising. N ew s staffs grew fat as hiring d ecision w ere m ad e on
coverage needs rather than bottom lines.
N ow , as new sp ap ers lose read ers and ad vertising to other m ed ia and stru ggle
to transition to Internet and other d igital form s of d elivery, w hile attemp ting
to m aintain p rofit m argins of m ore than 20 p ercent and m ollify Wall Street’s
need for grow th, cu ts in jobs and new sroom bu d gets are com ing fast and
deep.77

The “bu m py transition” to the Internet is d ifferent at d ifferent new spapers
(see Exhibit 3). Stu d ies 7 and 8 show that people w ho go online visit the w eb
sites of trad itional sou rces. Efforts to m easu re online new spaper read ership
are blossoming and the resu lts are m ost interesting from the point of view of
the trou bled chains (Knight Rid d er and Tribu ne) id entified in this analysis.
Scarborough Research analyzed online readership in the top 25 markets. The
26 d ailies in those m arkets accou nt for arou nd fou r-fifths of the average
circulation of all d ailies in Am erica. The stu d y inclu d es the flagship papers
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of the tw o trou bled chains. It also includ es the largest cross-ow ned papers in
the country.
On average, the online read ership (exclu sive and d uplicative) equals
20 percent of the total read ership of the paper. In other w ord s, for every fou r
su bscribers to the physical paper, there is one online read er. The flagship
papers of the trou bled chains are all below the average. The Los Angeles
Tim es ranks d ead last. If the L.A. Times w ere perform ing as w ell online as
the tw o lead ers (the Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Tam pa Tribune) it w ou ld
have 750,000 m ore online read ers. Even at the national average, it w ou ld
have over a quarter of a million more online readers.
That cross-ow nership is no panacea for the Internet problem is also
clear in these estimates. On average, the cross-owned papers in these markets
are not perform ing as w ell as the other papers. While there are a cou ple
papers among the leaders, more are at the bottom of the list.

CONCLUSION
Given the failu re of conglom eration/ consolid ation and the shift in
focus to the Internet, Frank Ahrens writes that “As FCC Digs Into Ownership,
Big Media No Longer Cares,”
Since 2003, the m ed ia giants have greatly exp and ed their p resence on the
Internet, bu ying su ccessfu l w eb sites or red ou bling their ow n efforts. The
continu ed roll ou t of high-sp eed Internet, the im p rovem ent in online content
and an exp losion of hand held d evices have com bined to give Big Med ia m u ch
greater reach and p otentially greater influ ence than it w ou ld have had , w ere
companies allowed to buy a few more television stations each.78

Bu t, if Big Med ia no longer cares, shou ld pu blic policy? The answ er
is an em phatic Yes. For the first tim e in a generation, the prospect of
increasing com petition in local new s is real; allow ing cross-ownership
m ergers w ould invariably stifle and m u te that com petition. The typical
m ed ia m arket in Am erica (the m id d le d ecile for exam ple) has one d om inant
new spaper w ith a m arket share of abou t tw o-third s of the m arket. The
lead ing TV station has a market share close to one-third of the TV m arket. A
merger between the two creates a dominant media first that overshadows any
other rivals in the m arket. Moreover, the local new s w ebsites to w hich
individuals go for local news and information are overwhelmingly the sites of
the local new spapers and the local TV stations.79 A merger betw een the tw o
would extend the concentration of local sources to the Internet.
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Exhibit 3: Internet Performance of Major Newspapers
Paper

Circulation

Cleveland Plain Dealer
Tampa Tribune
New York Times
Boston Globe
Washington Post
Atlanta Constitution
San Diego Union-Trib.
Arizona Republic
San Francisco Chronicle
Seattle Times
Sacramento Bee
Star Tribune
Houston Chronicle
Orlando Sentinel
Baltimore Sun
Oregonian
Chicago Tribune
Detroit News
Pittsburgh Post
St. Louis Post Dispatch
Miami Herald
Dallas Morning News
Philadelphia Enquirer
Denver Post
St. Petersburg Times
Los Angeles Times
Total
Non-Cross-Owned
Cross-owned
Troubled Chains

1,297,880
749,087
3,060,475
1,541,869
2,174,630
1,647,410
1,078,469
1,485,880
1,513,260
1,225,545
966,296
1,605,472
1,897,254
1,053,952
1,064,219
1,137,490
2,820,701
1,858,169
943,544
1,255,472
1,162,424
1,798,163
1,968,063
1,465,403
1,016,950
4,257,507
42,045,584
28,124,412
13,921,172
11,272,914

Online Readers
Percent of Total Readers Cross- Troubled
Chain
Unique Duplicate
Total
Unique Duplicate Total Owned
449,958
165,892
615,850
23.5
8.7 32.2
162,747
192,069
354,816
14.7
17.4 32.1
Y
366,540
981,043 1,347,583
8.3
22.3 30.6
197,453
469,175
666,628
8.9
21.2 30.2
140,521
778,502
919,023
4.5
25.2 29.7
224,484
428,687
653,171
9.8
18.6 28.4
Y
80,882
260,447
341,329
5.7
18
24
119,501
324,920
444,421
6.2
16.8
23
147,692
297,111
444,803
7.5
15.2 22.7
114,814
236,077
350,891
7.3
15 22.3
42,508
204,399
246,907
3.5
16.8 20.4
85,929
303,891
389,820
4.3
15.2 19.5
100,408
282,312
382,720
4.4
12.4 16.8
46,920
164,069
210,989
3.7
13 16.7
45,138
157,881
203,019
3.6
12.5
16
Y
38,696
176,242
214,938
2.9
13 15.9
135,070
397,766
532,836
4
11.9 15.9
Y
Y
99,212
247,274
346,486
4.5
11.2 15.7
28,826
143,248
172,074
2.6
12.8 15.4
62,615
163,358
225,973
4.2
11 15.3
45,320
162,522
207,842
3.3
11.9 15.2
Y
Y
71,730
249,410
321,140
3.4
11.8 15.2
Y
108,511 196,606
305,117
4.8
8.6 13.4
Y
39,911 180,385
220,296
2.4
10.7 13.1
40,309
101,911
142,220
3.5
8.8 12.3
163,941
429,786
593,727
3.4
8.6 12.3
Y
Y
3,159,636 7,694,983 10,854,619
6
14.5 20.5
2,236,843 5,509,823 7,746,666
6.2
15.4 21.6
922,793 2,185,160
3,107,953
5.4
12.8 18.3
497,980 1,344,561 1,842,541
3.8
10.3
14

Source: Scarborough Research, A New Story Lead for the Newspaper Industry, August 2006.
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The m ost interesting d evelopm ent flow ing from d igital convergence
has been an ou tbreak of com petition in local new s m arkets betw een
new spapers and television stations.
Although both television and
new spapers prod u ce new s, the form and format of prod u ction and the
m anner in w hich they are consu m ed are so d ifferent that they are not
generally seen as com peting prod u cts, either by antitru st au thorities or by
consu m ers. The cross elasticity of d emand is low .1 With both sets of entities
now targeting online d istribu tion as a grow th area, they m ay lock horns in a
manner they have not in the past.
For now the pow er of a hom etow n new spaper’s brand is a big d raw
online. “The new spapers have a little leg u p, bu t w e are extrem ely
com petitive,” says Rich H arris, execu tive VP/ general Manager of d igital
media and strategic marketing for NBC Universal’s TV-station group.”2
The failu re of conglom eration to prod u ce results, the shift tow ard
private ow nership and smaller new spaper chains, and the grow ing focus on
online d istribu tion challenge the notion that new spaper-TV cross-ownership
is necessary to save either ind ustry from econom ic ru in. In light of this, the
policy that prefers a larger nu m ber of ow ners, in general, and the
ind epend ence of the tw o m ost im portant sou rces of local new s and
information, in particular, cannot be said to im pose a bu rd en on either
industry.
More im portantly, the evid ence suggests that local new spapers and
TV stations are abou t to com e into com petition throu gh their Internet w eb
sites in a manner that has not typified the local new s m arket in the past. It
w ou ld be u tter folly to allow this bu rgeoning com petition to be squ elched by
cross-media mergers.
Structural rules, like the ban on cross-ownership, are intended to alter
behavior, precisely because it constrains the cond u ct of market participants.
As practiced in antitrust cases and ind u strial policy, the goal of stru ctu ral
lim itations is to prom ote econom ic efficiency. In the case of the cross
ow nership ban, the goal is to prom ote a m ore d iverse foru m for d em ocratic
d iscou rse and to prom ote localism in the m ed ia. What this analysis show s is
that the econom ic costs of achieving this goal throu gh a ban on crossow nership are sm all, if any at all, w hile the benefits in prom oting d iversity
and competition are large.

1

Coop er, Mark N . M edia Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Information A ge. Palo
Alto: Center for Internet and Society, 2003, pp. 124-126.
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STUDY 10
CONCERNS ABOUT PRINT JOURNALISM AND
CROSS-OWNERSHIP
M ARK COOPER AND S TEVE COOPER
THE S TRUGGLE O VER THE ESSENCE OF PRINT JOURNALISM
The collapse of the conglom erate m od el, the tension betw een Wall
Street’s and Main Street’s concerns, and the pu blic versu s private ow nership
d ebate u nd erscore a long stand ing d ebate over the m ed ia in general and
newspapers in particular.
The u nd erlying them e in Tribu ne’s u nraveling is that in a tim e of technological
transition, the tw o p u blics that are served by m any of the nation’s new sp ap ers
are no longer getting along so w ell. One is the p u blic m arket – that is, Wall
Street – w hich cares only abou t an attractive retu rn on its investm ent. The
other is the so-called p u blic good that new sp ap ers serve by p rofessionally
gathering and reporting for their communities.1

Som e argue that the tensions can be hand led , w ith d istant
management that appreciates the local roots of the business.
While jou rnalists m easu re the su ccess of new sp ap ers by Pu litzer Prizes,
investors u su ally d o not. That said , one of the com p any’s 21 new sp ap ers, the
Rocky Mou ntain N ew s, has w on fou r Pu litzer p rizes since 2000; the com p any’s
papers won five Pulitzers between 1980 and 1999.
John Tem p le, the ed itor and p u blisher of the Rocky Mou ntain N ew s and
d irector of content for Scrip p s’s new sp ap ers, said the comp any su p p orted the
role of the local new sp ap er. “Ken Low e gives ind ivid u als like m e the
ind ep end ence and au thority to d o the right thing,” he said . “Ou r m antra has
been to do what is right for our community.2

Others su ggest that it is a bu siness that requires a d ifferent point of
view, but to the same effect.
Mr. Geffen has told friend s the p ap er cou ld be exp ensive bu t that he w as
p rep ared to p ou r hu nd red s of m illions of d ollars into it. H e has said he w ou ld
bu y the p ap er w ith his ow n m oney and w ou ld be happ y w ith a 5 percent
retu rn on investm ent; far below w hat the Los Angeles Tim es has said is a 20
percent profit margin now.
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Mr. Geffen’s p rincip le goal, he has said , is increasing the size of the staff,
greatly im p roving the p ap er’s electronic op erations and increasing the
coverage of real estate and automobiles, areas of great interest to Angelenos.3

While the latter m ay seem “Quiixotic,” there is clearly a them e in the
current debate and in the literature that sees this as a way to go. The question
becomes how public policy can promote the outcome.
The FCC d oes not regu late new spapers, bu t it certainly can consid er
the im pact of new spaper-TV com binations on the overall m ed ia environm ent,
w hich inclu d es new spapers. The cross ow nership situations w ill alm ost
certainly not involve local ow ners. They w ill m ost likely be the largest of the
corporate entities, certainly in the new spaper space. This w ill reinforce or
preserve tend encies that have been harm ful to d emocratic d iscou rse. There
are also u niqu e im pacts that cross-ow nership situ ations have on print
journalism.
THE U NIQUE IMPACT OF N EWSPAPER-TELEVISION M ERGERS
There is a com plex relationship betw een new spapers and TV. On the
supply-sid e, the antagonism betw een TV and new spapers is an im portant
elem ent of prom oting civic d iscou rse. At the sam e tim e, the operation of
new spaper new sroom s prod u ces m any stories, especially local, that becom e
an inpu t for TV new s. Withou t the mu ch m ore intensive and in-d epth new s
gathering of papers, the news product space will be reduced. On the demand
sid e, w e observe that new spapers and television are com plem ents.
Consu m ers seek in-d epth follow -u p of the new s head lines that they
encounter in broad cast.
We w ant to preserve the antagonism and
independent resources that newspapers bring.
To the extent that FCC regu lation of the m ed ia su bject to its au thority
has the consequ ence of d econcentrating the prod u ction of local new s and
preserving the antagonism betw een the print and broad cast m ed ia, it shou ld
d o so. An avenu e of integration that w ou ld be particu larly d estru ctive of the
jou rnalistic valu es in ou r society or d estru ctive of the com petitive and
symbiotic relationship between newspapers and broadcast that disciplines the
broadcast media should be a source of serious concern to the Commission.
Thu s the Com m ission can legitimately enquire into the im pact on
civic d iscou rse of conglom eration, concentration and integration in each of
the m ed ia. Several recent books abou t new spapers paint an extrem ely
trou bling pictu re. Many analysts believe that the health of both Am erican
jou rnalism and the new spaper ind ustry w ill d epend on their ability to
su ccessfu lly achieve three things: d ilu ting w hat has becom e an increasingly
3
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over-concentrated marketplace; better m anaging the balance betw een
provid ing inform ative, influ ential new s coverage and su staining a profitable
new spaper; and recom mitting ou rselves to, as Leonard Dow nie, Jr. and
Robert G. Kaiser of The W ashington Post pu t it, “ind epend ent, aggressive
journalism [which] strengthens American democracy, improves the lives of its
citizens, checks the abu ses of pow erful people, su pports the w eakest
m em bers of society,” and , u ltimately, “connects u s all to one another.” 4 Put
m ore sim ply by Bartholom ew Sparrow , qu oting form er journalist H arold
Evans, “[T]he challenge before the Am erican med ia ‘is not to stay in bu siness
– it is to stay in jou rnalism ’.” 5 The su ggestion here is that the challenge for
new spapers that are d raw n into cross ow nership situations in w hich
democracy has an important stake is to stay in print journalism.
There are three d irect w ays in w hich rem oval of the ban on crossow nership w ou ld affect print jou rnalism . There is also the concern that the
pattern of conglom eration and cross-m ed ia ow nership in the new spaper
ind ustry and the potential for a su bstantial increase in these d evelopm ents
w ill resu lt in a qualitatively new type of problem : the potential for
fundamental, institutional conflicts of interest.
The flu rry of d ebate over m ed ia consolid ation m asks an equ ally, if not m ore
d istu rbing trend : the conflict of interest inherent in d iversified cross-ownership
of new sgathering institu tions by m u ltinational concerns. A m ed ia m arket in
which The Washington Post and Newsweek join in “strategic alliances” with NBC,
Microsoft Corp . help s u nd erw rite the salaries of rep orters for MSN BC, and
Am erica Online help s cap italize CN N exp and s the p otential for conflict of
interest far beyond the ind ivid u al to the institu tional level. Ind eed , the crossow nership and content sharing that typ ifies Am erican m ass m ed ia tod ay raises
legitim ate qu estions abou t w hether jou rnalists w orking on su ch far-flung
conglom erates can avoid conflicts of interest on the institu tional level, and
about what such conflicts do to the notion of an independent press…
Institu tional conflict of interest extend s the conflict inherent in a com m ercial
p ress… beyond the im m ed iate concerns of the jou rnalist or even the new s
organization for which he or she works.6

4

Dow nie Jr., Leonard and Robert G. Kaiser. The N ews A bout the N ews. N ew York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2002, p. 13.
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Sp arrow , Bartholom ew H . Uncertain Guardians: The N ews M edia as A Political
Institution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, p. 103.
6
Davis, Charles and Step hanie Craft. 2000. N ew Med ia Synergy: Em ergence of
Institutional Conflict of Interest. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 15, pp. 222-223.
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PRESSURE FROM CONCENTRATION, V ERTICAL INTEGRATION AND
CONGLOMERATION ON JOURNALISTIC V ALUES
The prospect of m ergers betw een TV stations and new spapers raises
concerns abou t vertical integration conglom eration and horizontal
concentration (see Figu re III-1).7 Su ch a m erger is said to be vertical if the
new s prod u ction ou tpu t of the new spaper operation w ou ld becom e inpu t for
the TV d istribu tion activity. It is a conglom erate m erger if the new entity
spans tw o separate markets: the print new s and the vid eo new s m arket. Both
of these changes w ou ld have negative effects on the jou rnalistic end eavor of
the newspaper.
The d ictates of vid eo d elivery w ou ld alter the natu re of reporting and
commitments to investigative journalism.
The conglom eration in larger enterp rises w ou ld red u ce the
jou rnalistic activity to a p rofit center that is d riven by the larger
economic goals of the parent.
Com bining the tw o activities w ithin one entity d im inishes the
antagonism between print and video media.

The pu rely horizontal aspect of these m ergers also poses a problem .
The basic activity of gathering new s as an inpu t for d istribu tion is very
sim ilar in the print and television m ed ia. To the extent large entities control a
substantial part of the production of news in an area, these mergers can create
market power.
Diminishing Journalistic Values
Consid er the contrast betw een jou rnalistic valu es and the image
presented by Tribu ne Com pany execu tives d escribing how the Chicago
Tribu ne and Chicago television station WGN , am ong other m ed ia properties,
view their business:
Tribu ne had a story to tell – and it w as ju st the story Wall Street w anted to
hear.
In charts and ap p end ices, they show ed a com p any that ow ns fou r
newspapers—and 16 TV stations (w ith shared ow nership of tw o others); fou r
rad io stations; three local cable new s channels; a lu crative ed u cational book
d ivision; a p rod u cer and synd icator of TV p rogram m ing, inclu d ing Gerald o

7
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Rivera’s d aytim e talk show ; a p artnership in the new WB television netw ork;
the Chicago Cu bs; and new -m ed ia investments w orth m ore than $600 m illion,
inclu d ing a $10 m illion investm ent in Baring Com m u nications Equ ity Fu nd ,
with dozens of Asian offices hunting out media investments.
…There w as an internal logic and consistent langu age to their talk: Tribu ne,
said the fou r m en, w as a “content com p any” w ith a p ow erfu l “brand .” Am ong
and between its divisions, there was a “synergy.”
…It w as a w ell-scrip ted , w ell-rehearsed p erform ance, thorou gh
thoroughly upbeat. And the word “journalism” was never uttered, once.

and

…Even ap art from TV and new m ed ia—at the Tribu ne p ap ers them selves—the
ed itor in chief rarely p resid es at the d aily p age one m eeting. The ed itor’s gaze
is fixed on the future, on new-zoned sections, multimedia desks, meetings with
the bu siness sid e, focu s grou p research on extend ing the brand , or op ening
new beachheads in affluent suburbs. “I am not the editor of a newspaper,” says
H ow ard Tyner, 54, w hose official resu m e id entifies him as vice p resid ent and
ed itor of the Chicago Tribu ne. “I am the m anager of a content com p any.
That’s what I do. I don’t do newspapers alone. We gather content.”8

We have seen that the econom ic synergies are elu sive, at best. When
the two largest sources of news and information – television and newspaper –
com e u nd er the sam e ow nership roof, there is special cause for concern abou t
business pressures that could undermine the forum for democratic discourse.
Reducing Antagonism and the Watchdog Role
Except w here there is m eaningfu l com petition betw een local
new spapers, I believe that lifting the new spaper/ broad cast cross-ownership
ban w ould significantly und ercu t the w atchd og role that new spapers play
over broad casters and thereby u nd erm ine, particu larly in the realm of
political speech, Congress’ goal of ensuring a vigorous exchange of views.
Ind u stry comm enters in FCC proceed ings have m ad e an im portant
aspect of the case for us. Their repeated statem ents that joint ventu res are not
effective m eans for captu ring econom ic efficiencies und erscore the im portant
role of antagonism . In other w ord s, they claim that ind epend ent entities in
joint ventures are too difficult to keep in line.
Tash sees ad vantages to p artnering, inclu d ing the ability for both com p anies to
maintain separate and independent voices.
“Anything you d o end s u p being in p artners’ interest rather than being forced
throu gh com m on ow nership ,” Tash says. “If it’s com m on ow nership , you
m ight ad d u p the p lu ses and m inu ses and d ecid e it’s a net-p lu s, even if it’s a
net-minus for one partner. In this relationship, it has to be a net plus for both.
8
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Tash admits that partnerships with other media companies can be tricky. “You
can’t rely on orders from a common owner to work through issues that arise.”9

It is exactly that antagonism that the foru m for civic d iscou rse need s,
bu t w ou ld lose w ith cross-ow nership. In Tam pa, Florid a, Med ia General, Inc.
ow ns both the Tampa Tribune new spaper and WFLA-TV. The d ecision to colocate the tw o m ed ia ou tlets led to a loss of ed itorial and jou rnalistic integrity
even before the actual move:
Others w ond er how the cozy, inbred relationship betw een the new sroom s
m ight affect their coverage of each other. Tribune TV w riter Walter Belcher
offered a chilling exam p le, saying ed itors forced him to lay off criticism of
WFLA for nearly a year prior to the opening of the News Center [which housed
the Tribune and WFLA new s op erations in the sam e sp ace to facilitate their
integration], sup p osed ly to avoid ill w ill betw een the staffs. “I told them that
m aybe I shou ld ju st stop w riting abou t TV altogether,” Belcher says w ith a
lau gh. “I eventu ally w ent back to [covering WFLA] in Febru ary, bu t I still felt
like I had to be careful and explain some things more clearly.”10

Unfortu nately, su ch chilling of free speech in a new sroom is no
lau ghing matter. N or is it the only exam ple in w hich Belcher’s coverage of
WFLA cam e u nd er scru tiny from joint m anagem ent. Belcher’s coverage w as
com prom ised fu rther w hen m anagers at WFLA requ ested that he not w rite
abou t specu lation that a reporter w ould be leaving the station to follow her
husband, a former WFLA reporter who moved to another station in Alabama.
A. H . Belo Corporation (Belo), ow ner of the Dallas M orning N ews and
WFAA-TV, had a similar experience, w ith a d ecision that the M orning N ews
shou ld cease any TV criticism in ord er to stay aw ay from critical reporting
about its sister station.
Then there is a qu estion of how the M orning N ews w ou ld cover the station.
Because the two share Belo as a parent, the newspaper has often been criticized
as being too soft on its sibling. Bu t now that the tw o w ere officially p artners,
the N ew s d ecid ed it cou ld no longer cover WFAA objectively. Rather than
exclude the one station from its coverage, the News halted all TV criticism.11

N ot only w as the M orning N ews’s coverage of WFAA-TV stifled
because of the co-ownership, an im portant m ed ia critic for the entire market
w as also lost. If joint corporate ow nership of a new spaper and television
station can lead to coverage being d ropped to m aintain positive internal
relations, w hat other types of coverage could be jettisoned to protect
corporate interests?
9
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Consolidating News Production
The d riving force behind the pu sh for cross ow nership d em onstrates
that the su pply of new s involves the prod u ction of a single prod u ct. A
substantial part of the econom ies that are sought is d riven by a d esire to u se
reporters in both activities, to repu rpose or repackage their ou tpu t. It is the
reporter prod u cing copy that is the central activity of both TV and new spaper
newsrooms. On the supply side it starts as one product.
13
Med ia giants like Gannett Co.,12 Tim es Mirror Co., and H earst 14 that
are pu shing hard for cross-ow nership w ou ld find another vehicle to
consolid ate d ailies and w eeklies and to slash staffs and pages. N ow the TV
station w ou ld be pu lled into this process. In the interest of m onopolizing a
region or cu tting costs, the new spaper goliaths ignore the need s of the local
people – intense, focused coverage of local schools, com m u nity activities, and
community concerns such as crime and local development.
Tam pa again provid es a case in point. There is no d ou bt that the
econom ic goal is to com bine the prod u ction of new s. Econom ic convergence
ju st need s to overcom e the cu ltu ral and professional d ifferences that
characterize the new sroom s. As a key player in the m ost vigorou s effort to
create convergence pu t it “The single greatest challenge w e have is to
overcome our [work] cultural differences.”15
Those pu shing convergence from the new spaper sid e are even m ore
adamant about ridding the operation of the journalistic ethic.
“An ongoing concern is how to integrate the entrep reneu r into a trad itional
cu ltu re,” Thelen [the Tam p a Tribu ne’s execu tive ed itor and vice chairm an]
says. “This w ill be a challenge for the com p any to ad ju st to. We w ant to p lace
a high valu e on exp erim ental risk taking, rather than on the tried and tru e
journalism story.”16

Reporters cau ght in the convergence frenzy clearly bristle u nd er the
heavy-handed efforts to merge the media.
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Bu t Kathleen Gallagher, a Milw au kee Jou rnal Sentinel investm ent w riter, w ho
often d oes live 45-second interview s from the new sroom , find s the TV p iece
“d isconcerting.” [TV anchors] sp end all this tim e thinking abou t their p rod u ct
and how they p resent them selves, and you ’re interru p ting the w riting of you r
story to do [the interview] quickly.17
“The last new sp ap er story I w rote, I w rote on m y ow n tim e,” says veteran
WFLA rep orter Lance William s. “Bu t the fu n p art of it is there are no
restrictions on m y story. It is hard to w rite a m inu te and thirty-second story.
But writing for the newspaper is freeing.
“My brain w as m u sh by the end ,” says Barron, w ho norm ally ru ns WFLA’s
Sarasota bu reau . “There w ere tim es w hen I sat d ow n to w rite a scrip t for TV
and would start putting in attribution like it was a newspaper story.”18
With a 110,000-daily-circu lation lead over the com p etition, Brow n says the
Times still beats the Tribune w ith basic, hard -core jou rnalism . “I think
[convergence] creates a seriou s d istraction, p otentially, in how they cover the
news,” he says. “There is a risk of dilution.”19
H ow ever, w hatever hap p ens, the Tam p a convergence exp erience raises at least
tw o concerns. If jou rnalists sp end tim e contribu ting to each other’s m ed ia,
when will they have time to gather the news? And more important, will similar
media convergence mean that fewer voices produce the news or perhaps, some
voices will be lost.20

The problem is not limited to Tam pa or Milw au kee. Lew is Fried land
ou tlines several processes that have starved local new s reporting of resou rces
and cautions that
To allow fu rther linkages betw een these tw o, alread y p ow erfu l m ovem ents
tow ard s concentration w ou ld fu rther d am age the alread y fragile environm ents
of local news.
What w ou ld be the alm ost certain, im m ed iate effect of allow ing new sp ap ertelevision cross ow nership ? The m ost obviou s effect w ou ld be a constriction of
the su p p ly of local new s and a concom itant restriction in the su p p ly of local
news sources.21

While the general im pact of triggering a m erger trend w ill have
negative im pacts on jou rnalistic valu es, it is im portant to note that there are
w ays in w hich com binations pose special threats to the preservation of
jou rnalistic principles. While m ergers tend to starve the jou rnalistic values of
17

Rabasca, 2001, p. 2.
Strupp, 2000, p. 21.
19
Id., p. 22.
20
Tompkins and Colon, 2000, p. 53.
21
Fried land , Lew is. “Statem ent” Attached to “Rep ly Com m ents of Consu m er
Fed eration, et al.” Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations and N ewspapers, MM Docket
No. 01-235, 15 February 2002.
18

PRINT JOURNALISM AND CROSS OWNERSHIP

167

the enterprise of resources, in the d rive to prod u ce profits for the m erged
entity, the m u ltitasking 22 and cross selling 23 that typifies com bination m ergers
pose a special threat. They are intend ed specifically to hom ogenize the
media.
Moreover, because professional lines are breached , it is quite
problematic to define activities and preserve professional ethics.
The alliance betw een the Chicago Tribune and Tribu ne-ow ned WGN channel 9
led the Am erican Fed eration of Television and Rad io Artists (AFTRA) to file a
grievance against the station after a WGN rep orter (an AFTRA m em ber) w as
asked to w rite for the new sp ap er w ithou t ad d itional comp ensation. “I think
that w ith the consolid ation of the m ed ia, it’s a real d anger,” says Eileen
Willenborg, executive director of AFTRA’s Chicago chapter. She raises another
issu e as w ell. ‘You can’t sp read p rofessionals so thin and still have a
professional product.” Tribune executives declined comment.24
As staff began to w ork m ore closely, they d iscovered a d isp arity in the p ay
levels betw een television rep orters and new sp ap er rep orters. Religion w riter
Bearden used to get extra pay for filing TV stories in addition to her newspaper
stories. With convergence, the extra p ay w ill d ry u p . Tribune m anagers say
they know they w ill have to ad d ress the p ay issu e if new sp ap er staffers
routinely appear on television.
And then there is the issu e of w orkload . Rep orters and p hotojou rnalists w orry
the marriage will mean more work without more money.25
Along with concerns about journalistic quality and time management come the
qu estion of com p ensation of rep orters, w ho p erform crossover w ork, as w ell as
red efining job d escrip tions and hiring ru les for incom ing rep orters. So far, no
staffers have received extra p ay for going beyond their regu lar w orkload , and
m any say they w ou ld like to see the issu e settled before convergence becom es
more routine.26

These pressures and problem s em erge in all m ergers. They are
heightened because the “fear is that corporate bean cou nters see convergence
sim ply as a w ay to ‘thin the herd ’ of reporters rather than u sing the hu ge
reporting team s field ed by papers to greatly broad en the scope of broad cast
stories.”27

22

Rabasca, 2001, p. 4.
Id ., p . 4; Tom p kins and Colon, 2000, p . 50; Mitchell, Bill. “Med ia Collaborations.”
Broadcasting and Cable, 10 April 2000.
24
Moses, 2000, p. 23.
25 Tompkins and Colon, 2000, p. 50.
26 Strupp, 2000, p. 22.
27 McConnell, Bill. “The N ational Acqu irers: Whether Better for N ew s or Fatter Profits,
Med ia Com p anies Want in on TV/ N ew spap er Cross-Ownership.” Broadcasting and
Cable, 10 December 2001.
23

168 COOPER AND COOPER
TRENDS WITHIN PRINT JOURNALISM
The FCC also should recognize that cross-ownership m ay reinforce
d istu rbing trend s in the new spaper m arket. The econom ic “logic” of
pu rsuing profits throu gh conglom eration, concentration and national
integration is potent, bu t the Com m ission’s job is to consid er the im pact of
those econom ic trend s on the quality of civic d iscou rse.
It cannot pay
homage to pure economics but ignore the end point to which reliance on pure
economics will drive civic discourse.
At the simplest and m ost general level, the extent to w hich
new spapers have experienced the trend s m ore in the past m ay be an
ind ication of w hat w ill happen in other m ed ia.
Ind eed , given the
d evelopm ents in rad io d u ring the rapid acceleration of integration of stations
into national chains u nleashed by the 1996 Telecom m u nications Act, the
general im pact of these trend s on civic d iscou rse seem s clear and shou ld be a
major source of concern to the Commission.
Concentration Eliminates Diversity
In Taking Stock, Gilbert Cranberg, Rand all Bezanson and John Soloski
argu e that if any one thing is to blam e for the d eterioration of Am erican
new spapers it is the over-concentration of the m arketplace.28 The efforts of
the large new spaper corporations to m onopolize regions and their respective
voices has lead to an entirely profit-driven business model that has in turn deprioritized prod u ct quality and d ebilitated m ost new s operations’ ability to
fu lly serve a free press.29 Com panies like Gannett and Knight Rid d er, tw o of
seventeen d om inant chains, have taken control of d ozens of new spapers,
bu ying ou t hu nd red s of com petitors, and red ucing citizens’ access to
probing, helpfu l inform ation that is vital to d aily life. Many of the pu blic
com panies have begu n to seek ad vantages from grou ping papers into
d om inant metropolitan and regional chains and then com bining many
aspects of the new s operations, sharing new s among all of the nom inally
separate papers. This is a strategy of vertical integration throu gh control over
content.30
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This has an im m ed iate and negative im pact on any given local new s
consu m er, for he is fed a generic d ose of coverage that d oes not likely inform
him of w hat is going on in his neighborhood . In Wisconsin, for instance,
Gannett pu rchased Thom pson’s central hold ings (eight d ailies and six
w eeklies) to ad d to the tw o it alread y ow ned there, effectively m onopolizing
the area.31 Su d d enly, thou sand s of su bscribers lost their essential local
coverage.
Sim ilar cases can be fou nd all over the cou ntry.32 CN H I bou ght eight
Thom pson d ailies in Ind iana, ad d ing to the fou r it alread y ow ned there.
CN H I and Gannett now accou nt for 40% of Ind iana’s d aily circu lation. The
consequ ences of this are clear: few er voices and perspectives are provid ed
and the ability of the people to “m ake ju d gm ents on the issu es of the tim e,”
som ething central to the Am erican Society of N ew spaper Ed itors’ Statement of
Purpose, is hindered.33
The statistics at this point are staggering. Chains ow n 80 percent of
Am erica’s new spapers and the aforementioned content-sharing has becom e
one of the biggest hu rd les.34 In the Sou theast, Knight Rid d er shared content
betw een three of its papers, The Charlotte Observer, The State (Colu m bia, SC)
and The Sun N ews (Myrtle Beach, SC), w hich are at least one hu nd red m iles
aw ay from each other and span tw o states. The likelihood of coverage being
pertinent to ind ivid u al read ers in d istricts this far apart is virtually nil. In
Baltim ore, Tim es Mirror Co. bou ght a Patu xent chain of thirteen w eeklies in
the Baltim ore su bu rbs even thou gh it ow ns The Baltimore Sun. If any of those
thirteen w eeklies w ere offering opposing view points to the Baltimore Sun, the
pu rchase cu t citizens’ access to this com peting d ialogu e. In m onopolizing
these local of ideas, the newspaper corporations demonstrate that they are not
com m itted to u phold ing their position as the “broad ly d emocratic and
broadly representative source of information in our democratic society.”35
Family operated papers are also being swallowed up by the corporate
papers w ho toss fists full of m oney at them .36 In H artford , Tim es Mirror Co.
bought The Hartford A dvocate, a w eekly created for the sole pu rpose of
com peting w ith the Tim es Mirror-owned Hartford Courant, the d om inant
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daily.37 In Montana, Lee Enterprises bou ght The Hungry Horse Tribune and The
Whitefish Pilot and began ru nning id entical ed itorials as if the tw o
com m u nities had the sam e concerns.38 In Westchester Cou nty, N Y, Gannett
com bined ten papers it ow ned and created one, The Journal N ews, sacrificing
successful, respected papers such as The Tarrytown Daily News.39
Profit at the Expense of Journalism
The frightening reality of this corporate expansion is that these
com panies, over the past few d ecad es, have show n a d eclining interest in
jou rnalism and an overw helm ing interest in profit-maximizing bu siness
practices. This ‘bu siness over new s’ attitu d e has cou ntless d raw backs that
have m anifested them selves in various form s at hu nd red s of now -weakened
newspapers.
Before id entifying the specific ills, it is im portant to u nd erstand the
corporate stru ctu res and m and ates that have u nd erm ined Am erica’s
new spapers’ goals. Cranberg, Bezanson and Soloski note that “new s has
becom e second ary, even incid ental, to m arkets and revenu es and m argins
and ad vertisers and consum er preferences.” 40 This list of m otivating factors
su m s u p w here the new spaper chains’ allegiances lie. This is d u e, in large
part, to the m ake-u p of the corporate board s that ru n the new spaper
com panies. “They d raw heavily from ind ustry, finance and law for ou tsid e
directors.”41 Taking Stock research ind icates that “of the 131 ou tsid e d irectors
on the board s of the 17 d om inant chains, only 17 (13 percent) have had
experience on the ed itorial sid e of a new s organization.” 42 Fu rtherm ore, seven
companies “have no ou tsid e d irectors w ith a new spaper backgrou nd ” and “a
half-d ozen only have one.” 43 Withou t d ed icated new spaper people involved
in the highest level of m anagem ent, the pu blicly ow ned (and trad ed )
new spaper becom es a stock m arket entity like any other, and the prod u ct,
new s, becomes an expend able com m od ity that is “altered to fit tastes” and
used to drive shareholder value up, without regard for journalistic integrity.44
While Taking Stock d oes conced e that “som e ed itors may still
d om inate corporate conversations about w hat constitu tes new s and how to

Bissinger, Bu zz. “The End of Innocence.” in Roberts, Gene, Thom as Ku nkel and
Charles Layton (ed s.), Leaving Readers Behind. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas
Press: 2001, p. 83.
38 Bissinger, 2001, p. 103.
39 Roberts, Kunkel and Layton, 2001, p. 5.
40 Id., p. 2.
41 Cranberg, Bezanson and Soloski, 2001, p. 42.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id., p. 108.
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d eploy new s gatherers,” it cau tions that “m ost no longer m ake su ch
d eterm inations singly or w ithou t elaborately ju stifying the effects on the
bottom line.” 45 In su rveying CEOs of som e of these com panies, they find a
com m on com m itm ent to sharehold ers and stock value, not new s and read ers.
William Bu rleigh of Scripps H ow ard points to a “su itable retu rn” as his
obligation, w hile Robert Jelenic of Journal Register Co. says his “mand ate
from the board is to prod u ce longtim e sharehold er valu e.” 46 The sim ple
om ission of new s and read ers as m otivation speaks on how these papers are
run, assembled and presented to the public – as money-making machines that
su bvert their “prim ary pu rpose of gathering and d istribu ting new s and
opinion [in order] to serve the general welfare.”47
Ed itors at papers big and sm all d escribe the stress caused by m ajor
new spaper corporations bearing d ow n on their new s operations, enforcing a
bottom line principle, and , u ltimately, infringing on their ed itorial role and
the new spaper’s ou tpu t. Taking Stock cites an ed itor su rvey in w hich ninety
percent of ed itors interview ed affirmed that they felt pressure from the
bottom line, m any ad d ing that they felt “resignation” and “resentm ent”
because of this pressu re.48 Geneva Overholser, form er ed itor of The Des
M oines Register, cond u cted a stu d y for the Am erican Jou rnalism Review and
fou nd that “ow nership by pu blic corporations has fu nd amentally and
perm anently transform ed the role of ed itor,” noting that of the seventy-seven
ed itors su rveyed , “half of them said they spent a third or m ore of their tim e
on “matters other than news.”49 The News About the News explains that editors
w ho once “spent their d ays w orking w ith reporters…now spend m ore of
their tim e in m eetings w ith the paper’s bu siness-sid e execu tives, plotting
marketing strategies or cost-cutting campaigns.”50
The resu lt of the ‘business over new s’ attitu d e has been the
d eterioration of the Am erican new spaper. The Philadelphia Inquirer, for
example, became one of the nation’s strongest papers while Gene Roberts was
its ed itor. When Knight Rid d er bou ght the d aily, it began slashing staff and
putting tremendous pressure on Roberts to increase profits. Roberts soon had
enou gh of the corporate new spaper m od el and retired w ith the Inquirer’s
daily circulation at 520,000 and its Sunday circulation at 978,000. Eleven years
later, the paper’s circu lation had plum m eted to 365,000 d aily and 732,000
Sunday.51 Su rprisingly, Knight Rid d er’s profit m argins rose to just u nd er 20
Id., p. 78.
Id., p. 64.
47 Id., p. 86.
48 Cranberg, Bezanson and Soloski, 2001, p . 89; N eim an Rep orts. 1999. The Business of
News, the News About Business, Summer.
49 Downie and Kaiser, 2002, p. 93.
50 Id., p. 68; Neiman Reports, 1999.
51 Downie and Kaiser, 2002, p. 81.
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percent d u ring that tim e, epitom izing w hat has becom e an ind u stry trend :
“pu blicly trad ed new spaper com panies have seen significant grow th in their
cash flow , d espite m od est grow th in revenu es.” 52
H ence, although
su bscription rates are d ropping because the qu ality of the papers is d ropping,
the chains are still profiting.
This pattern has been repeated at the L.A. Times, providing more fuel
for the d ebate over w hether cu ts cause su bscriber d eclines or visa versa “The
size of the Tim es ed itorial staff has shru nk from 1,200 five years ago to 940
now , and Tim es staffers say the executives in Chicago w ou ld like to red u ce
that to abou t 800. Tim es circulation has d ropped from 1.1 m illion in 1999 to
852,000 this year.”53
In ord er to accom plish this, the m ajor corporations often hire analysts
to d eterm ine how m u ch of their new sroom staff and resou rces they can cu t.
At The W inston-Salem Journal in N orth Carolina, a new spaper ow ned by
Richm ond ’s Med ia General, a consu lting firm (DeWolff, Boberg & Associates)
w as brou ght in to analyze how efficiently the paper’s staff w as operating.
After m aking the reporters keep “precise d iaries on how they spent their tim e
over three w eeks, DeWolff, Boberg prod u ced a “grid ” d escribing how m u ch
tim e variou s jou rnalistic end eavors should take.54 Based on the placem ent of a
story w ithin the paper, the analysis suggested how m u ch tim e shou ld be
spent w orking the story (d ow n to the tenth of an hou r), w hether or not a
press release shou ld be u sed , how m any and w hich types of sources should
be used and, of course, how long the story should be. It took three months for
the ed itors to convince the ow ners that “creative w ork like jou rnalism cannot
be governed by su ch arbitrary form ulas.” 55 N onetheless, Med ia General laid
off tw enty percent of its w orkforce by the time DeWolff, Boberg had
completed their consultation.
Knight Rid d er had a similar ou tlook for the San Jose M ercury N ews
w hose pu blisher, Jay T. H arris, revealed that “the d rive for ever-increasing
profits [w as] pu lling quality d ow n.” What eventually d rove H arris aw ay
from the paper w ere Knight Rid d er’s d em and s that the paper reach “a
specific profit m argin, an exact percentage figu re” that w ou ld give them a
su itable return. H arris cou ld no longer stom ach Knight Rid d er’s lack of
regard for the paper’s journalistic responsibilities and left.56
Instances of staff cu tting by corporate com panies have piled u p over
the past tw o d ecad es. When Gannett bou ght The A sbury Park Press (boosting
its and N ew hou se’s com bined share of N ew Jersey’s circulation to a
Cranberg, Bezanson, Soloski, 2001, p. 38
Ku rtz, H ow ard . “Tribu ne Co. Ou sts Pu blisher at L.A. Tim es: Jeffrey Johnson H ad
Fought Budget Cuts.” Washington Post, 6 October 2006, p. C7.
54 Downie and Kaiser, 2002, p. 97.
55 Id.
56 Id., p. 109.
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w hopping 73 percent) it im m ed iately liqu id ated a fou rth of the new sroom
staff, from 240 people to 185.57 Next, the news hole was reduced, bleeding out
niche local coverage that w as vital to a highly su bd ivid ed area w ith m any
tow nships and d istricts. The Press had trained itself to ad equately serve its
varied read ership, setting u p localized bu reau s and printing five zoned
ed itions. Gannett sw iftly d ropped the Press to fou r zoned ed itions and in a
final sw ipe at the new sroom staff; the chain increased w orkload s and took
away overtime pay.
The Press is one of hu nd red s of papers w restling w ith these new
term s of com petition, term s that “have little or nothing to d o w ith new s
quality.”58
Med iaN ew s acquired the Long Beach Press-Telegram and
immediately cut 128 jobs. Knight Ridder acquired the Monterey County Herald
and d ropped 28 em ployees on d ay one. The Jou rnal Register Co. bou ght the
Times-Herald (N orristow n, PA) and su bsequ ently fired 25 people. Their op-ed
page w as d ropped , the m ayor stopped su bscribing and w ithin one year the
paper w as com pletely d etached from N orristow n’s im m ed iate need s. Time
and again, econom ic pressures have sw elled , und erm ining “trad itional
jou rnalistic stand ard s and valu es” and proving that “there is no obviou s w ay
to simultaneously shrink a newspaper and make it better.”59
Happy News
The corporate paper takeovers of the past tw o d ecad es have also
resulted in the ‘softening’ of new s to appease ad vertisers w ho w ant bu oyant,
happy read ers perusing their ad s. Avoid ing content that som e ad vertisers
find boring (m ainly governm ent, especially state and local governm ent new s)
or u nlikely to give read ers the zest they need to bu y, has becom e
com m onplace as the papers rem ove hard new s sections to ad d “read erfriend ly” content, as Gannett calls it. Their aforem entioned A sbury Park Press
reporters w ere told that “there w ill be no bad new s in the “Day in the Life
stories,” and “no aggressive reporting or attem pts to expose problem s or
wrongdoing.”60 Gannett’s Courier-Journal in Rockford , Illinois w as criticized
in an evaluation by form er ed itor Mark Silverm an for em phasizing “hard new s su bjects” and su ggested the paper consid er “m ore how -to stories,
stories that show how a person or a group of people accomplished something,
question-and-answ er colum ns, ‘ask the experts’ call-in hot lines, and even
first-person stories by read ers.” 61 These are exam ples of the “prevailing
ethos” at Gannett and other corporate new spaper com panies – soft new s is
Neiman Reports, 1999, p. 143.
Cranberg, Bezanson, and Soloski, 2001, p. 13.
59 Downie and Kaiser, 2002, p. 69.
60 Id., p. 87.
61 Id., p. 91.
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easy and inexpensive to cover; it is d evoid of controversy and is therefore
safe; and, most importantly, it makes advertisers happy.
The d ilem ma here is not that the chain-ow ned new spapers are
ad d ing content. That, in theory, is a good thing. But, in ord er to m ake room
u nd er the shru nken bu d gets, other content has to be cu t, and it alm ost alw ays
com es ou t of the hard -new s bin. This m eans that Gannett can easily and
profitably rem ove hard -new s reporters at the A sbury Park Press, load u p on
AP story releases, shrink hard -new s story length, and ad d low -cost sections
like “Whatever,” a teen beat section, and “Critters,” a pet section w hich
inclu d es pet obitu aries that cost read ers at least 50 and som etim es 300 d ollars
to print.62 To com pensate, the chains d o a significant am ou nt of the cu tting in
the state governm ent bu reau s. In 1998, “only 513 reporters” nationw id e w ere
covering all state governm ents full-time. Breach of Faith points ou t that,
d istu rbingly, over 3000 m ed ia cred entials w ere issued for that year’s Su per
Bowl.63
The corporate d epartu re from state governm ent coverage has com e
w ith little or no regard for jou rnalistic integrity or the benefits the pu blic
receives from this coverage. Bu reaus at hu nd red s of papers across the
country have been slashed. The Journal-Constitution, in Atlanta, used to house
one of the m ost prolific state governm ent bu reaus in the nation, boasting
tw elve esteem ed reporters. When Cox bou ght the paper, it w as left w ith
three statehou se reporters. Shortly thereafter, the Journal-Constitution had
slanted , one-sid ed coverage that d id not have the resou rces to inform itself
ad equately and , in tu rn, inform the pu blic su fficiently. When the reporter
cru nch received bad press, Cox d ou bled its nu m ber of statehouse reporters to
six.
In Montana, the Great Falls Tribune earned a great repu tation for state
governm ent coverage, only to have Gannett bu y the paper and attem pt to
shu t d ow n the entire bureau in ord er to rely strictly on the Associated Press.
The ed itors talked new presid ent Chris Jensen ou t of it, only to find copies of
the paper on their d esks w ith “Gs” “marked on any story he consid ered too
governmental.64 The ed itor’s copy and bu d get w ere being cu t, to the point
where law books that were vital to reporting were no longer being ordered.
Form er Georgia Governor Zell Miller’s concern is that the tu rnover of
the statehou se reporters and their relative you th and m obility d etract from
the coverage, coverage that is alread y being ham pered . “They d on’t have a
long view of the lead ers,” he said . “They d on’t have context. There’s no

Id., p. 91.
Roberts, Kunkel and Clayton, 2001, p. 10.
64 Walton, Mary and Charles Layton. “Missing the Story at the Statehou se.” in Roberts,
Gene and Thom as Ku nkel (ed s.), Breach of Faith: A Crisis of Coverage in the A ge of
Corporate Newspapering. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2002, p. 14.
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historical perspective w hatsoever.” 65 Reaching this low -point in state
reporting is the fu nction of nearly tw o d ecad es of corporate ow nership
d em oralizing the veteran reporters, forcing them to leave for papers w here
they can tru ly pu rsu e their jou rnalistic end eavors and su bstitu ting you ng,
inexperienced reporters w ho need jobs – the kind of staff that w ill d o w hat
you tell them . As this cycle perm eates the rest of the new sroom , as other
departments are slashed, it will become increasingly difficult for chain-owned
papers to serve as a free press.
While the phenom enon is m ost prevalent in sm aller m arkets, it also
afflicts som e of the largest new spapers, inclu d ing USA Today,66 The
W ashington Post 67 and the N ew Y ork Times.68 In ord er to m aintain ad vertiser
relationships, coverage has to be u nd erm ined . These instances m ake it seem
as thou gh ad vertisers have as m u ch say abou t w hat is being reported as the
reporters do. This is certainly not a healthy journalistic environment.
Under Serving Commercially Unattractive Audiences
Putting circulation quality over circulation quantity is the other major
tactic the corporate papers u se to cu t cost and boost profits. This m eans that
new spapers d eterm ine the valu e of a region w ith respect to its attractiveness
to ad vertisers. The ad vertisers are not interested in pitching their prod u cts to
econom ic and social groups that they d o not norm ally attract or w ho fall into
u nw anted d em ographics. So, they pu t pressure on the papers to get their ad s
to the “right” people for the smallest price.
Accord ing to Taking Stock, “the practice of cu tting circulation has
increased in the past tw o d ecad es, w ith papers halting circu lation to areas
where readers don’t interest advertisers.”69 The result of this is that the lowest
circulation penetration is fou nd “in areas w ith high concentrations of both
Id., p. 21.
Rowse, 2000, p. 163.
67 According to Rowse, 2000, p. 49, in 1994, The Washington Post ran a huge story urging
the ap p roval of GATT w ithou t ad m itting that it w as a su bsid iary of Am erican
Personnel Com m u nications and stood to p rofit $1.3 billion if GATT w ent throu gh.
Sim ilarly, p . 159, the Post ru ns ad s for the N u clear Energy Institu te, a large su p p lier of
ad vertising revenu e, and neglected to ru n a story abou t a rep ort by Pu blic Citizen
w hich said 90 p ercent of nu clear reactors had been op erating in violation of
government safety rules.
68 Accord ing to Street, John. M ass M edia, Politics and Democracy. N ew York: Palgrave,
2001, p. 141, “The New York Times changed an article about Tiffany’s, a huge advertiser,
and accompanied it by a bland editorial, to avoid damaging their relationship with the
com p any.” Sim ilarly, Row se, 2000, p . 162, notes that Chrysler, an enorm ou s sou rce of
ad revenu e for w hom ever it d eals w ith, d em and s to see the content in the p ages
accompanying its ads to ensure that it is ‘positive’ and ‘light.’
69 Cranberg, Bezanson and Soloski, 2001, p. 93.
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low incom e and m inority popu lations.” 70 This leaves the m inority and lowincom e populations u nd er served by the press, w ith few er opportu nities to
access the valu able d aily new s and entertainm ent that people in higher
“quality” socioeconomic groups are supplied with.
Fu rtherm ore, “com petition for socioeconom ically d efined m arket
segm ents increasingly takes the form of altering the su bject m atter and shape
of news content, delivering the types and forms of information that persons in
the socioeconom ically d efined m arket prefer.” 71 This m eans that not only are
the chain papers physically not getting copies to certain social grou ps (their
tactics w ill be highlighted m om entarily), they are slanting the new s they d o
print to please the read ers that the ad vertisers w ant pleased . At this point,
the low incom e and m inority popu lations are d ou bly d eserted . The financial
m otivations of the corporate ow ners strip the new sroom s of their ability to
ju stly report and inform , and prohibit us from celebrating, m ou rning, and coexisting fruitfully as a culture.
The “d eliberate ind u stry strategy to pu rsue a m ore u pscale
read ership” has been exposed by researchers at the University of Iow a’s
school of jou rnalism by su rveying d irectors at the largest 90 U.S. d ailies. The
research states:
Interview s…mad e it evid ent that low er-incom e neighborhood s w ere being
d isad vantaged by su ch tactics as requ iring p aym ent in ad vance, refu sing to
d eliver to p u blic hou sing, d oor-to-d oor sales efforts only on d ays of the m onth
w hen governm ent checks w ere d u e, and d enial of d iscou nts. Com bined w ith
“aggressive p ricing”- that is, charging m ore – the p ractices am ou nt to w riting
off a whole class of potential readers.72

These tend encies are reinforced by a relative absence of m inorities
from new sroom s. Vanessa William s w eaves together the relationship
betw een com m u nities, jou rnalists, new s organizations, reporting and
democracy that I have highlighted throughout this analysis.
Black and w hite and red all over: the continu ed stru ggle to integrate Am erican
new sroom s. It’s a p lay on an old rid d le. In this case, the black and w hite refer
to race, althou gh I m ight ad d that in recent years the ind u stry, faced w ith the
rap id ly changing d em ograp hics of the cou ntry, m u st also be concerned w ith
Asians, H isp anics, and N ative Am ericans. The red refers to the heated
emotions that color this struggle: frustration, embarrassment, anger.
What d oes this have to d o w ith the new s p rod u ct? Everything. N ew s
organizations’ continu ed inability to integrate African-Am ericans and other
jou rnalists of color into their new sroom s and to m ore accu rately and fairly
rep resent racial and ethnic com m u nities threatens the cred ibility and viability
of d aily general-circu lation new sp ap ers. H ow can a new sp ap er claim to be a
Id., p. 96.
Id., p. 10.
72 Id., p. 95.
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jou rnal of record for a given city or region if it rou tinely ignores or
misrep resents large segm ents of the p op u lation in the geograp hic area it
covers?...
Ou r greatest concern abou t the ind u stry’s failu re to grasp the gravity of its
d iversity d eficit shou ld be the p otential harm to society. Many Am ericans
continu e to op erate ou t of m isinform ation and m isu nd erstand ing w hen it
com es to p ercep tions and relationship s betw een racial grou p s, betw een
religiou s grou p s, betw een m en and w om en, straight and gay p eop le, you ng
and old people, middle-class and working-class people. The press, by failing to
p rovid e m ore accu rate, thorou gh, and balanced coverage of ou r increasingly
d iverse com mu nities, has abd icated its resp onsibility to foster an exchange of
information and perspectives that is necessary in a democracy.73

The u niqu e “m arket failu res” d iscu ssed in the previou s chapter
provid e the basis for pu blic policy intervention to ensu re robu st civic
d iscou rse. That is, if w e w ere only concerned abou t the trad itional market
failu res d escribed in the previous section, w e m ight rely on antitru st policy,
perhaps w ith a m ore rigorou s set of stru ctu ral screens and a heightened
concern for vertical/ conglom erate issu es. H ow ever, the u niqu e m arket
failu res d em and m u ch m ore pu blic policy intervention to prom ote su ch civic
discourse.
When entities m erge, everyone in the m arket loses an ind epend ent
voice, w hile a small segment of the market gains better coverage. In fact,
d epend ing on the d istribu tion of preferences, the least w ell-served in the
m arket may becom e even less w ell-served , if the merged entity d rives ou t
sou rces that are targeted to the need s of m inorities and atypical grou ps. This
is particularly tru e w hen a national entity bu ys ou t a local entity. When the
m erger crosses institu tional lines, it m ay resu lt in an equ ally severe loss of
institutional diversity.

William s, Vanessa. “Black and White and Red All Over: The Ongoing Stru ggle to
Integrate Am erica’s N ew sroom s.” in William Serrin (ed s.), The Business of Journalism.
New York: New York Press, 2000, p. 100.
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STUDY 11:
OUT OF THE PICTURE,
THE LACK OF RACIAL AND GENDER DIVERSITY
IN TV STATION OWNERSHIP
S. D EREK TURNER
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Fed eral Comm u nications Com m ission im plem ented a
series of policies that prom ised to com pletely alter the mass m ed ia
marketplace.1 The proposed rule-changes w ere m et w ith an u npreced ented
pu blic and congressional backlash 2, and w ere ultimately overtu rned by the
courts.3 Three years later, the FCC is poised to once again force rule changes
u pon an u nw illing pu blic. In July 2006, the FCC issu ed a Further N otice of
Proposed Rulemaking, soliciting pu blic com m ent on the issu es raised on
rem and by the Third U.S. Circu it Cou rt of Appeals in its Prometheus v. FCC
decision.4

Fed eral Com m u nication Com m ission. 2003. In the Matter of 2002 Biennial
Regu latory Review – Review of the Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and
Other Ru les Ad op ted Pu rsu ant to Section 202 of the Telecom m u nications Act of 1996;
Cross-Ow nership of Broad cast Stations and N ew spap ers; Ru les and Policies
Concerning Mu ltip le Ow nership of Rad io Broad cast Stations in Local Markets;
Definition of Rad io Markets; Definition of Rad io Markets for Areas N ot Located in an
Arbitron Su rvey, MB Docket N os. 02-277. 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, 03-130, FCC 03-127.
Herein referred to as “2003 Order.”
2 Ben Scott. 2004. “The Politics and Policy of Med ia Ow nership .” Am erican University
Law Review Vol. 53: 3, February.
3 Prom etheu s Rad io Project, et al. v. F.C.C., 373 F.3d 372 (2004) (herein referred to as
“Prom etheu s”), stay m od ified on rehearing, N o. 03-3388 (3d Cir. Sep t. 3, 2004), cert.
d enied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. June 13, 2005).
4
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. 2006.
Fu rther N otice of Prop osed
Ru lem aking, in the Matter of 2006 Qu ad rennial Regu latory Review – Review of the
Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and Other Ru les Ad op ted Pu rsu ant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review –
Review of the Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and Other Ru les Ad op ted
Pu rsu ant to Section 202 of the Telecom m u nications Act of 1996; Cross-Ownership of
Broad cast Stations and N ew sp ap ers; Rules and Policies Concerning Mu ltip le
Ow nership of Rad io Broad cast Stations in Local Markets; Definition of Rad io Markets,
MB Docket N os. 06-121; 02-277 ; 01-235; 01-317; 00-244, FCC-06-93; H erein referred to
as “Further Notice”
1
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A key issu e before the Com m ission is how the rule changes w ill
im pact fem ale and m inority ow nership of broad cast rad io and television
ou tlets. This report provid es the first com plete and accu rate assessm ent and
analysis of fem ale and m inority fu ll-pow er com m ercial broad cast television
ow nership. The pu rpose of this stud y is to provid e the pu blic, Congress, and
the FCC itself w ith a complete u nd erstand ing of the state of m inority and
fem ale television ow nership, as w ell as the potential effects of proposed ru le
changes on female and minority ownership.
M INORITY AND FEMALE TV O WNERSHIP: A S ORRY H ISTORY
H istorically, w om en and m inorities have been u nd er-represented in
broad cast ow nership d u e to a host of factors — includ ing the unfortunate fact
that som e of these licenses w ere originally aw ard ed d ecad es ago w hen the
nation lived u nd er a segregationist regim e. The FCC, beginning w ith its 1978
Statement of Policy on M inority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, has
repeatedly pledged to remedy this sorry history.5
Congress also has recognized the poor state of female and m inority
ow nership. The Telecom mu nications Act of 1996 contains specific language
aim ed at increasing fem ale and m inority ow nership of broad cast licenses and
other im portant com m u nications m ed iu m s.6 The Act requires the FCC to
eliminate “m arket entry barriers for entrepreneu rs and other sm all
bu sinesses” and to d o so by “favoring d iversity of m ed ia voices.” 7 The Act
also d irects the Com m ission w hen aw ard ing licenses to avoid “excessive
concentration of licenses” by “d issem inating licenses am ong a w id e variety of
applicants, inclu d ing small businesses, ru ral telephone com panies, and
businesses owned by members of minority groups and women.”8
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. 1978. Statement of Policy on M inority
Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 FCC 2d, 979, 980 n. 8.
6 47 U.S.C.§257, §309(j)
7 Section 257 is contained w ithin Title II of the Com m u nications Act and thu s d oes not
d irectly encom p ass broad cast services. H ow ever, the Com m ission has interp reted
som e asp ects of the langu age of §257 to ap p ly to broad cast licensing. In 1998, the
Com m ission stated : “While telecom m u nications and inform ation services are not
defined by the 1996 Act to encom p ass broad casting, Section 257(b) d irects the
Com m ission to 'p rom ote the p olicies and p u rp oses of this Act favoring d iversity of
m ed ia voices' in carrying ou t its resp onsibilities u nd er Section 257 and , in its Policy
Statem ent im p lem enting Section 257, the Com m ission d iscu ssed m arket entry barriers
in the m ass m ed ia services.” See Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission 98-281, Report
and Order: In the M atter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review -- Streamlining of M ass M edia
A pplications Rules, and Processes -- Policies and Rules Regarding M inority and Female
Ownership of M ass M edia Facilities, MM Docket N o. 98-43, N ovem ber 25, 1998, herein
after referred to as the Form 323 Report and Order.
8 47 U.S.C.§309(j)
5
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The FCC initially appeared to take this m and ate seriously. In 1997,
the Com m ission com pleted a proceed ing, as required by the 1996 Act, w hich
identified barriers to entry for small businesses (which has been interpreted to
inclu d e m inority- and female-ow ned entities) and set forth the agency’s plan
for elim inating these barriers.9 Unfortu nately, su bsequ ent triennial reports
have lacked substance.10
In 1998, the Com m ission fu rther d em onstrated its seriou sness by
taking a cru cial first step to d eterm ine the actu al state of fem ale and m inority
ow nership of broad cast rad io and television stations. That year, the FCC
began requiring all licensees of fu ll-pow er com m ercial stations to report the
gend er and race/ ethnicity of all ow ners w ith an attribu table interest in the
license.11 In the Form 323 Report and Order, the Commission stated:12
Ou r revised Annu al Ow nership Rep ort form w ill p rovid e u s w ith annu al
inform ation on the state and p rogress of m inority and fem ale ow nership and
enable both Congress and the Com m ission to assess the need for, and su ccess
of, p rogram s to foster op p ortu nities for m inorities and fem ales to ow n
broadcast facilities.

Other than this m onitoring effort, the FCC has d one very little to
prom ote female and m inority broad cast ow nership (and the follow -u p on this
monitoring has been abysm al). In its 1999 Ord er that allow ed television
d u opolies, the Com m ission paid lip-service to concerns abou t the policy
change’s effect on m inority and female ow nership, bu t still w ent forw ard
w ith ru le changes that allow ed increased m arket concentration.13 In 2004, the
Com m ission sou ght inpu t into how it cou ld better im plem ent Section 257 of

Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. In the M atter of Section 257 Proceeding to
Identify and Eliminate M arket Entry Barriers for Small Businesses, Report, GN Docket N o.
96-113, 12 FCC Rcd 16802 (1997).
10 In his d issenting statem ent on the 2004 Section 257 rep ort, Com m issioner Michael
Cop p s d escribed the rep ort as a “a slap d ash cataloging of m iscellaneou s Com m ission
actions over the p ast three years that fails to com p ly w ith the requ irem ents of Section
257.”
11 47 C.F.R. 73.3615
12 Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. 1998. Report and Order, In the M atter of 1998
Biennial Regulatory Review Streamlining of M ass M edia A pplications, Rules, and Processes
Policies and Rules Regarding M inority and Female Ownership of M ass M edia Facilities, MM
Docket Nos. 98-43; 94-149, FCC 98-281.
13 Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission.
1999. Rep ort and Ord er, In the Matter of
Review of the Com m ission's Regu lations Governing Television Broad casting
Television Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Ru les, MM Docket N os. 87-8. 91-221,
FCC 99-209.
9
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the 1996 Act. Bu t this proceed ing rem ains open, and the cu rrent chairman has
shown no sign of interest in completing this important matter.14
In the 2003 Ord er im plem enting Pow ell's ru le changes, the FCC
assu red the pu blic that ow nership d iversity w as a key policy goal u nd erlying
its approach to ow nership regu lation.15 H ow ever, the Third Circuit fou nd
otherw ise, stating that “repealing its only regu latory provision that prom oted
m inority television station ow nership w ithou t consid ering the repeal's effect
on m inority ow nership is also inconsistent w ith the Com m ission's obligation
to m ake the broad cast spectru m available to all people ‘w ithou t
discrimination on the basis of race.’ ”16
THE FCC S HOWS N O CONCERN FOR TRACKING M INORITY AND FEMALE
O WNERSHIP
The 2006 Further Notice seeks public comment on the issue of minority
and fem ale ow nership. But before consid ering the potential effects of policy
changes on fem ale/ minority ow nership, w e m u st first know the current state
of ow nership and evaluate the effects of previou s policy changes. N o one
shou ld be in a better position to answ er these qu estions than the Com m ission
itself. The FCC possesses gend er and race/ ethnicity information on every
single broadcast entity and knows exactly when licenses changed hands.
H ow ever, the FCC has no accurate pictu re of the cu rrent state of
fem ale and m inority ow nership, and show s no sign of taking the m atter
seriou sly. Thou gh the Com m ission has gathered gend er/ race/ ethnicity d ata
for the past seven years, it has show n little interest in the responsible
dissemination of the information contained within the Form 323 filings.
This lack of interest or concern is mad e evid ent by the FCC’s ow n
Form
323 su m m ary reports. Station ow ners began reporting
gend er/ race/ ethnicity inform ation in 1999, and the FCC released its first
"su m m ary report" in Janu ary 2003 (for reporting in 2001).17 A second
su m m ary follow ed in 2004 (for reporting in 2003).18 The m ost recent report
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission, Med ia Bu reau . “Med ia Bu reau Seeks
Com m ent on Ways to Fu rther Section 257 Mand ate and to Bu ild on Earlier Stu d ies”
DA 04-1690, MB Docket No. 04-228, 15 June 2004.
15 See 2003 Order, “Encou raging m inority and fem ale ow nership historically has been
an important Commission objective, and we reaffirm that goal here.”
16 See Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 421, n58 (3rd Cir. 2004).
17 Thou gh this d ata su m m ary is not d irectly d isp layed on the FCC’s ow nership d ata
p age
(http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/data.html),
it
can
be
d ow nload ed
at
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/ownminor.pdf
and
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/ownfemal.pdf
18 Thou gh this d ata su m m ary is not d irectly d isp layed on the FCC’s ow nership d ata
p age
(http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/data.html),
it
can
be
d ow nload ed
at
14
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w as issu ed in Ju ne 2006 (for the 2004-2005 period ).19 H ow ever, calling these
pu blications “su m m ary reports” is som ew hat m islead ing, as they are m erely
a listing of each m inority or fem ale-ow ned station's Form 323 response and
not aggregated in any m anner. N o inform ation on the stations not ow ned by
women or minorities is given.
Closer exam ination of these su m mary reports reveals significant
problem s. Som e station ow ners listed in the 2003 sum m ary are m issing from
the 2004 report bu t reappear in the 2006 su m m ary, d espite the fact that
ow nership had not changed d u ring the interim period . Certain stations have
ow nership interests that ad d u p to greater than 100 percent. In som e
instances, the type of station facility (AM, FM or TV) is not specified.
Bu t the m ost alarming problem s are ones of om ission. N ot a single
station ow ned by Rad io One is listed , even thou gh the com pany is the largest
minority-ow ned rad io broad caster in the United States. Stations ow ned by
Granite Broad casting, the largest minority-ow ned television broad caster, are
also m issing from the FCC’s su m m ary reports. H ow ever, exam ination of the
ind ivid ual Form 323 filings for these stations show s that they are ind eed
minority-owned. Why aren't they in the FCC’s summary?
The answ er likely lies in how the larger-group stations report
ow nership inform ation, and how the FCC harvests the information for their
summary reports. Most of the licenses of those stations missed by the FCC are
“ow ned ” by interm ed iate entities, w hich are in some cases, many d egrees
separated from the “actual” ow ner. Some stations file m ore than 20 Form 323
forms (one for each holding entity), with the true owners listed on only one of
the filed form s. And in m any cases, the actu al ow nership inform ation is
attached as an exhibit and not listed on the actu al form . Thu s the FCC, w hich
tabu lates the information for their su mm aries by harvesting these electronic
form s via an au tom ated process, m isses stations that file in this convolu ted
and confusing manner.20
Sources insid e the Med ia Bu reau ind icate that there is little oversight
of Form 323 fillings and the su m mary reports prod u ced from them .21 This
lack of concern is m ad e evid ent not only by the poor qu ality of the su m mary
reports, bu t by the significant nu m ber of im properly filed form s. Station
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/owner_minor_2003.pdf
and
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/owner_female_2003.pdf
19
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/owner_minor_2004-2005.pdf
and
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/owner_female_2004-2005.pdf
20 Ind eed , the average nu m ber of stations ow ned by each u niqu e fem ale/ m inority
ow ner w ho ap p ears on the FCC Form 323 su m m ary is 1.4, versu s 2.5 for
fem ale/ m inority ow ners w ho shou ld , bu t d o not ap p ear in the FCC’s su m m ary. This
difference is weakly statistically significant (one-sided p-value of 0.039).
21 Byerly, Carolyn M. “Qu estioning Med ia Access: Analysis of FCC Wom en and
Minority Ownership Data.” Department of Journalism, Howard University.
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ow ners w ho listed them selves as one race in a certain year are listed as a
com pletely d ifferent race in later years; race and gend er information is left
blank; nam es are misspelled ; attribu tion of ow nership in other stations is not
listed as required; and some stations fail to file every two years as required by
law.22
This obvious lack of concern is tru ly trou bling given the
Com m ission's stated com m itm ent and legal obligation to foster im proved
fem ale and m inority broad cast ow nership. The FCC has both the raw d ata
and the resources to ad equately ad d ress the issu es raised by the Third Circuit
regard ing m inority ow nership bu t chooses instead to ignore this issu e and
rely on public commentators to do its job.
Du e to lim ited resources, this stu d y is limited to fu ll-power
com m ercial broad cast television stations. We hope that the resu lts of this
stu d y and the flaw s in the cu rrent FCC su m m ary reports w ill inspire the
Com m ission to u nd ertake a similar analysis of the m ore than 11,000
com m ercial rad io stations. Fu rtherm ore, w e hope that the Com m ission w ill
u nd ertake a longitu d inal analysis to d eterm ine the effects of cu rrent policies
on female and minority ownership of all broadcast stations.
M ETHODOLOGY
The u niverse of full-power com m ercial television stations w as
d eterm ined using the FCC’s CDBS Pu blic Access Database.23 Each ind ivid u al
station’s Form 323 ow nership filing w as then review ed , w ith ow nership
information assigned u sing the m ost recent filings (in m ost cases, the m ost
recent filings were from 2004-2006).24
“Ow nership” w as d efined as the gend er or race of ow ners w ith
voting interest that exceed ed 50 percent alone or in the aggregate. If no single
gend er or race m et these criteria, then stations w ere assigned “no controlling
interest status.” This statu s m ost often w as assigned to pu blicly trad ed

N u m erou s exam p les of these typ es of errors w ere noted . For exam p le, Christina M.
Coonce, the fem ale Am erican Ind ian/ Alaska N ative co-ow ner of WN YB w as listed as
“w hite” in the station's 1999 Form 323 filing bu t as Am erican Ind ian/ Alaska N ative in
later filings. In a 1999 filing for KBJR, the African-Am erican ow ner of Granite
Broadcasting, W. Don Cornwell, is listed as “W Don Ornwell” and as a white male.
23 The list w as gathered on Ju ly 18th 2006. In ad d ition to stations listed by the FCC as
“licensed ”, each station that had “constru ction p erm it-off-air” or “licensed and silent”
statu s w as exam ined to d eterm ine if the station w as cu rrently on the air, and if so,
were added to the list of licensed stations.
24 This review was conducted from July 18th to August 3rd.
Ownership reported herein
is consid ered cu rrent as of Ju ne 2006, as stations are requ ired to file an u p d ated Form
323 rep ort w ithin 30 d ays of a change in ow nership stru ctu re, in ad d ition to their
biennial filing.
22
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corporations w here listed entities d id not form a m ajority of the voting
interest. Inform ation concerning stations that are operating u nd er local
m arketing agreem ents (LMAs) w as obtained from contracts that w ere filed
with individual Form 323 filings. Data from the National Telecommunications
and Information Ad m inistration’s 1998 and 2000 M inority Commercial
Broadcast Ownership reports w ere verified and u pd ated w ith inform ation from
the CDBS d atabase, as w ell as other pu blicly available sou rces and interview s
with station representatives.
Stations broad casting on channels 2-13 w ere assigned VH F statu s,
w hile stations broad casting on channels 14-69 w ere assigned UH F statu s.
Information abou t the netw ork affiliation and local new s content of each
station w as d eterm ined by view ing station Web sites, checking local
program m ing listings or contacting the station.25 The above d ata w ere
m erged w ith d em ographic d ata at the state and Designated Market Area
levels, u sing inform ation from the U.S. Census Bureau and BIA Financial.
Statistical analysis m ethod s su ch as AN OVA, t-tests, and OLS and probit
m od els w ere em ployed to exam ine the statistical significance of m arket-level
ow nership and m arket-level d em ographics, as w ell as d ifferences in
ownership concentration. Significance levels are highlighted in each figure.
M INORITY AND FEMALE TV O WNERSHIP
There are cu rrently 1,349 fu ll-pow er com m ercial television stations in
the United States. Sixty-seven — or 4.97 percent — of the stations are ow ned
by w om en. Forty-fou r of the 1,349 stations, or 3.26 percent, are m inorityow ned . Of these stations, 18 have black or African-Am erican ow ners,
accou nting for 1.33 percent of all stations. N ine of these stations w ere
controlled by a single entity, Granite Broadcasting. Hispanic or Latino owners
controlled 15 stations, or 1.11 percent of the total. Am erican Ind ian or Alaska
N ative ow ners control five stations, or 0.37 percent, w hile Asian ow ners
control six stations, or 0.44 percent. There are no stations in the United States
owned by Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islanders (see Exhibit 1).
By com parison, non-H ispanic White ow ners controlled 1,033 stations, or 76.6
percent of the total stations. The bulk of the rem aining stations w ere ow ned
by entities w ith no single race/ ethnicity accounting for greater than 50
percent of the voting interest (or w here the proper information w as not
given). In m ost cases, the 264 stations d esignated as having “no controlling
interest” are ow ned by large pu blicly trad ed corporations su ch as Clear

Stations were deemed to air local news if they aired at least one local news broadcast
d u ring the p rogram m ing w eek, regard less of w hether or not the station itself actu ally
p rod u ced the new scast. Thu s stations airing rep u rp osed or rep ackaged new s
broadcasts are still counted as airing local news.
25
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Channel, w hose voting stock is d isbu rsed am ong a w id e popu lation of
shareholders.
Exhibit 1: Full-Power Commercial Television Ownership
By Gender & Race/Ethnicity
Category

Gender

Owner
Female
Male
No Controling Interest
Unknown

Amer. Ind./AK Nat.
Asian
Black or Afric. Amer.
Hispanic or Latino
Race/Ethnicity Nat. Haw/Pac. Isl.
All Minority
White
No Controling Interest
Unknown
Total Universe

Number of
Stations
67
948
327
7
5
6
18
15
0
44
1,033
264
8
1,349

Percent of All
Commercial
Full Power TV
Stations
4.97
70.27
24.24
0.52
0.37
0.44
1.33
1.11
0.00
3.26
76.58
19.57
0.59

Source: Form 323 filings; Free Press research

Seven stations, or 0.52 percent, are controlled by entities w hose
race/ ethnicity and gend er statu s could not be d eterm ined , and an ad d itional
station (WATM-TV) is controlled by an ow ner w hose race/ ethnicity statu s
could not be determined.
Of the 1,349 total full-power commercial broadcast television stations,
576 are VH F stations, operating on channels 2-13. The rem aining 773 are UH F
stations, w hich operate on channels 14-69. UH F stations usually have a
sm aller au d ience and broad cast at a low er pow er than their VH F
counterparts.
The FCC u ses a “d iscou nt ru le” to m easu re the nationw id e au d ience
reach of UH F stations, giving them half the potential aud ience reach
compared to VHF stations. Consequently, VHF station licenses are considered
m ore valu able than UH F licenses and the bu lk of stations operating in this
region are affiliated w ith the trad itional "big fou r" netw orks of ABC, CBS,
N BC and Fox. More than 92 percent of VH F stations are affiliated w ith these
networks.
Wom en ow n 30 of the 576 VH F stations, or 5.21 percent. The
remaining 37 female-ow ned stations are UH F stations, or 4.79 percent of UH F
stations. There are 12 m inority-ow ned VH F stations, accou nting for 2.08
percent of the total. The rem aining 32 m inority-ow ned stations m ake u p 4.14
percent of UHF stations.
The alread y low -level of m inority broad cast television ow nership is
even low er in the m ore valu able VH F m arket. African-Am ericans ow n six

OUT OF THE PICTURE

189

VH F stations, or 1.04 percent of the total. Latinos control three VH F stations,
or 0.52 percent. There are tw o Am erican Ind ian/ Alaska N ative-ow ned VH F
stations and ju st one Asian-ow ned VH F station, accou nting for 0.35 and 0.17
percent, respectively.
The d ata above encom pass all stations w here fem ales and / or
m inorities control greater than 50 percent of the voting interest in the entity
that u ltim ately ow ns the station license. H ow ever, som e stations are
operating u nd er Local Marketing Agreem ents, or LMAs. Und er an LMA, the
official ow ner has little or no inpu t in the station's d aily operation, w hich is
directed by the owner of another station in the same market. LMAs have been
w id ely criticized by ind u stry observers and m em bers of the FCC for being
little m ore than a schem e to avoid FCC ow nership lim its.26 For exam ple, the
six stations controlled by Carolyn C. Sm ith of Cu nningham broad casting are
all operated by Sinclair u nd er LMA’s in markets w here Sinclair w ould
otherw ise be in violation of the cu rrent d u opoly rule. Carolyn Sm ith is the
m other of Sinclair CEO David Sm ith, w hich along w ith the LMA relationship
suggests that Cunningham is merely a front for Sinclair.
Free Press id entified tw o m inority-ow ned stations and eight fem aleow ned stations that are und er the de facto control of m ale or non-minority
owners.27 When these stations are rem oved from the total tally, the level of
fem ale ow nership d rops to 4.37 percent of all fu ll-pow er com m ercial stations,
while minority ownership falls to 3.11 percent of all stations.
No Controlling Interest but No Diversity at the Top
There were 264 stations with “no controlling interest” held by a single
race, or 19.6 percent of all stations. Bu t only one of these 264 stations —
Atlanta’s WTBS, which is owned by Time Warner — has a minority CEO.
There w ere 327 stations w ith “no controlling interest” by gend er, or
24.24% of all stations. Of these 327 stations, only tw o stations (KJN P and
WEHT) have a female CEO or president.

See, for exam p le, Find lay, Prentiss. “Grou p Says Stations N ot Ind ep end ent.”
Charleston Post and Courier, 20 December 2004; see also Schmelzer, Paul. “The Death of
Local News.” Alternet, 23 April 2003.
27 In ad d ition to the six Cu nningham stations, the other tw o fem ale-ow ned stations
operated under an LMA are WZVN (operated by Waterman Broadcasting) and WNYB
(ow ned by Christina Coonce, bu t u nd er the de facto control of Tri-State Christian
Television, controlled by Mrs. Coonce’s hu sband , Garth). The tw o m inority ow ned
stations op erated u nd er LMA’s are KFWD (op erated by Belo) and KVIQ (op erated by
the Eureka Group).
26
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FEMALE AN D M INORITY BROADCAST TV O WNERSHIP D OES N OT M ATCH
THEIR PROPORTION S OF THE G ENERAL POPULATION OR O THER ECONOMIC
S ECTORS
Wom en m ake u p half of the U.S. population, yet ow n less than one
tw entieth of the full-pow er com m ercial television stations. Minorities accou nt
for nearly 33 percent of the U.S. population bu t ow n ju st 3 percent of the
television stations.
Given the long history of preju d ice and econom ic d iscrim ination
against w om en and m inorities, it is not too su rprising that broad cast
ow nership is below these grou ps’ respective proportions of the general
popu lation. H ow ever, the level of fem ale and m inority broad cast TV
ownership is also very low w hen com pared to other sectors of the econom y,
and even the inform ation sector as a w hole. In ind ustries like transportation
and health care, fem ale and m inority ow nership is som e five to 10 tim es
higher than in the broadcast television industry (see Exhibit 2).28
This d isparity is even m ore telling w hen consid ering ind ivid ual race
and ethnic grou ps. In sectors su ch as transportation and health care, all
m inority grou ps ow n businesses at or near their proportion of the general
population. Bu t in the TV broad cast sector, the tw o largest grou ps — AfricanAmericans and Latinos — barely own 1 percent of stations (see Exhibit 3).
Also note that w hile the level of m inority broad cast TV ow nership
has d ecreased in recent years, the percentage of minority ow nership in the
economy as a whole has increased, from 14.6 percent in 1997 to 17.9 percent in
2002.29

CONCLUSIONS
As the FCC consid ers how to respond to the rem and of the 2003
Pow ell Comm ission m ed ia ow nership ru les, it m u st pay close attention to the
Third Circuit’s strong langu age regard ing the Com m ission's failu re to
ad equately ju stify its rule changes in regard s to female and m inority
ownership. It is not sound policymaking to assert that diversity, localism, and
fem ale/ m inority ow nership are im portant goals, but then ignore the effects
that rule changes have on these goals. Fu rtherm ore, it is a failu re of
responsibility to gather valuable inform ation on ow nership bu t then to d o
nothing w ith the d ata. And it is inexcu sable to continu e to release d ata
summaries the Commission knows to be flawed.

U.S. Census Bureau. 2005. Economic Census, data collected in 2002.
Data for non-farm sectors from 1997 and 2002; d ata for broad cast TV sector from
1998, 2000, and 2006.
28
29

OUT OF THE PICTURE
Exhibit 2: Female & Minority Business Ownership by Sector
60

Percentage of Businesses
Owned

Female

50

51.3

Minorities

47

40
29.5

28.2

30

18.5

17.9

20

28.5

26

15.7

14.2
10.9

10
5.0

0

9.2

11.4

10.8

3.3

Full-Power
TV Stations

All
Sectors

Utilities

Transportation

Finance &
Insurance

Information

Health
Care

Education

Source: Form 323 Filings; U.S. Census Bureau; Free Press Research

Percentage of Businesses Owned

Exhibit 3: Minority Business Ownership
by Race/Ethnicity & Sector
14
American Indian/Alaska Native
12

12.9
12.2

Asian
Black

10

10.2

Hispanic

9.0
8
6.8
5.2
4.8

5.3

2
0.4
0.4

1.3
1.1

Full-Power
TV Stations

2.7
1.2
1.5

0.9

1.0
All
Sectors

4.8

4.6 4.7
3.1 3.7 3.9
3.3

3.8

4

0

6.2

6.1

6

Utilities

Transportation

0.5

1.2

0.8

Finance &
Insurance

3.8

Information

Health
Care

0.9
Education

Source: Form 323 Filings; U.S. Census Bureau; Free Press Research
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The find ings of this stu d y are a cru cial first step tow ard
u nd erstand ing the tru e state of female and m inority broad cast ow nership,
and the effects of regu latory policy on these ow ners. Bu t this stu d y w as
focu sed on the narrow er u niverse of fu ll-pow er com m ercial television, and
says nothing abou t rad io. It cou ld be argu ed that rad io is the m ore im portant
m ed iu m , since there are 10 tim es as many ou tlets and the price of entry for
female and m inorities is com paratively low . The FCC’s form 323 su m maries
seem to show a d ecline in fem ale and m inority rad io ow nership, bu t given
their flaw s a m ore thorou gh censu s is need ed . The Com m ission shou ld
cond u ct this w ork and pay close attention to the changes in ow nership over
time.
The FCC shou ld not proceed w ith any rulemaking before it has
thorou ghly stu d ied the issu e of fem ale and minority broad cast ow nership.
Furthermore, we feel that the results of our study demonstrate that any policy
changes that allow for increased concentration in television m arkets w ill
certainly lead to a d ecrease in the alread y low nu m ber of fem ale and
minority-ow ned TV stations and minority-ow ned local TV new s ou tlets.
Enacting regu lations that lead to su ch ou tcom es d irectly contrad icts the
Com m ission's statu tory and legal obligations u nd er the 1996
Telecom m u nications Act. Instead , the Com m ission shou ld consid er proactive
policies that protect and promote female and minority ownership.
The Commission also should take the following actions:
The FCC Med ia Bureau shou ld cond uct a com prehensive stu d y of
every licensed broad cast rad io and television station to d eterm ine the tru e
level of female and minority ownership.
The study should examine the level of ownership at both the national level
and at the DMA and Arbitron market levels.
The study should be longitudinal, examining the changes since 1999, when
the Commission began gathering gender and race/ethnicity ownership
information.
The study should focus on station format and content, particularly paying
attention to local news production.
The results of the study, as well as the raw data, should be made available to
the public.

The FCC shou ld revise and sim plify the pu blic d isplay of ind ivid u al
Form 323 station filings.
A citizen searching for the owner of a local station should easily be able to
ascertain the true identity of a station owner.
The practice of station licenses being held by layers and layers of wholly
owned entities should be thoroughly examined by the Commission.
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Broadcast licenses are awarded for temporary use of the public airwaves, and
the identities of the owners should be clearly stated on a single form.

The Com m ission shou ld expand the u niverse of stations that are
required to file Form 323.
Currently, no ow ners of Class-A or low -pow er stations are requ ired to file
ow nership inform ation w ith the FCC. H ow ever, the Com m ission states that
these classes of stations are im p ortant entry p oints for fem ale and m inority
ow ners. To valid ate this hyp othesis, the Com m ission shou ld extend the
obligation of filing Form 323 to these stations.
Currently all non-commercial educational broadcasters file Form 323-E,
which does not solicit information about the gender, race, and ethnicities of
station owners. The Commission should require their owners to disclose this
information.
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STUDY 12:
REACHING AND SERVING THE COMMUNITY
S. D EREK TURNER
One of the clear find ings of previous research, as d escribed in Stu d ies
4 and 5, is that m inority com m u nities are u nd erserved and that m inority
ow ners strive to serve their com m unities. The concern abou t a lack of
m inority ow ners is compou nd ed by the interaction of these tw o effects.
Minority ow nership cou ld ad d ress the tend ency of the com m ercial mass
m ed ia to u nd er serve these grou ps. The d ata set w e com piled on m inority
ownership addresses two aspect of this issue and reinforces those findings.
O WNERSHIP, N ETWORK A FFILIATION AND LOCAL N EWS PRODUCTION
The stations affiliated w ith the so-called “big fou r” netw orks — ABC,
CBS, N BC and Fox — are consistently the top-rated stations in each m arket
and are u sually fou nd on the lu crative VH F portion of the d ial. These stations
also prod u ce the highest-rated local new s content and thu s com m and m ost of
the local ad vertising revenu e. N early 92 percent of VH F stations air local
new s content, com pared to 47 percent of UH F stations. And over 96 percent
of big-fou r affiliated VH F stations air local new s content, com pared to 81
percent of big-four-affiliated UHF stations.
Ow nership of a big-four-affiliated station alm ost certainly guarantees
a significant au d ience share and a new s operation. H ow ever, m inorities ow n
ju st 13 of the 847 big-four-affiliated stations, or 1.5 percent (and just 1.3
percent of the big-four-affiliated VHF stations).
The d ifference in ow nership patterns is stark w hen com paring the
types of stations ow ned by m inorities and non-m inorities. Of the 1,305 nonm inority ow ned stations, 834 are big fou r affiliated , or 64 percent. H ow ever,
only 13 of the 44 minority-ow ned stations are affiliated w ith the big fou r
networks, or 29.5 percent.
Bu t the situ ation is reversed for ind epend ent stations u naffiliated
w ith a big fou r netw ork, the second ary English-langu age netw orks UPN , WB
(and their successors CW and MYN TV) and Ion, or the Spanish-Language
netw orks Telefu tu ra, Telem u nd o and Univision. Just 161 of the 1,305 nonm inority ow ned stations are ind epend ent, or 12.3 percent. H ow ever, 18 of the
41 minority-owned stations are independent, or 41 percent.
The fact that m inority ow ners control so few big-fou r stations
su ggests that the percentage of minority-ow ned stations airing local new s is
likely to be low er than their non-m inority cou nterparts. This is tru e: 41
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percent of m inority-ow ned stations air local new s versu s 67 percent of nonm inority owned stations.
Bu t that's not the w hole story. Minority-ow ned big fou r stations are
ju st as likely to air local new s as their non-m inority ow ned cou nterparts (92
versu s 90 percent). Tw o-third s of the m inority-ow ned Spanish-languagenetwork-affiliated stations air local new s, versu s half of the non-minority
ow ned Spanish-language-netw ork affiliates. And over 23 percent of the
minority-ow ned ind epend ent stations air local new s versu s just 15 percent of
the non-minority-ow ned ind epend ent stations. These d ata ind icate that
minority owners are just as capable of serving their local communities as their
non-minority counterparts.
Another w ay to illustrate this point is to exam ine the 892 fu ll-power
com m ercial television stations that air local new s. Of the 874 non-minority
ow ned stations that air local new s, only 24 are ind epend ent stations, or just
2.7 percent. H ow ever, 22 percent of the m inority-ow ned stations that air local
new s are ind epend ent stations. So even thou gh m inority ow ners are largely
kept ou t of the lu crative big fou r affiliated market, they still m anage to
prod u ce local new s content at levels higher than non-m inority ind epend ent
station owners.
M INORITY O WNERSHIP OF TV S TATIONS IS LOW EVEN IN M ARKETS WITH
LARGE M INORITY POPULATIONS
Becau se full-pow er broad cast television stations are geographically
lim ited in their m arket reach, information abou t m inority ow nership at the
local level is m ore telling than the national aggregate. The trad itional
geographic bou nd ary u sed for analysis of television m arkets at the local level
is the Designated Market Area, or DMA.
Like ow nership at the national level, m inorities are vastly
u nd errepresented at the DMA level, even in areas w here m inorities are the
majority. Minority-owned stations are present in 36 of the nation’s 210 DMAs.
Exam ination of ind ivid ual race/ ethnic grou ps show s very little overlap
betw een m inority-ow ned stations. Am erican Ind ian or Alaska N ative-owned
stations are in fou r of the 210 DMAs. Asian-ow ned stations are present in six
of the 210 DMAs. Black- or African-Am erican ow ned stations are in 17 of the
210 DMAs, w hile H ispanic- or Latino-ow ned stations are present in 10 of the
nation’s 210 DMAs. N on-m inority ow ned stations are present in every single
DMA. DMA coverage is slightly better for w om en-ow ners, bu t still far below
that of m en. Fem ale-ow ned stations w ere present in 51 of the nation’s 210
DMAs.
In 18 DMAs m inorities make u p the majority of the popu lation living
w ithin the m arket. H ow ever seven of these DMAs have no m inority-owned
stations. The rem aining 11 m inority-majority popu lated DMAs all have very
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low levels of m inority-ow nership, some 3 to 10 tim es below the level of
minority population living within each market.
H ispanics or Latinos are the only m inority group that form ed a
plu rality or m ajority of the popu lation w ithin a sizeable nu m ber of DMAs.
Only six of the 16 markets with a plurality or majority of the population made
u p of Latinos had stations ow ned by Latinos. H ow ever, even in these six
markets, the level of Hispanic or Latino-ownership was 3 to 8 times below the
proportion of the Latino population living there.
While there is only one DMA w here African-Am ericans constitute a
m ajority of the popu lation (Greenw ood -Greenville, MS), there are 59 m arkets
w here the African-Am erican proportion of the popu lation is at or above the
nationw id e level. H ow ever, black-ow ned stations are present in ju st five of
these 59 m arkets. Figu re 20 show s the 10 markets w ith the highest
percentages of African Am ericans living w ithin each m arket. Only one of
these m arkets contains an African Am erican-ow ned station, WRBJ in Jackson,
Mississippi.
There are no African-American-ow ned fu ll pow er com m ercial TV
stations in many cities w ith consid erable African-Am erican popu lations, su ch
as Atlanta, N ew Orleans, N ew York City and Washington, D.C. Other than
Jackson, Mississippi, Detroit is the only city w ith a large African-American
popu lation that has a black-ow ned TV station. This station is ow ned by
Granite and may change hands by the end of the year.
H onolulu is the only DMA w here Asians constitu te a majority of the
popu lation, and there is one Asian-ow ned station in this m arket. In the 17
m arkets w here the Asian proportion of the popu lation is at or above its
nationwide level, there are only 2 Asian-owned stations.
Data for Am erican Ind ian or Alaska N ative popu lation w as not
available at the DMA level. H ow ever, there are no Am erican Ind ian/ Alaska
N ative ow ners in the states w ith the highest Am erican Ind ian and Alaska
N ative populations (N ew Mexico and Alaska). Three of the five Am erican
Indian/Alaska Native-owned stations are located in Oklahoma and owned by
David Griffin, a broad caster w hose fam ily has operated KWTV since 1953.
The other tw o are in the Seattle, Washington and Buffalo, N ew York m arkets
(KHCV and WNYB).
H ISPANIC-O WNED S TATIONS A RE LOCATED IN M ARKETS WITH LARGE
H ISPANIC POPULATIONS BUT BLACK-O WNED S TATIONS A RE N OT
Thou gh there are m any m arkets w ith high H ispanic and Latino
popu lations that have no Latino-ow ned stations, H ispanic or Latino-owned
stations are m ore likely to be in m arkets w ith higher levels of Latino
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popu lation. This phenomenon is also tru e for Asian-ow ned stations, d riven
primarily by the single Asian-owned station in Hawaii (see Exhibit 1).1
H ow ever, black-ow ned stations are not m ore likely to be in markets w ith
bigger African-Am erican popu lations. These find ings su ggest that language,
particularly Spanish, is an im portant factor u nd erlying ow nership. These
find ings also su ggest that d u e to d ifficu lties w ith capital access and other
institu tional barriers to ow nership, African-American ow ners m ay be
pu rchasing stations w here they can — in certain sm aller, less lu crative
Mid w estern m arkets. H ow ever, perhaps d u e to the legacy of racism in the
Sou th, African-Am erican ow ners haven’t been able to operate in the smaller
Sou thern markets. While having African-Am erican ow ners anyw here is
d esirable, it is trou bling that African-Am erican ow ners d o not operate in
African-Am erican com mu nities, w here they w ou ld ad d a valu able
perspective to the coverage of local news and community affairs.
Exhibit 1: Minority Population in Markets with
Minority-Owned Full-Power Commercial TV Stations

Percentage of Total Population

50
45

Markets where corresponding
minority-owned stations are present

*
42.8

*
40.6

40
35

Markets where corresponding minorityowned stations are NOT present

30
25

22.6

20
14.9

15
10
5

12.0

*
8.6

9.9
3.7

0
Asian

Black

Hispanic

All Minority ‡

Source: Form 323 filings; BIA Financial; Free Press Research; population data for American
Indian/Alaska Native at DMA-level was not available, * = difference is statistically significant
at p<0.005; ‡ = this category only encompasses the race/ethnicities shown in this figure

These d ata w ere calcu lated u sing 210 observations, one for each DMA. Each DMA
w as scored for the p resence of a m inority-ow ned station, an Am erican Ind ian/ Alaska
Native-ow ned station, an Asian-ow ned station, and a black or African Am ericanow ned station. When calcu lating the p op u lation p ercentages, each m arket w as
w eighted by the total p op u lation w ithin each m arket, thou gh the figu res are not very
different (and remain significant) without weighting.
1
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THE N ATIONAL REACH OF M INORITY-O WNED S TATIONS
Another w ay to look into the connection betw een m inority-owned
stations and m inority au d iences is to d eterm ine the national reach of
minority-ow ned stations — that is, how m any m inority hou sehold s are living
w here there is a minority-ow ned station? As m entioned above, m inorityowned stations are present in 36 of the nation’s 210 DMAs. These stations
reach approxim ately 21 percent of all U.S. TV hou sehold s, bu t ju st 30 percent
of all m inority TV hou sehold s. To contrast, non-m inority ow ned stations
reach over 98 percent of all U.S. TV households.
These figu res w ere calcu lated using the FCC’s UH F d iscou nt ru le,
w hich attributes ju st half of a m arket’s au d ience to UH F stations. Withou t the
UH F d iscount, m inority-ow ned stations reach 38 percent of all U.S. TV
households and 54 percent of all minority TV households, while non-minority
owned stations reach 100 percent of U.S. TV homes (see Exhibit 2).
Exhibit 2: National Population Reach
of Minority-Owned Full-Power Commercial TV Stations
Station Owned
by Race/Ethnicity
Amer. Ind./AK Nat.
Asian
Black
Hispanic or Latino
Nat. Haw/Pac. Isl.
All Minority
Non-Minority

Percent of All U.S.
TV Households
Reached
With UHF
Discount

2.1
5.3
7.3
6.9
0
21.5
98.1

Without
UHF
Discount

3.2
9
13.3
12.1
0
37.6
100

Pct. of All
Minority TV HH
Reached
With UHF
Discount

Without
UHF
Discount

Percent of Asian
TV Households
Reached
With UHF
Discount

Without
UHF
Discount

10

Pct. of Black/Afr.
Amer. TV HH
Reached
With UHF
Discount

With UHF
Discount

Without
UHF
Discount

21.8

37.3

19.1
8.7

29.7

Without
UHF
Discount

Pct. of
Hisp./Latino TV
HH Reached

16.8

53.6

Source: Form 323 filings; BIA Financial; Free Press research

Perhaps m ore telling is the percentage of each m inority grou p
reached by each associated m inority-ow ned station grou p. Und er the UH F
d iscou nt, Asian-ow ned stations reach only 10 percent of U.S. Asian TV
hou sehold s, w hile African Am erican-owned stations reach ju st 8.7 percent of
African Am erican TV household s. Latinos fare better than other m inorities in
this m easure (primarily d ue to the Los Angeles market), w ith Latino-owned
stations reaching 21.8 percent of all Latino TV households.
These find ings provid e greater context to the overall national
ow nership nu m bers. N ot only is minority ow nership low , bu t m inority
ow ners are reaching ju st a sm all portion of the m inority aud ience. It is qu ite
trou bling that u p to 91 percent of African-Am erican hou sehold s are not
served by an African-Am erican broad caster. Even m ore trou bling is the
potential ou tcom e of m ed ia consolid ation on these few minority-owned
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stations. If just a hand ful w ere lost to consolid ation, these alread y anemic
numbers would fall even further.
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STUDY 13:
THE LINK BETWEEN AND CONCENTRATION OF
MEDIA MARKETS AND A LACK OF RACIAL
DIVERSITY IN TV STATION OWNERSHIP
S. D EREK TURNER AND M ARK COOPER
INTRODUCTION
The previous tw o stu d ies show the d ram atic u nd er representation of
m inorities and w om en among broad cast license hold ers and the im pact this
has on the ability of m inority and fem ale ow ners to reach their com m u nities.
This u nd er representation and u nd er serving of these com m unities is a
longstand ing historical problem . What role d oes concentration of ow nership
play in this problem ? This stu d y show s that relaxation of ow nership lim its
and increases in m ed ia concentration negatively affect m inority ow nership.
Public policies that allow concentration ownership make matters worse.
H ISTORICAL COMPARISON: M INORITY O WNERSHIP OF FULL-POWER
COMMERCIAL TV S TATIONS H AS D ECREASED S INCE 1998
This stud y represents the first com plete censu s of all licensed fu llpow er com m ercial broad cast television stations operating in the United
States. There w as one other attem pt to ascertain the level of fem ale broad cast
TV ow nership, a 1982 stud y com m issioned by the FCC.1 H ow ever, that stu d y
d eterm ined the gend er ow nership for ju st a sam ple of stations, not the fu ll
universe.
Since 1990, the N ational Telecomm u nications and Inform ation
Ad m inistration (N TIA) has ad m inistered the Minority Telecomm u nications
Developm ent Program (MTDP), a program first initiated d uring the Carter
ad m inistration to increase m inority ow nership of rad io and television
broadcasting stations as w ell as other telecom m u nications bu sinesses. From
1990 to 2000, the N TIA released several reports that estimated the total
number of minority-owned radio and television stations.
The agency has not cond ucted any fu rther research into this m atter
since their last report w as issu ed in Decem ber 2000, and officials have
ind icated that they d o not intend to issu e any fu rther reports. When asked

ELRA Grou p Inc. Female Ownership of Broadcast Stations. p rep ared for the Fed eral
Communications Commission, May 1982.
1

202 TURNER AND COOPER
abou t plans for fu ture stu d ies by the N ational Association of H ispanic
Jou rnalists, the N TIA d irected the grou p to the flaw ed FCC sum m aries of
Form 323 data.2
Becau se of the d iffering method ologies, d irect com parisons betw een
this stu d y and earlier N TIA reports are not valid . At the tim e N TIA
cond u cted its stu d ies, it d id not have the full ow nership information that is
now available from ind ivid ual Form 323 filings. To com pile their list of
minority-ow ners, the N TIA relied on w ord of m ou th and m em bership
information from variou s m inority broad cast trad e associations. While this
effort provid ed a fairly com plete assessm ent of m inority broad cast
ow nership, it w as not a full censu s of all broad cast stations. The agency has
ind icated that its resu lts w ere not com p rehensive, and that fu tu re w ork based
on Form 323 filings w ould provid e a m ore com plete pictu re of m inority
ownership.3
Using the N TIA’s 1998 list, the list of cu rrent m inority ow ners,
ow nership inform ation from the FCC and interview s w ith station
representatives, Free Press id entified nine stations that w ere m issed by the
N TIA in its 1998 report, for a total of 40 stations. A sim ilar effort w as applied
to correct the 2000 N TIA report, bu t it w as less precise because the N TIA
om itted the nam es of m inority-ow ned stations and ow ners in that su rvey.
H ow ever, Free Press d id id entify 35 total stations that w ere m inority-owned
in 2000 (see Exhibit 1). While these corrected d ata provid e a m ore com plete
assessm ent of the historical trend in m inority television ow nership, they d o
not represent a rigorous census of all stations.

National Telecommunications and Information Administration. Letter from NTIA to
Ms. Veronica Villafane, President, National Association of Hispanic Journalists, April 27,
2006.
Available at http://www.nahj.org/nahjnews/articles/2006/april/NTIAResponseLetter.pdf.
“Presently, NTIA has no plans to conduct a minority ownership study. You may find
of interest, however, data on female and minority ownership from the Federal
Communications Commission’s ownership reports filed in calendar year 2003. The
data are available on the Commission’s website. …"
3 See the 2000 N TIA rep ort, w hich states: “MTDP acknow led ges that d esp ite its best
efforts, non-sampling error likely occu rred becau se of an inability to id entify all of the
nation’s minority commercial broadcasters. Such error may be reduced in the future as
a resu lt of the FCC’s recent requ irem ent that ow ners d isclose on their biennial rep orts
information abou t the p articip ation of m inorities and w omen in station ow nership . ...
In establishing the requ irem ent, the Com m ission noted the d ifficu lty N TIA faces in
obtaining com p lete and accu rate inform ation from broad cast ow ners. It conclu d ed
that N TIA’s d ata w ou ld com p lem ent, bu t not su bstitu te for, inform ation the
Com m ission gathered , because as the licensing au thority, it is ‘ap p rop riately and
u niqu ely situ ated to collect inform ation on the gend er and race of the attribu table
interests of its licensees.’ ”
2
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Exhibit 1: Minority Full-Power Commercial Television Ownership Since
1998 By Gender & Race/Ethnicity
Current Ownership for 50
U.S. States & DC

Historical Data for 50 U.S. States & DC

Race/Ethnicity

Amer. Ind./AK Nat.
Asian
Black
Hispanic or Latino
Nat. Haw/Pac. Isl.
All Minority
White
No Controling
Unknown
Total Universe

Corrected 1998

Corrected 2000

2006

NTIA Data

NTIA Data

Free Press Census

Percent of All
Percent of All
Percent of All
Number of Commercial Number of Commercial Number of Commercial
Stations Full Power TV Stations Full Power TV Stations Full Power TV
Stations
Stations
Stations
2
3
25
10
0
40
n/a
n/a
n/a
1,209

0.17
0.25
2.07
0.83
0.00
3.31

3
3
21
8
0
35
n/a
n/a
n/a
1,288

0.23
0.23
1.63
0.62
0.00
2.72

5
6
18
15
0
44
1,033
264
8
1,349

0.37
0.44
1.33
1.11
0.00
3.26
76.58
19.57
0.59

Source: Form 323 Filings; NTIA; Free Press research

H ow ever, these d ata clearly show there has been no im provem ent in
the level of m inority broad cast television ow nership since 1998, d espite the
fact that the total u niverse of stations has increased by approxim ately 12
percent. Fu rtherm ore, there has been a m arked d ecrease in the total nu m ber
of black or African-Am erican ow ned stations — d ropping nearly 30 percent
since 1998.
O WNERSHIP CONCENTRATION: FEMALE AND M INORITY O WNERS
CONTROL FEWER S TATIONS PER O WNER THAN M ALE AND WHITE O WNERS
White m ale and large corporate station ow ners tend to ow n far more
stations than their m inority and fem ale cou nterparts. The average nu m ber of
stations ow ned per u nique non-m inority ow ner is 5.4, w hile m ale ow ners
controlled an average of 4.8 stations each. H ow ever, the average nu m ber of
stations owned per unique owner is 1.9 for minorities and 2.3 for women.
While the average nu m ber of stations ow ned by a u niqu e minority
ow ner is 1.9, for Latinos it is even low er, at and average of 1.3 stations per
u niqu e ow ner. This reflects the fact that the largest Latino grou p ow ner
controls just three stations, com pared w ith the largest w hite m ale grou p
owner, Ion (formerly Paxson), which controls 57 stations.
There are a total of 269 u niqu e ow ners, and 140 of these control more
than one station. Over 54 percent of white male owners control more than one
station, compared to 32 percent of minority owners.
These d ifferences have a practical im portance on several levels. First,
given that the m ed ian minority or female ow ner controls ju st a single station,
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these operations are m ore likely to better serve their local com m unities than
stations controlled by large grou p ow ners. This is confirm ed by a recently
su rfaced 2004 FCC stu d y w hich d em onstrated that locally ow ned and
operated stations aired m ore local new s content than their conglom erate
cou nterparts, d evoting an ad d itional 20 to 25% of each half hou r broad cast to
local new s coverage.4 Second , m inority and female station ow ners are m ore
likely than their w hite m ale cou nterparts to feel the negative effects of
increased consolid ation. Wom en and m inority ow ners w ill find it m ore
d ifficu lt to com pete w ith the large grou p ow ners for program m ing and
advertising dollars.
TRACKING O WNERSHIP: FCC RULES CHANGES LED TO THE S ALE OF
M INORITY-O WNED S TATIONS
Using the corrected list of m inority-ow ned TV stations from the 1998
N TIA report, Free Press tracked the ow nership of the 40 stations that w ere
m inority ow ned as of that year, investigating the effects of tw o key policy
changes that occu rred in the late 1990’s: the increase in the national
ow nership cap from 25 percent to 35 p ercent and the 1999 FCC Ord er that
allow ed local television d u opolies. Free Press id entified 17 m inority-owned
stations that w ere sold to non-m inority ow ners after 1998. N ine of these
seventeen sales w ou ld not have been perm itted u nd er the old national
ownership cap and duopoly rules (see Exhibit 2).5 Had these stations not been
sold , minority ow nership w ou ld be 20 percent higher than the cu rrent level.
Fu rtherm ore, 7 of the 8 station sales that w ou ld have been perm issible u nd er
the old national cap and d u opoly rules w ere sales to large station grou p
owners, and m ay not have occu rred if not for the pressu res of increased
industry consolidation.

“Do Local Ow ners Deliver More Localism ? Som e Evid ence from Local Broad cast
News.” Federal Communications Commission Working Paper, 17 June, 2004.
5 22 of the 40 m inority-ow ned stations (in 1998) have changed ow ners since 1998. In
ad d ition to the 17 stations listed above, one w as sold by a Latino to a Latino (KRCA),
one w as sold by a Latino to a Latino-ow ned com p any that later becam e non-Latino
m ajority controlled (KLDO sold by Panoram a to Entravision), tw o w ere held by
com p anies that later becam e non-m inority controlled (KTMW and KSMS), and one
station’s status cou ld not be d eterm ined (there is no record in the CDBS of
Albu qu erqu e station KDB-TV). KTVJ and WH SL are only p artial station sales, as
Roberts Broad casting retained 50% of the voting interest in these tw o stations. Since
1998, there has been a loss of 22 m inority ow ned stations and a gain of 26 m inority
owned stations.
4
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Exhibit 2:
Sales of Minority Full-Power Commercial Television Stations: Stations that
were Minority Owned in 1998
Station

Owner in 1998

Race/Ethnicity

KCMY Ponce-Nicasio
Hispanic/Latino
KEYE Granite Broadcasting
African American
KLTV TV 3 INC.
African American
KNTV Granite Broadcasting
African American
KPST Golden Link TV Inc.
African American
KTRE TV 3 INC.
African American
KTVJ Roberts Broadcasting
African American
KUPX Roberts Broadcasting
African American
WATL Qwest
African American
WGTW Brunson Comm.
African American
WHPX Roberts Broadcasting
African American
WHSL Roberts Broadcasting
African American
WLBT TV 3 INC.
African American
WNOL Qwest
African American
WPTA Granite Broadcasting
African American
WPTT WPTT Inc.
African American
WTMW Urban Broadcasting Corp. African American

Year of
Sale
2000
1999
2000
2002
2002
2000
2003
1999
2000
2004
1999
2003
2000
2000
2005
2000
2002

Purchaser
Paxson
CBS
Cosmos (Raycom)
NBC Universal
Univision
Cosmos (Raycom)
Univision
Paxson
Tribune
Trinity Broadcasting
Paxson
Univision
Cosmos (Raycom)
Tribune
Malara
Sinclair
Univision

Would have
Would have
Been Permited Been Permited
under 25%
under
Cap?
Duopoly Ban?
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Source: Form 323 Filings; NTIA; Free Press research
Granite Broad casting, the largest m inority station ow ner in 1998 (and
tod ay) controlled 10 stations in 1998. Since then, the com pany has sold three
stations (KN TV to N BC-Universal in 2002; KEYE to CBS in 1999, and WPTA
to Malara Broad casting in 2005) and acquired tw o stations (KRII in 2000, and
WISE in 2005).6 Granite cou ld not have sold its stations to N BC and CBS
u nd er the national ow nership cap lim its that w ere in effect prior to 1996.
Fu rtherm ore, the sale of California’s KN TV w ou ld have been prohibited
before the FCC allow ed m arket d u opolies in 1999, as N BC also ow ns the local
Telemundo affiliate KSTS in the Bay Area.
African-American-ow ned Roberts Broad casting controlled fou r
stations in 1998. Tw o of these stations w ere sold to Paxson (WH PX and
KUPX, both in 1999) in d eals that w ou ld not have been perm itted u nd er pre1996 national ow nership caps. The other tw o stations ow ned by Roberts
Broad casting in 1998 (KTVJ and WH SL, now KTFD and WRBU) rem ain
partially ow ned by the com pany, but Univision now hold s a 50 percent
interest in each of these stations and controls all aspects of their d ay-to-day
operations. The Roberts brothers have since acquired tw o new station
licenses (by constru cting new stations), WZRB in Colu m bia Sou th Carolina,
and WRBJ in Jackson Mississippi. These are the only tw o African Am erican
owned stations in the South.
In ad d ition, Granite is cu rrently in the p rocess of acqu iring Bingham ton N ew York
CBS station WBN G, and selling San Francisco WB station KBWB, thu s the cu rrent
station cou nt for Granite is nine, reflecting ow nership as of Au gu st 3rd, and after these
station sales close.
6
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Qu incy Jones, the legend ary African-Am erican m u sic prod ucer,
ow ned tw o stations in 1998 — WATL in Atlanta and WN OL-TV in N ew
Orleans. In 1999, the Tribu ne Com pany pu rchased both of Jones’ stations as a
part of their m erger w ith Mr. Jones’ com pany, Qw est. These sales w ou ld n’t
have been allow ed u nd er the pre-1996 ow nership lim its. And WN OL cou ld
not have been sold u nd er the pre-1999 d u opoly ru les, as Tribu ne also ow ns
the New Orleans ABC affiliate, WGNO-TV.7
In 1998, WGTW w as the only station in the cou ntry ow ned by an
African-American woman, Dorothy Brunson, who acquired the station license
in 1988 after w inning the license of failed station WKBS-TV at au ction. Bu t by
2004, Bru nson fou nd it d ifficu lt to acquire synd icated program m ing and sold
the station to Trinity Broadcasting.8
Other m inority-ow ned stations w ere sold to large conglom erates d u e
in part to FCC ru le changes that allow ed for increased consolid ation.
Pittsburgh station WPMY (form erly WPPT) w as sold to Sinclair by AfricanAm erican ow ner Ed d ie Ed w ard s in 2000, after the FCC allow ed d u opolies.
(Sinclair also ow ns the local Fox affiliate WPGH -TV.). Another AfricanAm erican ow ner, Ed d ie Whitehead sold KPST (now KFSF) in 2001 to
Univision, creating a d u opoly in San Jose. Carm en Briggs, a Latino w om an,
sold KCMY (now KSPX) to Paxson in Ju ne 2000 in a d eal that exceed ed the
pre-1996 national ownership limits.
Bu t perhaps the m ost notable loss of a m inority-ow ned station since
1998 w as Jackson Mississippi’s WLBT and tw o other stations ow ned by Frank
Melton, KTRE and KLTV. WLBT is one of only tw o stations to have had its
license revoked by the FCC. WLBT violated the Fairness Doctrine via its
flagrant, pro-segregationist activities in the 1950s and 1960s – w hich inclu d ed
selling airtime to the Ku Klu x Klan. After being stripped of its license in 1971,
WLBT cam e u nd er the control of the African-American-ow ned group
Com m u nications Im provem ent, w hich sold the station in 1980 to TV3 Inc., a
grou p ow ned by Melton, an African-Am erican. Melton helped im prove the
station's news operations and took over first place in the ratings. However, by
2000, Melton felt he cou ld no longer com pete w ith the large corporate station
ow ners for program m ing and ad vertising revenu e, and sold all three stations
to Cosm os Broad casting, now called Raycom Med ia, the 14th-largest
broadcast owner in the nation.9
The case of WLBT and the other m inority-ow ned stations pu t u p for
sale m akes it clear that increased consolid ation has a m easurable effect on

Schneid er, Michael. “Tribu ne to Acqu ire Qw est, Creating Big Easy Du op oly.” Daily
Variety, 10 November 1999.
8 “Changing Hands.” Broadcasting and Cable, 30 August 2004.
9 Mills, Kay. 2004.
“Changing Channels: The Civil Rights Case That Transform ed
Television.” Prologue Magazine, Vol. 36, No. 3, Fall.
7
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m inority ow nership. Small-station ow ners find it increasingly d ifficu lt to
com pete against large companies in the acqu isition of both program m ing and
ad vertising clients. Too m any station ow ners find the financial pressures of
consolidation too hard to resist.
M INORITY-O WNED S TATIONS CAN THRIVE IN LESS CONCENTRATED M ARKETS
Minority-owned stations tend to be, on average, in the larger (by both
nu m ber of stations and popu lation) television markets, or Designated Market
Areas.10 Given that the larger m arkets tend to be less concentrated , it is not
su rprising that m arkets w ith m inority ow ned stations are less concentrated
than those without these stations.11
But even if the size of the market and the level of minority population
in the m arket are held constant, m arkets w ith m inority ow ners are
significantly less concentrated than m arkets w ithou t m inority ow ners. And
w hen these factors are held constant, m arkets w ith a m inority-ow ned VH F
station airing local new s are also significantly less concentrated than m arkets
without a minority-owned VHF station airing local news.
Fu rtherm ore, w hen m arket size and level of minority popu lation is
held constant, the m arkets that saw the ad d ition of new m inority ow ned
stations since 1998 are significantly less concentrated than markets that did not
gain new minority owners.12
Another w ay of examining this issue is to look at the probability that
an ind ivid ual station w ill be m inority ow ned , given the particular
characteristics of each m arket or station. Und er this analytical fram e, w e still
find that even w hen hold ing m arket and station characteristics constant, as a
The sim p le pairw ise correlation betw een DMA rank (low est nu m ber being the
highest ranked ) and the p resence of a m inority-ow ned station is highly significant,
and show s that the rank of a m arket w ith a m inority-ow ned station is on average 71,
versus 112 for a station without a minority owner.
11 HHI, or the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is a measure of the amount of competition
w ithin a m arket, in this case the local broad cast TV m arket. The higher the H H I, the
m ore concentrated the m arket. Markets w ith a m inority ow ner p resent have a total
d ay H H I of 2,511 versu s 3,800 for m arkets w ithou t a m inority ow ner (this is
statistically significant at a p -valu e of less than 0.0005). The DOJ consid ers m arkets
w ith H H Is over 1,800 to be highly concentrated . Of the 210 DMA’s, 202 have H H Is
above 1,800 (the m ean H H I is nearly 3,579, w ith the m ed ian valu e at 2,900). As
exp ected , the largest m arkets have H H I’s low er than the sm aller m arkets, bu t even the
largest markets remain highly concentrated (the mean and median HHI for the top ten
m arkets is 1,958 and 1,926 resp ectively; the m ean and m ed ian H H I for the top 50
m arkets is 2,236 and 2,289 resp ectively; for the bottom 50 m arkets the valu es are 5,710
and 5,226 respectively).
12 In total, there w as a loss of 22 m inority ow ned stations since 1998, and a gain of 26.
See Appendix B for details.
10
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m arket becom es m ore concentrated , a station is significantly less likely to be
minority-ow ned or be a m inority-ow ned station that airs local new s.
Sim ilarly, hold ing m arket characteristics constant, as a m arket becom es m ore
concentrated , the probability that a particu lar m arket w ill have a m inorityow ned station, a m inority-ow ned new s station, or have ad d ed a m inorityowned station since 1998, are all significantly lower.
M ARKET CONCENTRATION AND M INORITY O WNERSHIP
To exam ine the relationship betw een m inority-ow nership of fullpow er com m ercial television stations and television m arket concentration,
several econom etric m od els w ere constru cted . The first set of m od els
exam ines the effect that the presence of a m inority ow ned station in a market
has on market concentration. In ord er to control for m arket-specific effects,
tw o control variables w ere u sed : market rank and the percent of m inority
popu lation w ithin a given m arket. This approach is also u sed to exam ine the
relationship betw een m inority-ow ned new s stations and market
concentration. These models are specified as:
HHItotalday = a + ß1(minorityown)i + ß2 (marketrank)i + ß3 (pctminor)i + ei
HHItotalday = a + ß1(minorownnews)i + ß2 (marketrank)i + ß3 (pctminor)i + ei
HHItotalday = a + ß1(minorownVHFnews)i + ß2 (marketrank)i + ß3 (pctminor)i + ei
HHItotalday = a + ß1(addminorown)i + ß2 (marketrank)i + ß3 (pctminor)i + ei
Where;
HHItotalday = the HHI for a particular market, based upon station audience share.
minorityown = dummy variable for the presence of a minority-owned station in a
given market.
marketrank = the Nielsen market rank for the 2005-2006 period.
pctminor = the percentage of a market’s population that is of minority racial or
ethnic status.
minorownnews = dummy variable for the presence of a minority-owned local news
station
minorownVHFnews = dummy variable for the presence of a minority-owned VHF
news station.
addminorown = dummy variable for a market that added a minority-owned station
after 1998.
The results are presented below in Exhibit 3, 4, 5 and 6. These models
suggest that the presence of a minority owned station, a minority owned VHF
news station, or a new minority-owned station, is negatively associated with
market concentration.
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Exhibit 3

Exhibit 4

Dependent Variable = HHI total day

Dependent Variable = HHI total day

OLS

Robust Regr.

OLS

Robust Regr.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Beta-Value

Minorityowned
Station

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population

constant

N = 210

Beta-Value

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)

-435.6969
-0.087587
(0.112)
(0.016)^
19.76933
0.639241
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-2.17345
-0.020914
(0.702)
(0.684)
1616.35

-285.4295

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

R2 = 0.4533

R2 = 0.4518

(0.030)^

Minorityowned
Station w/
Local News

9.177394
(0.000)#
-1.67478
(0.538)

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population

2192.86

adjusted-R 2 = adjusted-R 2 =
0.4453
0.4439

* = sig. at 10% level; ^ = sig. at 5% level; # = sig. at 1% level

constant

N = 210

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)

-376.4767
-0.0532756
(0.318)
(0.163)
20.06072
0.6486625
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-3.441814
-0.0331188
(0.540)
(0.511)
1568.00

-338.3842

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

R2 = 0.4492

R2 = 0.4497

(0.065)*
9.460458
(0.000)#
-2.178654
(0.423)
2159.54

adjusted-R 2 = adjusted-R 2 =
0.4412
0.4417

* = sig. at 10% level; ^ = sig. at 5% level; # = sig. at 1% level

Source: Form 323 Filings; BIA Financial; Free Press Research
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Exhibit 5

Exhibit 6

Dependent Variable = HHI total day
OLS

Robust Regr.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Dependent Variable = HHI total day

Beta-Value

Minorityowned VHF
Station w/
Local News

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population

Robust Regr.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Beta-Value

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)

-998.0537
-0.0886898
(0.089)*
(0.023)^
20.14959
0.6515361
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-5.329496
-0.051283
(0.338)
(0.298)
1600.73

-580.4603

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

R2 = 0.4543

R2 = 0.4522

R2 = 0.4549

R2 = 0.4478

(0.037)^

Added a
MinorityOwned
Station After
1998

9.264841
(0.000)#
-4.73582
(0.074)*

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population

2214.84

constant

N = 210

OLS

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)

-575.9534
-0.0940821
(0.077)*
(0.014)^
20..13091
0.6509321
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-2.18187
-0.020995
(0.699)
(0.678)
1564.03

-272.949
(0.088)*
9.698766
(0.000)#
-1.668853
(0.547)
2130.40

constant

adjusted-R 2 = adjusted-R 2 =
0.4463
0.4442

* = sig. at 10% level; ^ = sig. at 5% level; # = sig. at 1% level

N = 210

adjusted-R 2 = adjusted-R 2 =
0.4469
0.4398

* = sig. at 10% level; ^ = sig. at 5% level; # = sig. at 1% level

Source: Form 323 Filings; BIA Financial; Free Press Research

While this is an interesting and im portant find ing, it m ay be m ore
appropriate to treat m inority ow nership as a dependent variable, and exam ine
the probability that a given station (or m arket) w ill be m inority-ow ned (or
contain a m inority-ow ned station) given the characteristics of a m arket,
including the market concentration.
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These probability models are generally specified as:
minorownsta = a + ß1(HHItotday)i + ß2(mktrank)i + ß3(pctminor)i + ß4(VHF)i +
ß5(bigfour)i + ei
minornewssta = a + ß1(HHItotday)i + ß2(mktrank)i + ß3(pctminor)i + ß4(VHF)i +
ß5(bigfour)i + ei
minorownmkt = a + ß1(HHItotday)i + ß2(mktrank)i + ß3(pctminor)i + ei
minornewsmkt = a + ß1(HHItotday)i + ß2(mktrank)i + ß3(pctminor)i + ei
addminorown = a + ß1(HHItotday)i + ß2(mktrank)i + ß3(pctminor)i + ei
Where
minorownsta = dummy variable for a minority-owned station.
minornewssta = dummy variable for a minority-owned station that airs local news.
minorownmkt = dummy variable for a market with a minority-owned station.
minornewsmkt = dummy variable for a market with a minority-owned station that
airs local news.
addminorown = dummy variable for a market that added a minority-owned station
after 1998.
HHItotalday = the HHI for a particular market, based upon station audience share.
mktrank = the Nielsen market rank for the 2005-2006 period.
pctminor = the percentage of a market’s population that is of minority racial or
ethnic status.
VHF = dummy variable for a station operating on channel 2-13.
bigfour = dummy variable for a station that is affiliated with one of the big four
networks.
Each probability m od el w as investigated as a linear OLS m od el, and
as a WLS (robu st) linear m od el. Bu t given the lim itations of linear m od els in
the case of a d u m m y d epend ent variable, these probabilities w ere also
examined using Probit, and Logit binary response models.
The resu lts are presented below in Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. These
results suggest that the probability that a given station is m inority-ow ned is
significantly low er in m ore concentrated m arkets, even if market and station
characteristics are held constant. Fu rtherm ore, a given station is less likely to
be a m inority-ow ned local new s station in m ore concentrated m arkets. This
result is also seen w hen exam ining the probability that a market w ill have a
minority-ow ned station or a m inority-ow ned local new s station.
Fu rtherm ore, less concentrated m arkets w ere m ore likely to have ad d ed a
minority-ow ned station after 1998, even after controlling for m arket rank and
minority population.
These find ings are very robu st to m od el specification type, and are
extrem ely important, for they su ggest that m inority-ow ners thrive in m ore
com petitive m arkets, regard less of market or station characteristics. Also,
m inority prod u ction of local new s is m ore likely to occu r in a com petitive
m arket versus m arkets w ith less com petition, regard less of market or station
characteristics.
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The m agnitud e of the effect of m arket concentration is quite large.
For exam ple, the pred icted probability of a m arket having a m inority-owned
station at the m ed ian concentration level is approxim ately 17 percent (u nd er
the robu st-stand ard error Probit m od el). If that concentration increases by
one-half of one stand ard d eviation (a 940 u nit increase in H H I), then the
pred icted probability of a m arket having a m inority-ow ned station d rops by
two-third s, to abou t 6 percent. Likew ise, for an ind ivid ual station, the
pred icted probability of being m inority-ow ned at the m ed ian m arket H H I is
abou t 2.1 percent (u nd er the robu st-stand ard error Probit mod el). An
increase of one-half of one stand ard d eviation in H H I also lead s to a large
drop in the predicted probability, falling to just 0.8 percent.
These find ings su ggest that the likely ou tcom e of fu rther ind u stry
consolid ation and concentration w ill be few er m inority-ow ned stations and
minority-ow ned stations airing local new s content. This has trem end ou s
im plications for the cu rrent ow nership proceed ing at the FCC. One
u nam bigu ous consequ ence of further ind ustry consolid ation and
concentration will be to diminish both the number of minority-owned stations
and the alread y low nu mber of minority-ow ned stations airing local new s
content. The FCC shou ld seriou sly consid er the effects on m inority ow ners
and view ers before it m oves to enact policies that w ill lead to increased
market concentration.
Ind eed , as show n above, previous pro-consolid ation policies enacted
by the FCC in the late 1990’s had a significant im pact on m inority ow nership,
ind irectly or d irectly contribu ting to a loss of 40 percent of the stations that
were minority owned as of 1998.
CONCLUSION
This stu d y has show n that pu blic policy relaxing lim its ow nership
concentration not only fails to prom ote m inority ow nership bu t actually
u nd erm ines it at three levels. First, the trend since ru les w ere relaxed in the
mid-1990s show s a d ecline in m inority ow nership, d espite an increase in the
number of overall stations. Second, examination of the stations that were sold
since that change in policy show s that many sales of m inority ow ned stations
to non-m inorities w ere mad e possible d irectly by that change. There m ay
have been ind irect effects as w ell, since m any of the sales that took place
cou ld have taken place prior to the change in policy, bu t d id not. The
pressures to consolid ate unleashed by the relaxation of the previou s lim its
m ay have pushed m inority ow ners, w ho have little prospect of keeping u p
the trend, to sell out. Third, econometric evidence supports the proposition at
the m acro level that this m icro-level d ata w ou ld su ggest – greater
concentration is associated with lower levels of minority ownership.
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Exhibit 7

Exhibit 8

Dependent Variable = station owned by a
minority (dummy)

Dependent Variable = minority owned
station airing local news (dummy)

HHI total
day

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population
in Market

VHF Station

Big Four
Station

constant

OLS
Coeff.
Beta-Value
(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

Probit
Coeff.
dF/dx
(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

-0.000011
-0.072878
(0.041)^
(0.002)#
0.0002288
0.073232
(0.052)*
(0.058)*
0.0007315
0.073532
(0.009)#
(0.035)^
0.0024051
0.006697
(0.834)
(0.833)
-0.0453484
-0.123403
(0.000)#
(0.003)#
0.05546

-0.0003752
-0.0000194
(0.012)^
(0.006)#
0.0045539
0.0002351
(0.013)^
(0.007)#
0.0071797
0.0003707
(0.056)*
(0.061)*
-0.0002628
-0.0000136
(0.999)
(0.999)
-0.5981723
-0.0374242
(0.001)#
(0.004)#
-1.09931

(0.001)#
(0.000)#

(0.003)#
(0.001)#

OLS
Coeff.
Beta-Value
(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

-0.00000607
-0.0641
(0.075)*
(0.036)^
0.0000443
0.022658
Market Rank
(0.553)
(0.560)
0.0002696
Percent
Minority
0.04391
Population
(0.128)
in Market
(0.276)
-0.0056394
-0.025007
VHF Station
(0.437)
(0.443)
0.0112352
Big Four
0.048685
Station
(0.159)
(0.168)
0.0152167
HHI total
day

constant

R2 = 0.0244
N = 1349

pseudo R 2 =
2
adjusted-R = 0.089
0.0208

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5%
level; # = significant at 1% level

(0.153)
(0.086)*

Probit
Coeff.
dF/dx
(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

-0.0004846
-0.0000109
(0.028)^
(0.071)*
0.0028309
0.0000639
(0.237)
(0.221)
0.0063395
0.0001431
(0.219)
(0.316)
-0.1849883
-0.004069
(0.419)
(0.221)
0.3827043
0.0079049
(0.141)
(0.114)
(1.54)
(0.006)#
(0.021)^

R2 = 0.0056
N = 1349

pseudo R 2 =
adjusted-R = 0.059
0.0019
2

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5%
level; # = significant at 1% level

Source: Form 323 Filings; BIA Financial; Free Press Research

214

TURNER AND COOPER
Exhibit 9

Exhibit 10

Dependent Variable = market with a
minority-owned station (dummy)

HHI total
day

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population
in Market

constant

Dependent Variable = market with a
minority-owned station airing local news
(dummy)
OLS
Probit

OLS

Probit

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Coeff.

Beta-Value

dF/dx

Beta-Value

dF/dx

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

(sig.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)

-0.0000281
-0.1398196
(0.112)
(0.041)^
-0.0006912
-0.1111809
(0.210)
(0.247)
0.0046665
0.2233715
(0.001)#
(0.003)#
0.24043

-0.0006441
-0.0000977
(0.003)#
(0.001)#
0.001169
0.0001773
(0.660)
(0.652)
0.0183777
0.0027868
(0.003)#
(0.002)#
0.3792889

-0.0000128
-0.0906995
(0.318)
(0.210)
-0.0004261
-0.0973687
(0.289)
(0.313)
0.0021154
0.1438456
(0.040)^
(0.132)
0.1197049

-0.0007912
-0.000359
(0.017)**
(0.038)^
0.0012612
0.0000572
(0.705)
(0.721)
0.0119873
0.000544
(0.101)
(0.185)
0.344887

(0.001)#
(0.001)#

(0.479)
(0.462)

(0.020)^
(0.025)^

(0.665)
(0.727)

HHI total
day

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population
in Market

constant

R2 = 0.1273
N = 210

pseudo R 2 =
2
adjusted-R = 0.1898
0.1146

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level;
# = significant at 1% level

R2 = 0.0623
N = 210

pseudo R 2 =
adjusted-R = 0.1768
0.0486
2

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5%
level; # = significant at 1% level

Source: Form 323 Filings; BIA Financial; Free Press Research
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Exhibit 11
Dependent Variable = added minority owned
station in market after 1998 (dummy)
OLS

Probit

Coeff.

Coeff.

Beta-Value

dF/dx

(sig.)

(sig.)

(sig. w/ rob.err.) (sig. w/ rob.err.)

HHI total day

Market Rank

Percent
Minority
Population in
Market

-0.0000262
-0.1604588
(0.077)*
(0.035)^
0.0002054
0.0406665
(0.656)
(0.697)
0.0034945
0.2058482
(0.003)#
(0.023)^
0.09863

-0.0005219
-0.0000598
(0.016)^
(0.005)#
0.0039963
0.0004577
(0.162)
(0.159)
0.0168858
0.0019338
(0.010)#
(0.007)#
-0.5118781

(0.095)*
(0.066)*

(0.346)
(0.290)

constant

R2 = 0.0703
N = 210
2

adjusted-R =
0.0568

pseudo R 2 =
0.1351

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; # =

Source: Form 323 Filings; BIA Fina ncial; Free Press Research
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STUDY 14:
A CASE STUDY OF WHY LOCAL REPORTING
MATTERS:
THE RACIAL FRAMING OF THE RESPONSE TO
KATRINA IN PHOTOJOURNALISM IN LOCAL
AND NATIONAL NEWSPAPERS
M ARK COOPER AND S TEVE COOPER
O VERVIEW
This stu d y exam ines the fram ing of the response to hu rricane Katrina
in local and national new spapers as part of a broad er stu d y of the im portance
of localism in media markets. It replicates an earlier study by Gandy and Lee,
ad d ing a com parison of the coverage in local and national papers as w ell as
key control variables (su ch as the locale d epicted in the photo and the action
of each individual in each photo).
Gand y and Lee stu d ied the photojou rnalism record presented in the
N ew Y ork Times and The W ashington Post w ith a concern that “American
photojou rnalists follow ed a trad itional tem plate u sed by the Western press
w hen it covers period ic d isasters in the Third World . Observers su ggest that
m any of the im ages of the d isaster in N ew Orleans looked very sim ilar to the
im ages of Am erican d octors and marines rescuing the starving d esperate
victim s.” Bu t Gand y and Lee d id not have extensive d ata on the u nd erlying
“reality” of the events in N ew Orleans. This Stud y u ses the photojou rnalism
record of the hom etow n p apers as a baseline – the Times Picayune and the Sun
Herald, both of which won Pulitzer Prizes for their coverage.
We find that the national papers sim plified the situation and
exaggerated the role of victim s. Corroborating Gand y and Lee, w e find that
out-of tow n new spapers d epicted m any m ore passive black victim s in N ew
Orleans and one of the papers reported m any more negative actions by
Blacks. At the sam e tim e, w e find a u niform absence of Black rescu ers across
all papers, particu larly in N ational Guard Units, that raises questions abou t
the racial make-u p of these u nits and their d eployment, beyond the issu e of
photojournalism.
The find ings u nd erscore the im portance of local sou rces of news.
Even thou gh d istribu tion throu gh a new m ed iu m su ch as the Internet m ay
m ake sou rces m ore read ily available, it is the original local reporting that is
the key. Ou t-of-tow n new spapers sim ply d o not report m any of the stories
that truly matter “where you live” (although the Katrina story was too big not
to cover) or do not do so in a manner that reflects the local reality.
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FRAMING RACIAL ROLES IN PHOTOJOURNALISM
Social and political bases of localism (d em onstrated in Stu d y 4), clear
pu blic preference for trad itional, local sou rces of new s and inform ation, and
m ed ia usage patterns u nd erscore the continu ing im portance of local new s
ou tlets (d em onstrated in Stu d y 5), even as d istribu tion of local content m oves
online. The fact that m yriad ou tlets can be accessed online d oes not m ean
that nu m erou s sou rces d ealing w ith a specific local area are available. In
other w ord s, even thou gh d istribu tion throu gh a new m ed iu m su ch as the
Internet m ay m ake a local sou rce m ore read ily available in an area, it is the
original local reporting that is the key. Ou t-of-tow n new spapers sim ply d o
not report m any of the stories that m atter “w here you live.” Even w hen they
d o, there is a d ifference. The local angle on the local story is im portant, even
when it becomes a big enough story to be covered by out-of-town papers.
This Stu d y su bstantiates that assertion by analyzing the coverage of
one of the biggest local stories of the past year, the im pact of hu rricane
Katrina on the Gu lf Coast. A recent paper by Gand y and Lee presented an
analysis of the photographic record of the im pact of H u rricane Katrina on the
Gu lf coast.527 It analyzed all of the photographs pu blished by the N ew Y ork
Times and the W ashington Post in the first w eek after Katrina cam e ashore.
This Stu d y com pares the reporting in local new spapers to that of the national
papers.
Gand y and Lee asked w hat “specific new s tem plates w ere relied
u pon in presenting the story of Katrina and the victim s and heroes she
brou ght to the fore.” They are particularly concerned that “Am erican
photojou rnalists follow ed a trad itional tem plate u sed by the Western press
w hen it covers period ic d isasters in the Third World ,” suggesting that “m any
of the images of the d isaster in N ew Orleans looked very sim ilar to the
im ages of Am erican d octors and marines rescuing the starving d esperate
victims.”
Gand y and Lee chose the N ew Y ork Times and the W ashington Post
“becau se these papers are read by the nation’s opinion lead ers, and becau se
they are generally believed to set the agend a for other m ajor new s m ed ia in
the US.” These are prominent national papers.
At the sam e tim e, Gand y and Lee hypothesized that there m ight be a
d ifference in how the papers reported since “the Times is a national
new spaper w ith read ers ou tsid e of N ew York representing 40% of its total,
Gand y, Oscar. “Thinking Abou t Race, Id eology and Stru ctu re in the Presentation of
Disastrou s Events: The Case of Katrina.” Rethinking the Discourse on Race. St. John’s
University School of Law , 28 Ap ril 2006 and Lee, Chu l-joo and Oscar H . Gandy.
Others’ Disaster: H ow Am erican N ew sp apers covered H u rricane Katrina (Method s,
Resu lts and Discu ssion). Rethinking the Discourse on Race. St. John’s University School
of Law, 28 April 2006.
527
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w hile the national read ership of the Washington Post accou nts for only 10%.”
Becau se the popu lation of the Washington m etro area is 60 percent African
Am erican, versus 27 percent for the N ew York area and 10 percent
nationwid e, Gand y and Lee hypothesized that “the framing of stories in the
Post shou ld be m ore favorable to African Am ericans than im ages appearing
in the Times.”
The analysis w as confined to the first w eek after Katrina cam e ashore
(August 30 to Septem ber 7). “Given that ou r prim ary focu s is on
representational d ifferences am ong Katrina rescu ers and victim s, the very
first week of the crisis cycle was most appropriate for our analysis.”
While there were some differences between the two papers, the major
findings of the study were as follows:
Both presented a photojournalistic record that was heavily laden with
Black victims (NYT = 78%; WP = 72%),
who were overwhelmingly passive, compared to White victims (NYT =
88% of White victims active v. 12% of Black victims; WP = 82% of White
victims active v. 18% of Black).
Black rescuers were scarce in both (NYT = 3%; WP = 20%)
And there were virtually no images of Blacks rescuing Whites (NYT = 0;
WP = 2%).

Althou gh Gand y and Lee d id not cod e positive and negative actions
of victims into their basic analytic fram e, they d id note that a “su bstantial
portion of Katrina photos pu blished by both NYT (i.e. 6 ou t of 16 [38%]) and
the WP (6 out of 20 [30%]) that represent Black victim s as active also su ggest
that these Black people were engaging in socially undesirable activities.”
While the image that Gand y and Lee fou nd fit their hypothesis of a
“Third World ” view of d isaster relief, they w ere confronted w ith the
challenge that the photos and the d ata they prod u ced may have actually
represented the u nd erlying reality of the situation. They cou ntered by citing
some evidence that the victims were more evenly divided between Blacks and
Whites (51% to 45%) than the photos portrayed and offered a hypothesis that
the racial m akeu p of the rescu ers w as likely to be more m ixed than presented
in the photos, although no evidence was offered in support.
The Gand y and Lee paper focu sed on the au d ience of ou t-of-town,
national new spapers for another one of its hypotheses. The Washington Post
d id present im ages that w ere som ew hat m ore favorable to Blacks than the
N ew Y ork Times, bu t Gand y and Lee are correct to focu s on the fact that the
overall image in both papers was negative, as they define it.
Gand y and Lee d id not test w hat w e believe could be a m ore salient
feature of the photojournalism approach that would dictate the framing of the
Katrina response. The N ew Y ork Times and the W ashington Post are both
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national new spapers d istant from the event. Bu t how d id local new spapers
depict it? Did the local papers of record present a d ifferent pictu re than the
national, out-of-town papers? We set out to compare the depiction of the two.
M ETHOD
For the sam e tim e period , Au gu st 30 to Septem ber 7, w e gathered the
photojou rnalism record from fou r papers, ad d ing tw o local papers, The New
Orleans Times-Picayune and The Gu lfport-Biloxi Sun Herald, to the sam e tw o
national papers.
New Orleans Times Picayune = TP
Gulfport-Biloxi Sun Herald

= SH

Washington Post

= WP

New York Times

= NYT

We applied the sam e cod ing schem e to the photo record in both
national and local papers. Gand y and Lee cod ed each photo on fou r
dimensions:
Race: Black or White
Role:

Rescuer or Victim

Setting: Alone v. Multiple People
Action: Passive v. Active (Positive or Negative)

Gand y and Lee cod ed the overall action fram e of each pictu re, w hich
in the case of m any pictu res involves a ju d gm ent call abou t w hat the pictu re
portrayed . We chose to cod e each ind ivid u al in each picture to preserve and
represent d etail. We d efined the Alone v. Mu ltiple People parad igm in the
“Setting” d im ension to d escribe w hether a victim w as in the presence of a
rescu er (“multiple people”) and vice versa. So, for instance, 3 victim s in a
photograph containing no rescuers are coded as “alone.”
Also, because we are comparing home town, local papers, and out-oftow n, national papers, it is im portant to control for w hat locale w as being
captu red in the photo. There w ere three d ifferent locales d epicted in the
pictures – N ew Orleans, the Mississippi Coast, and other cities to w hich
people had been evacuated . Most of the evacu ees w ere from N ew Orleans.
The reality in each location was different.
RESULTS
The survey of the papers produced 528 pictures with 1223 individuals
(See Exhibit 1). The hom e tow n papers focused on their local area, w ith
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scattered images from other locales, w hile the ou t-of-tow n papers covered all
areas, although N ew Orleans w as the d om inant locale in each by far.
Observed d ifferences in the overall action fram e d epicted in national and
local papers could reflect differences in the locales represented.
Exhibit 1: The Database

Newspaper
Times Picayune
Sun Herald
Washington Post
New York Times

Photos Individuals
123
166
159
80

308
327
364
224

Locations
(% of Individuals)
N.O. Miss. Other Total
93%
1% 6% 100%
12
84
4 100
53
24
23
100
68
15
18
100

There is a sharp d ifference in the racial m ake-u p of N ew Orleans and
Biloxi, w hich is reflected in the race of the victim s (see Exhibit 2). N ew
Orleans is tw o-third s Black and black victim s pred om inate. Biloxi is tw othirds White and White victims predominate.
Exhibit 2: The Racial Makeup of the Impact Area Populations
and Victims Depicted

White/Other
Black
Total

Population (%)
Victims in Hometown Papers
(% of Total)
(% of Victim Images)
N.O.
Biloxi
N.O.
Biloxi
33%
81%
38%
67%
67
19
62
33
100
100
100
100

When w e com pare the pictu res of the tw o locales offered by the
hom etow n and ou t-of-tow n papers, w e find a clear d ifference. The ou t-oftow n papers accentuate the m ain victim fram es (see Exhibit 3). In N ew
Orleans, w here Blacks w ere the pred ominant victim s in the hom etow n paper,
the ou t of tow n papers exaggerate the presence of Black victims. In Biloxi,
w here Whites w ere the pred om inant victim s in the hom etow n paper, the ou tof-town papers exaggerate the presence of white victims.
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Exhibit 3: Victim Images in Hometown and Out-of-Town Papers
(% of Total Locale Images)

White
Black

New Orleans
TP
WP
NYT
20
14*
11**
43
61**
53*

Mississippi
SH
WP
46
59**
23
15 +

NYT
76**
12 +

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01
The reality d epicted in the Times Picayune on a pictu re-by-picture
basis w as m u ch m ore com plex than in the national papers (see Exhibit 4).
Abou t half of the pictu res in the Times Picayune inclu d ed u niform action
fram es. That is, every ind ivid ual in the photo fell into the sam e one of the 48
categories used to classify ind ivid uals. This percentage w as m u ch higher for
the other papers – alm ost 90 percent in the Su n H erald , over 80 percent in the
Washington Post, and abou t 75 percent in the N ew York Tim es. The Tim es
Picayu ne w as m u ch m ore likely to have ties – photos in w hich tw o or three
categories w ere equally represented in a given pictu re. The TP w as also
som ew hat more likely to have plu rality photos in w hich m ultiple categories
w ere represented bu t one pred om inated . Based on this analysis, from the
point of view of N ew Orleans, w e su ggest that the ou t-of-tow n papers
simplified the situation.

Exhibit 4: The Complexity of Individual Pictures
100
90

Percent of Pictures

80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Uniform

Plurality

Tie

TYPE OF ACTION FRAMES
Times Picayune

Sun Herald

Washington Post

NY Times
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Becau se of this u nd erlying com plexity, w e chose not to categorize
each picture. Rather, we conducted the analysis at the level of the individuals
depicted.
Ou r analysis focuses on N ew Orleans because it w as the center of
national attention and , as a resu lt, the nu m ber of photos in the national press
of other areas was too small for detailed analysis.
Ou r examination of the Gand y and Lee hypothesis provid es su pport
for several of the main points, although introducing a baseline with the Times
Picayu ne and controlling for the locales of the photos m akes the d ifferences
som ew hat sm aller (see Exhibit 5). Out of tow n new spapers w ere m ore likely
to d epict blacks as victim s w ho w ere alone and passive. They w ere m ore
likely to d epict w hites actively rescu ing blacks and less likely to d epict w hites
actively rescuing whites.
There w ere no instances of negative White images in any of the
papers. One of the ou t-of-tow n papers (WP) d epicted a higher percentage of
Blacks engaging in actions that were coded as negative.
Other characteristics of the action fram es pointed ou t by Gand y and
Lee are in evid ence as w ell, bu t they cannot be attribu ted to fram ing choices
by the national m ed ia, since they are in evid ence in all three papers. They
m ay point to other social issu es, how ever. Across all papers there are few
black rescu ers in the photos. White rescu ers ou tnum ber black rescu ers by 3
or 4 to one, in a region of the country where the ratio of whites to blacks in the
popu lation is close to 1 or 1.5 to 1. Based on u niform s, this appears to be
There w ere no instances of negative White im ages in any of the papers. One
of the ou t-of-tow n papers (WP) d epicted a higher percentage of Blacks
engaging in actions that were coded as negative.
Other characteristics of the action fram es pointed ou t by Gand y and
Lee are in evid ence as w ell, bu t they cannot be attribu ted to fram ing choices
by the national m ed ia, since they are in evid ence in all three papers. They
m ay point to other social issu es, how ever. Across all papers there are few
black rescu ers in the photos. White rescu ers ou tnum ber black rescu ers by 3
or 4 to one, in a region of the country where the ratio of whites to blacks in the
popu lation is close to 1 or 1.5 to 1. Based on u niform s, this appears to be
particularly tru e of the N ational Gu ard . The racial m ake-u p of the N ational
Gu ard , m ore specifically the u nits d eployed for d isaster relief, m u st be
exam ined to u nravel this m ystery. Is the N ational Gu ard segregated ? Were
u nits selectively d eployed ? Are pred om inantly black or m ixed racial u nits
d eployed in Iraq? Is there a d ifference in the m ilitary occu pational specialties
(MOS) of black and white units?

224

COOPER AND COOPER
Exhibit 5: The Key Action Frames in the Gandy & Lee Hypothesis
(Photos of New Orleans Only)

Alone
White Victims Alone - Passive
Alone - Negative

CFA Coding
Coding individuals in photos
of New Orleans Locale
TP
WP
NYT
6
5
5
6
6
5
0
0
0

Gundy & Lee
Photos coded
all locales
WP
NYT
18
19
7
8
0
0

Alone
Black Victims Alone - Passive
Alone - Negative

30
15
4

42**
24*
10**

33
18
5

44
30
4

48
26
3

All
White Rescuers Rescuing Blacks
Rescuing Whites

29
11
8

18**
14
2**

29
17*
0**

38
20
8

35
17
3

All
Black Rescuers Rescuing Blacks
Rescuing Whites

8
3
4

8
1
5

7
1
3

2
1
0

8
3
1

+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

CONCLUSION
It m ay be a little harsh to say that the ou t-of-tow n papers sim plified ,
exaggerated and d istorted the image of the Katrina d isaster in N ew Orleans,
bu t that w as the d irection in w hich their photojou rnalism tend ed , w hen
com pared to the hom etow n paper of record . The negative image of Blacks
w as d istorted , bu t not as severely as su ggested by the Gand y and Lee
d iscu ssion that d id not have a baseline reality. Ad d ing su ch a baseline,
d efined in this analysis as the presentation d epicted in the hom etow n paper,
m od erates the effect, bu t reinforces the conclu sion because im portant controls
were added.
The fact that ou r approach fou nd smaller d ifferences d oes not m ean
that the Gand y and Lee approach w as w rong. It w as just d ifferent. Tw o
prim ary sou rces of the d ifferences are in their cod ing of pictu res, as opposed
to individuals.
Cases w here w e fou nd a plu rality of one type of action in a pictu re
w ou ld be cod ed strictly as that type of pictu re in the Gand y and Lee
approach. This elim inates from the analysis the actions of non-plural
ind ivid uals, w hich m agnifies the d ifferences betw een ou r num bers and
Gand y and Lee’s. To the extent that passive Blacks w ere the plu rality, w hich
is likely, it w ou ld accentuate this action fram e. If the im pact of the fram e is
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the overall them e of the pictu re, then cou nting each ind ivid ual separately
might be said to underestimate the effects of framing.
Second , evacu ees w ere overw helm ingly Blacks from N ew Orleans.
As evacu ees, they w ere likely to be in passive situations. The fact that the
national papers inclu d ed m any m ore photos of evacu ees d rove their
presentation in the d irection qu estioned by Gand y and Lee. For ou r analysis,
w hich w as focu sed on a hom e-tow n vs. ou t-of-tow n com parison, w e d ropped
the pictu res of evacu ees w ho had alread y reached their d estination. Bu t
evacuees were part of the national story.
In this sense, the fact that the
d ifferences hold u p w ith ou r approach m akes the Gand y and Lee argu m ent
stronger, since we have controlled for alternative explanations.
More im portant, from the point of view of this analysis, are the clear
d ifferences betw een hom etow n and ou t-of-tow n representation of the events.
This d ifference, and the fact that the Times Picayune and the Sun Herald both
w on Pu litzer Prizes for their coverage of the events, fu rther rem ind s u s of the
importance of local newspapers.

226

COOPER AND COOPER

227

PART VI:
THE IMPACT OF CONSOLIDATION AND
CONGLOMERATION ON
LOCALISM AND DIVERSITY POLICY
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STUDY 15:
CONSOLIDATION AND CONGLOMERATION
DIMINISH DIVERSITY AND DO NOT PROMOTE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
REVIEW OF THE HEARING RECORD
Mark Cooper
INTRODUCTION
The cornerstone of the effort to relax the ow nership lim its is the claim
by the FCC that consolid ation and / or conglom eration can prom ote the goals
of the Com m u nications Act. Although the cou rt accepted the claim ,1 the
record evid ence is extremely thin. In fact, there is no evid ence in the record
that achieve routine levels of statistical significance to show that consolidation
and / or conglom eration contribu te to any of the goals of the Act. Su bsequ ent,
rigorou s empirical evid ence show s that new spaper TV com binations and
d u opolies d o not increase the quantity or quality of local new s and
information available. The FCC conclu d ed and the Cou rt accepted the w rong
conclu sion. Since the new ru les have been su spend ed , there w ill be no harm
if the FCC reverses its conclu sion u nd er the quad rennial review and retu rns
to the standard in place prior to 2003.
H ere it is critical to appreciate the stand ard that shou ld be applied .
Given the recognition that “the w id est possible d issem ination of inform ation
from d iverse and antagonistic sou rces” and the close association of points of
view w ith ow nership, the loss of an ind epend ently ow ned ou tlet is a
significant harm to d emocratic d iscou rse. Moreover, new spapers and
television are the d om inant sou rce of local new s and information by far. The
gain from consolid ation and conglomeration that eliminates ind epend ent
voices from the foru m for d em ocratic d iscou rse m ust be very large to offset
the loss of a m ajor ind epend ent voice. N either the record evid ence nor
subsequent research demonstrates such a substantial gain.
This paper review s the record evid ence, w hich the FCC failed to cite
in its ord er. The next tw o papers bring new evid ence to bear on this critically
important issue.

1

Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC 373 (2004) (Prometheus); p. 52.
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CLAIMED BEN EFITS
RECORD

OF

CROSS-O WN ERSHIP

ARE

N OT D EMON STRATED

IN THE

Project for Excellence in Journalism
The FCC’s ord er claiming that cross-ow nership can enhance quality
rests on tw o stu d ies – its ow n Med ia Ow nership Working Grou p (MOWG)
stu d y 7 and a stu d y by the Project on Excellence in Jou rnalism .2 Follow ing
the FCC’s record , the cou rt cited these tw o stu d ies the relevant paragraphs in
the order. Neither of the studies provides a valid basis for reaching the stated
conclusion.
The PEJ stud y w as d ism issed by the Com m ission as follow s:
“Whether or not the PEJ stu d y is u nbiased , its resu lt appear statistically
insignificant, the u nd erlying d ata have not been m ad e available, and
therefore, cannot be consid ered reliable or convincing evid ence.” 3 H aving
d ism issed the stu d y as fu nd am entally flaw ed , the FCC cau tioned , w hen it
cited the stu d y in the cross-ow nership d iscussion that “ We u se PEJ’s filing
here solely as a source of anecd otal evid ence, not as a statistical stud y, and d o
not base ou r conclusions regard ing the new spaper/ broad cast crossow nership rule u pon it.” 4 The irony of the Com m ission even m entioning a
stu d y it had so bru tally criticized is m agnified by the fact that in original and
the reply com m ents the PEJ reached exactly the opposite conclu sion that the
FCC did,
The closest the PEJ Stu d y com es to w hat the FCC m ight or m ight not d o is this
rather general observation: “The d ata strongly su ggest regu latory changes that
encou rage heavy concentration of ow nership in local television by a few large
corporations will erode the quality of news Americans receive.”5

Tw o of the fou r areas of analysis in the PEJ of cross-ow ned properties
contrad icted the claim s of the FCC – rating trend s and enterprise. In fact, the
only d ifference betw een cross-ow ned and non-cross-ow ned stations that even
Project for Excellence in Jou rnalism , Econom ists Inc’s “Critiqu e of the Recent Stu d y
on Med ia Ow nership ” A Resp onse by the Project for Excellence in Jou rnalism , March
18, 2003, p.1.
3 Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission, 2002 Biennial Regu latory Review – Review of
the Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and Other Ru les Ad op ted Pu rsu ant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18 FCC Rcd 13620, 13711-47 (2003),
(hereafter Order), ¶573.
4 Order, ¶345, footnote 766.
5 Rep ly Com m ent, “Econom ists Inc.’s ‘Critiqu e’ of the Recent Stu d y on Med ia
Ow nership : A Resp onse by the Project for Excellence in Jou rnalism ,” Fed eral
Com m u nications Com m ission, 2002 Biennial Regu latory Review – Review of the
Com m ission’s Broad cast Ow nership Ru les and Other Ru les Ad op ted Pu rsu ant to
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, March 18, 2003, p. 1.
2
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approached statistical significance w as the trend of d eclining rating (Chi sq –
5.16, p <.10), which points in the opposite direction from the FCC conclusion.
Commission Studies
Thus,
the Com m ission p rincip ally relied on the find ings of its MOWG stu d y that
newspaper-ow ned television stations p rovid ed alm ost 50% m ore local new s
and p u blic affairs p rogram m ing stations, 21.9 hou rs p er w eek…. The
Com m ission also fou nd corresp ond ing ad vantages in qu ality of local coverage
p rovid ed by new sp ap er-ow ned stations, as show n by ratings (m easu ring
consumer approval) and industry awards (measuring critical approval).

N either the Com m ission in the ord er nor the Cou rt in its ru ling noted
CFA’s criticism of this conclu sion. Ind eed , the Cou rt states, “Bu t the Citizens
Petitioners d o not su ggest that a stud y entirely focu sed on intram arket
com binations w ou ld have d ifferent resu lts.” 6 Actually, in the record w e
suggested exactly that.
In ord er to m ake meaningful inferences abou t the effects of cross
ow nership, one m u st compare apples to apples. Cross-ow ned stations are
highly ranked stations in large m arkets. Without proper controls – i.e.
com paring them to small m arket low ranked stations – lead s on to m ake false
claim s for the benefits of cross-ow nership that are properly attribu table to
station rank and market size.
The prim ary nu m erical evid ence on w hich the FCC relied w as not
presented as statistically significant (no statistical tests w ere applied ). The
N ew spaper Association of Am erica, w hose com m ents the FCC cited , sim ply
rew orked the sam e d ata. Both failed to introd u ce proper controls or apply
statistical tests.
Exhibit 1 presents the flaw in the FCC/ N AA analysis in graphic
terms. It shows the market size (i.e. rank of the DMA) on the X-axis. It shows
the total hours of local new s on the Y-axis. In the m arket ranked equal to
those w here w e find cross-ow ned stations, there is little d ifference in the
production of news.
Exhibit 2 show s the m ean nu m ber of hou rs of new s. The exhibit
show s new s program m ing of fou r types of stations in each m arket: those
with the most hours in the market; the highest ranked station, the second rank
station and the cross-ow ned station. Three of the six cross-ow ned stations
had the m ost hou rs in their m arket; all six of the cross-ow ned stations w ere
ranked first. The non-cross-owned stations with the most hours have a higher
average nu mber of hou rs than the cross-ow ned stations. The non-cross
owned stations that had the highest ratings had a higher average number of
6

Promethreus, p. 50.
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Exhibit 1: News Production, Market Size, Market Rank and CrossOwnership
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Source: Spavins, Thomas C., et al, “The Measurement of Local Television News and Public
Affairs Programs,” Appendices B and C.

hou rs than the cross-ow ned stations. Any apparent ad vantage of crossowned stations is a function of comparing them to much lower ranked station
in smaller markets. There is no w ay to infer that cross-ow nership w ill resu lt
in an increase of news produced.
Exhibit 2: Hours of News Supplied by Station Rank and Market Size
Top-Rated Second-Rated
Most Hours
Stations
Stations

Non-Cross-Owned
All
DMA's Cross-Owned

32.5
27.5

28.9
27.5

22.5

Top 34 Non-Cross-Owned
DMA's Cross-Owned

35.6
27.5

28.5
27.5

24.7

Source: Calculated from Spavins, Thomas C., et al, “The M easurement of Local Television
News and Public Affairs Programs,” Appendices B and C.

The above analysis focu ses on the ou tpu t of stations, rather than the
ou tpu t of m arkets. Looking at the total quantity of new s in markets w ith
cross ow ned stations, w e observe that tw o of the six m arkets w ith cross
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ow ned stations w ere on the trend line of all stations as calculated in Exhibit 3.
There were two well above the line. There were two somewhat below it.

TOTAL LOCAL NEWS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS HOURS

Exhibit 3: Total Hours of Local News and Public Affairs
(Markets With Cross Owned Stations compared to trend line)
120
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0
0

20

40

60

80

DMA RANk

Source: Calculated from Spavins, Thomas C., et al, “The M easurement of Local Television
News and Public Affairs Programs,” Appendix A.

There w ere three close to it. The bold claims that concentration and cross
ow nership are good for new s ou tpu t is not su pported by this d ata. At best
there is a sm all d ifference betw een stations in new spaper/ broad cast
com binations and d u opolies. Whatever sm all increases in qu ality and / or
quantity come with very large losses in media ownership diversity.
The second type of d ata offered in support of the proposition that
cross-ow nership im proves local new s w as to cou nt aw ard s for local new s
program s. A nu m ber of problem s in the approach w ere pointed ou t in the
record . Pu tting those problem s asid e, the d ata poses similar problem s. The
evid ence d oes not su pport the claim to benefits of concentration and cross
ow nership, w hen m arket size and station rank. The netw orks contend that
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the jou rnalistic aw ard s received by cross-ow ned stations ind icate that su ch
stations are “better off” than non-cross-ow ned stations. Looking at a crossow ned situ ation in the sam e m arket, how ever, it is d ifficu lt to conclu d e that
the stations are better or w orse (See Exhibit 4). We observe m any that are
better and many that are w orse. The inconclu siveness of the aw ard d ata
above is d emonstrated by the follow ing observations. In the aggregate, crossow ned stations m ay be more likely to w in aw ard s, bu t the statistical valid ity
of the conclu sion and the representativeness of the sam ple are su spect. When
view ed on a m arket-by-market basis, the d ata is not convincing. There w ere
nine m arkets w ith cross-ow ned stations in w hich aw ard s w ere m ad e. In four
m arkets, the cross-ow ned stations w on all of the aw ard s. They tend ed to be
among the top tw o highest ranked stations. The non-cross-ow ned stations
that w on aw ard s in markets w here cross-ow ned stations exist w ere ranked
consid erably low er in term s of view ership. On average, they w ere ranked
(betw een third and fou rth) in their markets, com pared to the cross-owned
stations that w on (w hich w ere ranked second on average). In five m arkets
w here aw ard s w ere w on, the cross-ow ned station w on none, they tend ed to
low er ranked . The cross-ow ned stations that d id not w in aw ard s w ere
ranked abou t fou rth on average. Generally, the non-cross ow ned stations d id
more with less.
CLAIMS THAT OTHER FACTORS ‘MITIGATE’ THE H ARM OF
CROSS-O WNERSHIP ARE U NSUPPORTED
The FCC tried to bru sh asid e the clear negative im pact of cross-media
m ergers w ith the claim that ow nership d oes not m atter, as su mm arized by
the court,
First, it fou nd that “[c]om m only-ow ned new sp ap ers and broad cast stations d o
not necessarily sp eak w ith a single, m onolithic voice.” Given conflicting
evid ence in the record on w hether ow nership influ ences view p oint, the
Com m ission reasonably conclu d ed that it d id not have enou gh confid ence in
the p rop osition that com m only ow ned ou tlets have a u niform bias to w arrant
sustaining the cross-ownership ban.7

The record evid ence to w hich the Com m ission points is yet another
stu d y that lacks statistical valid ity and , u pon close read ing d oes not su pport
the Commission’s position.8 As demonstrated in Study 5: Media Ownership and
Viewpoint, the link betw een ow nership and point of view is w ell
demonstrated in the acad em ic literatu re and this single fatally flaw ed cannot
stand as a basis for doubt of that proposition.

7
8

Prometheus, pp. 51-52.
Ownership Order, ¶ 362.
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The second basis for claiming that cross-ow nership w ill d o no harm
involved other sources of new s. As the Cou rt noted , “the Com m ission found
that d iverse view points from other m ed ia sou rces in local m arkets (su ch as
cable and
the Internet) com pensate for view points lost to
new spaper/ broad cast consolid ation.” 9 Ironically, the FCC end ed u p not
cou nting cable as an ind epend ent sou rce of new s, so it is hard to und erstand
how it cou ld sim ultaneously cou nt and not cou nt. The Cou rt accepted the
argu m ent to d iscou nt cable, bu t fou nd the sam e reasoning applied to the
Internet –
w e affirm the Com m ission’s reasoned d ecision to d iscou nt cable. Bu t w e think
that the sam e rationale also ap p lies to the Internet. Therefore, it s d ecision to
cou nt the Internet as a sou rce of view p oint d iversity, w hile d iscou nting cable,
was not rational.10

Ad d itional evid ence su mm arized in Stu d ies 7 and 8 show s that the
Internet has not becom e a significant ind epend ent sou rce of local new s and
information. Television and new spapers remain the d om inant sou rces of
such information.
Beyond the flawed statistical studies of cross-owned stations, the FCC
provid es a lengthy recou nting of self-serving claim s by broad casters that they
w ou ld d o more if they cou ld buy new spapers.
The claim of synergies
allow ing im provem ent in operations is not su pported by ind epend ent
evid ence, u ntainted by the econom ic interest of the com m entors in the record
evid ence, or elsew here. As noted , to the extent that any conclu sions have
statistical valid ity in the PEJ stu d y, they contrad ict the claim . Moreover, the
acad em ic literatu re on synergistic benefits of cross-m ed ia conglom eration
shows that they are non-existent as described in Studies 9 and 10.
Thu s, the record evid ence d id not su pport the Com m ission’s d ecision
to aband on the prohibition on cross-ow nership and su bsequ ent evid ence
contrad icts that d ecision. Moreover, it shou ld be noted that the Com m ission
d id not propose to poke a sm all hole in the cross-ow nership ban. Rather, it
proposed a blanket, no-questions asked safe harbor that w ou ld allow cross
media mergers in over four-fifths of the media markets in the country.11
THE LOCAL TELEVISION O WNERSHIP RULE
As w ith the cross-ow nership ru le, the Com m ission conclu d es that
“Anecd otal and em pirical evid ence in the record d em onstrates postcom bination increases in the am ount of local new s and pu blic affairs
Prometheus, p. 52.
Prometheus, p. 62.
11 The Com m ission never p u blished a fu ll list of w hich m arkets w ou ld be su bject to
which limitations under the cross media limits test. This is our estimate of the impact.
9

10

236

COOPER

program m ing offered by com m only ow ned stations.” 12 As in the case of
cross-ow nership, the ord er fails to take note of the CFA analysis that
d em onstrated the em pirical evid ence w as not statistically valid . As in the
case of cross-ow nership, su bsequent, statistically valid analysis contradicts
the Commission’s conclusion.
The netw orks ignore the im portance of ow nership and instead
present inform ation to the Com m ission d em onstrating that the quantity of
new s is increasing and therefore im plying that the qu ality of the new s is
being preserved. Lengthy tables are provided to show that the networks have
increased the nu m ber of hou rs d evoted to new s. The netw orks claim that
d u opolies enable them to d o so, bu t the evid ence d oes not support this
conclu sion (see Exhibit 4). Increases in new s coverage are equal in d u opoly
and non-d u opoly markets. More im portantly, the loss of ind epend ent hou rs
of new s exceed s the gain in the total hou rs of new s. In other w ord s, w e get a
little m ore qu antity at a severe cost to quality (ind epend ent hou rs of news).
Conversely, the ban on d u opolies prom otes d iversity of view points
(measured by ownership) without detracting from the quantity of news.
Exhibit 4: Television News Awards

Non-Cross
Owned
4 Or More Awards
3 Awards
2 Awards
1 Award

Cross Owned
12
8
14
23

0
2
4
2

Sources: Spavins, Thomas C., et al, “The M easurement of Local Television N ews and
Public Affairs Programs,” Appendices B and C.

Append ix B to the broad cast netw orks com m ents, w hich presents an
econom etric analysis, is consistent w ith these find ings. It find s a sm all
increase in the probability that a station w ill cover new s (from 66.5 to 74.5
percent), bu t no statistically significant d ifferences in the am ount of new s.
Becau se the netw orks d isregard ow nership, the stud y d id not exam ine the
loss of ind epend ent new s. Also the netw ork-sponsored econometric stu d y
cannot ad d ress the question of causality. It d id not inquire as to w hether the
d u opolists ad d ed new s after a d u opoly w as created , or m erely bou ght
stations that already produce news.
An exam ination of the d etailed d ata provid ed by FOX and N BC
show s that they d id not ad d new s to any stations that d id not alread y carry it
12

Order, ¶169.
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and , in one case; they elim inated the new s on a d u opoly station. Thu s,
Append ix B to the N etw ork filing has m istakenly ascribed a positive effect to
d u opolies w here none exists. In term s of new s carriage, the netw orks w ere
not able to show a positive effect in the am ou nt of new s carried , and
com pletely ignored the negative effect of the loss of an ind epend ent new s
voice (see Exhibit 5).
A sim ilar conclu sion em erges from the stu d y prepared for Sinclair by
Robert Crand all.13 Using a stand ard of statistical significance that is rarely
seen in the acad em ic social science literatu re (10 percent), Crand all conclu d es
that d u opolies resu lt in a slight d ecrease in ad vertising rates. The d ecrease is
extrem ely sm all, just .3 percent. In other w ord s, accord ing to Crand all,
prohibiting d u opolies (w hich preserves a valu able ind epend ent TV voice)
im poses a statistically insignificant and qu antitatively minu scu le econom ic
cost.
Exhibit 5: The Costs of Duopoly Far Exceed the Benefits

Duopoly

Non-Duopoly

Lost Hours
Change in
Change in
of
# of Markets Hours of
# of Markets Hours of
Independent
News
News
News
9
+1.7
-2.5
16
+1.9
Fox
6
+4.4
-12.0
10
+3.9
NBC
+2.8
-6.3
26
+2.7
Total/Average 15
Source:
a/ Viacom data does not provide sufficient detail to conduct the lost hours analysis.
b/ Fox shows much larger gains for non-duopolies when it goes back to its pre-acquisition of
stations, which in many cases is a decade or more ago. Use of this data would make nonduopolies appear even more valuable. This analysis uses changes since 11/2000.

CONCLUSION
Thu s, w e believe that the record evid ence d id not su pport the
conclu sions reached by the FCC. Althou gh the Cou rt accepted som e of the
propositions u nd erlying the d ecision to relax the ow nership limits, it fou nd
the im plem entation of relaxed rules so faulty that actu al changes in the ru les
w ere stayed . The w eakness of the record evid ence w e have d escribed in this
paper d em onstrates tw o points. First, to the extent that the Prometheus Court
accepted the erroneous reasoning of the FCC, it w as m istaken. Second , to the
extent that the erroneou s conclu sions abou t the relationship betw een
ow nership and the policy goals led the FCC to seek broad relaxation of the
Crand all, Robert W., The Econom ic Im p act of Provid ing Service to Mu ltip le Local
Braodcast Stations Within a Single Geographic Market,” Sinclair, Exhibit1.
13
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ru les it w ent too far. Both observations are im portant. Developm ents and
analysis since the cou rt d ecision reinforce ou r conclu sion and these tw o
observations.
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STUDY 16
CONSOLIDATION AND CONGLOMERATION
DIMINISH DIVERSITY AND DO NOT PROMOTE
THE PUBLIC INTEREST:
NEW EVIDENCE
M ARK COOPER AND S. D EREK TURNER
Since the Cou rt ru ling, a great d eal of evid ence has com e to light that
contrad icts the FCC’s ord er. Most im portantly, a significant part of that
evid ence is d irectly related to the evid ence that w as entered into the
proceed ing and form ed the basis for the Med ia Ow nership Ord er. In other
w ord s, the fabric of the ord er w as rotten to the core and the remnants that
passed ju d icial review shou ld be d iscard ed . The FCC has opened the d oor to
this very proposition by incorporating all of the prior evid ence into this
proceeding, rather than starting afresh.
THE PEJ D ATA
The plot involving the PEJ stu d ied thickened d ram atically in recent
w eeks w hen it w as revealed that su bsequ ent to the Cou rt ruling the
Com m ission obtained the PEJ d ata set, applied the statistical controls that
w ere lacking in the original stud y, and fou nd that the PEJ data contradicts
the FCC’s conclusion. In short, having incorrectly cited the PEJ stu d y as
su pporting the lifting of the ban on new spaper TV cross ow nership, the FCC
then proved using the very same data that it had erred in doing so. The direct
contradiction betw een w hat the FCC said and w hat the FCC d id applies to
every aspect of the proceed ing. N ot only d oes concentration harm localism ,
but various form of conglomeration and consolidation do as well.
Stu d ies ad d ressing tw o d ifferent ou tpu t m easu res w ere d eveloped
from the PEJ d atabase. One ou tpu t m easu re w as the quantity of local new s.
The second ou tpu t m easu re w as the d iversity of the ou tpu t of local and
national new s. Essentially, the d atabase cou nted the nu m ber of m inu tes
d evoted to d ifferent types of stories. The localism m easu res are
straightforw ard cou nts– the nu m ber of total new s second s, the nu m ber of
local news seconds and the number of local-on-location news seconds.
The d iversity m easu re is m ore controversial. The prim ary variable
u sed w as actu ally m u ch m ore a m easu re of variety than d iversity. If one
station d evoted 30 second each to tw o d ifferent stories, both w ere cou nted as
contribu ting to variety. H ow ever, if tw o stations d evoted 30 second s each to
the sam e story, that w as not cou nted as contribu ting to d iversity at all. Only
if a station that “d u plicated ” the coverage of a story d evoted m ore tim e to it,

240

COOPER AND TURNER

d id it cou nt as d iversity and only the increm ental tim e cou nted . “[I]f any tw o
or m ore local new s stations broad casts cover the sam e story on the sam e d ay
only the second beyond the collective average of the respective overlapping
broad casts are cou nted as ad d ing to d iversity.” 1 This is at od d s w ith the
fu nd am ental d efinition of d iversity as the Su prem e Cou rt interprets it.
“Antagonistic” reporting of the same events is essential to creating the “crosslights” that reveal tru th. This m easu re severely u nd ercou nts that essential
concept. Nevertheless, it too contradicts the FCC’s conclusions.
In som e specifications, a m ore appropriate m easu re of d iversity w as
used. This “total DMA diversity” “counts the total time devoted to all unique
stories covered .” 2 This m easu re of d iversity prod u ced even m ore robu st
results confirming the negative effect of concentration on diversity.
The prim ary find ing of the localism stu d y w as that local ow nership
matters in the production of local news.
The estim ates p resented in Section 4 su ggest that local ow nership m ay have
significant im p lications for local content. In p articu lar, local ow nership
ap p ears to increase total, local and local on-location new s second s. Moreover,
the increase in total new second s from local ow nership ap p ears to be alm ost
entirely driven by an increase in local news.3
Owned-and-op erated broad cast television stations p rod u ce less local new s, bu t
d o not air significantly less total new s or local on-location new s. Therefore, it
ap p ears that ow ned and op erated stations su bstitu te non-local new s for local
new s (that is not on location). This m ight ind icate su bstitu tion of netw ork
feeds for no-on-location content.4

Consolid ation in the national television m arket d oes not im prove the
perform ance of the broad cast station ow ners. This find ing em erges in both
the localism and diversity studies.
As a local ow ner acqu ires television stations in m ore DMAs, they p rod u ce less
total new s. The large (albeit statistically insignificant) p oint estim ates from the
local new s and on-location local new s regression ind icate that the d ecrease in
total new s m ay be p rim arily d riven by d ecreases in local and local on-location
news seconds.5
In short, ou r estim ate su ggests that increasing concentration ap p ears to
d im inish d iversity in local broad cast new s both at the firm and m arket level.

Alexand er, Peter J. and Brend an M. Cu nningham , Same Story, Different Channel:
Broadcast News and Information (October 4, 2004).
2 Id. p. 15.
3 Anonym ou s, Do Local Owners Deliver M ore Localism? Some Evidence from Local
Broadcast News (Federal Communication Commission, draft dated June 17, 2004), p. 14.
4 Id., p. 15.
5 Id. P. 15.
1
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This result is robust to the measure of diversity used in estimation and emerges
after controlling for possible endogeneity in market structure.6

Conglom eration across m ed ia types
performance of the broadcast station owners.

d oes

not

im prove

the

While new sp ap er ow nership is not a significant factor, a local television station
ow ner w ho ow ns a w ithin-DMA rad io station ap p ears to p rod u ce significantly
less local new s, p ossibly becau se they su bstitu te local rad io new s for local
television news.7
Ou r theoretical research su ggests that m ed ia variety allow s consu m er to insu re
against the id iosyncratic natu re of inform ation from p articu lar sou rces.
Moreover, the em p irical evid ence w e have assembled su ggests that
concentrated m ed ia m arkets exhibit m ore hom ogeneity in the inform ation
conveyed to consumers. Such concentration can, therefore, inhibit the ability of
individuals to derive a more stable payoff from media consumption.
This find ing im p lies that regu latory p olicy d esigned to p rotect and encou rage
competition simultaneously helps satisfy a second policy objective: diversity.8
Sp ecifically, u sing the relative station-level d iversity m etric, w e find that w hen
the stru ctu re of the m arket becom es m ore concentrated , relative d iversity of
local new s content is d im inished . Im p ortantly, this resu lt is not robu st to an
instru m ental variables sp ecification. H ow ever, u sing the total m arket d iversity
m etric, H H I is significant in OLS and robu st to instru m ental variable
transform ation. Since the total m arket d iversity m etric is argu ably su p erior to
the incremental metric as a measure of overall diversity, this result is useful – it
su ggests that total d iversity w ithin a DMA is sensitive to the level of
concentration. Since w e find that m arket stru ctu re p lays an equ ally im p ortant
role in d eterm ining p rod u ct variety in national broad casts, w e are fairly
confident of this finding.9

The final sentence of the above citation ind icates that the negative
im pact of concentration on d iversity in local new s also occu rs for nation
news, even though the weak definition of diversity is used: “In particular, we
find that concentration d isplays a negative and significant relationship w ith
national news broadcast variety.”10
One can hard ly imagine a m ore stu nning contrad iction of the FCC’s
claim that ow nership and concentration d o not m atter. H ow ever, these
stu d ies go to the general relationship betw een ow nership, concentration and
the policy outpu ts that Congress is concerned abou t: localism and d iversity.

Alexander, Peter J. and Brendan M/Cunningham, “Diversity in Broadcast Television:
An Empirical Study of Local News,” International Journal of Media Management 6:177
7 Id., p. 14
8 Alexander, Peter J. and Brendan M. Cunningham,
9 Alexander and Cunningham, Same Story, p. 24.
10 Id., p. 20.
6
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These finding are crucial since the FCC relied on general concerns about these
relationship to relax the lim its on ow nership. Bu t w hat abou t the specific
policies – d uopolies and new spaper cross ow nership, w hich are at issu e in
this proceed ing? The PEJ d atabase u sed to exam ine the general relationships
d oes not contain enou gh observations to exam ine these policies. H ow ever,
other databases have been constructed to do so.
D UOPOLIES
In a series of stu d ies Yan and N apoli have show n that d u opolies are
not associated w ith the p rovision of larger am ou nts of local new s or pu blic
affairs program m ing.11 Using a sam ple of TV stations and a tw o-week
constru cted rand om sam ple of local new s and pu blic affairs program m ing,
N apoli and Yan have show n that d u opolies d o not provid e m ore local new s
and pu blic affairs program m ing. In the append ix to this paper, their
approach to assessing the im pact of ow nership characteristics is extend ed to
cross-ow nership betw een new spapers and TV stations. They conclu d e that
there is no statically significant d ifference in the qu antity of local new s or
pu blic affairs program m ing cross-ow nership d oes not increase the am ou nt of
news or public affairs programming provided.
In a stu d y of local pu blic affairs program m ing, N apoli and Yan fill an
im portant gap in the analysis. They reach exactly the sam e conclu sion that
the updated PEJ analyses of local news did.
Perhap s the m ost interesting are the find ings regard ing the effect of the station
ow nership characteristics. First, if there is nay resu lt that has been consistent
throu ghou t the m od els, it is the negative effects of TP$, the ow nership by one
of the big fou r broad cast netw orks. Cou p led w ith the marginally significant
p ositive effect of local ow nership , these find ings su ggest that (big fou r)
netw ork ow nership has ham p ered the p rovision of local p u blic affairs
programming.
Equ ally interesting is the lack of significant effect of d u op oly ow nership fou nd
in this study. In relaxing the multiple ownership rules in 1999, the FCC argued
that the new ru les w ou ld lead to increased local new s and p u blic affairs
programming in the local market by emphasizing the economic efficiencies and
p u blic service benefits to be gained from com bined resou rces u nd er com m on
ow nership of stations. H ow ever, these p rogram m ing benefits have not

Yan, Michael and Philip N ap oli, “Market Stru ctu re, Station Ow nership , and Local
Public Affairs Program m ing on Local Broad cast Television,” Telecomm u nications
Policy Research Conference, October 2004; Yan Michael Zhaoxu and Yong Jin Park,
“Du op oly Ow nership and Local Inform ational Program m ing on Television: An
Em p irical Analysis,” Telecom m u nications Policy Research Conference, Sep tem ber
2005; N ap oli, Philip , M arket Conditions and Public A ffairs Programming: Implications for
Digital Television Policy (Washington, D.C.: Benton Foundation, N.D.).
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m aterialized . More d am aging to the FCC’s reasoning, the stu d y also fou nd
that a station’s p u blic affair p rogram m ing d ecision w as not affected by its
financial resources (as measured by a station’s 2002 revenues).
Together, the find ings regard ing local ow nership , netw ork ow nership and
d u op oly call into qu estion the u nd erlying rationale of the FCC’s cu rrent
p olicies tow ard m ore relaxed national and m u ltip le ow nership ru les
(p articu larly in term s of econom ies of scale contribu ting to greater p rod u ction
of such programming).12

Ironically, Yan and Napoli went on to caution that “[a]t the very least,
the results presented in this stu d y su ggest that it w ou ld be prem atu re for the
Com m ission to ignore the qu estion of ow nership in its ongoing localism
inquiry.”13 We now know that the FCC has not ignored the role of
ow nership, bu t w hen it fou nd that the evid ence contrad icted its Ord er, it
suppressed the evidence.14
Yan and Park revisited the issu e of the effect of d u opolies on public
affairs program m ing and local new s by expand ing the d ata set and ad opting
a different methodology. The original Yan and Napoli study pulled a random
sam ple of stations for the rand om ly constru cted tw o w eeks of program m ing.
This tu rns up a nu m ber of d u opoly stations, bu t not necessarily matched
com parisons for those stations in their ow n m arket. Yan and Park expand ed
the d ata set to inclu d e a set of matched com parisons for the d u opoly
situations (while relying on the same randomly constructed two-week sample
of programm ing. Using a qu asi-experim ental d esign, they com pared
d u opoly and non-d u opoly stations w ithin d u opoly m arkets, as w ell as non
non-d u opoly stations in non-d u opoly markets. They also ad d ed a before and
after com ponent, testing w hether the introd u ction of d u opolies affected the
ou tpu t of stations. Thu s, there are three types of stations in their d esign –
d u opoly (DD), non-d u opoly in d u opoly markets (DN ), and non-duopoly
stations in non-duopoly markets (NN).
Across the board , the find ings d id not su pport the claim s that
allow ing d u opolies w ou ld increase the prod u ction of either local new s or
public affairs.
Looking at the m arket level, d u ring the two-w eek sam p le p eriod in 2003, the
stations in d u op oly m arkets aired an average of 29.2 hou rs of local new s
p rogram m ing, w hile those in non-d u op oly m arkets d id 29.8 hou rs. The
d ifference is not statistically significant. One of ou r research qu estions asks
w hether or not d u op oly markets, as a w hole p rovid e m ore local new s
p rogram m ing than non-d u op oly m arkets. The answ er, accord ing to ou r
find ings here is no. Stations in d u op oly m arkets d o not broad cast m ore local
Yan and Napoli, p. 16
Oid.,p. 16.
14 Du nbar, John. “Law yer Says FCC Ord ered Stu d y Destroyed ”, A ssociated Press,
September 14th 2006.
12
13
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new s p rogram m ing than those in non-duopoly m arkets. The sam e conclu sion
also ap p lies to the 1997 d ata. N ote, how ever, stations in both typ e of m arkets
has significantly increased their local programming from 1997 to 2003. There is
no interaction effect betw een m arket typ e and the tim e trend . In other w ord s,
stations in d uop oly m arkets d id not increase their local new s p rogram m ing
more than those in non-duopoly markets…
One of ou r key research hyp otheses is w hether or not stations increase their
local inform ational p rogram m ing after joining a com m on ow nership … The
d u op oly stations (DD) d id increase their local new s p rogram m ing form 18.5
hou rs in 1997 to 22.6 hou rs in 2003. H ow ever, so d id tw o other typ es of
stations (DN and NN). We tested for the interaction effect between station type
and the tim e trend and fou nd no su ch effect. Therefore, the d u op oly stations
did not enjoy a greater increase that the other types of stations.15

It is w orth recalling that this is exactly the conclu sion w e reached in
ou r reply com m ents in the earlier proceed ing, w hen w e examined the d ata
introd u ced by the netw orks. The evid entiary basis for relaxing the ru le based
on the quantity of new s never existed , as d escribed m ore fully in Study 15:
Consolidation and Conglomeration Diminish Diversity and Do N ot Promote the
Public Interest: A Review of the Hearing Record in the Media Ownership Proceeding.
Yan and Park bring a larger d ata base and a rigorous research d esign to bear
on the question.
Tu rning to the d ifferent types of stations, the d u opoly stations (DD)
broadcast significantly few er hou rs of local new s program m ing in 2003
than their non-d u opoly cou nterparts in the sam e market (DN ). They
also contributed less time to local news than non-duopoly stations from
m arkets that has no com m on television ow nership, althou gh the
difference was not significant.16
This is exactly the result show n in Study 15: Consolidation and
Conglomeration Diminish Diversity and Do N ot Promote the Public Interest: A
review of the Hearing Record in the M edia Ownership Proceeding, Exhibit 2, with
respect to cross-ow nership. That exhibit is based on the FCC’s ow n d ata.
Again, the hearing record d id not su pport the conclu sion reached and the
more recent data confirms that conclusion.
Yan and Park explored the claim that w eaker stations in the duopoly
w ou ld be helped by the com bination to d o a better job of provid ing local
news. Again, they found no such effect.
One strong argu m ent for the relaxation of the television m u ltip le ow nership
ru les is that joint ow nership can benefits the w eaker station in a com bination
d isp rop ortionately…. [T]he significant increases in local new p rogram m ing
exp erienced by the three typ es of stations w ere all attribu table to the m ajor
15
16

Yan and Park, pp. 11-12.
Id., pp. 11-12.
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stations.
For exam p le, major DD stations increased their local new s
p rogram m ing by eight hou rs and m ajor N N stations d id by 10.3 hou rs. On the
contrary, the minor stations did not show any significant increases in their local
new s p rogram m ing at all. Thu s there is no evid ence that joint ow nership
induces minor stations to produce more local news programming.17

Yan and Park also analyzed this set of qu estions for the provision of
local public affairs programming. They reach the same conclusion.
At the m arket level, stations in d u op oly m arkets broad cast slightly m ore local
p u blic affairs p rogram m ing than their cou nterp arts in non-d u op oly m arkets in
both 1997 and 2003, bu t the d ifferences w ere not statistically significant. In
ad d ition, there w ere no significant changes in local p u blic affairs p rogram m ing
for the tw o typ es of m arkets across the years. If anything, the changes form
1997 to 2003 were negative.
At the station level, d u op oly stations broad cast the least am ou nt of local p u blic
affairs p rogram m ing in both years. N ote, how ever, none of these changes w as
statistically significant. Looking at the p rovision of local p u blic affairs
p rogram m ing by the m ajor and m inor stations, neither the m ajor stations nor
the m inor stations increased their local p u blic affairs p rogram m ing once
becoming duopolies. Again, the changes were on the declining side.18

N EW EVIDENCE ON CROSS-O WNERSHIP
We applied the approaches u sed by N apoli and Yan for d u opolies to
the cross-ow nership issu e by obtaining the id entical program m ing
information for all cross-owned stations in the U.S. and merging the data with
the rand om sam ple of stations. We then cond u cted both a matched
com parison analysis and a m u ltiple linear regression analysis. We find that
cross-ow nership is not associated w ith the provision of larger am ou nts of
local news or public affairs programming.
Matched Comparison Results
Yan and Park ad d ed non-d u opoly stations in d uopoly and nond u opoly m arkets to the d atabase for pu rposes of the d u opoly analysis. We
ad d ed the 27 cross-ow ned stations to the d atabase and sou ght the best
m atches available in the original d atabase. This tu rned u p 14 m arkets in
which there were cross-owned and non-cross-owned stations (see Exhibit 1).
The cross-ow ned stations tend ed to be m u ch higher ranked .
N evertheless, the d ifference betw een cross-ow ned and non-cross-owed
stations w as not significant (see Exhibit 2). Ad d ing in station rank as a
covariate yield s the sam e result. Station rank is significantly related to local
17
18

Id., p. 13.
Id. p. 13.
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new s prod u ction in the expected d irection, the low er the rank the less the
ou tpu t. Given the sm all nu m ber and lack of good m atches, w e focu s ou t
attention on the multiple regression approach.
Exhibit 1: Matched Comparisons
Cross-Owned
Market
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dallas-Ft. Worth
Miami-Ft. Laud.
Cincinnati
Miwaukee, WI
Columbus, OH
Dayton, OH
Pudacah
Waco
Baton Rouge
Fargo-Valley City
Columbus-Tupelo
Average
Non-Cross-Owned
Market
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Dallas-Ft. Worth
Miami-Ft. Laud.
Cincinnati
Miwaukee, WI
Columbus, OH
Dayton, OH
Pudacah
Waco
Baton Rouge
Fargo-Valley City
Columbus-Tupelo
Average

Station Channel Network
WNYW
5
Fox
KTLA
5
WB
WGN
9
WB
WFAA
8
ABC
WDZL
39
WB
WCPO
9
ABC
WTMJ
4
NBC
WBNS
10
CBS
WHIO
7
CBS
WPSD
6
NBC
KCEN
6
NBC
WBRZ
2
ABC
WDAY
6
ABC
WCBI
4
CBS

Share
5.25
6
8
12
5.5
11.75
16.25
16.25
18.25
14.75
12.25
13
13.75
15.25
12.02

Rank
5
6
4
1
5
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2.6

Owner
Fox Television
Tribune Bcstg Co.
Tribune Bcstg Co.
Belo Corp
Tribune Bcstg Co
Scripps Howard Bcstg
Journal Comm
Dispatch Printing Co
Cox Broadcasting
Paxton media
Frank Mayborn Enterp
Manship Stations
Forum Publishing Co
Morris Multimedia

Station Channel Network
WCBS
2
CBS
KCAL
9
IND
WBBM
2
CBS
KDFW
4
Fox
WFOR
4
CBS
WSTR
64
WB
WITI
6
Fox
WCMH
4
NBC
WDTN
2
ABC
WDKA
49
WB
KWKT
44
Fox
WAFB
9
CBS
KXJB
4
CBS
WLOV
27
Fox

Share
8.25
4.75
7
9
9
4.75
11.5
13.75
7.75
2
6.75
21.5
13.5
6
8.96

Rank
3
7
5
3
1
5
2
2
3
5
4
1
3
3
3.6

Owner
CBS/Viacom
CBS/Viacom
CBS/Viacom
Fox Television
CBS/Viacom
Sinclair Bcst
Fox Television
NBC/GE
LIN Television Corp
Lucci, Paul T.
Comm Corp of America
Raycom Media
Catamount Bcst Group
Lingard Bcstg Corp
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Exhibit 2: Analysis of Matched Comparisons
Local News

Cross-Ownership

Local Public Affairs

Beta

Beta

Beta

Beta

(signif.)

(signif.)

(signif.)

(signif.)

0.260

0.174

0.286

0.261

(0.181)

(0.355)

(0.141)

(0.194)

Station Rank

-0.369

-0.103

(0.050)**

(0.604)

** = significant at the 5% level

Multiple Regression Results
Yan’s m ost recent analysis, Newspaper/Television Cross-Ownership and
Local N ews and Public A ffairs Programming on Television Stations: A n Empirical
Analysis, reaches sim ilar conclu sions. “The Regression analysis of the stu d y
controlled for [market factors] and its results show s that cross-ownership d id
not have any significant relationship w ith the am ou nt of local new s and
pu blic affairs program m ing aired by the sam ples stations d u ring the sam ple
period.”19
Becau se the policies affect cross-ow nership and d u opolies, as w ell as
the fact that likely m arket im pacts are d ifferent, w e d id several ad d itional
analyses of the d ata and specified the m u ltiple regression m od els som ew hat
differently.
This paper uses the sam e d ataset and reaches the sam e conclu sion,
w hile taking a som ew hat d ifferent approach to specifying the m od el. N apoli
and Yan specified a m ix of station and m arket variables that pred ict the
quantity of local news provided.
The three m ost im portant control variable in the N apoli and Yan
analysis w ere the type of license (VH F-UH F), w hether the station w as an
affiliate of one of the big fou r netw orks (ABC, CBS, N BC, Fox) and the
revenu e of the station. For a nu m ber of reasons w e bu ild a basic m od el that
does not include these variables.
The natu re of the license has ceased to be relevant in the cu rrent
m ed ia environm ent. With cable d istribu tion of vid eo signals, the VH F-UHF
d istinction is not longer relevant. With over 80 percent of hou sehold s
receiving their vid eo signals over cable, the “strength” of the signal no longer
Yan, Michael Zhaoxu . 2006. “N ew sp ap er/ Television Cross-Ow nership and Local
N ew s and Pu blic Affairs Program m ing on Television Stations: An Em p irical
Analysis”, A rep ort comm issioned by the Donald McGannon Com m u nication
Research Center at Ford ham University, u nd er a grant from the Benton Fou nd ation,
October 3rd.
19
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m atters. To the extent that the VH F-UH F d istinction w as im portant in the
analysis, it w as a proxy for other historical characteristics of the station.
Therefore, in the place of the VH F-UH F variable, w e u se the age of the
station.
There is one characteristic of the license that is relevant, the city of the
license. A broad caster has a m ust-carry right in a specific geographic area,
and the location of the license is fixed . To captu re this, w e inclu d e m arket
rank along with the other market characteristics Napoli and Yan included.
For the pu rposes of the original d u opoly analysis, the inclu sion of
w hether a station w as affiliated w ith one of the Big 4 netw orks or one of the
Top 4 netw orks w as appropriate. By d efinition, the form ation of a d u opoly
affects the affiliation of the acqu ired station. Moreover, pu blic policy
prevented m ergers betw een the top fou r stations in the m arket; it largely held
constant the issu e of Big 4 and Top 4. In the case of cross-ow nership policy,
the FCC d id not have this stipu lation. It is possible that a com bination
m erger w ou ld change a station’s affiliation and rank. It is u nlikely that tw o
affiliates of one of the Big 4 netw ork w ill com pete head -to-head in a m arket.
The m ost likely ou tcom e is that affiliation w ill not change. There is a small
chance that the id entity of the Big 4 stations might change. N evertheless, w e
d rop this characteristic as a control variable, bu t exam ine it as a policy
relevant intervening variable.
The m ake-u p of the Top 4 cou ld be affected by a cross-ownership
com bination. H ow ever, this variable w as not statistically significant in either
the d u opoly or the cross-ow nership analyses cond u cted by N apoli and Yan,
so we drop it from the analysis altogether.
Station revenu e m ay be m ore policy relevant in the cross-ownership
analysis than the d u opoly analysis. The hope for com binations of a
new spaper and a TV station is that w ou ld shift revenu e shares betw een
stations. In reality, that hope has not generally been achieved . N evertheless,
w e d rop this variable as a control variable, bu t examine it as a policy relevant
intervening variable.
The models used were generally specified as follows:
news_l = a + ß1(type)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i + ß9(big4)i + ß10(rev_s)i
+ ei
pa_l = a + ß1(type)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i + ß9(big4)i + ß10(rev_s)i +
ei
presence = a + ß1(type)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i + ß9(big4)i +
ß10(rev_s)i + ei
pa_l_dum = a + ß1(type)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i + ß9(big4)i +
ß10(rev_s)i + ei

Where,
news_l = seconds of local news
pa_l = seconds of local public affairs
presence = dummy variable for presence of local news
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pa_l_dum = dummy variable for presence of local public affairs programming
type = dummy variable for cross-owned station
rank = DMA market rank
yrstd = year station was stared (expressed in ### format; i.e. 1954 = 54, 2002 = 102)
big4 = dummy variable for ABC, CBS, Fox, or NBC affiliated stations
rev_s = station revenues
market controls =
ptv_m = number of public television stations in market
cable_m = percentage of households in market subscribing to cable
tvhh3 = number of television households in market, 2003 (thousands)
ptvview = percentage of public television viewing in a station’s market
othview = percentage of non-broadcast television viewing in a station’s market

Each m od el is exam ined in a parsim oniou s m anner, investigating the
ad d ed effects of the m arket control variables as w ell as the big-fou r and
station revenu e variables. For the exam ination of second s of local new s, OLS
and Robust regression mod els w ere u sed . H ow ever, the presence of a
significant nu m ber of stations w ith zero second s of pu blic affairs
program m ing created m ethod ological problem s. To ad equately d eal w ith
this corner-solu tion scenario, Tobit m od els w ere u sed . Du m m y variables for
the presence of any local new s or local pu blic affairs program m ing w ere
created , and investigated u sing Probit and linear probability m od els.
H ow ever, the fact that every single cross-ow ned station in the sam ple aired
local new s preclud ed the u se of a Probit m od el. Thu s, a Tobit m od el w as
em ployed for the variable presence w hen investigating the effect of crossownership.
Resu lts examining the effect of cross-ow nership are listed below in
Exhibits 3-6.
Market rank and age of station are statistically significant and large
pred ictors of the am ou nt of new s prod uced . The d irection of the relationship
is as expected . The larger the m arket, the greater the am ou nt of new s
prod u ced . The old er the station, the greater the amou nt of new s prod u ced .
The coefficient on the cross-ow nership variable – type – is not statistically
significant. N one of the other variables is statistically significant either.
Moreover, controlling for the age of the station and the m arket in w hich it is
located , m easu red by the m arket rank, rend ers the relationship betw een
cross-ownership and the amount of news statistically insignificant.
When w e reintrod u ce the tw o station characteristics as intervening
variables, w e find that their coefficients are significant and they increase the
am ou nt for variance explained significantly. Age of station and rank remain
statistically significant, and the other variables rem ain statistically not
significant.
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Exhibit 3: Effect of Cross-Ownership on Amount of Local News
Dependent Variable = Local News (news_l)
OLS

type

rank

yrstd

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
215.8334
0.0487
(0.242)
(0.227)
-3.3992
-0.1427
(0.000)#
(0.001)#
-56.4422
-0.7473
(0.000)#
(0.000)#

Robust
Regr.
Coeff.
(signif.)

260.4077
(0.141)
-4.4174
(0.000)#
-59.7830
(0.000)#

OLS
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
177.2227
0.0411
(0.309)
(0.275)
-4.4286
-0.1856
0.000
(0.000)#
-40.8849
-0.5239
(0.000)#
(0.000)#

Robust
Regr.
Coeff.
(signif.)

196.9035
(0.252)
-4.5500
(0.000)#
-44.0963
(0.000)#

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

big4

rev_s

cons.

OLS
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
271.1242
0.0584
(0.171)
(0.112)
-6.4700
-0.2733
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-56.7719
-0.7534
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-37.0583
-0.0416
(0.426)
(0.398)
-2.8679
-0.0199
(0.662)
(0.633)
-0.0974
-0.0907
(0.129)
(0.107)
78.3121
0.0799
(0.133)
(0.118)
16.6757
0.1202
(0.115)
(0.093)*

Robust
Regr.
Coeff.
(signif.)

285.1201
(0.134)
-7.5943
(0.000)#
-60.8676
(0.000)#
-28.0980
(0.529)
1.0278
(0.871)
-0.1105
(0.073)*
51.3614
(0.305)
13.1793
(0.194)

922.7512
0.30525
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
4.2781
0.1217
(0.020)^
(0.071)*
4003.67

842.6817

4303.58

5387.15

5656.76

(0.000)#
4.8365
(0.008)#

OLS
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
147.1774
0.3258
(0.424)
(0.361)
-6.5111
-0.2744
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-39.5891
-0.5084
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-44.2822
-0.0507
(0.306)
(0.289)
-4.6495
-0.0324
(0.449)
(0.413)
-0.1333
-0.1261
(0.073)*
(0.176)
70.3505
0.0707
(0.173)
(0.164)
14.3041
0.0995
(0.167)
(0.158)
806.4215
0.2678
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
7.8520
0.2248
(0.001)#
(0.004)#
3754.44

Robust
Regr.
Coeff.
(signif.)

138.1575
(0.455)
-7.0793
(0.000)#
-42.9163
(0.000)#
-50.7322
(0.243)
-3.5764
(0.562)
-0.1579
(0.035)^
50.8090
(0.326)
9.8062
(0.345)
733.2874
(0.000)#
8.1873
(0.001)#
4278.80

5761.28

6027.08

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

R2 =
0.6139

R2 =
0.6666

R2 =
0.6743

R2 =
0.670

R2 =
0.6248

R2 =
0.6795

R2 =
0.6870

R2 =
0.7021

adj-R2 =
0.61

adj-R2 =
0.66

adj-R2 =
0.67

adj-R2 =
0.69

adj-R2 =
0.61

adj-R2 =
0.67

adj-R2 =
0.67

adj-R2 =
0.69

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; #= significant at 1% level
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Exhibit 4: Effect of Cross-Ownership on Presence of Local News
Dependent Variable = Presence of Local News (presence); dummy
OLS

type

rank

yrstd

Tobit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0399
0.0469
0.0293
(0.594)
(0.617)
(0.193)
0.0006
0.0008
0.0830
(0.114)
(0.109)
(0.114)
-0.0130 -0.0163
-0.5591
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)#

OLS

Tobit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0450
0.0536
0.0347
(0.537)
(0.548)
(0.145)
0.0003
0.0004
0.0386
(0.552)
(0.486)
(0.580)
-0.0087
-0.0105
-0.372
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)#

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

big4

rev_s

cons.

1.6232

1.7826

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

R2 =
0.3257
adj-R2 =
0.3176

0.2491
0.2745
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
0.0007
0.0675
(0.352)
(0.188)
1.1606
(0.000)#
(0.000)#

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.22 0.3525

Tobit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0339
0.0385
0.0237
(0.672)
(0.700)
(0.367)
0.0010
0.0013
0.1302
(0.199)
(0.169)
(0.184)
-0.0131 -0.0164
-0.5613
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)#
0.0040
0.0040
0.0146
(0.831)
(0.868)
(0.833)
0.0018
0.0026
0.0404
(0.499)
(0.444)
(0.469)
0.0000
0.0000
0.03
(0.701) (0.672)
(0.687)
0.0684
0.0888
0.2261
(0.001)# (0.001)#
(0.001)#
0.0060
0.0073
0.1393
(0.164)
(0.180)
(0.146)

0.3218
(0.000)#
0.0009
(0.317)
1.1679

1.0310

1.0192

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.002)#

R2 =
0.3660
pseudo-

OLS

R2 =
0.3537
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.26 0.3323

OLS

Tobit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0491
0.0361
(0.525)
(0.175)
0.0006
0.0829
(0.410)
(0.399)
-0.0090
-0.3841
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
0.0030
0.0112
(0.870)
(0.880)
0.0011
0.0249
(0.676)
(0.647)
0.0000
0.1463
(0.134)
(0.201)
0.0626
0.2084
(0.004)#
(0.004)#
0.0059
0.1357
(0.175)
(0.213)
0.2870
0.316
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-0.0005
-0.0454
(0.623)
(0.600)
0.6222

Coeff.

(0.029)^
(0.035)^

(signif.)

0.0582
(0.535)
0.0009
(0.332)
-0.0110
(0.000)#
0.0024
(0.914)
0.0016
(0.627)
0.0000
(0.096)*
0.0796
(0.003)#
0.0070
(0.194)
0.3763
(0.000)#
-0.0007
-0.561
0.4940
(0.159)

R2 =
0.3935
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.24 0.3668

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; #= significant at 1% level

pseudoR2 = 0.29
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Exhibit 5: Effect of Cross-Ownership on Amount of Local Public Affairs
Dependent Variable = Local Public Affairs (pa_L)
OLS

type

rank

yrstd

Tobit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
49.5981 66.8353
0.1234
(0.064)* (0.209)
(0.340)
-0.1050 -0.5670
-0.0486
(0.443) (0.054)*
(0.367)
0.0800
-0.6657
0.0117
(0.859)
(0.480)
(0.841)

OLS

Tobit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
53.6855 63.4730
0.1406
(0.045)^ (0.225)
(0.354)
-0.1747 -0.5530
-0.0827
(0.305)
(0.119)
(0.140)
-0.4040 -1.1980
-0.0585
(0.511)
(0.356)
(0.319)

-21.4236 #######

(0.094)*
(0.008)#

(0.532)

(0.818)
(0.729)

(0.779)
(0.633)

othview

47.6583

11.6291

(0.173)
(0.102)

(0.872)

R2 =
0.0182
adj-R2 =
0.0063

(0.506)
-0.0717
(0.894)

R2 =
0.0258
pseudo-

Coeff.

75.6433

ptvview

cons.

Tobit

-29.7960

TVHH3

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.00 0.0050

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
66.2041 95.9423
0.1563
(0.023)^ (0.092)*
(0.293)
-0.0936 -0.5354
-0.0433
(0.726)
(0.337)
(0.634)
0.0642
-0.7042
0.0093
(0.888)
(0.455)
(0.876)
1.6545
2.8854
0.0203
(0.808)
(0.837)
(0.757)
1.0336
1.5667
0.0786
(0.283)
(0.424)
(0.329)
-0.0102 -0.0164
-0.1039
(0.278)
(0.393)
(0.166)
4.9906
16.7731
0.0558
(0.513)
(0.293)
(0.332)
-0.1186
0.6661
-0.0094
(0.939)
(0.839)
(0.932)

OLS

-8.7317
-0.0326
(0.687)
(0.466)
-0.2480
-0.0797
(0.375)
(0.433)
96.1495

cable_m

rev_s

Tobit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
67.8651
0.1688
(0.019)^
(0.313)
-0.0982
-0.0465
(0.714)
(0.602)
-0.4343
-0.0627
(0.488)
(0.321)
2.2493
0.0289
(0.739)
(0.671)
0.9344
0.0732
(0.329)
(0.406)
-0.0082
-0.0867
(0.480)
(0.295)
5.1017
0.0576
(0.525)
(0.372)
-0.1434
-0.0112
(0.929)
(0.922)
-12.4751
-0.0465
(0.591)
(0.307)
-0.1995
-0.0641
(0.581)
(0.633)
29.4862

ptv_m

big4

OLS

(0.440)

R2 =
0.0324
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.01 0.0002

(signif.)

87.1508
(0.114)
-0.5136
(0.344)
-1.1797
(0.365)
2.9902
(0.825)
1.0281
(0.587)
-0.0253
(0.290)
16.4382
(0.309)
0.7367
(0.823)
-46.7730
(0.327)
0.2778
(0.695)
4.6388
(0.623)

R2 =
0.0389
pseudo-

adj-R2 = - pseudoR2 = 0.01 0.0034
R2 = 0.01

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; #= significant at 1% level

CONSOLIDATION DIMINISHES DIVERSITY: NEW EVIDENCE 253
Exhibit 6: Effect of Cross-Ownership on Presence of Public Affairs
Dependent Variable = Presence of Local Public Affairs (pa_L_dum); dummy

type

rank

yrstd

OLS

Probit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0263
0.0164
(0.802)
(0.803)
-0.0015
-0.1737
(0.006)#
(0.005)#
-0.0028
-0.1019
(0.118)
(0.124)

Coeff.

OLS

Probit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.0662
-0.0124 -0.0260
-0.0079
(0.808)
(0.909)
(0.927)
(0.806)
(0.908)
(0.927)
-0.0040
-0.0010 -0.0026
-0.1156
(0.006)# (0.146)
(0.154)
(0.007)# (0.146)
(0.164)
-0.0073 -0.0019 -0.0051
-0.0657
(0.115)
(0.453)
(0.435)
(0.121)
(0.452)
(0.443)

(0.189)
(0.201)
0.4133
(0.503)
(0.510)

(0.203)
(0.167)

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

0.7271

0.6025

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.094)*
(0.098)*

(0.006)#
(0.005)#

rev_s

cons.

R2 =
0.0440
adj-R2 =
0.0325

(0.415)
(0.413)
0.0026

R2 =
0.0557
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.03 0.0357

OLS

-0.1898

cable_m

-0.0669
-0.0608
(0.446)
(0.439)
0.0015
0.1202
(0.174)
(0.151)
0.6473

Probit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
Beta
(signif.) (signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.0480
0.1215
0.0061
0.0286
0.0037
(0.673)
(0.677)
(0.958)
(0.684)
(0.682)
(0.959)
-0.0014 -0.0036 -0.0012
-0.1581
-0.1379
(0.198)
(0.188)
(0.270)
(0.202)
(0.196)
(0.271)
-0.0028 -0.0075 -0.0015
-0.1031
-0.0542
(0.119)
(0.111) (0.542)
(0.124)
(0.115) (0.536)
0.0015
0.0042
-0.0009
0.0045
-0.0029
(0.957)
(0.952)
(0.973)
(0.957)
(0.952)
(0.973)
0.0011
0.0025
-0.0005
0.021
-0.01
(0.773)
(0.796)
(0.892)
(0.776)
(0.798)
(0.893)
-0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
-0.0139
-0.1386
(0.884)
(0.866)
(0.252)
(0.884)
(0.866)
(0.221)
0.0342
0.0900
0.0321
0.0965
0.0885
(0.255)
(0.255)
(0.322)
(0.239)
(0.245)
(0.305)
0.0023
0.0060
0.0020
0.0455
0.039
(0.707)
(0.708)
(0.753)
(0.696)
(0.703)
(0.752)
-0.1018
-0.0929
(0.277)
(0.270)
0.0025
0.1999
(0.082)*
(0.039)**
0.4649
-0.0613
0.5621

ptv_m

big4

OLS

(0.950)
(0.946)

R2 =
0.0503
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.04 0.0188

(0.186)
(0.166)

Probit
Coeff.
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0171
(0.955)
(0.955)
-0.0032
(0.259)
(0.263)
-0.0043
(0.518)
(0.518)
-0.0022
(0.976)
(0.976)
-0.0017
(0.867)
(0.869)
-0.0002
(0.237)
(0.235)
0.0849
(0.321)
(0.305)
0.0057
(0.737)
(0.738)
-0.2866
(0.245)
(0.239)
0.0071
(0.087)*
(0.065)*
0.2048
(0.856)
(0.852)

R2 =
0.0674
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.04 0.0264

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; #= significant at 1% level

pseudoR2 = 0.05
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In Yan’s October 2006 stu d y, he find s that cross-ow nership has a
statistically significant positive effect on the presence of local news.
H ow ever, Yan cau tions against over-interpreting this find ing, stating
“cross-ow ned stations w ere m ore likely to be in the bu siness of provid ing
local news, though evidence of a causal relationship would require examining
w hether and how stations' provision of local inform ational program m ing
changed after they becam e part of a new spaper/ television com bination.”
Ind eed , this result is m ore likely attribu ted to the fact that m ost of the crossow ned stations in the sam ple w ere grand fathered prior to 1975, and all bu t
one of the non-grand fathered cross-ow ned stations aired new s prior to the
formation of the cross-ownership relation.
In ou r m od el of the effect of cross-ow nership on the presence of local
new s, w e find that cross-ow nership is not significant. The d ifference in this
result and Yan’s October 2006 result is likely due to the presence of the station
age control variable in ou r m od el, w hich m ay captu re the effect of the
established news status of the grandfathered combinations.
The resu lts also ind icate that cross-ow nership has no effect on the
prod u ction or am ou nt of local pu blic affairs program m ing. While the OLS
results ind icate significance, the OLS mod el is not appropriate for this d ata
set, given the fact that 57 percent of stations in the sam ple aired zero second s
of public affairs programming. The Tobit model appropriately deals with this
corner-solu tion scenario, and d em onstrates that cross-ow nership has no effect
on the amount of public affairs programming.
The evid ence clearly su pports the conclu sion that there is no d irect
relationship betw een cross ow nership and the am ou nt of local new s or pu blic
affairs program m ing. We d o not find m u ch of a case for an ind irect effect
either. Controlling for all the other variables, the relationship betw een crossow nership and the potential intervening variables, Big 4 and Station Revenu e
is not significant. In the Probit m od el that inclu d es only Market Rank and
Station Age, as control variables for predictors of cross-ownership, Big 4 is not
related to cross-ow nership in a statistically significant w ay, bu t Station
Revenue is. However, the magnitude of the indirect effect would be small (at
the m ean revenu e the probability of cross-ow nership is abou t 7 percent; at
one stand ard d eviation above this m ean revenu e the probability of crossow nership is approxim ately 10 percent). These m od els d o not explain mu ch
of the variance in cross-ownership (see Exhibit 7).
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Exhibit 7: Indirect Effect of Cross-Ownership
Dependent Variable = Cross-Owned (type); dummy

rank

yrstd

OLS

Probit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
-0.0005
-0.1009
(0.094)*
(0.070)*
-0.0051
-0.2974
(0.000)#
(0.000)#

Coeff.

OLS

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
-0.0034
0.0003
0.0564
(0.131)
(0.453)
(0.128)
(0.330)
-0.0416 -0.0035
-0.1948
(0.000)# (0.018)^
(0.000)# (0.011)^

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

big4

rev_s

cons.

0.5007

1.5620

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.010)#
(0.007)#

R2 =
0.1012
adj-R2 =
0.0940

Probit
Coeff.

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.0005
0.0004
0.0704
(0.866)
(0.545)
(0.835)
(0.504)
-0.0348 -0.0043
-0.2631
(0.005)# (0.000)#
(0.007)# (0.000)#
0.0029
0.0148
(0.851)
(0.837)
-0.0008
-0.0248
(0.719)
(0.714)
0.0001
0.2513
(0.005)#
(0.029)^
-0.0026
-0.0123
(0.878)
(0.845)
-0.0013
-0.0438
(0.703)
(0.617)
-0.1859

-0.0425
-0.0607
(0.422)
(0.629)
(0.310) (0.592)
0.0024
0.0062
0.2904
(0.000)# (0.087)*
(0.011)^ (0.056)*
0.3013
0.8216
(0.031)^
(0.021)^

(0.439)
(0.418)

R2 =
0.1468
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.18 0.1324

OLS

0.4303
(0.036)^
(0.035)^

Probit
Coeff.

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.0015
0.0006
0.1223
(0.720)
(0.298)
(0.683)
(0.229)
-0.0379 -0.0028
-0.1627
(0.000)# (0.051)*
(0.000)# (0.039)^
0.0098
0.0018
0.0095
(0.926)
(0.906)
(0.910) (0.899)
0.0000
-0.0010
-0.0303
(1.000)
(0.663)
(1.000)
(0.651)
0.0002
0.0000
0.0646
(0.156)
(0.570)
(0.079)* (0.537)
-0.0099 -0.0082
-0.0372
(0.942)
(0.658)
(0.934)
(0.588)
-0.0177 -0.0025
-0.0799
(0.513)
(0.494)
(0.423)
(0.370)
-0.0344
-0.0516
(0.521)
(0.372)
0.0023
0.3025
(0.005)#
(0.025)^
0.4022
1.5997
(0.318)
(0.329)

R2 =
0.1390
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.19 0.1141

OLS

(0.097)*
(0.106)

Probit
Coeff.
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0026
(0.540)
(0.465)
-0.0311
(0.015)^
(0.017)^
0.0145
(0.891)
(0.872)
-0.0019
(0.899)
(0.895)
0.0000
(0.885)
(0.858)
-0.0306
(0.823)
(0.793)
-0.0191
(0.479)
(0.366)
-0.1455
(0.744)
(0.707)
0.0067
(0.216)
(0.142)
1.3923
(0.430)
(0.488)

R2 =
0.1675
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.21 0.1347

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; #= significant at 1% level

pseudoR2 = 0.21

255

256

COOPER AND TURNER

Althou gh w e have argu ed that the N apoli and Yan approach in the
d u opoly analysis w as appropriate, given the policy and the d ifferent
intentions and effects of d u opolies compared to cross-ow nership m ergers, w e
have applied ou r approach to the d u opoly variable as w ell. We have ru n this
analysis on the sam e set of stations as in the original rand om sample (i.e. w e
do not include the cross-owned stations). The results are similar.
The models were generally specified as follows:
news_l = a + ß1(duo_s)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i + ß9(big4)i
+ ß10(rev_s)i + ei
pa_l = a + ß1(duo_s)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i + ß9(big4)i +
ß10(rev_s)i + ei
presence = a + ß1(duo_s)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i +
ß9(big4)i + ß10(rev_s)i + ei
pa_l_dum = a + ß1(duo_s)i + ß2(rank)i + ß3(yrstd)i + ß4-8[market controls]i +
ß9(big4)i + ß10(rev_s)i+ ei

Where all variables are as d escribed above, and duo_s = dummy
variable for a duopoly station.
Results are presented below in Exhibits 8 - 12.
Market Rank and Age of the station are statistically significant
pred ictors of the am ou nt of new s; the coefficient on the d u opoly variable is
not significant. Again, w e find that controlling for station age and m arket
rank alone rend ers the relationship betw een d u opoly status and the am ou nt
of new s statistically insignificant.
Inclu d ing the station characteristic
variables as controls, explains m ore variance and w e find a statistically
significant coefficient on both Big 4 and Stations Revenu e, as N apoli and Yan
d id . The coefficient on d u opoly w as not statistically significant. Du opolies
d id not prod u ce m ore public affairs than non-d u opolies, and none of the
other variables w as significant (w ith the exception that m ore hou rs of pu blic
television viewing in a market may have a small positive effect on the amount
of pu blic affairs programm ing prod u ced ). There is also no ind ication that
d u opoly has a significant ind irect effect on new s or pu blic affairs (see Exhibit
12).
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Exhibit 8: Effect of Duopoly on Amount of Local News
Dependent Variable = Local News (news_l)
OLS
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
47.2502
0.0134
(0.766)
(0.764)
-3.0978
-0.1343
(0.003)#
(0.005)#
-56.0540
-0.7571
(0.000)#
(0.000)#

Robust
Regr.

OLS

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
60.1555 -94.7219
-0.0269
(0.695)
(0.543)
(0.485)
-3.9614 -3.7037
-0.1596
(0.000)# (0.002)#
(0.007)#
-59.1702 -39.0480
-0.5106
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)#

OLS

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
-84.7684 37.1831
0.0105
duo_s
(0.581)
(0.817)
(0.816)
-4.0146 -4.9345
-0.2138
rank
(0.001)# (0.013)#
(0.011)^
-41.4465 -56.1126
-0.7579
yrstd
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)#
-13.3065
-0.0144
ptv_m
(0.786)
(0.776)
-0.0924
cable_
-0.0007
(0.989)
m
(0.988)
-0.0639
TVHH
-0.0497
(0.422)
3
(0.342)
61.7453
ptvvie
0.0652
(0.256)
w
(0.243)
12.7453
othvie
0.0951
(0.245)
w
(0.215)
850.5913 774.2783
0.2915
big4
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)#
7.1231
8.5707
0.1628
rev_s
(0.004)# (0.000)#
(0.035)^
5701.791 5939.448 3829.314 4032.907 5175.460
cons.

Coeff.

Robust
Regr.
Coeff.

Robust
Regr.
Coeff.
(signif.)

42.6029
(0.784)
-5.8849
(0.002)#
-60.0116
(0.000)#
-5.2560
(0.912)
4.2627
(0.525)
-0.0770
(0.317)
32.5192
(0.536)
8.5656
(0.418)

5428.314

Robust
Regr.

OLS
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
-98.8102
-0.0281
(0.529)
(0.477)
-5.3018
-0.2285
(0.005)#
(0.007)#
-38.6411
-0.5053
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-20.3582
-0.0223
(0.657)
(0.646)
-1.5653
-0.0111
(0.810)
(0.794)
-0.0586
-0.0457
(0.478)
(0.515)
53.8708
0.0557
(0.320)
(0.329)
11.9771
0.0856
(0.265)
(0.258)
827.5520
0.2836
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
7.8426
0.1793
(0.005)#
(0.010)#
3420.335

Coeff.
(signif.)

-89.9843
(0.568)
-5.1603
(0.007)#
-41.3690
(0.000)#
-29.1731
(0.527)
-0.2542
(0.969)
-0.0256
(0.757)
22.9439
(0.673)
6.1826
(0.567)
759.6710
(0.000)#
8.7902
(0.000)#
3866.614

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#

R2 =
0.5924

R2 =
0.6382

R2 =
0.6606

R2 =
0.6848

R2 =
0.5978

R2 =
0.6504

R2 =
0.6650

R2 =
0.6813

adj-R2 =
0.5869

adj-R2 =
0.6333

adj-R2 =
0.6524

adj-R2 =
0.6773

adj-R2 =
0.5830

adj-R2 =
0.6375

adj-R2 =
0.6485

adj-R2 =
0.6656

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; # = significant at 1% level
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Exhibit 9: Effect of Duopoly on Presence of Local News
Dependent Variable = Presence of Local News (presence); dummy

duo_s

rank

yrstd

OLS

Probit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob..err.)
0.0950
0.0822
(0.160)
(0.159)
0.0008
0.1097
(0.061)*
(0.064)*
-0.0134
-0.5537
(0.000)#
(0.000)#

Coeff.

OLS

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob..err.) rob.err.)
0.2160
0.0820
0.0728
(0.460)
(0.231)
(0.419)
(0.191)
0.0026
0.0004
0.0561
(0.185)
(0.432)
(0.174)
(0.462)
-0.0558 -0.0091
-0.3731
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)# (0.000)#

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

1.6222

4.7556

0.2632
0.2816
(0.000)#
(0.001)#
0.0005
0.0356
(0.643)
(0.470)
1.1594

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

big4

rev_s

cons.

R2 =
0.3159
adj-R2 =
0.3066

Probit
Coeff.

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.0276
0.0845
0.0731
(0.939)
(0.209)
(0.925)
(0.199)
0.0016
0.0013
0.1660
(0.530)
(0.131)
(0.528)
(0.113)
-0.0367 -0.0135
-0.5563
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)# (0.000)#
0.0052
0.0170
(0.801)
(0.8037)
0.0012
0.0260
(0.677)
(0.655)
0.0000
0.0543
(0.491)
(0.524)
0.0668
0.2151
(0.004)#
(0.003)#
0.0059
0.1338
(0.199)
(0.163)
0.7724
(0.007)#
(0.004)#
0.0190
(0.195)
(0.154)
2.7011

1.0591

(0.007)#
(0.005)#

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

R2 =
0.3601
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.32 0.3448

OLS

Probit
Coeff.

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.2547
0.0892
0.0791
(0.425)
(0.188)
(0.369)
(0.136)
0.0052
0.0007
0.0963
(0.216)
(0.379)
(0.223)
(0.354)
-0.0627 -0.0095
-0.386
(0.000)# (0.000)#
(0.000)# (0.000)#
0.0496
0.0045
0.0154
(0.628)
(0.821)
(0.667)
(0.834)
0.0023
0.0006
0.0122
(0.874)
(0.845)
(0.869)
(0.829)
0.0001
0.0001
0.1362
(0.405)
(0.118)
(0.396)
(0.182)
0.3727
0.0636
0.2053
(0.002)# (0.007)#
(0.000)# (0.006)#
0.0369
0.0068
0.1527
(0.132)
(0.140)
(0.122)
(0.164)
0.3047
0.3259
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
-0.0008
-0.0553
(0.512)
(0.406)
2.1985
0.5956
(0.120)
(0.079)*

R2 =
0.3463
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.37 0.3222

OLS

(0.056)*
(0.063)*

Probit
Coeff.
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.1051
(0.782)
(0.734)
0.0030
(0.519)
(0.511)
-0.0432
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
0.0518
(0.633)
(0.681)
0.0015
(0.926)
(0.919)
0.0002
(0.348)
(0.329)
0.3589
(0.006)#
(0.002)#
0.0384
(0.131)
(0.133)
0.9198
(0.003)#
(0.001)#
0.0133
(0.390)
(0.279)
0.1701
(0.921)
(0.907)

R2 =
0.3924
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.37 0.3625

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; # = significant at 1% level

pseudoR2 = 0.41

CONSOLIDATION DIMINISHES DIVERSITY: NEW EVIDENCE
Exhibit 10: Effect of Duopoly on Amount of Local Public Affairs
Dependent Variable = Local Public Affairs (pa_L)
OLS

duo_s

rank

yrstd

Tobit

OLS

Tobit

Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
Beta
(signif.) (signif.) (signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
rob.err.)
-23.4194 -10.8811 -23.0500 -11.3927
-0.0921
-0.0984
(0.189)
(0.772)
(0.180)
(0.750)
(0.068)*
(0.120)
-0.2296 -0.5984 -0.1738 -0.4482
-0.1380
-0.1124
(0.049)^ (0.023)^ (0.201)
(0.128)
(0.054)*
(0.173)
0.1192
-0.4453 -0.0477 -0.4636
0.0223
-0.0086
(0.737)
(0.564)
(0.927)
(0.655)
(0.769)
(0.911)

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

big4

rev_s

cons.

58.645

26.777

(0.037)^
(0.046)^

(0.658)

R2 =
0.0201
adj-R2 =
0.0069

Tobit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
-25.6711
-0.1009
(0.154)
(0.055)*
-0.2938
-0.1766
(0.186)
(0.047)^
0.0994
0.0186
(0.782)
(0.811)
2.3746
0.0355
(0.665)
(0.637)
0.2843
0.0278
(0.714)
(0.637)
-0.0035
-0.038
(0.692)
(0.548)
8.9048
0.1304
(0.143)
(0.055)*
1.2823
0.1326
(0.295)
(0.185)

Coeff.

-12.7449 -24.5039
-0.0656
(0.454)
(0.508)
(0.443)
0.2074
0.4254
0.0711
(0.452)
(0.437)
(0.443)
68.708
34.246

-38.113

(0.120)
(0.043)^

(0.610)
(0.540)

(0.723)

R2 =
0.0287
pseudo-

OLS

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.00 0.0053

R2 =
0.0331

OLS

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
-12.0988 -23.9611
-0.1023
(0.746)
(0.176)
(0.110)
-0.7666 -0.2407
-0.1557
(0.116)
(0.257)
(0.093)*
-0.4789 -0.0404
-0.0079
(0.533)
(0.933)
(0.921)
2.8380
2.8977
0.0477
(0.810) (0.575)
(0.556)
0.5546
0.0403
0.0043
(0.737)
(0.956)
(0.949)
-0.0124 -0.0066
-0.0775
(0.527)
(0.477)
(0.414)
22.8678
8.8942
0.138
(0.083)* (0.146)
(0.076)*
2.8700
1.1501
0.1234
(0.289)
(0.342)
(0.288)
-13.6608
-0.0703
(0.441)
(0.233)
0.2248
0.0771
(0.466)
(0.519)
-180.196 -4.292
(0.280)

(0.958)
(0.940)

Tobit
Coeff.
(signif.)

-11.7233
(0.741)
-0.6601
(0.144)
-0.4542
(0.661)
2.8452
(0.792)
-0.0396
(0.979)
-0.0199
(0.334)
21.9220
(0.087)*
2.8023
(0.279)
-32.3613
(0.395)
0.5704
(0.356)
-117.315
(0.502)

R2 =
0.0422

pseudo-

adj-R2 = - pseudo- adj-R2 = - pseudoR2 = 0.01 0.0050
R2 = 0.01 0.0025
R2 = 0.01

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; # = significant at 1% level
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Exhibit 11: Effect of Duopoly on Presence of Local Public Affairs
Dependent Variable = Presence of Local Public Affairs (pa_L_dum); dummy

duo_s

rank

yrstd

OLS

Probit

OLS

Probit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob..err.)
0.1022
0.0788
(0.257)
(0.256)
-0.0012
-0.1423
(0.040)^
(0.038)^
-0.0027
-0.099
(0.134)
(0.140)

Coeff.

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob..err.) rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.2590
0.0916
0.2341
0.0702
(0.271)
(0.343)
(0.350)
(0.263)
(0.353)
(0.352)
-0.0032 -0.0009 -0.0024
-0.1073
(0.039)^ (0.218)
(0.220)
(0.042)^ (0.221)
(0.233)
-0.0071 -0.0011 -0.0030
-0.04
(0.132)
(0.664)
(0.667)
(0.139)
(0.654)
(0.663)

-0.0524

0.6821

0.4873

-0.0192
-0.0177
(0.838)
(0.840)
0.0016
0.0975
(0.297)
(0.234)
0.5394

(0.313)
(0.286)
0.1096

0.3172

Coeff.
Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/ (sig. w/ (sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.) rob.err.)
0.2543
0.0874
0.2258
0.0670
(0.282)
(0.368)
(0.372)
(0.277)
(0.375)
(0.370)
-0.0043 -0.0015 -0.0041
-0.1758
(0.150)
(0.195)
(0.182)
(0.154)
(0.198)
(0.187)
-0.0073 -0.0008 -0.0025
-0.0297
(0.126)
(0.749)
(0.727)
(0.132)
(0.739)
(0.721)
-0.0052 -0.0056 -0.0144
-0.0167
(0.943)
(0.843)
(0.847)
(0.944)
(0.845)
(0.850)
0.0035
-0.0002 -0.0010
-0.0047
(0.735)
(0.951)
(0.927)
(0.737)
(0.952)
(0.927)
-0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
-0.1159
(0.439)
(0.281)
(0.268)
(0.437)
(0.244)
(0.282)
0.1346
0.0519
0.1397
0.1444
(0.098)* (0.123)
(0.117)
(0.095)* (0.110)
(0.107)
0.0128
0.0055
0.0152
0.1059
(0.435)
(0.408)
(0.387)
(0.438)
(0.411) (0.394)
-0.0390 -0.1199
-0.036
(0.689)
(0.641)
(0.685)
(0.637)
0.0021
0.0060
0.1311
(0.210)
(0.212)
(0.141)
(0.182)
-0.4736
0.2684
-0.5858

(0.000)#
(0.000)#

(0.190)
(0.194)

(0.027)^
(0.020)^

(0.867)
(0.862)

(0.402)
(0.374)

(0.639)
(0.623)

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

big4

rev_s

cons.

R2 =
0.0425
adj-R2 =
0.0295

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.03 0.0278

Probit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
0.0976
0.0749
(0.283)
(0.289)
-0.0016
-0.1857
(0.159)
(0.158)
-0.0027
-0.0994
(0.135)
(0.143)
-0.0018
-0.0053
(0.948)
(0.948)
0.0014
0.0274
(0.715)
(0.717)
-0.0000
-0.0724
(0.445)
(0.432)
0.0500
0.1429
(0.105)
(0.100)*
0.0046
0.0938
(0.453)
(0.452)

Coeff.

(0.831)
(0.835)
0.0043

R2 =
0.0506
pseudo-

OLS

R2 =
0.0568
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.04 0.0220

OLS

(0.546)
(0.523)

Probit

(0.623)
(0.610)

R2 =
0.0684
pseudo-

adj-R2 =
R2 = 0.04 0.0225

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; # = significant at 1% level

pseudoR2 = 0.05

CONSOLIDATION DIMINISHES DIVERSITY: NEW EVIDENCE
Exhibit 12: Indirect Effect of Duopoly
Dependent Variable = Duopoly (duo_s); dummy

rank

yrstd

OLS

Probit

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob..err.)
-0.0020
-0.3043
(0.000)#
(0.000)#
0.0008
0.0405
(0.526)
(0.491)

Coeff.

OLS

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
(sig. w/
rob..err.) rob.err.)
-0.0103 -0.0016
-0.2368
(0.000)# (0.003)#
(0.000)# (0.001)#
0.0049
0.0040
0.1822
(0.407) (0.034)^
(0.355) (0.012)^

ptv_m

cable_m

TVHH3

ptvview

othview

0.2676

-0.6544

0.0249
0.03
(0.711)
(0.736)
0.0032
0.2561
(0.003)#
(0.038)^
-0.0619

(0.011)^
(0.009)#

(0.147)
(0.138)

(0.723)
(0.685)

big4

rev_s

constant

R2 =
0.0941
adj-R2 =
0.0860

pseudo-

R2 =
0.1633

R2 =
0.1211

adj-R2 =
0.1473

Probit

OLS

Coeff.

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
(sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
-0.0122 -0.0022
-0.3403
(0.001)# (0.007)#
(0.000)# (0.001)#
0.0220
0.0007
0.0344
(0.031)^ (0.593)
(0.016)^ (0.559)
0.0154
0.0587
(0.456)
(0.439)
0.0007
0.0163
(0.824)
(0.817)
0.0000
0.0175
(0.850)
(0.883)
0.0110
0.0409
(0.632)
(0.650)
0.0050
0.1315
(0.278)
(0.297)
0.3617

Probit

OLS

(0.062)*
(0.088)*
-2.2336

-0.0628

Coeff.
Beta
(signif.) (signif.)
(sig. w/
(sig. w/
rob.err.) rob.err.)
-0.0148 -0.0017
-0.2565
(0.003)# (0.043)^
(0.000)# (0.015)^
0.0044
0.0040
0.1833
(0.465) (0.035)^
(0.405) (0.016)^
0.0434
0.0153
0.059
(0.637)
(0.456)
(0.613)
(0.451)
0.0007
-0.0004
-0.0109
(0.956)
(0.880)
(0.956)
(0.874)
-0.0000 -0.0000
-0.0976
(0.761)
(0.335)
(0.783)
(0.282)
0.0403
-0.0014
-0.0052
(0.696)
(0.952)
(0.738)
(0.945)
0.0326
-0.0000
-0.0004
(0.166)
(0.997)
(0.264)
(0.996)
0.0104
0.0125
(0.883)
(0.893)
0.0036
0.288
(0.003)#
(0.040)^
-2.1522
-0.0217

(0.017)^
(0.009)#

(0.824)
(0.850)

(0.081)*
(0.173)

(0.267)
(0.292)
0.0083

pseudo-

R2 =
0.1045

R2 =
0.2020

adj-R2 =
0.0757

Coeff.

(0.946)
(0.944)

Probit
Coeff.
(signif.)
(sig. w/
rob.err.)
-0.0145
(0.009)#
(0.005)#
0.0221
(0.032)^
(0.022)^
0.0688
(0.489)
(0.475)
0.0011
(0.940)
(0.938)
-0.0002
(0.155)
(0.120)
-0.0906
(0.486)
(0.465)
-0.0141
(0.638)
(0.578)
0.2619
(0.438)
(0.459)
0.0108
(0.029)^
(0.060)*
-1.2552
(0.459)
(0.457)

pseudo-

R2 =
0.1683

pseudo-

R2 =
0.1389

adj-R2 =
0.1316

R2 =
0.2163

* = significant at 10% level; ^ = significant at 5% level; # = significant at 1% level
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STUDY 17:
THE CHALLENGE OF CONTEMPORARY
COMMERCIAL MASS MEDIA ECONOMICS TO
DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSE
M ARK COOPER
INTRODUCTION
The legal d iscu ssion in Stu d ies 1, 2, and 3 sets ou t the pu blic policy
issu es by emphasizing the w ays in w hich civic d iscou rse transcend s m ere
econom ics to inclu d e d iversity and localism , both of w hich are vital to
d em ocratic d iscou rse. The d iscu ssion of point of view , bias or slant, in Stu d y
5 d em onstrates the link betw een ow nership and d iversity. The d iscussion of
bias arrives at the conclu sion that com petition is critical to prom oting vibrant
d em ocratic d iscourse. This section takes the argu ment one step farther. It
d em onstrates w hy the econom ic characteristics of m ass m ed ia prod u ction
results in “market failu re” at the start of the 21st centu ry. In other w ord s, the
problem is not that ‘good ’ econom ics m akes for ‘bad ’ civic d iscou rse. In fact,
vigorous, atom istic competition is generally consid ered supportive of
d em ocracy, althou gh not, in itself sufficient to d eliver the m ed ia d em ocracy
need s, as d iscu ssed in Stud y 3. The problem is that the stru ctu ral tend encies
of contem porary m ed ia markets make for ‘bad ’ econom ics that reinforce the
tend ency of failu re in the foru m for d em ocratic d iscou rse. The tend ency of
ow nership stru ctu res to d eviate from com petitive m arkets is an econom ic
problem that becom es a challenge for d em ocratic d iscourse becau se ow ners
can com bine econom ic influ ence w ith their privileged position in the foru m
for d em ocratic d iscourse to exercise u nd u e influ ence over pu blic opinion to
the detriment of citizens and democratic discourse.
COMPETITION AND D EMOCRACY
Economists stress that vigorously competitive markets are compatible
w ith d em ocratic processes. There are political reasons to prefer atom istically
com petitive m arkets. Scherer and Ross, am ong the m ost prom inent analysts
of ind ustrial organization, note that analysis should begin w ith the political
im plications of econom ic institu tions.1 Specifically, they ask, “Why is a

1

Scherer, F. Michael and David Ross. Industrial M arket Structure and Economic
Performance. N ew York: H oughton Mifflin Com p any, 1990, p . 18: “We begin w ith the
p olitical argu m ents, not m erely becau se they are su fficiently transp arent to be treated
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com petitive m arket system held in su ch high esteem by statesm en and
econom ists alike? Why is com petition the id eal in a m arket econom y, and
w hat is w rong w ith m onopoly?” They provid e a series of answ ers, starting
from the d ecentralized , objective processes that typify atom istically
competitive markets that check the power of large entities.
One of the m ost im p ortant argu m ents is that the atom istic stru ctu re of bu yers
and sellers requ ired for comp etition d ecentralizes and d isp erses p ow er. The
resou rce allocation and incom e d istribu tion p roblem is solved throu gh the
almost mechanical interaction of supply and demand forces on the market, and
not throu gh the consciou s exercise of p ow er held in p rivate hand s (for
exam p le, u nd er m onop oly) or governm ent hand s (that is, u nd er state
enterp rise or governm ent regu lation). Lim iting the p ow er of both governm ent
bod ies and p rivate ind ivid u als to m ake d ecisions that shap e p eop le’s lives and
fortunes was a fundamental goal of the men who wrote the U.S. Constitution.2

Other econom ic characteristics of atom istically com petitive m arkets
that converge w ith d em ocratic principles are the au tonom y and freed om of
entry that such markets imply.
A closely related benefit is the fact that com p etitive m arket p rocesses solve the
econom ic p roblem impersonally, and not throu gh the p ersonal control of
entrepreneurs and bureaucrats…
[Another] p olitical m erit of a com p etitive market is its freed om of op p ortu nity.
When the no-barriers-to-entry cond ition of p erfect com p etition is satisfied ,
ind ivid u als are free to choose w hatever trad e or p rofession they p refer, lim ited
only by their ow n talent and skill and by their ability to raise the (p resum ably
modest) amount of capital required.3

Thu s, atom istic com petition prom otes ind ivid u alistic, im personal
d ecisions w ith freed om of opportu nity and relatively low resou rce
requirem ents for entry. These are id eal for popu list form s of d em ocracy.4

briefly, bu t also becau se w hen all is said and d one, they, and not the econom ists’
abstruse models, have tipped the balance of social consensus toward competition.”
2

Id., p. 18.
Id., p. 18.
4
Lessig, Law rence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. N ew York: Basic Books, 1999,
pp. 166-167: “Relative anonymity, decentralized distribution, multiple points of access,
no necessary tie to geograp hy, no sim p le system to id entify content, tools of
encryption – all these featu res and consequ ences of the Internet p rotocol m ake it
d ifficu lt to control sp eech in cybersp ace. The architectu re of cybersp ace is the real
protector of speech there; it is the real “First Amendment in cyberspace,” and this First
Am end m ent is no local ord inance… “The architectu re of the Internet, as it is right
now , is p erhap s the m ost im p ortant m od el of free sp eech since the fou nd ing. This
model has implications far beyond e-mail and web pages.”
3
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Law rence Lessig points ou t that at the tim e of the fram ing of the Constitu tion
the press had a very atomistic character.
The “press” in 1791 was not the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal. It did
not com p rise large organizations of p rivate interests, w ith m illions of read ers
associated w ith each organization. Rather, the p ress then w as m u ch like the
Internet tod ay. The cost of a p rinting p ress w as low , the read ership w as slight,
and anyone (w ithin reason) cou ld become a p u blisher – and in fact an
extraordinary number did.5

The problem in contem porary m ass m ed ia m arkets is that they have
m oved qu ite far from the com petitive form of organization. In fact, the
pu rsuit of efficiency throu gh econom ies of scale and netw ork effects has
pu shed many contem porary ind ustries tow ard oligopoly or m onopoly. This
is a source of concern and requires vigilant solutions in all com m ercial
m arkets. Efficiency that results from large economies of scale also lead s to
sm all nu m bers of com petitors and can d egenerate into inefficient abu se of
m onopoly pow er.6 In m ed ia m arkets, w here the im pact reverberates so
pow erfully in the foru m for d em ocratic d iscou rse, these tend encies m ust be
prevented from imposing the graver condition of distorting civic discourse.
M ARKET FAILURE IN M EDIA M ARKETS
It has long been recognized that the contem porary technologies and
the cost stru ctu re of com m ercial m ass m ed ia prod u ction are not cond u cive to
vigorous, atom istic com petition. Print and broad cast m ed ia have u niqu e
econom ic characteristics.7 To the extent that econom ics is a consid eration,
econom ic com petition in com m ercial m ass m ed ia markets cannot assu re
d iversity and antagonism .8 The conceptu al u nd erpinnings of the argu m ent
5

Lessig, 1999, p. 183.
Coop er, Mark N . 2001. “Antitru st as Consu m er Protection in the N ew Econom y:
Lessons from the Microsoft Case.” Hasting Law Journal 52, April.
7
Berry, Steven T. and Joel Wald fogel. 1999. Pu blic Rad io in the United States: Does it
Correct Market Failure or Cannibalize Commercial Stations? Journal of Public Economics
71, p oint ou t free entry m ay not accom p lish the econom ic goals set ou t for it either.
There is evid ence of the anticom p etitive behaviors exp ected to be associated w ith
red u ctions in com p etition, su ch as p rice increases and excess p rofits. Wirth, M. O.
1984. “The Effects of Market Stru ctu re on Television N ew s Pricing.” Journal of
Broadcasting 28: 215-24; Sim on, J., W. J. Prim eau x and E. Rice. 1986. “The Price Effects
of Monop oly Ow nership in N ew sp ap ers.” Antitrust Bulletin Spring; Ru binovitz, R.
1991. “Market Pow er and Price Increases for Basic Cable Service Since Deregu lation.”
Economic A nalysis Regulatory Group, Department of Justice, 6 Au gu st 1991 Bates, B. J.
1993. “Station Trafficking in Rad io: The Im p act of Deregu lation.” Journal of
Broadcasting and Electronic Media 37:1: 21-30.
8
Ray, W. B. FCC: The Ups and Downs of Radio-TV Regulation. Iow a: Iow a State
University Press, 1990; Wat W. 1996. “The Su p rem e Cou rt Defines the Foru m for
6
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are w ell know n to m ed ia m arket analysts.9 On the su pply-sid e, m ed ia
m arkets exhibit high first copy costs or high fixed costs.10 On the d em and side, media market products are in some important respects non-substitutable
or exhibit strong group-specific preferences.11
The “w elfare” effect of these characteristics is to cause the m arket to
fail to m eet the inform ation need s of som e grou ps in society. This resu lts
because groups express strong preferences for specific types of programming
or content. Program ming that is targeted at w hites is not highly su bstitu table
for programm ing that is targeted at blacks, from the point of view of blacks.
If fixed costs and grou p preferences are strong, prod u cers mu st d ecid e at
w hom to target their content. Given the profit m axim izing incentive to
recover the high costs from the larger aud ience, they target the m ajority or, in
a more fragmented market the plurality. The minorities are less well served.
As articulated and em pirically d em onstrated by Joel Wald fogel, this
m ight be term ed an econom ic theory of d iscrim ination “because it gives a
non-d iscriminatory reason w hy m arkets w ill d eliver few er prod u cts – and ,
one m ight infer, low er u tility – to ‘preference minorities,’ sm all grou ps of
Dem ocratic Discou rse.” Journalism and M ass Communications Quarterly Sp ring;
Firestone, C. M. and J. M. Schem ent. Toward an Information Bill of Rights and
Responsibilities. Washington, DC: Asp en Institu te, 1995 Brow n, Du ncan H . 1994. “The
Acad em y’s Resp onse to the Call for a Marketp lace Ap p roach to Broad cast
Regulation.” Critical Studies in M ass Communications 11: 254 Benkler, Yochai. 1999.
“Free as the Air.” New York University Law Review 74.
9
Baker, C. Ed w in. M edia, M arkets and Democracy. Cam brid ge: Cam brid ge University
Press, 2001, p. 42.
10
Wald fogel, Joel and Lisa George. “Who Benefits Whom in Daily N ew sp ap er
Market.” N BER W orking Paper 7994. Cam brid ge: N ational Bu reau of Econom ic
Research, 2000 (hereafter Wald fogel, Television), p . 1. Other p ap ers in the series of
stu d ies of “p reference externalities” w ere m ad e a p art of the record in conju nction
w ith Joel Waldfogel’s ap p earance at the FCC Rou nd table, inclu d ing, 1999. “Preference
Externalities: An Em p irical Stu d y of Who Benefits Whom in Differentiated Prod u ct
Markets.” N BER W orking Paper 7391 Cam brid ge: N ational Bu reau of Econom ic
Research; Siegelm an, Peter. “Race and Rad io: Preference Externalities, Minority
Ow nership and the Provision of Program m ing to Minorities” A dvances in A pplied
M icroeconomics 10; Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Joel Wald fogel. Electoral Acceleration:
The Effect of Minority Pop u lation on Minority Voter Tu rnou t. N BER W orking Paper
8252. Cam brid ge, MA: N ational Bu reau of Econom ic Research, 2001; George, Lisa and
Joel Wald fogel. Who Benefits Whom in Daily N ew sp ap er Markets? N BER W orking
Paper 7944. Cam brid ge, MA: N ational Bu reau of Econom ic Research, 2000; as w ell as
the statem ent Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission. Comments on Consolidation and
Localism. Rou nd table on Med ia Ow nership , 29 October 2001 [hereafter, Localism );
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Joel Wald fogel. “Tiebou t Acceleration: Political
Particip ation in H eterogeneou s Ju risd ictions.” University of Pennsylvania, A ugust 2000
(hereafter Participation).
11
Baker, 2001, p. 43.
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ind ivid uals w ith atypical preferences.” 12 Discrim ination results not from
biases or psychological factors, but from impersonal economic processes.
A consu m er w ith atyp ical tastes w ill face less p rod u ct variety than one w ith
com m on tastes…. The m arket d elivers few er p rod u cts – and less associated
satisfaction – to these groups simply because they are small. This phenomenon
can arise even if radio firms are national and entirely non-discriminatory.
The fu nd am ental cond itions need ed to p rod u ce com p artm entalized p reference
externalities are large fixed costs and p references that d iffer sharp ly across
grou p s of consu m ers. These cond itions are likely to hold , to greater or lesser
extents, in a variety of media markets – newspapers, magazines, television, and
movies.13

This poses a fu nd am ental challenge to the valid ity of the assu m ption
that markets allocate resources efficiently.
Fried m an has eloqu ently argu ed that m arkets avoid the tyrannies of the
m ajority end em ic to allocation throu gh collective choice. Mou nting evid ence
that m inority consu m er w elfare d ep end s on local m inority p op u lation in local
m ed ia m arkets ind icates that, for this ind u stry at least, the d ifference betw een
m arket and collective choice allocation is a m atter of d egree, not kind . It is
im p ortant to u nd erstand the relationship betw een m arket d em ograp hic
com p osition and the targeting of p rogram m ing content becau se related
research d ocu m ents a relationship betw een the p resence of black-targeted
media and the tendency for blacks to vote.14

U NDER SERVING M INORITY POINTS OF V IEW
Exhibit 1 show s graphically how this tyranny w orks in m ed ia
m arkets. When there are large fixed costs, a limited ability to cover the
m arket and strong d ifferences in preference for programm ing, profit
maximizers serve the core audience and neglect smaller preference minorities.
The larger the minority group and the closer its taste to the majority, the more
likely it is to be served.
The tyranny of the m ajority in m ed ia markets is linked to the tyranny
of the m ajority in politics becau se the m ed ia are the m eans of political
communication.
We p resent evid ence that electoral com p etition lead s cand id ates to p rop ose
p olicies that are su p p orted by p rop ortionately larger grou p s and that m em bers
of these grou p s are m ore likely to tu rn ou t if they find the p rop osed p olicies
m ore ap p ealing. In ad d ition, w e show that cand id ates find it easier to d irect
cam p aign efforts at larger grou p s becau se many existing m ed ia ou tlets cater to
this audience…
12

Waldfogel, 1999, pp. 27-30.
Waldfogel, 1999, pp. 27-30.
14
Waldfogel, 2001, p. 3; Baker, 2001, p. 80.
13
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Exhibit 1: Conceptualizing the Tyranny of the Majority in Media Markets

T h e s e Au d ie n c e s Ar e S e r v e d W it h
S t a n d a r d F a r e T o M a x im iz e
C o n t r ib u t io n T o F ix e d C o s t s

T h e S m a lle r T h e M in o r it y An d T h e F a r t h e r
F r o m T h e M a in s t r e a m T a s t e , T h e Le s s
Lik e ly T h e G r o u p Is T o B e S e r v e d

Channels of com m u nication that are u sed to d issem inate p olitical inform ation
rarely exist for the sole p u rp ose of inform ing p otential voters. The nu m ber of
channels that cand id ates have at their d isp osal reflects the cost stru ctu re of
p rinting new sp ap ers, establishing rad io stations, and fou nd ing p olitical
grou p s. To the extent that these activities carry fixed costs, channels that cater
to sm all grou p s are less likely to exist. The w elfare im p lications – if one view s
the d ecision to vote as the d ecision to “consu m e” an election — are analogou s
to those of differentiated markets with fixed costs.1

Exhibit 2 d em onstrates the strong d ifferences betw een blacks and
w hites in their preferences for program m ing. Similarly, preferences d iffer
sharply across groups defined by

1

Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2001b, pp. 36-37.
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Exhibit 2: Most Popular TV Shows Differ Between White
and Black Audiences
140
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Source: Goldberg, Bernard. Bias. Washington: Regnery, 2002, pp. 150, 155.

gend er, age, race and ethnicity (H ispanic). The Figu re show s the ranking
am ong w hites and blacks of the top ten show s view ed by w hites, the top ten
show s view ed by blacks, and the six new s show s ranked in the top tw enty
among whites. In all, we have 25 shows, fifteen that are highly ranked among
w hites and fou rteen that are highly ranked am ong blacks. There is little
overlap between the two groups.
The easiest w ay to appreciate the d ifference is to note that nine of the
top ten ranked show s am ong blacks d o not even rank in the top fifty am ong
w hites. The m ost popu lar fifteen show s am ong w hites have an average
ranking of 57 am ong blacks. The top ten show s am ong blacks have an
average ranking of 85 among w hites. The d ifference in preference for the
popu lar new s show s is sim ilar. The average ranking for the six new s show s
analyzed among whites was fourteen; among blacks it was 53.
The tend ency to u nd er serve m inority points of view springs in part
from the role of ad vertising in the m ed ia.2 Ad vertising as a d eterm inant of
2

Waldfogel, 2001, p. 1.
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d em and introd u ces a su bstantial d isconnect betw een w hat consu m ers w ant
and w hat the m arket prod u ces.3 First, to a significant extent, because
ad vertisers accou nt for such a large share of the revenu e of the m ass m ed ia,
the m arket prod u ces w hat ad vertisers w ant as mu ch as, if not m ore than,
w hat consum ers w ant. Second , becau se ad vertising in particular, and the
m ed ia in general, revolves arou nd influencing people’s choices, there is a
sense in w hich the ind u stry creates its ow n d em and .4 The tend ency to avoid
controversy and seek a low est com m on d enom inator is au gm ented by the
presence of advertisers, expressing their preferences in the market.
The failu re of com m ercial m ass m ed ia to m eet the need s of citizens is
nowhere m ore evid ent than in m inority com m u nities. Wald fogel has
presented strong evid ence of a kind of a tyranny of the m ajority in a nu m ber
of m ed ia m arkets. These find ings have been reinforced by recent find ings of
other scholars, as a 2002 article in the Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic
Media makes clear.5
The analyses presented here represent the next step forward in determining the
extent to w hich ad vertiser valu ations of m inority au d iences affect the viability
of m inority-ow ned and m inority-targeted m ed ia ou tlets. The resu lts conform
to those of p reviou s stu d ies, w hich fou nd that m inority au d iences are m ore
difficult to monetize than non-minority audiences…6
Minority-targeted m ed ia content su ffers from not only the p otentially low er
valu ations of m inority au d iences bu t also from the fact that, by d efinition, it

3

Baker, 2001; Baker, C. Ed w in. A dvertising and a Democratic Press. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1994. Krotoszynski, Ronald J., Jr. and A. Richard M. Blaiklock, 2000.
Enhancing the Sp ectru m : Med ia Pow er, Dem ocracy, and the Marketp lace of Id eas.
University of Illinois Law Review, p . 831: “The larger the au d ience the station generates,
the higher the station’s p otential ad vertising revenu es. Broad casters, therefore,
attem p t to find and air p rogram m ing that w ill ap p eal to the largest p ossible au d ience.
In d oing so, broad casters necessarily air p rogram m ing that is likely to app eal to m ost
people within the potential audience – that is they air programming that appeals to the
majority culture’s viewpoint.”
4
Sunstein, Cass. Republic.com. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 108-109,
discusses the implications for democracy.
5
N ap oli, Philip. 2002. “Au d ience Valu ation and Minority Med ia: An Analysis of the
Determ inants of the Valu e of Rad io Au d iences.” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic
Media 46: 180-181.
6
The au thor notes agreem ent w ith Ofori, K. A. 1999. “When Being N o. 1 is not
Enou gh: The Im p act of Ad vertising Practices on Minority-Ow ned and MinorityTargeted Broadcast Stations.” Civil Rights Forum on Communications Policy, Washington
D.C; Webster, Jam es G. and Patricia F. Phalen. The M ass A udience: Rediscovering the
Dominant M odel. N ew Jersey: Erlbau m , 1997; Baker, C. Ed w in. A dvertising and a
Democratic Press. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
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ap p eals to a sm all au d ience. Sm aller au d iences mean sm all revenu es,
particularly when the audience is not highly valued by advertisers…7
Moreover, low er levels of au d ience size and valu e both exert d ow nw ard
p ressu res on the p rod u ction bu d gets of m inority content, w hich fu rther
u nd erm ines the ability of su ch content to com p ete and rem ain viable… The
d ifferential in p rod u ction bu d gets m ay be enou gh for som e m inority au d ience
m em bers to find the m ajority content m ore ap p ealing than the content targeted
at their p articu lar interest and concerns. Su ch d efections fu rther u nd erm ine
the viability of m inority-targeted content… The end resu lt is low er levels of
availability of minority-targeted content.8

A long trad ition of m ore qu alitative research also su pports the
conclu sion that m inority m arket segm ents are less w ell served .9 Greater
concentration resu lts in less d iversity of ow nership. Diversity of ow nership –
across geographic, ethnic and gend er lines – is correlated w ith d iversity of
programming.10
Sim ply, m inority ow ners are m ore likely to present
7

The au thor cites Ow en, Bru ce and Steven Wild m an. V ideo Economics. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1992; Waldfogel, 1999.
8
Naplio, 2002, p. xx.
9
H am ilton, Jam es T. Channeling V iolence: The Economic M arket for V iolent Television
Programming. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998; Wild m an, Steven. 1994.
“One-w ay Flow s and the Econom ics of Au d ience Making.” in Jam es Entem a and D.
Charles Whitney (ed s.), A udiencemaking: How the M edia Create the A udience. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Pu blications, 1994; Wild m an, Steven and Theom ary Karam anis. “The
Econom ics of Minority Program m ing.” In Am y Garner (ed s.), Investing in Diversity:
A dvancing Opportunities for M inorities in M edia. Washington: Asp en Institute, 1998; and
Owen and Wildman, 1992.
10
Fife, Marilyn D. The Impact of M inority Ownership on Broadcast Program Content: A
Case Study of W GPR-TV ’s Local N ews Content. Washington: N ational Association of
Broad casters, 1979; Fife, Marilyn D. The Impact of M inority Ownership on Broadcast
Program Content: A M ulti-M arket Study. Washington: N ational Association of
Broad casters, 1986; Congressional Research Service. M inority Broadcast Station
Ownership and Broadcast Programming: Is There a N exus? Washington: Library of
Congress, 1988; H art, Jr., T. A. 1988. “The Case for Minority Broad cast Ow nership .”
Gannett Center Journal; Wimmer, K. A. 1988. “Deregulation and the Future of Pluralism
in the Mass Med ia: The Prosp ects for Positive Policy Reform .” M ass Communications
Review; Gau ger, Tim othy G. 1989. “The Constitu tionality of the FCC’s Use of Race and
Sex in Granting Broad cast Licenses.” N orthwestern Law Review; Kliem an, H ow ard .
1991. “Content Diversity and the FCC’s Minority and Gend er Licensing Policies.”
Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic M edia 35: 411-429; Collins-Jarvis, Lori A. 1993.
“Gend er Rep resentation in an Electronic City H all: Fem ale Ad op tion of Santa
Monica’s PEN System .” Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic M edia 37:1: 49-65; Lacy,
Stephen, Mary Alice Shaver and Charles St. Cyr. 1996. The Effects of Public Ownership
and N ew sp ap er Com p etition on the Financial Perform ance of N ew sp ap er
Corp oration: A Rep lication and Extension. Journalism and M ass Communications
Quarterly Summer.
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minority-centric points of view 11 ju st as fem ales are m ore likely to present
female-centric points of view 12 in the speakers, form ats and content they pu t
forw ard . Stud y 12 d ocu ments the vast u nd er-serving of m inority au d iences
from the su pply sid e and the link betw een a lack of m inority ow nership and
concentration.
THE IMPACT OF M ARKET FAILURE ON CIVIC D ISCOURSE
The im pact of the market stru ctu re of contem porary m ed ia markets
and their failu res is felt across the foru m for d em ocratic d iscou rse. In
particular, it results in ow ner influ ence, erosion of checks, balances and other
positive externalities of vigorous civic discourse and loss of local perspective.
Baker presents a lengthy discussion of the political implications of the
m onopolistic m ed ia m arket. The first point is that it results in m arket pow er,
trad itionally m easu red as excess profits.13 For m ed ia m arkets, how ever,
11

Em p irical stud ies d em onstrating the link betw een m inority p resence in the m ed ia
and m inority-oriented p rogram m ing inclu d e Fife, 1979; Fife, 1986; Congressional
Research Service, 1988 ; H art, 1988; Wim m er, 1988; Evans, Akou sa Barthew ell. 1990.
“Are Minority Preferences N ecessary? Another Look at the Rad io Broad casting
Industry.” Y ale Law and Policy Review 8; Du bin, Jeff and Matthew L. Sp itzer. 1995.
Testing Minority Preferences in Broad casting. Southern California Law Review 68;
Bachen, Christine, Allen H am m ond , Lau rie Mason and Step hanie Craft. Diversity of
Programming in the Broadcast Spectrum: Is there a Link Between Owner Race or Ethnicity
and N ews and Public A ffairs Programming? Santa Clara: Santa Clara University Press,
1999; Mason, Lau rie, Christine M. Bachen and Step hanie L. Craft. 2001. Su p p ort for
FCC Minority Ow nership Policy: H ow Broad cast Station Ow ner Race or Ethnicity
Affects N ew s and Pu blic Affairs Program m ing Diversity. Communication Law & Policy
6.
12
A sim ilar line of em p irical research d ealing w ith gend er exists. See Lacy, Shaver and
St. Cyr, 1996; Gau ger, 1989; Kliem an, 1991; Collins-Jarvis, 1993; Lau zen, Martha M.
and David Dozier. 1999. Making a Difference in Prim e Tim e: Wom en on Screen and
Behind the Scenes in 1995-1996 Television Season. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic
Media Winter; O’Su llivan, Patrick B. The N exus Between Broadcast Licensing Gender
Preferences and Programming Diversity: W hat Does the Social Scientific Evidence Say?
Santa Barbara: Department of Communication, U.C. Santa Barbara, CA, 2000.
13
Baker, 2001, p p . 43-44: “Monop olistic com p etition theory ap p lies to m ed ia good s.
They… characteristically m anifest the ‘p u blic good ’ attribu te of having d eclining
average costs over the relevant range of their su p p ly cu rves d u e to a significant
p ortion of the p rod u ct’s cost being its ‘first cop y cost,’ w ith ad d itional cop ies having a
low to zero cost. There are a nu m ber of im p ortant attribu tes of m onop olistic
com p etition that are relevant for p olicy analysis and that d istingu ish it from the
stand ard m od el of so-called p u re com p etition, the stand ard m od el that u nd erw rites
the belief that a p rop erly w orking m arket lead s inexorably to the best result (given the
m arket’s givens of existing m arket exp ressed p references and the existing d istribu tion
of w ealth). The first featu re to note here is that in m onop olistic com p etition often
p rod u cts p revail that d o not have close, certainly not id entical, su bstitutes. Second ,
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econom ic profits can be u sed (d issipated ) in another im portant w ay. Med ia
owners can use their market power to influence content or policy directly.
The weak competition allows owners to earn monopoly profits and to
u se m onopoly rents to pu rsu e their personal agend as. The claim that
ow nership of the m ed ia d oes not m atter to the selection and presentation of
content is not plau sible.14 Whatever their political preferences, m ed ia ow ners
are in a uniquely powerful position to influence civic discourse. They can use
both the econom ic resou rces m ad e available by their m arket pow er (as can
m onopolists in any ind ustry) and the u niqu e role of the m ed ia to pu rsu e
those preferences.15
One set of behaviors that is particu larly problem atic involves
u nd em ocratic u ses of m ed ia m arket pow er in pursuit of the private interests
of ow ners throu gh manipu lation, co-optation and censoriou s behaviors.16
This can u nd erm ine the w atchd og role of the press or d istort coverage of
events, w hen it su its their interests. The chilling effect need not be consciou s
or overt. Pow erful m ed ia ow ners tend to be very visible figu res in their
political and policy preferences. Em ployees and institu tions instinctively toe
the line and self-censor ou t of an instinct for self-preservation, w hich
dampens antagonism in the media.17 It need not be continuous to be effective,
bu t can be exercised at critical mom ents – elections, policy votes in
legislatures.
Even thou gh this is not Wald fogel’s central concern, w hen he looks at
the qu estion of ow nership, he find s su pport for the view that ow nership

this non-su bstitu tability of the p revailing m onop olistic p rod u ct w ill allow reap ing of
potentially significant monopoly profits.”
14
Krotoszynski and Blaiklock, 2000, p p . 832…833: “The ow ners of a television or rad io
station p ossess a u niqu e ability to influ ence the d irection of p u blic affairs throu gh
selective coverage of contemp orary events and cand id ates for p u blic office…. “To be
su re, concentrations of p olitical p ow er present a m ore d irect kind of threat to
d em ocracy than d o concentrations of m ed ia p ow er. That said it is p ossible to u se
m ed ia p ow er as a m eans of channeling, if not controlling the flow of p olitical p ow er.
The ow ners of a television or rad io station have a u niqu e op p ortu nity to influ ence the
ou tcom es of electoral contests – both by rep orting on cand id ates favorably and
u nfavorably and throu gh benign (or m align) neglect. Med ia exp osu re is like oxygen
to cand id ates for p olitical office, p articu larly at the fed eral level. If a television station
p retend s that a cand id ate d oes not exist, her chances of election are consid erably
reduced.”
15
Baker, 2002, p . 43. Krotoszynski and Blaiklock, 2000, p . 875, p u t it as follow s: “There
is sim p ly no reason to believe that som eone like Ted Tu rner or Ru p ert Mu rd ock w ill
consistently seek to m axim ize econom ic retu rns rather than u se m ed ia p ow er to
influence political events in ways he deems desirable.”
16
Baker, 2002, p. 73.
17
Krotoszynski and Blaiklock, 2000, p . 867: “Em p loyees are u nlikely to criticize their
employers, and this truism holds true for the fourth Estate.”
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m atters beyond “sim ple” econom ics. Wald fogel find s in his stu d y of rad io
markets that “black owners enter in situations that white owners avoid.”18 He
continu es to consid er possible explanations for this behavior and offers a
hypothesis that relies on owner preferences,
A second p ossibility is that black ow ners enter for “id eological” reasons, w hich
m eans they are w illing to forego som e p rofits in ord er to p rovid e a p articular
sort of p rogram m ing. This hyp othesis w ou ld rationalize the observation that
black-ow ned and targeted stations have few er listeners, on average, than [sic]
their w hite-ow ned cou nterp arts (in m arkets w ith both w hite and black-owned,
black-targeted stations). Black ow ners’ w illingness to accep t sm aller retu rns
cou ld exp lain w hy greater black ow nership increases black-targeted
p rogram m ing: ad d itional black ow ners are w illing to enter low -profitability
m arket niches (p rogram m ing to sm all black au d iences) that w hites w ou ld not
enter.19

Perhaps Wald fogel pu ts the w ord “id eology” in qu otes to blu nt its
negative connotation. Baker presents the policy implications in terms that are
familiar and relevant to the arena of diversity policy in civic discourse.
Choice, not m erely m arket forces, influ ences qu ality. Choice exp lains the
variation both w ithin and betw een ow nership categories. Moreover, qu ality
m ay p rovid e som e efficiencies and m anagem ent qu alities that som etim es
increase the enterp rise’s potential for profits or qu ality. H ow ever, the
incentives for execu tives (ed itors and p u blishers) in chain firm s as w ell as the
ad d ed p ressu res of p u blic ow nership are likely to be d irected tow ard focu sing
on increasing p rofits. Possibly d u e to p rice of m em bership or involvement
w ithin a com m u nity that lead s to d ed ication or d esires to form statu s in that
com m u nity, local ow nership m ight be sociologically p red icted to lead to
greater com m itm ent to and greater choice to serve valu es other than the
bottom line.20

Baker argues that the experiences of civic discourse for minorities and
the pu blic at large are d eeply affected by ow nership. Large, monopolistic
stru ctu res m ake it m ore d ifficu lt for opinion lead ers w ithin m inority or niche
com m u nities to gain experience in the industry.21 Baker links the need to
have policies that promote view point d iversity to the tend ency of the
com m ercial m ed ia to u nd er serve the less pow erful in society.22 In ord er for
18

Siegelm an, Peter, Joel Wald fogel. 2001. “Race and Rad io: Preference Externalities,
Minority Ow nership and the Provision of Program m ing to Minorities” A dvances in
Applied Microeconomics 10, p. 23.
19
Id., p. 25.
20
Baker, 2002, p. 47.
21
Id., pp. 67-68.
22
Baker, 2001, pp . 96-97: “Thu s, from the p ersp ective of p rovid ing p eop le w hat they
w ant, m ed ia m arkets are su bject to the follow ing criticism s. They p rovid e m u ch too
m u ch “bad ” qu ality content – bad m eaning content that has negative externalities.
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the m ed ia to m eet the need s of these grou ps, it mu st inform and m obilize
them.23
The empirical evidence available in the academic and trade literatures
overw helm ingly su pports the concerns expressed abou t the em ergence of a
hyper-com mercialized , concentrated m ass m ed ia. Com m ercialism can easily
overw helm pu blic interest and d iverse content.24 Concentration d rains
resou rces from jou rnalistic enterprises.25 Em pirical evid ence clearly su ggests
that concentration in m ed ia markets– few er ind epend ent ow ners — has a
negative effect on d iversity.26 The evid ence to support this conclu sion
Med ia m arkets also m ay p rod u ce a w astefu l abu nd ance of content resp ond ing to
m ainstream taste. Otherw ise, the m ain p roblem is u nd erp rod u ction. Markets
p red ictably p rovid e inad equate am ou nts and inad equ ate d iversity of m ed ia content.
Esp ecially inad equ ate is their p rod u ction of “qu ality” content – qu ality m eaning
content that has p ositive externalities. Prod u ction of civically, ed u cationally, and
m aybe cu ltu rally significant content p referred by the p oor is p red ictably inad equ ate.
Sm aller grou p s w ill often be served inad equ ately, either in relation to d em ocracy’s
com m itm ent to equ ally valu e their p references or d u e to the consequ ences of
monopolistic competition.”
23
Baker, 2002, p. 16.
24
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Age of Access. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, 2000, pp. 79.
25
Layton, Charles, 1999. “What d o Read ers Really Want?” A merican Journalism Review
March. reprinted in Gene Roberts and Thom as Ku nkel, Breach of Faith: A Crisis of
Coverage in the A ge of Corporate N ewspapering. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas
Press, 2002; McConnell, Bill and Su sanne Au lt. 2001. “Fox TV’s Strategy: Tw o by Tw o,
Duop olies are Key to the Com p any’s Goal of Becom ing a Major Local Presence.”
Broadcasting and Cable, 30 Ju ly 2001 Trigoboff, Dan. “Chri-Craft, Fox Moves In: The
Du op oly Marriage in Three Markets Com es w ith Som e Consolid ation.” Broadcasting
and Cable, 6 August 2001; Trigoboff, Dan. 2002. “Rios H ead s KCOP N ew s.”
Broadcasting and Cable, 14 October 2002; Beam , Rand al A. 1995. “What it Means to Be a
Market-Oriented N ew sp ap er.” N ewspaper Research Journal 16; 2002. “Size of Corp orate
Parent Drives Market Orientation.” N ewspaper Research Journal 23;Vane, Sharyn. 2002.
“Taking Care of Bu siness.” A merican Journalism Review March; N eim an Rep orts. 1999.
The Business of News, the News About Business, Summer.
40
Levin, H arvey J. 1971. “Program Du p lication, Diversity, and Effective View er
Choices: Som e Em p irical Find ings.” A merican Economic Review 61:2: 81-88 Lacy,
Step hen. 1989. “A Mod el of Dem and for N ew s: Im p act of Com p etition on N ew sp ap er
Content.” Journalism Quarterly 66; Johnson, Thom as J. and Wayne Wanta. 1993.
Newspap er Com p etition and Message Diversity in an Urban Market. Mass
Communications Review 20: 45; Davie, William R. and Ju ng-Sook Lee. 1993. Television
N ew s Technology: Do More Sou rces Mean Less Diversity? Journal of Broadcasting and
Electronic Media 37, Fall: 453-464 Wanta, Wayne and Thomas J. Johnson. 1994. “Content
Changes in the St. Lou is Post-Disp atch Du ring Different Market Situ ations.” Journal of
Media Economics 7; Cou lson, David C. 1994. “Im p act of Ow nership on N ew sp ap er
Quality.” Journalism Quarterly, 1994.; Cou lson, David C. and Anne H ansen. 1995. The
Lou isville Cou rier-Jou rnal’s N ew s Content After Pu rchase by Gannett. Journalism and
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inclu d es both anecd otal exam ples and statistical stu d ies.
The econom ic
interests of m ed ia ow ners influ ence their ad vertising, program ming choices,
and how they provide access to political information.27
Conglom erates are d riven by ad vertisers, w ho exercise influ ence over
content.28
Dangerou s abu se of this influ ence ranges from favorable
new spaper review s of a broad caster’s program ming 29 or loss of coverage,30 to
positive ed itorials/ opinion articles abou t the bu siness interests of a
broadcaster or politician.31 Such favoritism would be more difficult to prevent
if cross-ow nership w ere broad ly perm itted .32 When the tw o largest sou rces of
M ass Communications Quarterly 72:1: 205-215; Iosifid es, Petros. 1999. “Diversity versu s
Concentration in the Deregu lated Mass Med ia.” Journalism and M ass Communications
Quarterly Sp ring; Lacy, Step hen and Tod d F. Sim on. “Com p etition in the N ew sp ap er
Ind u stry.” in Step hen Lacy and Tod d F. Sim on (ed s.), The Economics and Regulation of
United States Newspapers. Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993.
27
Soloski, John. 1979. “Econom ics and Managem ent: The Real Influ ence of N ew sp ap er
Groups.” N ewspaper Research Journal 1; Bennett, W. Lance. N ews: The Politics of Illusion.
N ew York: Longm ans, 1988; Bu sterna, John C. 1988. “Television Station Ownership
Effects on Program m ing and Id ea Diversity: Baseline Data.” Journal of M edia Economics
2:3: 63-74; H erm an, Ed w ard and N oam Chom sky. M anufacturing Consent. N ew York:
Pantheon Books, 2002; Glasser, Theod ore L., David S. Allen and S. Elizabeth Banks.
1989. The Influ ence of Chain Ow nership on N ew s Play: A Case Stu d y. Journalism
Quarterly 66; Katz, J. 1990. “Mem o to Local N ew s Directors.” Columbia Journalism
Review May/ Ju ne: 40-45 McManu s, J. 1990. “Local N ew s: N ot a Pretty Pictu re.”
Columbia Journalism Review 28; Price, Monroe E. 1999. “Pu blic Broad casting and the
Crisis of Corporate Governance.” Cardozo Arts & Entertainment 17.
28
Ju st, Marion, Rosalind Levine and Kathleen Regan. 2001. “N ew s for Sale: H alf of
Stations Rep ort Sp onsor Pressu re on N ew s Decision.” Columbia Journalism ReviewProject for Excellence in Journalism November/December, p. 2.
29
Stru p p , Joe. “Three Point Play.” Editor and Publisher, 21 Au gu st 2000, p . 23; Moses,
Lu cia. “TV or not TV? Few N ew sp ap ers are Cam era Shy, Bu t Som etim es Tw o Into
One Ju st Doesn’t Go.” Editor and Publisher, 21 Au gu st 2000, p . 22; Roberts, Gene,
Thom as Ku nkel, and Charles Clayton. “Leaving Read ers Behind .” In Roberts, Gene,
Thom as Ku nkel, and Charles Clayton (ed s.), Leaving Readers Behind. Fayetteville:
University of Arkansas Press, 2001, 10.
30
Belo. 2003. Comments of Belo Corp., In the M atter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review –
Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules A dopted Pursuant
to Section 202 of the Telecommunications A ct of 1996, Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations
and N ewspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning M ultiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast
Stations in Local M arkets, Definition of Radio M arkets, MB Docket N o. 02-277, MM
Dockets 02-235, 01-317, 00-244, p p . 8-9; Karr, Albert. “Television N ew s Tu nes Ou t
Airwaves Auction Battle.” Wall Street Journal, 1 May 1996, p. B1.
31
See Qu incy Illinois Visitors Gu id e, 2001 ed ition; McConnell, Bill. “The N ational
Acqu irers: Whether Better for N ew s or Fatter Profits, Med ia Com p anies Want in on
TV/Newspaper Cross-Ownership.” Broadcasting and Cable, 10 December 2001.
32
Ku nkel, Thom as and Gene Roberts. 2001. “The Age of Corp orate N ew sp ap ering,
Leaving Read ers Behind .” A merican Journalism Review May. On coverage of the 1996
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new s and inform ation – television and new spaper – com e u nd er the sam e
ow nership roof, there is special cau se for concern abou t bu siness pressu res
that could undermine the forum for democratic discourse.33
Left u nrestrained , the marketplace w ill prod u ce few er w atchd og
activities cond u cted by less rigorou s institu tions. The pu blic at large benefits
from the watchdog function beyond the value that individual media firms can
captu re in their m arket transactions (ad vertising revenu e and view er
paym ents). Baker u ses investigative journalism as an exam ple. Abu ses are
less likely to be u ncovered and m ore likely to occu r because the d eterrent of
the threat of exposure will be diminished.34
One item both new s entities “sell” is exp ose ’s on the content of investigative
jou rnalism . N ot ju st the read ers or listeners bu t all m em bers of the com m u nity
benefit from w hatever reform or better governm ent or im p roved corp orate
behavior that occu rs d u e to these stories. This jou rnalism can create hu ge
p ositive externalities. The p ap er’s lim ited nu m ber of p u rchasers cannot be
exp ected to p ay the fu ll valu e of this benefit - they have no reason to p ay for
the valu e received by non-read ers. Even m ore (econom ically) trou bling, a
m ajor benefit of the existence of new s organizations that engage in relatively
effective investigative jou rnalism is that this jou rnalism d eters w rong d oing by
governm ental or corporate actors - but deterred behavior produces no story for
the jou rnalism to rep ort and hence for the m ed ia entity to sell. The p aper has
no op p ortu nity to internalize these benefits of its jou rnalism - an econom ic
exp lanation for there being less of this typ e of jou rnalism than a straight
welfare economics analysis justifies.35

The positive externalities that Baker id entifies w ith respect to the
w atchd og and experiential fu nctions are part of a larger category of
Telecommunications Act see Gilens, Martin and Craig H ertzm an. 1997. “Corp orate
Ow nership and N ew s Bias: N ew sp ap er Coverage of the 1996 Telecom m u nications
Act.” Pap er d elivered at the A nnual M eeting of the A merican Political Science A ssociation,
August, p. 8.
33
Davis, Charles and Step hanie Craft. 2000. N ew Med ia Synergy: Em ergence of
Institutional Conflict of Interest. Journal of Mass Media Ethics 15, pp. 222-223.
34
Baker, 2002, Id ., p . 64: “Consid er the m erger of tw o entities that su p p ly local new s
w ithin one com m u nity – p ossibly the new sp ap er and rad io station... Presu m ably the
m erged entity w ou ld still have an incentive to engage in at least a p rofit-maximizing
am ou nt of investigative jou rnalism . Bu t how m u ch is that? The am ou nt sp ent in the
pre-m erger situ ation m ay have reflected m erely an am ou nt that the m ed ia entity’s
audience wanted and would pay for (either directly or indirectly through being “sold”
to ad vertisers). Alternatively, the p re-m erger p rofit m axim izing level for each
ind ep end ent entity m ay have reflected a com p etitive need to com p are ad equ ately to a
p rod u ct offered by its com p etitor. In this second scenario, com p etition m ay have
ind u ced increased bu t still inefficiently sm all exp end itu res on investigative
journalism.
35
Baker, 2002, p. 64.
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externalities associated w ith inform ation prod u cts, particu larly civic
d iscou rse content. Inform ation prod u cts, to a significant d egree, are seen as
possessing attribu tes of pu blic good s,36 w hich m arkets fail to provid e in
adequate quantity or quality.

36

Su nstein, Cass. 2000. “Television and the Public Interest.” California Law Review 8, p.
517.

TERRAIN OF MEDIA AND POLITICS

281

STUDY 18:
THE CONTEMPORARY TERRAIN OF MEDIA AND
POLITICS DEMANDS MORE CONCERN ABOUT
CONCENTRATION OF THE MASS MEDIA
M ARK COOPER
O LD THEORIES THAT N O LONGER A PPLY M UST BE D ISCARDED
The previou s stu d ies show that the em pirical evid ence com piled in
the last d ecad e su pports trad itional explanations of m ed ia m arket behavior in
certain areas and rejects them in other areas. The rejection of some of the old
saws is not necessarily a function of the fact that the explanations and theories
w ere w rong in the past; rather changes in the social, econom ic and political
stru ctu re m ay have rend ered them obsolete. The assu m ptions abou t
cond itions in the m arket and behavior of m ed ia ow ners that m ad e them good
predictors of market structures and output in the past, no longer apply.
The essential point of the Cou rt ru ling in Prometheus is that public
policy choices m u st reflect social reality. Thu s, it is im portant to give u p the
old theories that no longer explain reality and ad opt new ones. The m ost
obviou s first step is to recognize that, left to its ow n d evices, the econom ic
processes in m ed ia m arkets w ill not prod u ce a vibrantly com petitive m ed ia
m arketplace that serves the pu blic interest.
Consolid ation and
conglom eration d iminish d iversity and create pow erful m ed ia voices that
have excessive influence.
The FCC relied on tw o theories to claim that concentration of the
m ed ia is good for consum ers: Peter Steiner’s 1 argu m ent that concentrated
m ed ia com panies provid e greater d iversity and Joseph Schu m peter’s 2 theory

1

Federal Communications Commission, Initial Notice.
N otice, p . 32, p rovid es the innovation d iscu ssion. “Fu rther N otice of Prop osed
Rulemaking.” In the M atter of Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition A ct of 1992, Implementation of Cable A ct Reform
Provisions of the Telecommunications A ct of 1996, The Commission’s Cable Horizontal and
V ertical Ownership Limits and A ttribution Rules, Review of the Commission’s Regulations
Governing A ttribution Of Broadcast and Cable/M DS Interests, Review of the Commission’s
Regulations and Policies Affecting Investment In the Broadcast Industry, Reexamination of the
Commission’s Cross-Interest Policy, CS Docket N o. 98-82, CS Docket N o. 96-85, MM
Docket No. 92-264, MM Docket No. 94-150, MM Docket No. 92-51, MM Docket No. 87154, 13 Sep tember 2001, Para 36, issu ed on the sam e d ay as the original notice in the
m ed ia ow nership p roceed ings m akes reference to Schu m p eter in this d iscu ssion. The
Chairm an had m ad e sim ilar references to monop oly and innovation in his Broad band
2
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that m onopolists prod u ce m ore innovation. The Com m ission and ind u stry
comments that restate these theories present no economic evidence in support
of the argu ments. The FCC either m isrepresents the original id ea, or fails to
recognize that the assu m ptions u nd erlying the theories d o not fit the m ed ia
market reality.3
The Steiner hypothesis has always been controversial as a proposition
abou t d iversity. “Overall, explicit tests of the Steiner m od el have provid ed
m ixed resu lts in stu d ies d ealing w ith program choices. For the m ost part,
stu d ies d ealing w ith television have rejected the Steiner theory on the basis of
audience preference and the mechanics of the television broadcast industry.” 4
Many of the stu d ies of the hypothesis conflate variety of formats w ith
d iversity of view points. It is abou t entertainm ent, not new s and inform ation.
Even in the narrow realm of variety, support has been mixed.
The critical assu m ption u nd erlying Steiner’s theory is a relative
hom ogeneity of taste. The theory m ay have been tru e w hen it w as first
offered fifty years ago, given the m ake-u p of the popu lation and the
d em ographic characteristics of the au d ience at w hom the m ed ia w ere
targeted . The em pirical evid ence of the past d ecad e show s that strong
d ifferences in taste result in preference m inorities that are u nd erserved and
u nd ervalu ed by the com m ercial m ass m ed ia. Moreover, as the popu lation
becom es increasingly com plex, the role of d ifferences in information need s
grow s. Even w here it can be show n that m ergers allow a beat to be ad d ed ,
w e find that u pscale entertainm ent is the focu s (m ining the favored au d ience)
at the expense of new s and information. It is tim e for the Com m ission to
aband on the theory su pporting increased concentration in m ed ia m arkets. It
no longer fits the reality of the cond itions of civic d iscou rse in Am erica, if
indeed, it ever did.
The Com m ission relies u pon the Schu m peterian argu m ent on
transitory m onopoly pow er to su ggest it shou ld allow or prom ote
concentrated m ed ia markets to provid e resou rces for investm ent. The

Migration sp eech and the argu m ent ap p ears w ord for w ord in the FCC’s d raft
strategic plan (October 1, 2002).
3
Inform ation Policy Institu te. “Com m ents of the Inform ation Policy Institu te.” In the
M atter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast
Ownership Rules and Other Rules A dopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the
Telecommunications A ct of 1996, Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations and N ewspapers,
Rules and Policies Concerning M ultiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local
Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, MB Docket No. 02-277, MM Dockets 02-235, 01-317,
00-244, January 2, 2003 (hereafter, Information Policy Institute), pp. 53-59.
4
Cham bers, Tod d and H erbert H . H ow ard . 2006. “The Econom ics of Med ia
Consolid ation,” in Alan B. Albarran, Sylvia N . Chan Olm stead and Michael O. w irth,
Handbook of M edia M anagement and Economics (Mahw ah: Law rence Erlbau m ), p . 177.
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Com m ission has m isinterpreted or m isapplied Schum peter’s argu m ent.5 The
FCC seeks to ju stify m arket concentration, w hereas Schu m peter focu sed on
firm size. There is no d oubt that the d om inant com m ercial m ass m ed ia firms
are alread y large enou gh to possess econom ies of scale. Concentration that
increases market pow er m ay u nd erm ine Schu m peterian processes becau se it
dulls competition, which was central to his argument.
The m onopoly rents earned by the innovative entrepreneu r in the
Schu m peterian argu m ent m u st be transitory, lest they d egenerate into plain
old antisocial m onopoly rents. Med ia ind ustry m ogu ls look and behave
m u ch m ore like trad itional anti-com petitive m onopolists than innovative
Schu m peterian entrepreneu rs.6 The u nd erlying technologies have been
relatively stable for d ecad es.
Strengthening the hand of entrenched
incu m bents using off-the-shelf technologies hard ly seem s the w ay to prom ote
innovation and creative d estru ction. The Com m ission’s policies are having
the opposite effect.7 H ere, as in the case of the Steiner hypothesis, the
Commission has simply failed to accept the empirical facts.
Based u pon the em pirical evid ence, the Com m ission m u st aband on
the Steiner/ Schu m peter justification for concentration and m onopoly pow er
in m ed ia m arkets. Whether these tw o argu m ents articu lated over fifty years
ago ever made sense for media markets is debatable, but it is overwhelmingly
clear they do not fit the facts of 21st century America.
More im portantly, the Com m ission mu st fully appreciate the critical
role that competition plays in the current environment.
THEORY OF A D IVERSE, H ETEROGENEOUS M EDIA EN VIRON MEN T WITH S TRONG
PREFERENCES AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS
Wald fogel’s analysis d escribed in Stud y 18 focu ses tightly on m ed ia
m arket stru ctu re and its political im pact 8 and falls w ithin a broad er field that
applies econom ic analytic techniqu es to the stu d y of politics and the m ed ia.9
5

Information Policy Institute, 2003, pp. 46-52.
Consu m ers Union, et al. “Initial Com m ents of Consu m er Fed eration,” et al., Cross
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and N ewspapers, MM Docket N o. 01-235, Decem ber 4,
2001.
7
Coop er, Mark. Cable M ergers and M onopolies: M arket Power Digital M edia and
Communications Networks. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2002.
8
Wald fogel, 2001a. Other p ap ers in the series of stu d ies of “p reference externalities”
inclu d e Wald fogel, 1999, at Siegelm an and Wald fogel, 2001, Wald fogel and
Oberholzer-Gee, 2001b, George and Wald fogel, 2000, as w ell as Wald fogel, 2001b; and
Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel, 2001a.
9
Glaeser, Ed w ard L., Giacom o A. M. Ponzetto and Jesse M. Shap iro. 2004. “Strategic
Extrem ism : Why Rep u blicans and Dem ocrats Divid e on Religiou s Valu es.” Harvard
Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper N umber 2044, October; Glaeser, Ed w ard .
6
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In these theories, information dissemination and communications play critical
roles, and link d irectly to a grow ing literatu re that conclu d es that the
econom ics of the com m ercial mass m ed ia ultimately set the cond itions for a
tyranny of the m ajority in m ed ia m arkets.
These literatu res share
fu nd am ental assu m ptions, in particu lar an assu m ption of strong preferences
u nevenly d istribu ted in a heterogeneou s population. The literatu res link
m ed ia behavior d irectly to political processes, recognizing that the cost of
information dissemination and voting play a key role in the political process.
These theories challenge m ajor tenets of the perceived acad em ic
w isd om of the 1950s and 1960s that saw a ru sh to the m id d le and the search
for the m od al voter, w hich w ere pred icted by an earlier generation of
econom ists stu d ying politics. These claim s have been u nd ermined by the
strategic actions of political entrepreneurs in a context of social change.10 The
claim that the m ed ia passively m eet consu m er need s w hen they express their
d esires to ad vertisers has been u nd ercu t by m ed ia m arkets that actively
pu rsue profit m aximization by slanting ou tpu t to serve highly segm ented
pluralities, especially when and where there are media monopolies.11
This realignm ent of the operation of com m ercial med ia m arkets w ith
respect to the thru st of political activity is part of a broad er shift in econom ic
thinking. The assumption that rational actors, maneuvering freely in markets,
can create and sustain efficient, stable econom ic equilibriu m s has been
challenged . The stock m arket crash of 1987 and the bu rsting of the d ot.com
bu bble in 200012 squarely refu ted the efficiency and stability of the rational
actor theory in the fortress d om ain of rational m arket theory – financial
markets. The suspicion spread rapidly to other economic and social sciences.
At a broad er level, this p ap er contribu tes to one of the central issues in
economics, namely whether the presence of rational arbitrageurs keep financial
m arkets “efficient.” In the context of financial m arkets, Fried m an (1953)
argu ed long ago that it d oes. Su bsequ ent research, how ever, has p roved him
w rong, both theoretically and em p irically. One find ing of this research is that,
in som e situ ations, su ch as stock m arket bu bbles, it m ay p ay p rofit-maximizing
firm s to p u m p u p the tu lip s, rather than elim inate irrationality. Su bsequ ent
research has consid ered the interaction betw een biased ind ivid u als and
rational entrep reneu rs in other contexts, su ch as the incitem ent of hatred ,
p olitical com p etition, and prod u ct d esign. H ere w e ask a closely related
question for the m arket for new s: d oes comp etition am ong p rofit-maximizing
“The Political Econom y of H atred .” N BER W orking Paper 9171. Cam brid ge, MA:
N ational Bu reau of Econom ic Research, 26 October 2004; Mu llainathan, Send hil and
Andrei Shleifer. 2004. The Market for News. American Economic Review 95.
10
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper, 1957;
11
As argu ed by Steiner, Peter O. 1952. “Program Patterns and the Workability of
Competition in Radio Broadcasting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 66.
12
Shiller, Robert J. 2003. “From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 17:1.
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new s p rovid ers elim inate m ed ia bias? We find that the answ er, as in both
financial and political markets, is no. Powerful forces motivate news providers
to slant and increase bias rather than clear up confusion.13

As oversimplified econom ic efficiency explanations falter,
sociological explanations fill the gap. Psychology re-enters political analysis
and sociology inform s the vast analyses of the m ed ia’s role in society. The
key social change that has u pend ed the old theories and gives cred ence to the
econom ic theory of m ed ia d iscrim ination is the increasing heterogeneity of
the population.
H ETEROGENEITY, EXTREMISM AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The terrain of m ed ia and d iscou rse is d riven by d ifferentiation in a
heterogeneous population with an active involvement of politically motivated
actors seeking to influ ence the presentation of new s and information in the
media. Waldfogel’s story in the media is writ large across a number of fields.
Differentiation arou nd salient values is the fu nd am ental concept that
links the social science d iscu ssions. The fu nd am ental observation that
u nd erlies this analysis is that firm s or political organizations seek to
d ifferentiate them selves along a prod u ct d im ension. Econom ists assu m e
salience of valu es (or the lack thereof) and stu d y its im plications for firm
behavior. A prim ary area of sociological inquiry is the analysis of the natu re
and quality of salience itself. Political science stu d ies how to create salience
through priming and agenda setting.14
In the econom y, firm s w ant to d istingu ish them selves accord ing to
the valu e that is m ore m eaningfu l to the consum er.
“Firm s choose to
m axim ize d ifferentiation in the d om inant characteristic and to m inim ize
d ifferentiation in the others w hen the salience of the form er is su fficiently
large.”15 Differentiation in the m ind of the consum er eases com petitive
pressures and allows profit maximization. If a single dimension is sufficiently
salient, it w ill becom e the prim ary axis of d ifferentiation w hile other prod u ct
dimensions will be downplayed.

13

Mu llainathan and Schleier, 2004, p p . 5-6. Fried m an, Milton. 1953. “The Case for
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15
Irm en and Thisse, 1998, p. 5; N even and Thisse, 1990; Tabu chi, 1994; Tirole, 1988.
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differentiate themselves by cover stories (Irmen and Thisse, 1998).
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The sociological literatu re find s that heterogeneity is the key to grou p
d ifferentiation and negative intergroup perceptions. “N egative perceptions
of ou t-grou ps are higher for those w ho live in neighborhood s w ith m ore of
their ow n racial grou p. It is im portant to bear in m ind that, these d ifferences
are also relative to the racial composition of the metropolitan area. The effects
of neighborhood racial isolation are greatest for people in m ore d iverse
m etropolitan areas.” 16 In other w ord s, as the environm ent becom es m ore
heterogeneous, the threat from ou tgroups grow s and d ifferentiation becom es
more salient.
The social d istribu tion of popu lations and the psychological
perception of grou ps interact to influence policy preferences. For exam ple,
w ith respect to the key econom ic issu e su ch as red istribu tion, the sociological
observation parallels the economics described by Waldfogel in Study 18.
Demographic fragm entation affects red istribu tion becau se it influ ences how
the p olitical p rocess aggregates ind ivid u al p references.
Interp ersonal
p references p rovid e a com p lem entary exp lanation. If ind ivid u als p refer to
red istribu te to their ow n racial, ethnic or religiou s grou p , they p refer less
d istribu tion w hen m em bers of their ow n grou p constitu te a sm aller share of
beneficiaries. As d em ograp hic heterogeneity increases, on average, the share
of beneficiaries belonging to one’s ow n grou p d eclines. Thu s average su p p ort
for redistribution declines as heterogeneity increases.17 .18

The political science literature offers a conclusion similar to that of the
econom ic literatu re w ith respect to d ifferentiation. “At any tim e, politics w ill
appear largely one-dimensional because the existing party activist
equilibriu m w ill d efine party d ifferences along the d imension that
d istinguishes them . One-d im ensional m od els w ill su ccessfully pred ict m ost
of the variation in legislative voting platforms.”19
Sim ilar to the sociological literatu re, the political science literatu re
offers the observation that “[e]xtrem ism rises w ith the heterogeneity of
voters’ preferences. As there is a greater range of preferences in the
population, party platforms will get more extreme.”20 But the political science
literature goes one step further. Entrepreneurial political leaders and activists
tend to be m ore extrem e than the m ass of voters and to exploit shifting
preferences to drive differentiation.
The political entrepreneu r w ants to raise the perceived benefit among
su pporters by low ering the perceived cost of voting, w hile achieving the
opposite among non-su pporters. The cost to politicians of reaching voters
becom es a critical issu e in election cam paigns. The cost to consu m ers of
16
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18
Hecter, 2004, p. 400.
19
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learning the facts is a key d eterminant to the effectiveness of political
entrepreneu rs at tailoring and m anaging the m essages they seek to d eliver.
The political entrepreneur uses media and communications to mobilize voters
by influ encing ind ivid uals – increasing the benefits and low ering the cost of
action.
Psychological fu nd am entals d ictate the avenu es throu gh w hich this
influ ence flow s. Ind ivid uals are consid ered to have strict core valu es w hile
rem aining flexible (or persuad able) to a greater or lesser d egree on other
valu es. The salience of any set of valu es (even core valu es) at any m om ent is
neither predetermined nor nearly determinable.21
The political activity of targeting exploits the fact that ind ivid uals
“prefer to hear or read new s that [is] m ore consistent w ith their beliefs,” and
that they especially “appreciate, find cred ible, enjoy, and rem em ber stories
that are consistent w ith their beliefs.” Contrarily, ind ivid u als “tend to ignore
category-inconsistent inform ation u nless it is large enou gh to ind uce category
change.”22 Psychologically, ind ivid uals prefer consistency and reinforcem ent
of their view s and preferences, bu t they rem ain su sceptible to influence by
their networks, particularly its leaders, and the media.
The effectiveness of the message flow s from the “ease w ith w hich it
com es to m ind ,” 23 the target’s capacity to u nd erstand ,24 and the target’s
w illingness to think about the m essage.25 Effectiveness m ay also hinge on
w hether or not a targeted grou p consid ers itself d irectly and personally
affected by the m essage,26 especially “w here the message is central to the
group identity.”27 These characteristics induce elaboration on the message.28
We w ou ld expect the im portance of id eology as a m otivation for
political participation to vary over tim e; how ever, d epend ing on salience and
clarity of id eological cues provid ed . The m ore extrem e the position taken by
a party’s lead ers and the m ore those lead ers em phasize id eological appeals,
the m ore likely that party w ill be to attract id eologically m otivated activists.
Id entifying one’s grou p as affected and hearing m essages that appear to pu t
the grou ps interests in play catches the listeners attention. The d rift to the
extrem e w ill be accelerated if the group is m od erately large (close to half the
popu lation) and can be read ily sorted . If this is the case, m em bers of the
21
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organization are connected to each other bu t separate from others ou tsid e the
organization.29
THE ROLE OF THE M EDIA AND M ESSAGING
We should not be su rprised to find that the m ed ia play a large part in
this process. We have d escribed the im pact of the press and the tend ency for
the press to becom e politicized earlier, as w ell as the recent econom ic analysis
of m ed ia m arkets that reach a conclusion on d ifferentiation that is similar to
the other social science conclu sions.30 Because the med ia are the prim ary
m eans of political com m unication, especially d u ring elections, the resulting
political discourse is skewed against minority viewpoints.
The m ed ia play a cru cial role because m ed ia influ ence opinions and
m otivate action. The m ore aw are voters are, the m ore likely they are to vote.
Su ccessfu l mobilization hinges on low ering the costs of voting for citizens,
w hile facilitating the m obilizing process for parties and organizations. The
objective of political entrepreneu rs, thou gh, is a d ifferential voter tu rnou t
betw een su pporters and non-su pporters. This is achieved by m oving their
platforms aw ay from the center and tow ard the id eology of the core
constitu ency. The process is stim ulated and accelerated by inform ation
m anagem ent, w hich is effective because d ifferential aw areness of a
politician’s positions increases tu rnout am ong supporters m ore than the
opponent’s supporters.
Partisan m ed ia and channels of comm u nication becom e extrem ely
im portant, since they can help to target m essages. “Extrem ism occu rs
w henever there is som e ability to target inform ation to a grou p w hose
preferences d iffer from the preferences of the nation as a w hole.” 31
Particularly powerful is negative campaigning, which depresses voter turnout
among those with the least interest and information about the campaign,32 but
does not have that effect on one’s own supporters.
Targeting is aid ed by id eological, geographical and institu tional
segregation. “Party affiliation m eans d ifferential access to information abou t
the party platform s. One w ay in w hich parties m ay gain the ability to
broadcast messages is to have access to a selected subgroup of the population,

29
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su ch as a Chu rch or a Union.” 33 Su ch organizations facilitate recru itm ent
since “Political m obilizers are m ost likely to tu rn to people they know w hen
seeking recruits.” 34 People are m ore likely to be influenced by people they
know.
Using organizations and the m ed ia, political entrepreneu rs seek to
energize their su pporters, w ithou t energizing the su pporters of their
opponents. Political entrepreneurs target and tailor their messages to activate
and u nify their su pporters w hile confu sing and d ivid ing ad versaries. They
prevent alienation am ong their ow n supporters w hile prom oting ind ifference
among the opponent’s supporters. Well-recognized strategies include staging
events, spinning, and slanting.
“With access to a social group, a party will shift its policies… towards
the preferences of the m em bers of the organization. If the opposing party is
prevented from also gaining access to the organization, this shift yield s an
increase in the m argin of victory.” 35 Managem ent of preferences across a
range of issues is grou nd ed in the core preferences of the grou p, w hich are
fram ed by slanting and spin. Sorting and separation enhance the political
valu e of the netw ork, bu t the location of the grou ps are not pred eterm ined or
given, they are the result of strategic choices and action.
People in d ifferent netw orks are too far apart in their beliefs to
persuad e each other. Such separation is essential for the lead ers of the
netw orks: if a netw ork com es too close to others, its m em bers m ight com e
u nd er foreign influ ence, and as a consequ ence the id eological coherence of
the network is endangered.36
Activists have a pivotal fu nction in both the sociology of
organizations and the political d ynam ics of parties and elections.
Sociologically, they have key characteristics of influential com m u nicators –
commanding respect and sharing characteristics w ith the broad er grou p of
members.37 Politically, activists are the central agents in the recruitm ent and
m otivation process and have the greatest influ ence over political cand id ates.38
Ideological clues make it easier to attract activists.39
The battle for the middle requires a campaign to pull voters out of the
m id d le as opposed to repositioning the cand id ate m ore firmly on m id d le
ground.40 Political entrepreneu rs w ant to stim u late activists (interested ,
33
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strong su pporters) and m otivate m ore passive su pporters. They particu larly
w ant to get their activists interacting w ith passive su pporters and interested
ind epend ents. They w ant to persu ad e the interested m id d le. They w ant to
d em obilize the less interested am ong their opponent’s su pporters and
dishearten the more interested.
N egative cam paigning helps am ong the less interested and less
committed.
Negative advertising and fear campaigning are inevitable parts
of m ass m ed ia politics as w ell. They m ake u p a sm all part of the total
expend itu re and id eological platform and they d rive the im portant w ed ges,
but they must be used carefully or they can backfire.
The intersection of au d iences and m essages is com plex and m akes
moving the electorate difficult. Management of messages is made feasible by
geographic dispersion and institutional separation of the audiences.
M EDIA BIAS AND POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS
It shou ld also be noted that the m ed ia is not ju st a tool that political
entrepreneu rs m anipu late to achieve short-term goals like getting elected .
One of the m ost im portant classes of political entrepreneu rs is m ad e u p of
m ed ia ow ners. Med ia ow ners have d iscretionary resou rces and the m eans of
influ encing pu blic opinion as a result of their market pow er. Oligopolistic
com petition gives ow ners resources and d rives them tow ard extrem ism .
Politically m otivated m ed ia ow ners have the sam e interest in creating and
controlling m ore ou tlets to give their id eas a greater ad vantage in find ing
au d iences. The m ald istribu tion of “d eep enou gh pockets,” creates a
maldistribution of media outlets.
Bu t the politicization of the m ed ia goes far beyond the trad itional
concern about m ed ia ow ners as political entrepreneu rs. Ju st as long-term,
u nd erlying social and econom ic changes m ay profou nd ly affect the terrain on
w hich the political battle is fou ght, so too fu nd am ental changes in m ed ia
technology can alter the landscape of politics.
The fu nd am ental econom ic characteristics of m ed ia prod u ction in the
electronic age create forces for oligopolistic, or m onopolistic, com petition that
supports the political role of the media in two ways.
First, the m ed ia tend to serve su bsets of the popu lation to m axim ize
profits, w here preferences are d iverse. They valu e larger grou ps and target
w ealthier aud iences w ho provid e the bu lk of the retu rns for ad vertisers.
m od eration hyp othesis and confirm s an alternative, m obilization hyp othesis, noting
that “It seem s as if m arginal incu m bents are concerned that ap p ealing to voters in the
center w ill alienate m ore of their core su p p orters than they w ou ld gain from new
voters in the center (p . 510).” They link this behavior to the role of “their p rim e
constitu ency… m ost of w hom are w ell ou tsid e the id eological m ainstream of the
district.”
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Sensationalism sells, as long as it d oes not u pset the target au d ience, a
technique that w eighs particu larly heavily on those that can be easily
influ enced , potentially d istorting their view of ‘w hat is really going on’ or
‘what is really important.’
To d ifferentiate them selves, m ed ia outlets tend to be m ore extrem e
than the au d iences they target. The econom ic characteristics of m ed ia ou tlets
red u ce the nu m ber of sources available in the m ajor m ed ia, especially at the
local level. This creates a high rate of profit and red u ces com petition.
Differentiation along major lines of division becomes manageable.
The m od el of the m arket for new s offers ad d itional insights into the
behavior and d istribu tion of new s sou rces. Med ia ou tlets d o not ju st reflect
the m arket. To m axim ize profits, m ed ia ou tlets w ill slant new s to cater to
read er bias. Com petition d oes not solve the problem . “With heterogeneous
read ers, competition by itself polarizes read ership and if anything raises the
average read er bias. N ew s sou rces can be even m ore extrem e than their m ost
biased read ers. One cannot therefore infer read er beliefs d irectly from m ed ia
bias.”41
N ew s sou rces taking m ore extrem e positions to d ifferentiate
them selves is not the only reason that the d istribu tion of new s sou rces might
not sim ply reflect the und erlying d istribu tion of preferences. “[S]u ch
differences are reinforced by political entrepreneurs, who have an incentive to
create particular beliefs that w ou ld bring them su pport… N ew spapers w ou ld
then follow these entrepreneu rs in m irroring and reinforcing the beliefs of
their supporters.”42
The political process creates a strong incentive to spin the new s, and
political entrepreneurs have an interest in managing it.
Su p p ose that a p olitician, or som e other figu re of au thority, has a first m over
advantage, i.e. can choose which data… gets presented to the media first… The
p ap ers slant these d ata tow ard read er beliefs, bu t… w ill have significant
influ ence on w hat they rep ort as com p ared to their getting d ata from an
u nbiased sou rce… This effect becom es even m ore p ow erfu l in a m ore general
m od el of sequential rep orting. In this case, the initial sp in m ay shap e read er
p riors w hich fu tu re p ap ers face and consequ ently slant new s tow ard s. The
initial spin would then be reinforced even by ideologically neutral papers.43
Political competition is only one source of underlying reader diversity. We can
also im agine entrep reneu rs starting new sp ap ers on their ow n, so long as they
have d eep enou gh p ockets, creating enou gh d em and for u northod ox view s to
broad en the range of op inions (and slants) that are being covered . Id eological
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d iversity of entrep reneu rs them selves m ay be the sou rce of d iversity of m ed ia
coverage.44

The strategy for slanting and spinning lead s back to the initial
d iscu ssion of the goal of d ifferential m obilization of su pporters and
opponents. The best issues “bind the netw orks that su pport you , and d ivid e
those of your opponent.”45
The role of political entrepreneu rs and the political role of m ed ia
ow ners ad d the final link in the analysis. Grou ps form ed arou nd core values
becom e the vehicles for m obilizing voters throu gh asym m etrical
informational aw areness and are reinforced by slanting and spin. Political
entrepreneurs can rent them out on issues that are not at their core.
In this fram ew ork, political com petition d oes not lead to convergence
of party platform s to the view s of the m ed ian voter. Rather, parties separate
their m essages and try to isolate their m em bers to prevent personal influ ence
from those in the opposition.46
The battle over bias in the m ed ia is an essential ou tgrow th of the
u nd erlying political process d iscussed above. Discred iting sou rces of
information that the political entrepreneu r d oes not control or are hostile
tow ard s serves the pu rpose of explaining and d ism issing inconsistencies that
threaten to shake the faith of one’s su pporters. It d im inishes the extent to
w hich channels of u ncontrolled m ed ia can heighten aw areness of one’s
intentions, w hich threatens to m obilize opponents. It raises d ou bts am ong the
su pporters of one’s opponents and makes it hard er for the conscientiou s
citizen to ascertain the facts. The actu al behavior of the m ed ia need not have
changed for the battle over bias to be ignited ; nor d oes the bias actu ally have
to be tru e for charges of bias to be repeated . The claim serves a political
purpose.
A particularly clear exam ple of this from the 2004 Presid ential
election campaign was a New York Times story that reported a private meeting
w ith im portant su pporters at w hich Presid ent Bu sh w as said to have
promised to move quickly on privatization of social security (pumping up the
base). The Bu sh cam paign ad am antly d enied the accou nt (attem pting to
red u ce the m essage to opponents of a threat to one of their core valu es),
claim ing the erroneous story w as a resu lt of the ongoing bias of The Times.
Yet, the presid ent’s highest d om estic agend a priority after the election w as
privatizing social security, even thou gh exit polls show ed that very few
mentioned it (less than 5 percent).
If w e recou nt a series of “fact checking” exercises from the 2004
presidential campaign we can see the ambiguity in the outcomes that makes a
44
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simple correlation betw een reporting and bias d ifficu lt to d eterm ine. Abu
Ghraib, a scoop that w as held u p for tw o w eeks at the behest of the Pentagon,
proved to be a “tru e” statem ent of facts, although its im plications and
m eaning w ere su bject to consid erable d ebate. The m issing 380 tons of high
explosives w as a scoop that got ou t sooner than the initial sou rce had
intend ed . The facts w ere d ispu ted and rem ained in d ispu te u ntil the election,
w hen the relevance of the issu e w as elim inated and reporting stopped
(althou gh the final w ord seem s to ind icate the scoop w as correct). The Bush
N ational Guard m em o proved to be a frau d . All three incid ents involved one
netw ork. Does the scoop offset the scand al? Shou ld the netw ork lose its
anchor for the jou rnalistic lapse, or get a Pulitzer for its investigative
excellence?
The critiqu e of the com m ercial m ass med ia and the d iscu ssion of the
im pact of m essage managem ent and the television new s cycle on the process
of political d iscou rse are stru ctural argu m ents, not ind ictm ents of the
citizenry. Our concern is with the tendency of the institutions to make certain
types of content available and u biquitou s, w hich d istorts the pattern of
discourse.
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPETITION
This analysis of the m arket for new s and its im pact on the political
process d oes have a potential bright spot. We can assu m e that by creating
d ivergent, biased view s, com petition expand s the range of new s sou rces
available. “Market segmentation benefits a conscientiou s read er, w ho can
then aggregate the new s from d ifferent sou rces to synthesize a more accu rate
pictu re of reality.” 47 Thu s, conscientious read ers have a broad er range of
information to sam ple in their search for the tru th, even thou gh the d esire for
truth cannot drive out bias.
A d ifferent assu m ption abou t read er behavior pred icts that
com petition alone w ill red u ce the bias of new s outlets.48 If read ers prefer
tru th and repu tations su ffer w hen errors in reporting are d iscovered , then
competition drives outlets toward less biased reporting.
Und er both sets of assu mptions, heterogeneity is cru cial to red ucing
the im pact of bias. In the form er, it occu rs at the level of the read er, w ho can
ferret ou t the tru th by cross-checking, if interested . Unfortunately, the
political process raises the cost of find ing sou rces, particularly w here the
d istribu tion of sou rces is skew ed . Moreover, political processes and the
informational process of ‘spinning’ strive to d im inish the nu m ber of
conscientiou s read ers.
The conscientiou s read er is not part of the
constitu ency sou ght ou t by the political entrepreneurs. In this w ay, m ed ia
47
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d riven political entrepreneu rship d istorts the prod u ction of new s and
information.
Und er the second assu m ption, bias is red u ced at the level of the
ou tlets, w hich fear loss of read ers. Unfortu nately, this ou tcom e requires the
proportion of conscientious read ers to be su fficiently large and their ability to
d ivine the tru th sufficiently w ell d eveloped to im pose economic pain on
disreputable outlets.
The two conflicting interpretations of the effect of competition lead us
back to Baker’s form ulation of com plex d em ocracy.49 Partisan ou tlets are
probably an inevitable part of the political process and should be recognized
as su ch (so read ers can better evaluate bias). Com petition, w ithin and
betw een partisan cam ps, m ay help to eliminate the m ost egregiou s biases.
Com petition betw een ou tlets m ay prevent them from m oving too far to the
extrem es, bu t w e shou ld not expect them to end u p in the m id d le, consistent
w ith the u nd erlying assu m ption abou t d ifferentiation from w hich this
analysis was launched.
In both approaches, com petition is to be encou raged . Looking at the
level of the behavior of news outlets, Gentzow and Shapiro conclude:
An ad vantage of ou r m od el is that it generates sharp p red ictions abou t w here
bias w ill arise and w hen it w ill be m ost severe… In the cu rrent d ebate over
FCC ow nership regu lation in the U.S., the m ain argu m ent in favor of lim its on
consolid ation has been the im p ortance of “ind ep end ent voices” in new s
m arkets. [Ou r m od el] offers a new w ay to u nd erstand the d angers of
consolid ation: ind ep end ently ow ned ou tlets can p rovid e a check on each
others’ coverage and thereby lim it equ ilibriu m bias, an effect that is absent if
the outlets are jointly owned.50

Ellm en and Germ ano argu e that one of the avenu es com petition m ay
red u ce bias in new s, w here read ers w ant accu rate reporting, is to w eaken the
effects of advertising.
We m od el the m arket for new s as a tw o-sid ed m arket w here new sp ap ers sell
new s to read ers w ho valu e accu racy and w ell sp ace to ad vertisers w ho valu e
advert-recep tive read ers. We show that m onop olistic new sp ap ers u nd errep ort or bias new s that su fficiently red u cers ad vertisers profits. N ew spap er
com p etition generally red u ces the im p act of ad vertising. In fact, as the size of
ad vertising grow s, new sp ap ers m ay p arad oxically red u ce ad vertiser bias, d u e
to increasing competition for readers.51
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Analyzing the behavior of ind ivid uals in seeking new s sou rces – a
d irect test of the conscientiou s read er hypothesis 52 – Garrett reaches a sim ilar
conclusion:
The d ata show that thou gh online sou rces are an im p ortant sou rce of new s for
a large and grow ing nu m ber of ind ivid u al, m ajor new s organizations continu e
to d om inate the new s land scap e, online and off. Fu rtherm ore, w hen these
sou rces are u sed , they are u sed to su p p lem ent m ainstream sou rces. Online
ou tlets are not at this p oint a seriou s com p etitive threat to the m ainstream
players….
The resu lts confirm that in their search for p olitical new s p eop le are u nlikely to
reject biased new s sou rces… In the absence of u nbiased m ainstream new s
sou rces, how ever, m ost p eop le w ill choose an ou tlet that consistently su p p orts
their own viewpoint over one that is a consistent source of challenge….
The find ings regard ing p references u nd erscore the im portance of a new s
m arket that contains balanced new s ou tlets, w hile the d ata on contem p orary
u ses of Internet new s cannot yet look to online new s to ensu re that su ch a
market exists.53

In the heterogeneous, politicized m ed ia environm ent, the only w ay to
prom ote balance is to prom ote com petition betw een, not consolid ation of
media outlets. The theories that touted benefits of concentration do not fit the
contem porary m ed ia land scape. Competition betw een m ass m ed ia is m ore
important than ever.
H ETEROGENEITY OF N EEDS AND D IVERSITY OF S OURCES
There is a second strand of the literature that argues for policies that
prom ote d iversity that flow from the d iscu ssion of the conscientiou s voter.
H eterogeneity of ind ivid u al characteristics and involvem ent in the pu blic
sphere gives rise to heterogeneity of need s for d ifferent types of inform ation.
There is a stream of thought about voter behavior that runs through the social
science literatu re that u nd erscores the d ifference betw een voter orientations.
52

Tsfati, Yariv and Josep h N . Cap p ella. 2005. Why Do Peop le Watch N ew s They Do
N ot Tru st? The N eed for Cognition as a Mod erator in the Association betw een N ew
Med ia Skep ticism and Exp osu re. M edia Psychology 7, d em onstrates that the need for
cognition, “a need to stru ctu re relevant situ ations in m eaningfu l, integrated w ays” (p .
254), is one critical d im ension that affects inform ation search strategies. Those w ith
high need s for cognition are good cand id ates for the role of conscientiou s voters.
“Becau se those high on N FC enjoy thinking in general, the cognitive need m ad e them
p rocess the m essage regard less of their m istru st of the sou rce. For those low on N FC,
m essage p rocessing w as influ enced by the sou rce tru stw orthiness m anip u lation.” (P.
266).
53
Garrett, R. Kelly. “Med ia Deregu lation and the Online N ew s Market.”
Telecommunications Policy Research Conference September 2005, pp. 26-27.
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It is a m istake to assu m e that voters need to be constantly m obilized and
informed.54 Accord ing to this argum ent, for average citizens, passive
m onitoring and interm ittent m obilization is all that can be hoped for, or
necessary, for d em ocracy to fu nction. Involved , know led geable m em ber of
the pu blic are best served by m ore su bstantive sou rces.55 They seek ou t
d ifferent types and qu antities of inform ation (new s v. television) from
d ifferent types of sou rces (noncom m ercial v. com m ercial).56 Passive m onitors
in the public desire simpler presentation and are reached by different types of
media.57
Learning abou t p olitical cand id ates before voting can be a cognitively taxing
task, given that the information environment of a campaign may be chaotic and
com p licated … Different voters ad op t d ifferent strategies, w ith the choice of
strategy d ep end ent on the cam p aign environm ent and ind ivid u al voter
characteristics.58

This is a challenging environm ent that taps the best of the Supreme
Cou rt First Am end m ent ju rispru d ence in contem porary society. As Benkler
notes,
Red Lion, how ever, is abou t a realization that free sp eech is not an antigovernm ent concep t, bu t rather a com m itm ent to su stain an inform ation
environm ent in w hich a society’s constitu ents can be both collectively selfgoverning and ind ivid u ally au tonom ou s…. Red Lion continu es to be living
p reced ent for the p rop osition that the valu e of free sp eech itself requ ires
governm ent to secu re a d iverse, op en inform ation environm ent as free of
p rivate m onop olization as it is of governm ental control. It continu es to be
living p reced ent for the u nd erstand ing that free sp eech is a valu e resp ected in
the real w orld , on the backgrou nd of the technological and econom ic
cond itions that m ake ou r inform ation environm ent m ore or less concentrated ,
m ore or less op en to p u blic d iscou rse and ind ivid u al exp ression. The free

54

Graber, 2003; Bau m , 2003; Zaller, 2003; H ibbing, J. and Theiss-Morse, E. Stealth
Democracy: A mericans’ Beliefs A bout How Government Should W ork. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002; Schudson, 1998.
55
Lip sitz, Keena, et al. 2005.
What Voters Want From Political Cam p aign
Communications. Political Communications 22.
56
Aarts, Kees and H olli A. Sem etko. 2003. “The Divid ed Electorate: Med ia Use and
Political Involvement.” Journal of Politics 65:3, N ew ton, Kenneth. 1999. “Mass Med ia
Effects: Mobilization or Med ia Malaise.” British Journal of Political Science 29;
Dru ckm an, Jam es N . 2005. Med ia Matter: H ow N ew sp ap ers and Television N ew s
Cover Campaigns and Influence Voters. Political Communication 22.
57
Lipsitz, et. al., 2005.
Red law sk, David P. 2004. “What Voters Do: Inform ation Search Du ring Election
Campaigns.” Political Psychology 25:4, p. 595.
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sp eech valu e requ ires governm ent to hu sband the inform ation environm ent
well. 59

CONCLUSION
Althou gh theory formation arou nd this new view of m ed ia markets
and their impact on political processes is in the early stages, it is alread y
affecting the fram ing of research qu estions. For exam ple, a stu d y by the
FCC,60 w hich w as su ppressed , cites the Mu llainathan and Schliefer,61 George
and Wald fogel,62 and Stromberg stu d ies 63 as part of the anim us to analyzing
the link between media market structure and production of local news.
We su ggest that d ivergent ow nership p atterns ind u ce d ifferent cost stru ctu res,
ad vertising access, and agency p roblem s, each of w hich, sep arately and
interactively, produce different levels of local news among the firms…
As w e su ggest in this p ap er, the FCC m ed ia ow nership ru le-m aking and
su bsequ ent Congressional action m ay affect the com p osition of local news
broad casts. This m ay be im p ortant, given the w orld of Strom berg, and George
and Wald fogel that su ggest inform ation consu m ed at the local level has
substantial political-economic distributional consequences.64

The second line of argum ent, em bod ied in the Gentzkow and
Shapiro65 analysis, has been cited as the fram ew ork for analyzing the sou rces
on which citizens rely.66
First, scholars have noted that m ed ia ow ners are self-interested w ith p olitical
intentions. To the extent that m ed ia ow ners are interested in u sing their
p rop erties to influ ence p u blic op inion, m ergers w ill often (thou gh not alw ays)
reduce ideological diversity.
Gentzkow and Shap iro su ggest that a second m echanism linking consolid ation
with biased coverage is the importance of reputation in the news market paired
w ith new s consu m ers’ tend ency to p erceive view p oint consistent sou rces as
more reliable….
The find ings regard ing new s p references u nd erscore the im p ortance of a new s
m arket that contains balanced new s ou tlets, w hile the d ata on contemporary

59

Benkler, Yochai. 2000. “Review .” International Journal of Law and Information
Technology 8:2, p. 214.
60
Anonymous, 2004.
61
2004.
62
2000
63
Stromberg, David. 2004. “Mass Media Competition, Political Competition and Public
Policy,” Review of Economic Studies, (71 (2004).
64
Anonymous, 2004, p. 16.
65
2005.
66
Garrett, 2005
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u ses of Internet new s su ggest w e cannot yet look to online new s to ensu re that
such a market exists. 67

67

Garrett, 2005, pp. 5… 27.
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STUDY 19:
THE CRITIQUE OF THE FCC APPROACH TO
MEASURING MARKET CONCENTRATION
M ARK COOPER
RULERS V. RULES
In d iscussing the approach taken to m arket stru cture analysis, Ken
Ferree, head of the Med ia Bu reau , w ou ld em phasize that people m u st not
confu se the ru ler w ith the ru les. As an exam ple, he recou nted a story abou t
his life-long desire to be a fighter pilot. The problem was, he grew to be 6 feet
6 inches. H e got too tall to com fortably fit in a cockpit and the military had a
height limit. The ruler was not the problem, the rule was.
Market stru ctu re analysis is a ru ler, not a rule. Whatever rule that is
proposed , can be assessed w ith the ru ler. The Prometheus Court1 fou nd that
the FCC had bu ngled both jobs, crafting the ru ler (the Diversity Ind ex) and
writing the rule (cross-media limits).
The fact that the FCC d id su ch a bad job d oes not mean it can sim ply
quit. It still m u st find a w ay to m easu re d iversity and com petition in local
m ed ia m arkets and w rite rules that prom ote the goal of “the w id est
d issem ination of information from d iverse and antagonistic sou rces.” Three
Courts have now told the FCC to carefu lly cou nt voices.2 Perhaps because it
was the FCC’s third try, the Prometheus Court gave the Commission a detailed
road map.
The legal stand ard for review ing rules is im portant becau se it
establishes the qu ality of the analysis that m u st be cond u cted in su pport of a
ru le. At the m ost basic level, Congressional intent is im portant and a Cou rt
“m ay find an agency ru le is arbitrary and capricious w here the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.” This can be
termed “an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”3
The Cou rt asks w hether “the agency exam ined the relevant d ata and
articu lated a satisfactory explanation for its action, inclu d ing a ‘rational’
connection betw een the facts fou nd and the choice m ad e.” If not, it can be
concluded that “the agency made a clear error in judgment.”4

1

Prometheus Radio Project, et al. v. FCC 373 F.Supp 372(2004) (Prometheus).;
Fox Television Stations, Inc., v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Circ. 2002) (Fox); Sinclair
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Circ. 2002) (Sinclair).
3
Prometheus, 373 F.Supp. at 390.
4
Id. at 389..
2
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Althou gh an expert agency like the FCC is given d iscretion in w riting
ru les, at a m ore com plex level the Cou rts w ill overtu rn ru les if the agency
“entirely failed to consid er an im portant aspect of the problem , offered an
explanation for its d ecisions that ru ns cou nter to the evid ence before the
agency, or is so im plausible that it cou ld not be ascribed to a d ifference in
view or the prod u ct of agency expertise.” 5 In the case of an exercise su ch as
id entifying threshold s for m erger review u nd er the Ad m inistrative
Procedures Act (APA),
the trad itional APA stand ard of review is even m ore d eferential “w here the
issu es involve ‘elu sive’ and ‘not easily d efined ,’ areas su ch as p rogram
d iversity in broad casting.” Yet… a “rationality” stand ard is ap p rop riate…
w hen an agency has engaged in line-d raw ing d eterm inations… its d ecisions
m ay not be “p atently u nreasonable” or ru n cou nter to the evid ence before the
agency.6

Thu s, legal practice d oes not d em and (and social science cannot
provid e) perfection or even great precision in the analysis. It d em and s
su bstantial evid ence, consistent reasoning, choices that are reasonable and
results that are rational.
A NALYTIC A ND M ETHODOLOGICAL FLAWS IN THE FCC’S RULER
In Sinclair, the D.C. Circu it Cou rt had criticized the FCC’s ru le
lim iting the ow nership of m u ltiple TV stations w ithin a single m arket (the
d u opoly rule) becau se it had cou nted m ed ia “voices” in the sam e m arket
d ifferently for each of its ru les.7 The Sinclair court w anted consistency
betw een ru les. As a result of the Sinclair d ecision, w hen later review ing the
ru le that prevents the hold er of a television station license from ow ning a
new spaper in the sam e m arket in its biennial review , the FCC had to confront
the task of treating d ifferent m ed ia consistently head on. It had to d eal w ith
the challenge of com bining m ed ia in one fram ew ork. Thu s, the central issue
in the 2003 cross-ow nership proceed ing – how to cou nt d ifferent m ed ia
w ithin the sam e m arket – is the very issu e that led the Sinclair cou rt to reject
FCC’s television station duopoly rules.
In 2003, FCC respond ed to Sinclair by m od ifying a stand ard antitrust
approach to create a consistent em pirical fram ew ork for evaluating m ed ia
ou tlets in a local area. Where d ifferent types of m ed ia had to be consid ered
together (e.g. in the qu estion of m ergers betw een new spapers and television
stations) the FCC attempted to create a single “Diversity Index.”

5

Id., at 390.
Id.
7
Sinclair, 284 F.3d at 162-65.
6
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The Prometheus cou rt accepted the general antitru st fram ew ork and
even the id ea that a single ind ex could be created , bu t fou nd the FCC’s
im plem entation to be faulty. “Bu t for all of its efforts, the Com m ission’s
Cross-Med ia Lim its em ploy several irrational assu mptions and
inconsistencies.”8 The Cou rt id entified three prim ary problem s in the
implementation of the Diversity Index.
The FCC refu sed to analyze the actual au d ience of a m ed ia ou tlet,
assu m ing instead that all ou tlets w ithin a m ed ia type are equal. Its w eights
for com bining each type of m ed ia w ere inconsistent and not based on sou nd
em pirical m easu res.9 The link betw een the ind ex and the m erger approval
was tenuous at best.10
The Cou rt fou nd that the FCC had not properly w eighted the variou s
m ed ia. “In converting the H H I to a m easu re for d iversity in local m arkets,
how ever, the Com m ission gave too m u ch w eight to the Internet as a m ed ia
outlet.”11 The Cou rt focu sed on the hand ling of the Internet, in part, becau se
of the extensive argu m ents presented by m ed ia ow ners to the Com m ission
that the Internet had d ramatically changed the m ed ia land scape. In fact, the
m ishand ling of rad io actually has a larger im pact. H ow ever, view ing the
issu e through the portal of the Internet provid ed the Cou rt w ith the
opportu nity to present a richly nuanced d iscu ssion of the m ed ia’s ou tpu t and
function. By assigning a substantial weight to the Internet, the FCC has failed
to note that there is very little ind epend ent local new s and information
produced by many of the websites the FCC pointed to.12
The reach of the outlet is also important. The Court made this clear in
the d iscussion of the w ay the FCC treated cable and the Internet. The Cou rt
said it chose to “affirm the Com m ission’s reasoned d ecision to d iscou nt cable
. . . [b]u t w e think that the sam e rationale also applies to the Internet.” 13 The
FCC had exclu d ed cable from the local new s and inform ation m arket, since it
fou nd that there w as little local new s available and few su ch channels reach
the public. For example, the FCC found that for many who said they watched
cable for new s, “cable new s channels w ere probably confu sed w ith broad cast
network news.”14 Moreover, only 10 to 15% of cable systems include channels
that provide local and public affairs programming.”15
A close look at the data showed the Prometheus Court that the Internet
exhibits characteristics that are similar to cable. For example, “62% of Internet
8

Prometheus, 373 F.Supp at 402..
Id., at 404-09.
10
Id., 409-11.
11
Id., at 403.
12
Id., at 406.
13
Id., at 405..
14
Id.
15
Id.
9
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u sers get local new s from new spaper w ebsites, 39% visit television w eb
sites.”16 The FCC’s claim that “the Internet is available everyw here,” w as
challenged by the fact that “alm ost 30% of Am ericans d o not have Internet
access.”17 The Cou rt conclud ed that “on rem and the Com m ission m u st either
exclu d e the Internet from the m ed ia selected for inclu sion in the Diversity
Ind ex or provid e a better explanation for w hy it is inclu d ed in light of the
exclusion of cable.”18
As d iscussed in the analysis of m ed ia usage, part of the FCC’s
problem w as caused by w eak m ethod ology. The FCC recognized the
im portance of evalu ating the u se of the m ed ia.19 In ord er to ad d ress the issu e,
it com m issioned a su rvey. Yet, the FCC failed to ask the right questions and
proceed ed to m ake ru les w ith ad m itted ly fau lty d ata. “Unfortunately, we do
not have data on this question specifically with regard to local news and cu rrent
affairs. The available ‘prim ary sou rce’ d ata ad d ress local and national new s
together and d o not show that d ifferent m ed ia have d ifferent im portance, in
the sense that primary usage differs across media.”20
THE FCC’S INCONSISTENT RULE
H aving d eclared its intention to u se the Diversity Ind ex to d escribe
m arkets, the FCC then w rote a rule that seem ed to bear only a tangential
relationship to the ruler. The Cou rt rem and ed the cross m ed ia lim it for a very
precise reason.
Althou gh the Com m ission is entitled to d eference in d ecid ing w here to d raw
the line betw een accep table and u naccep table increases in m arkets’ d iversity
scores, w e d o not affirm the seem ingly inconsistent m anner in w hich the line
w as d raw n. As the chart above illu strates, the Cross-Med ia Lim its allow som e
com binations w here the increases in Diversity Ind ex scores w ere generally
higher than for other combinations that were not allowed.21

The Cou rt chose as an exam ple to look at m id -size m arkets to
d em onstrate the inconsistency in the Com m ission’s line d raw ing. Exhibit 1
contains the FCC’s chart to which this discussion applies.
The court noted:
16

Id., at 406.
Id., at 407.
18
Id., at 408..
19
FCC Ownership Rules Order, at ¶ ¶ 410 (em p hasis ad d ed ). (“If m ed ia d iffer in
im p ortance system atically across resp ond ents [e.g. if television w ere m ost im p ortant
to everyone, and everyone m ad e only m inor u se of rad io to acqu ire new s and cu rrent
affairs information], then it would be misleading to weight all responses equally.”)
20
FCC Ownership Rules Order, at ¶¶ 410-411 (emphasis added).
21
Prometheus, at 411.
17
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Consid er the m id -sized m arkets (fou r to eight stations), w here the Commission
fou nd that a com bination of a new sp ap er, a television station, and half the
rad io stations allow ed u nd er the local rad io ru le w ou ld increase the average
Diversity ind ex scores in those m arkets by 408 (fou r stations) 393 (five), 340
(six), 247 (seven) and 314 (eight) points respectively. These permitted increases
seem to belong on the other sid e of the Com m ission’s line. They are
consid erably higher than the Diversity Ind ex score increases resu lting from
other com binations that the Com m ission p erm itted , su ch as the new spap er
television combination, 242 (fou r stations), 223 (five), 200 (six), 121 (seven) and
152 (eight). They are even higher than those resu lting from the com bination of
a new sp ap er and television d u op oly – 376 (five stations), 357 (six), 242 (seven),
and 308 (eight) – w hich the Com m ission d id not p erm it. The Com m ission’s
failu re to p rovid e any exp lanation for this glaring inconsistency is w ithou t
d ou bt arbitrary and cap riciou s, and so p rovid es fu rther basis for rem and of the
Cross-Media limits.22

Exhibit 1: FCC Analysis and Approval of Mergers
(Italicized numbers represent mergers that are prohibited;
non-italicized numbers represent mergers that are allowed)
Base Case
TV
Average
Stations
Diversity
In
Index
Market
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
15
20

1707
1316
1027
928
911
889
753
885
705
635
595
612

Average Change in Diversity Index Resulting From Mergers
Newspaper Newspaper Newspaper, Newspaper Newspaper
+
+
+
+
+
Radio
1 TV
1 TV
2 TV
Radio,
+
Stations
2 TV
1/2 Radio
Stations
271
------910
1321
335
------731
1009
242
------331
515
236
------242
408
263
223
393
376
846
239
200
340
357
688
171
121
247
242
533
299
152
314
308
734
198
86
207
172
473
107
51
119
101
292
149
48
145
97
302
40
128
80
350
222

Source: Federal Communications Commission, “Report and Order,” In the M atter of 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and
Other Rules A dopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications A ct of 1996, Cross
Ownership of Broadcast Stations and N ewspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning M ultiple
Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local M arkets, Definition of Radio M arkets,” M B
Docket No. 02-277, MM Dockets 02-235, 01-317, 00-244 July 2, 2003, Appendix D.

22

Prometheus, p. 75.
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CONCLUSION
As the preced ing d iscussion clarifies, in ord er to appropriately
respond to the Prometheus cou rt’s rem and ord er, the Com m ission m u st
d evelop a ru ler that accou nts for the d iffering im portance and reach of
varying m ed ia voices in a given m arket, and w eights them accord ingly. It
must also develop rules that logically relate to that rule and draw lines within
its ow nership ru le that are consistent across d ifferent m arkets and d ifferent
m ed ia com binations. Stu d ies that follow d em onstrate a m ethod of achieving
that goal that com plies w ith the d irection of the Prometheus cou rt.
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STUDY 20:
BUILDING A REASONABLE MEASURE OF
MARKET STRUCTURE
M ARK COOPER
THE A NTITRUST A PPROACH TO M ARKET S TRUCTURE A NALYSIS
For the pu rpose of m erger analysis, antitru st officials d efine m arkets
by the substitutability of products.1 Products must be good substitutes and be
read ily available in a given geographic area to be inclu d ed in the m arket.
Hence, economists talk about product and geographic markets.
After the market is d efined , the analyst looks at the size of the firm s
in the m arket as a first screen in assessing the likely im pact of a m erger.
When the number of firms in a market is small, or a single firm is very large, a
concern arises that m arket pow er can be exercised . Prices can be raised or
quality red u ced to increase profits throu gh coord inated or parallel actions
am ong a small nu m ber of firm s, or the u nilateral acts of a single d om inant
firm.
The level of concentration is calcu lated by taking the m arket share of
each firm , squ aring it, then su m m ing the resu lt for all firms, and m u ltiplying
by 10,000 to clear the fraction. 2 Know n as the “H erfind ahl-H irschm an Ind ex
HHI” or H H I, this ind ex has an easy interpretation of concentration.3 A
m arket that is m ad e u p of 10 equal-sized firm s w ill have an H H I of 1000.
Each firm has a 10 percent m arket share. Squ aring the share yield s 100 points
1

U.S. Dep artm ent of Ju stice and the Fed eral Trad e Comm ission, Horizontal M erger
Guidelines, 1997.
2
William G. Shep herd , The Economics of Industrial Organization (Englew ood Cliffs, N J:
Prentice H all, 1985), p . 389, gives the follow ing form u la for the H erfind ahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI):
n

Si2 10,000

H
i 1

where
n = the number of firms
Si = the share of the ith firm.
The H H I is calcu lated based on ratios rather than p ercentages and the d ecim als are
cleared by m u ltip lying by 10,000. For ease of d iscu ssion the Cou rt ad op ts the
convention of describing the calculation in percentages.
3
The HHI can be converted to equal-sized equivalents as follows:
Equal-sized voice equivalents = (1/HHI)*10,000.
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for each firm , tim es 10 firm s (10x10 x 10). A m arket w ith 5 five equal-sized
firms will have an HHI of 2000 (20x20=400 x 5).
The Department of Ju stice consid ers a m arket w ith few er than 10
equal-sized firm s to be concentrated (see Exhibit XII-1). It consid ers a m arket
w ith few er than the equ ivalent of approxim ately 5.5-equal sized firm s (H H I =
1800) to be highly concentrated. Markets with an HHI between 1000 and 1800
are consid ered m od erately concentrated . A highly concentrated m arket is
called a tight oligopoly.4 A m od erately concentrated m arket is called a loose
oligopoly.
WHICH M EDIA? WHICH M ARKETS?
In ord er to cond u ct m arket stru ctu re analysis, the m arket m ust first
be d efined . This is accomplished by id entifying the prod u cts being analyzed
and the m arkets in w hich they are available.
Both sets of d efinitions,
prod u cts and geographic areas, proved to be challenging for the FCC in the
2003 media ownership proceeding.
In analyzing a m arket structu re for policy pu rposes, one of w hich is
to assess the impact of a merger, we must describe which products to include.
Prod u cts shou ld be includ ed if they are good substitu tes for one-another.
Econom ists look at the cross-elasticity of d em and . The qu estion is: “If the
price of prod u ct increases, or its qu ality d eclines, are there substitu tes to
which consumers can readily switch?”
One of the central concerns that the D.C. Cou rt of Appeals raised in
rem and ing the local ow nership rule in Sinclair w as the fact that the FCC had
failed to count non-broad cast ou tlets. The cou rt held “that the Com m ission
had failed to d em onstrate that its exclusion of non-broad cast m ed ia from the
eight voices exception ‘is necessary in the public interest’.” 5
For the pu rposes of evaluating TV-TV m ergers, the FCC d id the right
thing, w hen it d id not inclu d e non-broad cast voices. Bu t w hy d id n’t the FCC
inclu d e new spapers and rad ios in its voice cou nt for the ru le that lim ited the
nu m ber of markets in w hich one ow ner could hold licenses to m ore than one
TV station (the d u opoly ru le)? The answ er it cou ld have given is now clear
and su pported overw helmingly by the em pirical evid ence in the record . TV
has a u niqu e im pact on politics and policy d ebates and all TV m arkets are
highly concentrated . For the pu rposes of the cross-media ru les, how ever, the
Commission must count all voices.
We have d escribed the critical characteristics of the variou s m ed ia in
the prior d iscu ssion of m ed ia and localism . Broad cast TV and new spapers
are the d om inant m ed ia on w hich people rely for their new s and inform ation.
In this analysis, w e ad d ress the challenge of com bining types of m ed ia and
4
5

Shepherd, supra note 2, at 4.
Sinclair Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 165 (D.C.Cir. 2002).
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follow the road map outlined by the Prometheus Cou rt. Prod u ct and
geographic m arket d efinitions are inherently intertw ined . For exam ple, tw o
new spapers are generally consid ered su bstitu table, as a prod u ct, bu t not if
they are u navailable w ithin a given market. We begin w ith an area w here
the Prometheus Cou rt seem ed to accept the FCC d ecision, as d o w e – the
geographic market.
COMMERCIAL G EOGRAPHIC M ARKETS
One of the key steps in analyzing market stru ctu re is to d efine the
geographic scope of the m arket. Defining the m arket properly is critical
because if the m arket is d efined too broad ly, prod ucers w ho are assu m ed to
be in the market, making their output available, will not actually be there.
It is well recognized that different media cover different areas. Radio
signals travel sm aller d istances than television signals. Cable and satellite
d istribu tion expand s the reach of television beyond w hat the m arket reach
available was from over-the-air d istribution. H ow ever, even if a station has
the right to ask for carriage in a wide area, it might not do so because it would
attract few view ers ou tsid e of its area. H agerstow n, Maryland TV stations d o
not seek carriage on District of Colu m bia cable system s, even thou gh they are
in the same Designated Market Area (DMA).
We also show that while newspapers may be available in a wide area,
their circulation tend s to be concentrated in a limited geographic area. The
reason is simple. By focusing on a geographic area, they are able to attract
read ers and ad vertisers w ho are affected by events in a specific area and are
likely to shop in that area. Trying to cover very large areas w ould resu lt in
huge newspapers.
If the view er/ listener/ read er w ants to find ou t abou t the local area
efficiently, he or she is likely to tu rn to sou rces that focu s on that area. There
is, of cou rse, a trad e- off betw een clu tter, w hich im poses a cost on the
consu m er, and the d esire of com m ercial entities to expand their base of users
and ad vertisers. As the reach of the m ed ia expand s, the probability that any
fact or comm ercial establishm ent w ill be relevant to any ind ivid ual u ser
declines.
This m ethod ological issue is an im portant part of the conceptu al
analysis. For years m ed ia ow ners w ho seek relaxation of the ru les have
argued that the mere availability of a source in an area is all that matters. They
have com plained that cou nting u sers for pu rposes of m arket stru ctu re
analysis “penalizes su ccess” or confuses “su ccess w ith access.”
The
Prometheus Cou rt has su ggested this, recognizing that the size of the au d ience
matters a great deal.
Com m ercial m arkets are prim arily d efined as areas in w hich
broad casters sell ad vertising. There are tw o stand ard s generally u sed : –
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Designated Market Areas (DMAs) for television and Arbitron m arkets for
radio. There are 210 DMAs and 296 Arbitron radio markets. However, a large
nu m ber of rad io stations are not inclu d ed in any Arbitron area. These
“om itted ” stations represent abou t 39 percent % of the 13,635 stations
inclu d ed in the BIA d ata base, bu t abou t 33 percent of the 1,986 stations w e
identify as providing news or information.
The DMA as a m arket is larger than the Arbitron m arket and also
larger than a typical new spaper m arket. In the last m ed ia ow nership
proceed ing, the FCC d efined the m arket as a m arket som ew here in betw een
DMA and Arbitron m arkets. The FCC called it the city, bu t then m isallocated
media outlets within that defined market.
The BIA d atabase provid es Arbitron areas for rad io and allocates
new spapers to these markets as w ell. Bu t it d oes not actually m easure
circulation w ithin the Arbitron area, how ever. Thus, a precise geographic
d efinition of the m arket w ill remain elu sive. Using the Arbitron area w ith
papers allocated is a reasonable approach.
Exhibit 1 show s the calcu lations of new spaper concentration for a
d ozen m arkets based on the DMA, the Arbitron area, the city and the cou nty.
The city and cou nty d ata are taken from a series of profiles that Editor and
Publisher provid ed in 2001. We generally observe the expected relationship.
The DMA is least concentrated , the city next, the Arbitron area next and the
cou nty m ost concentrated . The very large d ifference betw een the Arbitron
and cou nty calcu lations and the w id er areas su pports the notion that
new spapers d o not circu lated that w id ely even w ithin cities. Thus, the focu s
on much smaller geographic areas is justified.
Exhibit 2 presents an analysis of the ten m arkets for w hich the FCC
provid ed d etailed analysis in the su pport of its 2003 the proposed ru les. It
show s that the Arbitron area fits the city d efinition that the FCC u sed . Thus,
w e believe that the Arbitron area is a reasonable geographic area for m ed ia
market analysis.
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Exhibit 1: Concentration of Newspaper Circulation in
Various Geographic Markets
Large Markets
Sub-Markets
HHI
Year Type
Type
N
HHI
2001 City
2505 County
8
4009
NEW YORK
2004 DMA
1678 Arbitron
2
3612
2001 City
2298 County
5
3825
LOS ANGELES
2004 DMA
2237 Arbitron
2
3098
2001 City
3791 County
6
5949
SAN FRAN
2004 DMA
2943 Arbitron
3
3758
2001 City
2298 County
5
3825
DALLAS
2004 DMA
2237 Arbitron
2
3098
2001 City
3743 County
5
4976
SEATTLE
2004 DMA
1756 Arbitron
1
2317
2001 City
4819 County
5
8046
CLEVELAND
2004 DMA
5813 Arbitron
2
6969
2001 City
4143 County
6
8546
ORLANDO
2004 DMA
3046 Arbitron
3
7364
2001 City
5904 County
5
7427
FRESNO
2004 DMA
5761 Arbitron
2
8714
2001 City
3161 County
7
7201
TAMPA
2004 DMA
2546 Arbitron
3
5116
2001 City
8640 County
5
8944
ATLANTA
2004 DMA
4263 Arbitron
1
5250
2001 City
8682 County
6
9221
RICHMOND
2004 DMA
8429 Arbitron
1
8429
2001 City
10000 County
6
10000
NEW ORLEANS
2004 DMA
7117 Arbitron
1
9459
2001 City
5001 County
6
9662
NORFOLK
2004 DMA
5206 Arbitron
1
5693
2001 City
10000 County
6
10000
LAS VEGAS
2004 DMA
7117 Arbitron
1
9459
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Exhibit 2: Comparing FCC Cities and Arbitron-Defined
Newspaper Markets
# Of Dailies
DMA Arbitron
City
FCC
CFA
HHI
HHI
New York
12
9
1661
2174
Kansas City
6
6
6693
8239
Birmingham
2
3
3710
8160
Lancaster
1
1
2546
10000
Little Rock
3
3
5750
8545
Burlington
3
3
1666
5349
Myrtle B.
1
1
3643
10000
Terre Haute
3
4
2419
4532
Charlottesville
1
1
10000
10000
Altoona
1
2
1763
9309

Exhibit 3 show s the figu res for the counties in the Los Angeles area,
w hich is one of the least concentrated m arkets in the U.S. We u sed average
d aily circulation for new spapers (the Ed itor and Publisher and Beacon d ata
bases). Again, w e observe m u ch higher levels of concentration at the cou nty
level.
Los Angeles is u sed as an exam ple because it is the third least
concentrated (for new spapers) DMA in the cou ntry and the five cou nties
identified above account for 95 percent of the households in the DMA.
As applied in this analysis, this is a conservative approach that
underestimates the level of concentration somewhat for a number of reasons.
First, we assume all TV stations in the DMA are available in every
Arbitron area. That is not the case in reality.
Second, the calculation of newspaper concentration in the Arbitron
area underestimates newspaper concentration, even assuming all
circulation of each newspaper is in its primary Arbitron area. The
overestimate of circulation is more than offset by the larger size of
the Arbitron area.

G EOGRAPHIC POLITICAL M ARKETS
There is another reason to exam ine the issu e of market d efinition.
The com m ercial d efinition of the m arket is not the prim ary focu s of this
proceed ing. We are concerned abou t the m arket for new s and inform ation –
the forum for democratic discourse. In particular, we are concerned about the
areas in which local policy decisions are made.
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Exhibit 3: Local Papers Dominate Home Counties

PORTION OF DAILY COUNTY CIRCULATION

LOS ANGELES AREA PAPERS

0.7

Press
Enterprise

0.6 LA Times

Register
S.B.
News
Ventura
Star

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

LOS
RIVERSIDE SANTA
VENTURA
ANGELES
BARBARA

ORANGE

COUNTY

Sources: Eileen Davis Hudson and M ark Fitzgerald, “Capturing A udience Requires a
Dragnet,” Editor and Publisher, October 22, 2001, p. 20.

One of the m ost im portant local policy d ecisions is the election of
representatives to the Congress. H ow d oes the political marketplace line u p
with the commercial marketplace?
Congressional d istricts are d raw n by state legislatu res. The typ ical
DMA is m u ch larger than the typical congressional d istrict. The Arbitron
m arket is smaller than the d istrict. This analysis show s that the Arbitron
market is a better fit.
The hypothesis is that the d ecision of a representative abou t w here to
locate their d istrict offices is a good ind ication of where the location of the
political marketplace. We id entified the location of over 800 d istrict offices.
These are the offices of 98 percent of all the districts.
Abou t tw o-third s of the d istrict offices are located w ithin a DMA and
an Arbitron area (see Exhibit 4). In just over one-third of the observations
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there is one d istrict office in the Arbitron area. Just over one half of the
d istrict offices are located in Arbitron areas w ith tw o or few er offices and tw o
–third s are in Arbitron areas w ith three or few er d istrict offices. For DMAs,
there are m ore d istrict offices w ithin each DMA. Abou t one fifth of the
district offices are in DMAs with only one office; 40 percent are in DMAs with
two of fewer offices; 50 percent are in DMAs with three or fewer.
Treating the non-Arbitron areas as sm all m arkets, makes the
d ifference even m ore pronou nced . Even thou gh these rad io stations are not
placed w ithin Arbitron areas, representatives know w hich rad io stations
serve their d istrict. In sum , Arbitron areas are a mu ch better approxim ation
of political markets than the DMA.
Grand Rapid s, Michigan, w hich ranks ju st at the lim it of the first
quintile of Designated Market Areas, provid es a good exam ple of the overlap
of com m ercial and political markets (see Exhibit 5). It is m ad e u p of 4
Arbitron areas. Each has a lead ing d aily new spaper., w ith the nam e of the
city in its title (Grand Rapids Press, Kalamazoo Gazette, The M uskegon Chronicle,
Battle Enquire). Interestingly, one pu blisher – Ad vance – ow ns three of these
papers. If there w ere no geographic specialization, it w ou ld m ake little sense
to have separate papers. There is a similar pattern in the rad io market, w ith a
lead ing station in each area and a single ow ner hold ing tw o of the top
stations. Each of these cities appears to at the heart of a Congressional
District. The location of district offices of members reflects this fact.
PRODUCTS
To build a general model of media markets we have compiled data on
the m arket shares of all TV stations, d aily new spapers, w eekly new spapers,
and radio stations (see Exhibit 6). Following the Prometheus court’s reasoning,
the exercise of estimating the size and m ake-u p of the local new s and
information m arket is one of id entifying w hich sources of ind epend ent local
news respondents use and which sources influences them.
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Exhibit 4: Arbitron Areas are a Better Fit for the Political Marketplace
than DMAs
THE FIT BETWEEN MEDIA MARKETS AND DISTRICT OFFICES:
DISTRICT OFFICES WITHIN ARBITRON MARKETS ONLY

PERCENT OF
DISTRICT OFFICES
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Exhibit 5: Michigan Congressional Districts and Media Markets

Muskegon.

Grand Rapids-Kalamazoo - Battle Creek-Muskegon DMA/Arbitron Areas
Radio Stations
TV Station
Congressional Congressional Number
with News Format Commercial
District
Offices
of Dailies
(non-zero share)
Licenses
2nd

Muskegon,
Cadillac, Holland

1

1

1

3rd

Grand Rapids

3

2

4

6th

Kalamazoo, St.
Josephs

1

1

2

7th

Battle Creek,
Lansing, Jackson

1

1

2

6*

5**

9***

Total in DMA

Notes: As of 2003, *Advance owned the top ranked newspaper in 3 of the four Arbitron Areas;
**Clear Channel owned three of the radio stations, two of the top ranked radio stations with a
news format in different Arbitron areas; ***LIN held 3 of the commercial licenses in is two of
the cities and the number one and number five ranked stations. On average, eight of the nine
stations are available on cable throughout the DMA.
Sources: Congress At Your Fingertips: 109th Congress, 1st Session 2005 (Capitol Advantage),
p. XIV; BIA Database.
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Exhibit 6: Constructing the Media Market Measures
Media Weights:
Weighted Average of first and second mentions for influence
(Consumer Federation/Consumers Union Survey).
Reach:
Television = All channels in the DMA assumed to reach
population in city.
Population reached is households using television (HUT) in early
evening and late evening day parts (news day parts) from BIA
Financial, Television Market Reports: 2003). City population from
Arbitron (Market Ranks: Spring 2004)
HUT (news day parts) x City Population
Dailies = Average daily circulation (Editor and Publisher Database:
2003; Beacons Newspapers: 2003)
Weeklies = Average daily circulation (average weekly circulation
divided by seven) (Beacons Newspapers: 2003)
Radio = Households using news/information/talk programming
(AHQ) (Arbitron, Radio Today: 2004) Assumed to be atomistically
competitive.
AHQ (News/Info/Talk in the region) x City Population
Internet = Assumed to be atomistically competitive.
Concentration:
Television = Local Commercial share (BIA Financial, Television
Market Reports: 2003)
Dailies = Average daily circulation (Editor and Publisher Database:
2003; Beacons Newspapers: 2003)
Weeklies = Weekly circulation (Beacons Newspapers: 2003)
Radio = Revenue market share BIA; Assumed to be atomistically
competitive.
Internet: Assumed to be atomistically competitive, 100 equal-sized voices
While w e follow ed the FCC’s general approach to geographic m arket
definition, which seems reasonable,6 unlike the FCC, which ignored the size of
the aud ience of each type of prod u ct, w e focu s on estimating the average
d aily ou tpu t of relevant new s and inform ation for each m ed ia firm in the
m arket. In d efining the m arket on an Arbitron area basis, w ith the hou sehold
as the unit of analysis, we include the following:

6

2003 Order, Appendix C.
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Households that use television during news- day parts on an average daily
basis.
Listeners who tune into news/talk and information channels on a routine
basis.
Daily circulation of newspapers.
Weekly circulation of newspapers (converted to an average daily basis).

Weeklies
Weeklies provid e a good exam ple and starting point for how to
proceed . We find that w eeklies are a m od erately influential sou rce of local
news. However, weeklies are a very targeted source of information and cover
only a small set of the issu es covered in d ailies in a sm all geographic area.7
Ind eed , they m ay be influential precisely becau se they are so targeted . They
d eal w ith the m icro- level d etail that is d irectly relevant to the neighborhood
or com m u nity. Because they are targeted , they are not w id ely circulated .
They are not sold all over a city on new sstand s. A city m ay have a hu nd red
w eeklies, bu t only a few are read ily available to the average citizen. Thus, it
is im portant to consid er circu lation and the geographic reach of the sou rce.8
We inclu d ed all the w eeklies in the DMA. This overstates the reach of
w eeklies, since m ost w eeklies are only available in a restricted area.
H ow ever, the sm all circulation, particu larly w hen the w eekly circulation is
converted to d aily equ ivalents to rend er it com parable to the d aily reach of
the other media, compensates for this.
For w eeklies, w e used the average circulation (from the Beacons d ata
base), w hich is d ivid ed by seven to ad ju st to the d aily basis of other m ed ia
u sage. Concentration ratios w ere calculated based on the total circu lation of
papers throughout the DMA.
Radio
If w eeklies are the m ost “m icro” of the local inform ation sou rces,
rad io is likely the next m ost “m icro.” In cou nting rad io stations, w e have the
ad d ed problem that the vast m ajority of rad io stations d o not d o new s. Many

7
Lacy, Step hen, David C. Cou lson and H u gh J. Martin, “Ow nership Barriers to Entry
in N on-m etrop olitan Daily N ew sp ap er Markets,” Journalism & M ass Communications
Quarterly Vol.81, at 331 Su m m er 2004.. (“Even thou gh w eekly and d aily new sp ap ers
are not p erfect su bstitu tes, research ind icates that at least som e read ers m ay su bstitu te
weeklies for dailies and visa versa.”)
8
Id. (“Weekly new sp ap er m arkets rarely exceed the bou nd aries of their hom e cou nty
but may be smaller than the county.” )
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of those that d o provid e new s sim ply read w ire service stories. They are not
independent sources of local news as defined by the Prometheus court.
To cou nt rad io stations in the new s and information m arket, w e
inclu d ed all rad io stations that list new s, inform ation, talk or public service
form ats as one of the top three form ats. We m ultiplied by the popu lation of
the city.
Newspapers
In contrast to rad io, w hich is the least new s intensive of the media,
d aily new spapers are pred om inantly d ed icated to new s and cover a w id er
geographic area, usually a city or county.9 In an earlier analysis, w e fou nd
that the d aily new spaper circulation in large m etropolitan areas tend s to be
highly d ifferentiated by cou nty.
We inclu d ed all circulation for all
newspapers identified by BIA as located in the Arbitron area.
Broadcast Television
Since m ost hou sehold s receive their television signals from cable or
satellite and because local stations have the right to be carried, they tend to be
the m ost “m acro” m ed ium . They are available throu ghou t a w id er area,
although not all stations are available throu ghou t the Designated Market
Area (which is the unit of analysis for the television industry).
H ow ever, only abou t half of all local stations provid e new s. To
com pensate for this, w e inclu d e all TV stations w ithin a d esignated m arket
area, bu t based on N ielson ratings as reported in BIA Television M arket Report,
2003, w e u sed hou sehold s u sing television (H UT) in the d ay parts that are
usually devoted to news as the base of viewers. We use the HUT figure as the
average of the early evening (e.g. 4:00 pm to 6:00 pm eastern) and late evening
(e.g. 11:00 pm to 11:30 pm) news- day parts. Although this implicitly assumes
that all local TV stations provid e new s, w hich is not the case, in earlier
analysis w e have show n that the sim ple cou nt of broad casters that provid e
local new s is close to the concentration ratio based on the view er-based H H I.
The largest firm s that contribu te m ost to the H H I are likely to be represented
in each city in the DMA and they provide news.
The new s- d ay part of H UT w as m ultiplied by the city popu lation.
The H UT analysis inclu d es noncom m ercial stations. H ow ever, market shares
w ere based on the local com m ercial aud ience view ing- share as calcu lated by
BIA Financial.
This overestim ates concentration slightly, since
noncommercial stations are excluded, but their market shares are quite small.

9

Coop er, Mark, M edia Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Information A ge (Center
for Internet and Society, Stanford, 2003), pp. 127-130.
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Internet
The evid ence review ed in the preced ing stu d y of m ed ia u sage and
localism d emonstrates that the Internet is not a significant source of local
news. The Internet market was assumed to be atomistically competitive, with
100 equ al-sized com petitors. If ISP market share w ere used , the nu m ber
would be closer to 10-equal sized competitors.
D ESCRIBING M ARKET S TRUCTURE
Estimating the Units Sold
In calcu lating the total m ed ia m arket, w e focu s on the trad itional
ou tlets. We inclu d e all med ia in the d enom inator of the fraction. We use
estimate that the trad itional m ed ia make accou nt for 91 percent of the total
m arket (see Exhibit 7). Respond ents gave the fou r trad itional m ed ia as an 87
percent of the m arket, calcu lated either as tw o 2 tim es first m ention, plu s a
one 1 tim es second m ention. H ow ever, several factors should be taken into
account in arriving at a final total for the traditional media.
Exhibit 7: Media Usage
MENTIONS
(4X1)+2
Medium

First

Second

Value

Local TV
33
28
160
National TV
2
6
14
Radio
6
15
39
Internet
3
7
19
Magazines
0
1
1
Local Daily
37
20
168
National Daily
1
2
6
Local Weekly
12
9
57
Other
2
2
10
Sum of Traditional
Internet
Adjustment
National Owners
Source: Calculated by author, see text.

WEIGHTING APPROACH
(3X1)+2
(2X1)+2

Index
0.34
0.03
0.08
0.04
0
0.35
0.01
0.12
0.02
0.89
0.91
0.92

Value
127
12
33
16
1
131
5
45
8
378

Index
0.34
0.03
0.09
0.04
0
0.35
0.01
0.12
0.02
0.89
0.91
0.92

Value
94
10
27
13
1
94
4
33
6
282

Index
0.33
0.04
0.1
0.05
0
0.33
0.01
0.12
0.02
0.88
0.9
0.91

First, we should weight first mentions more than second mentions for
in evaluating u se. Exhibit 7 show s that w eighting the first response 2, 3 or 4
tim es the second ad d s 1 to 2 percentage points to the total for the trad itional
media.
Second , about one- fifth of the respond ents w ho said they u se the
Internet said they go prim arily to the w eb sites of local new spapers. Another
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fifth said they go to w eb sites of local TV stations. Since five percent of the
respond ents m ention the Internet, the trad itional m ed ia total should be
increased by about 2 percent.
Third, we should also take account of the fact that the national media,
w hich are cited by abou t 5 five percent of the respond ents as a sou rce of local
new s, w ill overlap w ith the local m ed ia in a significant nu m ber of cases. The
fou r m ajor netw orks are allow ed to reach 39 percent of the national m arket.
The ow ners of national new spapers – the N ew York Tim es, USA Tod ay and
to a lesser extent the Washington Post – own many newspapers and television
stations across the cou ntry as w ell. To accou nt for this, w e d ivid e the
estim ate of the trad itional local m ed ia share by .99. The results show that the
traditional media market share of the total media market is about 91 percent.
Calculating the Value of the Units Sold
The au d ience of each m ed ia ou tlet is one key elem ent of its role in the
foru m for d em ocratic d iscou rse. This d oes not tell u s how su bstitu table the
different media outlets are. How does listening to a short piece on news radio
stack u p against read ing a long piece in a d aily new spaper? In the econom ic
view , this w ou ld be the su bstitu tability of the m ed ia. For pu rposes of
m easu ring this characteristic in the forum for d em ocratic d iscourse, w e asked
respond ents how im portant each m ed ia type w as in form ing their opinions.
This is the w eight of the m ed ia type, w hich is one of the factors that in
determining its role in the market.
The survey qu estions ad d ress the issu e of the “valu e” of each
m ed iu m in the qu estion on influence over pu blic opinion (see Exhibit 8). We
shou ld w eight first and second responses. We also take into accou nt the
ind irect effect of visiting w eb sites of trad itional outlets. H ere how ever, w e
must do it for the individual media, rather than for the total market. Based on
this analysis we have assigned the following weights to the media.
TV = .33
Dailies = .32
Radio = .11
Weeklies = .10
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Exhibit 8: Media Importance as a Source of Local News and Information
MENTIONS

Medium

1st

Local TV
National TV
Radio
Internet
Magazines
Local Daily
National Daily
Local Weekly
Other
Sum of Traditional

30
6
8
4
1
34
2
10
2

2nd
30
6
15
6
1
17
2
9
2

WEIGHT WITH
INTERNET/NATIONAL
(4X1)+2
(3X1)+2
(2X1)+2
(4X1)+2 (3X1)+2 (2X1)+2
Value Index Value Index Value Index Index
Index
Index
WEIGHTING APPROACH

150
30
47
22
5
153
10
49
10

0.32
0.06
0.1
0.05
0.01
0.32
0.02
0.1
0.02
0.84

120
24
39
18
4
119
8
39
8

0.32
0.06
0.1
0.05
0.01
0.31
0.02
0.1
0.02
0.84

90
18
31
14
3
85
6
29
6

0.32
0.06
0.11
0.05
0.01
0.3
0.02
0.1
0.02
0.83

0.33
0.06
0.1
0.05
0.01
0.33
0.02
0.1
0.02
0.87

0.33
0.06
0.1
0.05
0.01
0.32
0.02
0.11
0.02
0.87

0.33
0.06
0.11
0.05
0.01
0.3
0.02
0.11
0.02
0.86

The rem aining 14 percent of the new s m ed ia market for national TV
ou tlets, Internet, m agazines and other is inclu d ed in the d enominator of the
HHI calculation, but not in the numerators.
N ote that w e have taken the non-trad itional m ed ia into accou nt in
both steps of the analysis. First, we calculate the number of units in the media
m arket. The non-trad itional m ed ia appear in the d enom inator. Then w e
w eight those u nits to arrive at a m arket share for each ou tlet. Again, the nontraditional media appear in the denominator.
The real w orld logic is as follow s. When som eone bu ys a new spaper,
that new spaper is cou nted in the m ed ia m arket, bu t a little bit less than w hen
that person tu rns on the TV d uring a new s- d ay part. Since w eeklies com e
ou t once a w eek, w e d ivid e their circu lation by 7, bu t w eeklies are given only
one-third the w eight of TV or d ailies. We cou nt rad io listeners like TV
view ers (i.e. local market share for new s- oriented stations), bu t rad io is given
one-third the w eight of TV stations. The analogy to econom ic m arket share
analysis is straightforw ard . We cou nt each u nit sold and m ultiply by the
value (price) to calculate the market share.
CONCLUSION
This stu d y lays ou t a d efensible and rational approach to m easu ring
geographic markets and prod u ct m arkets and d escribing m arket stru ctu re for
the pu rposes of m easu ring concentration that com plies w ith the Prom etheu s
cou rt’s rem and ord er. It tu rns ou t, as the next stu d y show s, that the m ost
im portant factor in arriving at a reasonable pictu re of the local m ed ia m arket
is to cou nt the au d ience. The m ed ia w eights d escribed here, are a second ary
factor.
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STUDY 21:
ESTABLISHING THRESHOLDS FOR MEDIA
MERGER ANALYSIS
M ARK COOPER
THE M ERGER G UIDELINES CATEGORIZATION OF M ARKETS
Identifying At Risk Markets
The Department of Ju stice consid ers a m arket w ith few er than 10
equal-sized firm s to be concentrated (see Exhibit 1). It consid ers a m arket
w ith few er than the equ ivalent of approxim ately 5.5-equal sized firm s (H H I =
1800) to be highly concentrated. Markets with an HHI between 1000 and 1800
are consid ered m od erately concentrated . A highly concentrated m arket is
called a tight oligopoly.1 A m od erately concentrated m arket is called a loose
oligopoly. Shepherd d escribes these threshold s in terms of fou r-firm
concentration ratios as follows:2
Tight Oligop oly: The lead ing fou r firm s com bined have 60-100 p ercent of the
market; collusion among them is relatively easy.
Loose Oligop oly: The lead ing fou r firm s, com bined , have 40 p ercent or less of
the market; collusion among them to fix prices is virtually impossible.

The ju d icial language on the relationship betw een ow nership and
view point d iversity and the d esire to prevent excessive econom ic
concentration and u nd ue influ ence is certainly broad ly consistent w ith the
vernacular of antitrust. However, the precise analytic link that has developed
in the econom ics literatu re betw een the d iversity ou tcom es and the statistical
index does not exist for media. So, sufficient qualitative evidence was entered
into the prior m ed ia ow nership proceed ing’s record to convince the
Prometheus Cou rt of the link betw een ow nership and d iversity, lead ing to the
Cou rt’s acceptance of the applications of the antitru st approach to m ed ia
markets for purposes of diversity analysis.
Econom ic policy is concerned abou t m arket pow er. The Departm ent
of Ju stice (DOJ) and the Fed eral Trad e Com m ission (FTC) d efines it as
follow s: “Market pow er to a seller is the ability to profitably m aintain prices
above com petitive levels for significant period of tim e… Sellers w ith m arket
pow er also m ay lessen com petition on d im ensions other than price, su ch as
product quality, service or innovation.”
1
2

Shepherd, p. 4.
Shepherd, p. 4.
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In Exhibit 1, the thresholds chosen by the DOJ/FTC are identified.
Exhibit 1: Describing Market Structures

Department Of
Justice Merger
Guidelines
Concentration

Type Of
Market

Equivalents In
Terms of Equal
Sized Firms

Typical
HHI

4-Firm
In Share
Media
Markets

Monopoly

1a

5300+

~100

Duopoly

2b

3000 5000

~100

Dominant Firm

4<
5

>2500
2000

6

1800
1667

60
67
60

10

1000

40c

50

200

8c

High
Tight Oligopoly

80

Moderate
Unconcentrated

Loose Oligopoly
Monopolistic
Competition
Atomistic
Competition

a = A ntitrust practice finds monopoly firms with market share in the 65% to 75% range.
Thus, HHIs in “monopoly markets can be as low as 4200; b = Duopolies need not be a perfect
50/50 split. Duopolies with a 60/40 split would have a higher HHI.
c = Value falls as the number of firms increases.
Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, revised April 8, 1997, for
a discussion of the HHI thresholds; See W illiam G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial
Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N J: Prentice Hall, 1985), for a discussion of four firm
concentration ratios.

A m arket w ith an H H I of less than 1,000 – the equ ivalent of 10 equalsized firm s is consid ered unconcentrated . This correspond s to a com petitive
m arket, althou gh atom istically com petitive m arkets requ ire m any m ore
competitors.
The DOJ/ FTC consid er a m arket w ith an H H I betw een 1,000 and
1,800 to be moderately concentrated.
A market with an HHI above 1,800 – the equivalent of about 5.5-equal
sized firms – -- is considered highly concentrated.

ESTABLISHING THRESHOLDS 325
Assessing the Impact of Mergers
These threshold s have been chosen based on theory, em pirical
evid ence and experience w ith the exercise of market pow er. Mergers
betw een firm s that resu lt in m arkets that are m od erately or highly
concentrated raise concerns.
b) Post-Merger H H I Betw een 1000 and 1800. The Agency regard s m arkets in
this region to be moderately concentrated… . Mergers producing an increase in
the H H I of m ore than 100 p oints in m od erately concentrated m arkets p ostm erger p otentially raise significant com p etitive concerns d ep end ing on the
factors set forth in Sections 2-5 of the Guidelines.
c) Post-Merger H H I Above 1800. The Agency regard s m arkets in this region to
be highly concentrated …. Mergers p rod u cing an increase in the H H I of m ore
than 50 p oints in highly concentrated m arkets p ost-m erger p otentially raise
significant competitive concerns…. it will be presumed that mergers producing
an increase in the H H I of m ore than 100 p oints are likely to create or enhance
market power or facilitate its exercise.

S ETTING S TANDARDS FOR M EDIA M ARKETS
The Broader Goals of the Communications Act
H ow d oes this translate into m ed ia policy? In both spheres,
com petition is d eem ed important to prevent and d iscipline these abu ses. The
legal ju risprud ence on m ed ia policy u ses concepts that are sim ilar to the id ea
of m arket pow er. The goal of the Com m u nications Act is m u ch broad er in
both w hat it seeks to prom ote and prevent. The Su preme Cou rt has
repeated ly stated that the First Am end m ent “rests on the assu m ption that the
w id est possible d issem ination of inform ation from d iverse and antagonistic
sou rces is essential to the w elfare of the pu blic.” 3 In Red Lion, the seminal
television case, the Cou rt ru led that “[i]t is the right of the view ers and
listeners, not the right of the broad casters, w hich is param ou nt…the right of
the pu blic to receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, m oral and
other id eas and experiences…[T]he ‘pu blic interest’ in broad casting clearly
encom passes the presentation of vigorou s d ebate of controversial issues of
importance and concern to the public.”4
Lim its on m ed ia ow nership are based on the prem ise that
“d iversification of m ass m ed ia ow nership serves the pu blic interest by
prom oting d iversity of program and service view points as w ell as by

3
4

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 US 367, 390 (1969) (hereinafter Red Lion).
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preventing und u e concentration of econom ic pow er.” 5 Moreover, “the greater
the d iversity of ow nership in a particu lar area, the less chance there is that a
single person or grou p can have an inord inate effect, in a political, ed itorial,
or similar programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level.”6
The Com m u nications Act charges the FCC w ith prom oting
com petition, localism and d iversity. Ind eed , econom ic concentration is only
one of several d angers that m ed ia policy is intend ed to avoid . Excessive
influ ence over pu blic opinion, d iversity and localism are ad d itional goals. In
fact, the cou rts have fou nd that econom ic efficiency, w hich is at the core of
antitrust policy, is a secondary concern in media ownership policy.
Thu s, m ed ia ow nership lim its are concerned abou t prom oting
diversity of view point, and preventing u nd u e concentration of econom ic
pow er and inord inate influence over public opinion. There are other goals of
the m ed ia policy, as w ell, su ch as localism , racial or gend er d iversity, bu t this
analysis focuses on the concentration issue.
Practical Considerations
The goals of the Communications Act suggest a m ore rigorou s
concentration threshold for m ed ia m ergers is required . This observation is
reinforced by several practical factors.
Price increases are relatively easy to see and react to. Bu t slant or bias
in reporting or attem pt to m anipulate the m ed ia and influ ence public opinion
are much more difficult to detect.
The episod ic natu re of im portant political d ecisions m akes
“transitory” abu ses a m uch greater concern. Elections are infrequ ent and
pu blic attention focu ses on them for short period s of tim e. Med ia entities
m ay behave w ell for 23 months or 47 m onths, bu t it is the brief period before
an election that matters most.
Althou gh som e have argu ed that antitru st policy originally had
pu rposes broad er than mere econom ics, and should still, that is not the
central concern of antitru st practice.
The antitru st law s charge the
Departm ent of Ju stice and Fed eral Trad e Com m ission w ith preventing harm
to com petition in its merger analysis, w hereas the Com m u nications Act
charges the FCC with promoting the public interest in its merger review.

5

FCC v. N at’l Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978); Prom etheu s
Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 383 (3rd Cir. 2004) (citing N at’l Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 780).
6
Sinclair Broadcasting Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (qu oting
FCC’s 1999 Local Ow nership Ord er, Review of the Commission' s Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, FCC 99-209 (rel. Aug. 6, 1999)).
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, althou gh w e borrow the analytic tools from econom ics to
describe the media market structure, we believe that the thresholds of concern
and the targets for concentration as applied to m ed ia m ergers m ust be m ore
protective of d em ocratic d iscourse. Given the greater im portance of m ed ia
d iversity, as articu lated by the Su prem e Cou rt and as em bod ied in the
Com m u nications Act, the larger task that com petition m u st accom plish and
the broad er set of concerns that m ed ia policy m ust ad d ress, the FCC shou ld
u se a higher stand ard for m ed ia m ergers than the antitru st au thorities apply
for trad itional corporate m ergers. Mergers shou ld certainly not be allow ed in
m arkets that are m od erately concentrated becau se they pose a significant
threat to the “w id est possible d issem ination of inform ation from d iverse and
antagonistic sources.”
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STUDY 22:
WHY SOURCE DIVERSITY MATTERS:
THE FAULTY READING OF THE RECORD ON
BROADCAST PROGRAM OWNERSHIP RULES
Mark Cooper
The Com m ission m istakenly relaxed the d u opoly rule in part because
it failed to treat sou rce d iversity as a separate goal or to analyze the role and
state of sou rce d iversity in d etail. It inappropriately and incorrectly failed to
exam ine the ow nership of programm ing and ignored the m ou ntain of
evidence in the record that the ow nership and control of programm ing in the
television m arket is concentrated . The Com m ission arrived at the erroneou s
d ecision to triple the nu mber of m arkets in w hich m u ltiple stations can be
ow ned by a single entity because it facilely and incorrectly rejected sou rce
d iversity as a goal of Comm u nications Act.1 H ow ever, w hether w e consid er
sou rce d iversity as a separate goal of the Act (w hich the Com m ission
rejected), or as a subcomponent of the broader concept of viewpoint diversity,
the u nd erlying flaw is the failu re to analyze the ow nership of program s and
the im portant role that ind epend ent ow nership of program s – ind epend ent of
ow nership of ou tlets – plays in the m ed ia m arket. The basic problem is
easiest to explain if source diversity is treated as a separate goal.
S OURCE D IVERSITY PLAYS AN IMPORTANT ROLE
The FCC conclu d ed that sou rce d iversity is not a separate goal of its
d iversity policy. It reached this erroneou s conclusion by conflating program
prod u ction and program d istribu tion, applying a faulty analysis of the
econom ic/ business m od els of program d istribu tors and ignoring extensive
evid ence that CFA/ CU entered into the record . H ad the Com m ission
conducted a proper analysis of source diversity, it would have concluded that
the lim it on local d u opolies and triopolies should be m u ch m ore stringent
because the concentration of ow nership of ou tlets u nd erm ines d iversity by
reducing the ability of independent programmers to product content.
Consid ering the fact that the governing constitu tional ju rispru d ence
is focused on sou rce d iversity – based on the prem ise that “the w id est
possible d issem ination of information from d iverse and antagonistic sou rces
is essential to the pu blic w elfare” – it is rem arkable that the Ord er d evotes a
scant fou r paragraphs to the issu e. Ju st as remarkable is the nu m ber of errors
contained in those scant four paragraphs.
1

Order, paras. 42-46, 102-110.
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The Ord er begins its d iscussion of sou rce d iversity in paragraphs 42
by d efining it as the “availability of m ed ia content from a variety of sou rces.”
Paragraph 43 d iscusses the evid ence offered by several com m enters abou t the
concentration of prod u ction of content that focu sed prim arily on prim e tim e
program m ing, noting that “in 1993, 68% of prim e tim e programm ing on the
largest broadcast networks was independently produced versus 24% today.”
With no actu al d iscussion of sou rce d iversity, paragraphs 44 and 45
sw itch from a d iscu ssion of sou rce d iversity to a d iscu ssion of the nu m ber of
ou tlets. Paragraph 44 states that “in light of the d ram atic change in the
television market, inclu d ing the significant nu m ber of channels available to
m ost hou sehold s tod ay, w e find no basis to conclu d e that governm ent
regulation is necessary to promote source diversity.” Paragraph 45 goes on to
note the increase in channels available to “the vast m ajority of hou sehold s”
from six in 1979 to an average of 102 channels per hom e.” The Com m ission
claim s in paragraph 44 that “Com m enters recom m end ing that the
Commission adopt source diversity as a goal offer no evidence of the quantity
of program m ing sou rces across the d elivered vid eo program m ing m arket (i.e.
both broad cast and non-broad cast channels) and w hy that quantity is
d eficient.” It conclu d es in paragraph 45 that “given the explosion of
program m ing channels now available in the vast m ajority of hom es tod ay,
and in the absence of evid ence to the contrary, w e cannot conclu d e that
sou rce d iversity should be a policy goal of ou r broad cast ow nership rule.”
Virtually id entical m isread ing is repeated tim e and again throu ghou t the
order.2
Dem onstrating that sou rce d iversity shou ld be a focal point of pu blic
policy to prom ote d iversity and localism in no w ay d etracts from the
sim ultaneou s find ing, at w hich the Com m ission correctly arrives (para. 27),
that “outlet ownership can be presumed to affect the viewpoints expressed on
that ou tlet. We continu e to believe that broad cast ow nership lim its are
necessary to preserve and prom ote view point d iversity. A larger nu m ber of
ind epend ent ow ners w ill tend to generate a w id er array of view points in the
m ed ia than w ou ld a com paratively sm aller nu mber of ow ners.” The
d ifference betw een view point d iversity (m easu red as the ind epend ent
ow nership of ou tlets) and source d iversity (m easu red as the ind epend ent
produ ction of content) is easy to m aintain and explain as a basis to prom ote
the public interest in localism and diversity, even if the Commission preferred
to view ind epend ent program sou rces as a com ponent of view point
diversity.3
Ow ners’ view points are expressed in the content they choose to
d eliver to the pu blic through the ou tlets they control. The ou tlet ow ners m ay

2
3

Order, paras. 535, 651, 654
CFA/CU, Comments 1, pp. 49-52;
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prod u ce their ow n content or bu y it from ind epend ent prod u cers. A
m u ltiplicity of sou rces w ill serve the interests of d iversity and localism better
by creating com petition betw een sou rces provid ing ow ners a better range of
programming from which to choose. More independent source will stimulate
greater innovation and creativity and m ore locally oriented content.4
Ind epend ent program m ers can also be expected to prod u ce m ore vigorous
watchdog journalism.5
It m ay also low er the barrier to entry into the m ed ia m arket, since a
separate m arket for ind epend ent program m ing w ould facilitate entry at one
stage of prod u ction (program m ing or d istribu tion) rather than tw o (vertically
integrated prod u ction and d istribu tion). The Com m ission should be w ell
aw are of the need to prom ote sou rce d iversity separately from the ow nership
of ou tlets, since it accepts higher levels of concentration in m id -size and
sm aller m arkets on the basis of a claim about their m ore d em and ing
economics.6 Ind epend ent ow nership of program m ing cou ld ad d a significant
source of diversity, absent vertical integration.
As d em onstrated by CFA/ CU in this proceed ing, large bu yers of
program m ing can exercise m onopsony pow er to the d etrim ent of
ind epend ent prod u cers and the pu blic, even w hen they are not vertically
integrated , bu t the problem becom es even m ore severe w hen they are
vertically integrated , w hich m ost of the large program d istribu tors are.7
Stru ctu ral lim its on concentration of ow nership of ou tlets can help to create
an environment that promotes independent production of content.
The FCC also fails to recognize the evid ence in the record that
d em onstrates that this bu ying pow er in the national m arket affects d iversity
in local markets.8 CFA/ CU w orked w ith Joel Wald fogel in the preparation of
an econom etric stu d y by Joel Wald fogel, w ho later w as hired by the
Com m ission to cond u ct one of its task force stud ies that contrad icts this
claim.9 This stu d y is one am ong m any cited in ou r com m ents that contrad ict
the FCC claim that consolid ation into national chains d oes not d im inish
diversity.10

CFA/CU, Comments 1, pp. 53-57CFA/CU, Comment 2, 58-59, 79-82.
CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 26-27, 83-88.
6 Order, para. 201.
7 CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 186-220.
8 Order, para. 534, states that ”Commenters do not provide evidence that persuades us
to alter those view s, and w e affirm ou r 1984 conclusion that the national TV
ow nership ru le is not necessary to p rom ote d iversity.” The Com m ission p rovid es no
discussion whatsoever of the evidence it has rejected.
9 CFA/ CU, Com m ents 1, Attachm ent B. The resu lts of this stu d y w ere su m m arized in
Waldfogel’s statement to the Media Ownership Roundtable conducted by the FCC.
10 CFA/CU, Comments 1, pp. 40-45; Comments 2, pp. 54-59, 250-253
4
5
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M ISREADING THE RECORD
The claim that there is an absence of evid ence abou t concentration in
the Delivered Video Programming market could not be farther from the truth.
The com m enters that the Ord er id entified and several others (w ho it failed to
id entify as ad d ressing this issu e)11 provid ed extensive evid ence on precisely
the point that the sou rces of programm ing are concentrated and therefore
lack d iversity. It d em onstrated this explicitly across “both the broad cast and
non-broad cast channels” at both the local and national levels.12 Perhaps the
Com m ission failed to recognize this evid ence becau se now here in the ord er
did it analyze the actual sources of programming. It never did analyze source
d iversity because it im m ed iately shifted from a d iscu ssion of source d iversity
to a cou nt of ou tlets, w ithou t ever d irectly analyzing w ho prod u ces the
content that is delivered through those outlets.
In fact, the CFA/ CU com m ents, w hich the Com m ission failed to
inclu d e in its list of com m enters w ho ad d ressed source d iversity, presented
evid ence that d irectly estim ated the lack of sou rce d iversity by d em onstrating
that, at the local level, broad cast and non-broad cast program m ing is a tight
oligopoly (moderately to highly concentrated) across a range of markets.13
CFA/ CU d em onstrated that broad cast netw ork ow ners w ho have
u sed their m u st carry/ retransmission rights to gain carriage of their
programming on cable systems have recaptured between 50 and 75 percent of
the view ers that have shifted to cable.14 Broad cast and non-broadcast
program m ing w as closely analyzed and CFA/ CU show ed that ow ners of
broad cast netw orks recaptu re view ers w ith their non-broad cast offerings.
CFA/CU established the concentration of news programming markets at both
the national15 and local16 levels.
CFA/ CU d em onstrated that, at the regional and national levels, in
the past d ecad e a hand fu l of cable operators and broad cast netw ork ow ners
com pletely d om inate the lau nch of new cable netw orks.17 Looking at
su bscribers and w riting bu d gets, CFA/ CU and others d em onstrated that the
program m ing m arket is a tight oligopoly as w ell.18 CFA/ CU show ed that
joint ventu res and cross-ow nership among and betw een the m em bers of this

Order, para. 43.
CFA/ CU, Com m ents 1, p p . 104-109; CFA/ CU, Com m ents, 2, p p . 153-159, 203-220,
CFA/CU, Replies 2, pp. 12-16.
13 CFA/CU, Comments 1, pp. 104-109; Comments 2, pp. 153-159;
14 CFA/CU, Replies, pp. 12-16.
15 CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 104-108 155.
16 CFA/CU, Ex Parte, pp. 42.
17 CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 218-220.
18 CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp.156-158.
11
12
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oligopoly red u ce the incentive to com pete and creates shared interests in
controlling the flow of programming.19
The Com m ission has som e vague id ea that the d om inant
broad casters now com m ingle broad cast and non-broad cast activities. Para.
523 offers a hypothetical exam ple of program acqu isition that show s that the
tw o largest DVP buyers spend over one quarter of their bu d gets on cable
networks. The fact that the Commission resorted to a hypothetical discussion,
rather than analyze the d ata in the record , alone calls its conclu sion “w e have
no evid ence that they [television stations ow ners} exercise m arket pow er in
the program production market”20 into doubt.
All this is in ad d ition to the high level of concentration in prim e tim e
program m ing, w hich CFA/ CU and others d em onstrated in consid erably
more detail than the Commission acknowledges.21
There can be no m istake abou t the implication and pu rpose of this
analysis, since CFA/ CU clearly explained the im portant role of sou rce
diversity in its initial comments in this long running proceeding.
Sou rce d iversity is also m eaningless u nless the sou rces are stru ctu rally
ind ep end ent. Sou rce d iversity references the sam e fu nd am ental p rincip le--a
d istinct entity shou ld be resp onsible for creating content.
The First
Am end m ent is served w hen ind ep end ent organizations m ake d ecisions abou t
w hat content w ill be p rod u ced , and thu s w hat content w ill u ltim ately reach an
au d ience. Sou rce d iversity thu s m akes no sense w ithou t sep arately owned
sou rces and d istribu tion m echanism s. Market p ow er in p rogram and content
purchasing will eliminate diversity in program production through the exercise
of m onop sony p ow er. Sou rces shou ld not only be sep arate from each other,
but also be separate from outlets to prevent the harms of vertical integration.22

Ignoring the extensive evid ence of a lack of sou rce d iversity across
broad cast and non-broad cast, as w ell as national and local m arkets has d ire
consequ ences for the pu blic interest in d iversity and localism . As CFA/ CU
explained at great length in its com m ents, allow ing d om inant firm s in the
local and national markets to acquire direct control of more outlets will enable
them to strengthen their grip on the program m ing m arket.23 As the nu m ber
of ind epend ent ow ners of ou tlets shrinks, prod u cers have few er and few er
opportu nities to m arket their w orks, especially because the larger program
d istribu tors are vertically integrated into program prod u ction. As a smaller
nu m ber of ow ners controls a larger share of the m arket they gain greater and

CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 186-203.
Order, para., 517.
21 CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 200-202.
22 CFA/CU, Comments 1, pp. 30, footnotes omitted.
23 CFA/CU, Comments 1, pp. 108-113; CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 186-200.
19
20
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greater leverage in the bargaining w ith ind epend ent prod u cers. Ind eed , they
can make or break programming.24
One of the critical factors that the Ord er has failed to recognize, in
spite of this m ou ntain of evid ence provid ed , is that the ow ners of the
broad cast netw orks are also su bstantial ow ners of non-broadcast
program m ing. Contrad icting the claim in the Ord er that there are tw o very
d istinct bu siness m od el in the television m arkets, CFA/ CU and others have
show n that the ow ners of broad cast netw orks have m onetized their m u st
carry/ retransm ission rights into carriage on cable system s, w hich provid es
them with a substantial stream of subscription revenues.
It is tru ly ironic that the FCC, w hich rou tinely notes that rising
program m ing costs are one of the causes of d ramatic increases in cable rates,25
has failed to notice that the ow ners of m any of the program s m ost frequ ently
cited as the program ming cost culprits are the ow ners of the d om inant
broad cast netw orks.26 Consid er paragraph 61 in w hich the Com m ission cites
the fact that “in com peting w ith broad casters, non-broad cast program m ing
netw orks typically have tw o incom e stream s to d evelop or pu rchase
programming. Broad casters continue to rely overw helm ingly on ad vertising
revenu es.” The three non-broad cast program m ing netw orks it cites as
exam ples, ESPN , CN N , MTV are all ow ned by entities that also ow n
broad cast netw orks. In fact, the three ow ners of these show s ow n fou r of the
top six national broadcast networks.
The FCC’s d iscu ssion of non-broad cast program m ing in its historical
overview reconfirm s the error in failing to look at ow nership of
program m ing. In paragraphs 102 and 109, the cable netw ork m entioned
(HBO, TBS, ESPN, CNN, BET, Nickelodeon, MTV) are owned by corporations
that also ow n netw orks. The ow ner of USA, Liberty, has a su bstantial
ow nership interest in corporations that ow n netw orks. The only ind epend ent
channel in the list is the Weather Channel.
Even the d iscu ssion of broad cast netw orks in paragraph 110 fails to
take note of ow nership. Tw o of the three new netw orks the FCC tou ts are,
ow ned by corporations that ow n another netw ork (UPN ), or a m ajor cable
operator (WB).
The Com m ission’s observation that the top fou r broad cast netw orks
have an ow nership interest in only 25% of the 102 broad cast channels, m isses
the point that they have gu aranteed access to that d istribu tion and close
interconnection throu gh stock ow nership and joint ventu res to the cable
CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 206-208.
Fed eral Com m u nications Com m ission, “Rep ort on Cable Ind u stry Prices.” In the
M atter of Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition A ct of 1992, Statistical Report on A verage Rates for Basic Service, Cable
Programming Service, and Equipment, various issues.
26 Order, para. 142.
24
25

WHY SOURCE DIVERSITY MATTERS

337

com panies that control the rem aind er of the channels.27 The joint activities of
this cabal has resu lted in a vid eo program ming m arket that is a tight
oligopoly by all traditional measures of market structure.28
In note 1090, the Com m ission states that broad cast netw orks are
“organizational u nits of larger m ed ia enterprises,” but argues that “corporate
management ordinarily expects, however, that each business unit will recover
its u nit-specific fixed and variable costs, contribu te to the cost of shared
corporate services and fu nctions, and earn u nit-specific profit.”
The
Com m ission presents no evid ence specific to the vid eo ind ustry that this is
the case. It d oes not analyze the obvious fact that such a su bstantial am ou nt
of programming purchased for cable networks is likely to generate substantial
revenu e not in the trad itional broad cast m od e, nor d oes it provid e any
analysis of the joint assets, like stu d ios, that su pport both broad cast and nonbroad cast program ming or the increasing revenu e associated w ith
repu rposing of program ming. The failu re to cond uct analyses su ch as these
d em and s that the Com m ission reconsid er its Ord er in regard to the national
cap.
The failure of the FCC to analyze the ow nership of program m ing and
to properly und erstand the econom ic m od els being applied in the ind u stry
has u nd ermined its analysis of source d iversity and led it to incorrectly allow
greater concentration of ow nership of ou tlets. For these reasons, the
Commission should reconsider the nation cap and restore it the previous level
of 35 percent.
EVIDENCE OF BARRIERS TO ENTRY RESULTING FROM V ERTICAL INTEGRATION.
The evid ence in the record that d eals w ith the im pact of vertical
integration focu ses on the severe d ifficulty that ind epend ent prod u cers have
in gaining access to the consu m er because of the vertical integration of
d istribu tors into content p rod u ction in three areas, prim e tim e program m ing,
broadcast-cable bu nd les of program m ing, and cable self-d ealing. In each of
the areas the evid ence continu es to m ou nt that vertical integration is a severe
problem for independent content producers.

27
28

Order, para. 123.
CFA/CU, Comments 2, pp. 203-220.

338

COOPER

VERTICALLY INTEGRATED VIDEO OLIGOPOLY

339

STUDY 23:
THE IMPACT OF THE VERTICALLY
INTEGRATED, TELEVISION-MOVIE STUDIO
OLIGOPOLY ON SOURCE DIVERSITY
AND INDEPENDENT PRODUCTION
M ARK COOPER
INTRODUCTION & O VERVIEW
The Emergence of a Vertically Integrated Oligopoly in Television
This paper exam ines the im pact of three m ajor policy changes in the
early and m id - 1990s on the prod u ction and d istribu tion of vid eo content,
prim arily broad cast television program m ing in Am erica: the repeal of the
Financial Interest / Syndication rules and the enactment of both the Cable Act
of 1992 and the Telecom mu nications Act of 1996. It show s that these policy
changes led to the form ation of a vertically integrated oligopoly in television
entertainm ent and a d ramatic shrinkage of the role of ind epend ent prod u cers
of content. The policy changes and resu lting alterations in m arket stru ctu re
and behavior w ere not lim ited to the broad cast sector, how ever. They also
affected the synd ication m arket, cable television and theatrical m ovies
because prime tim e program m ing plays a critical role in the overall vid eo
entertainm ent prod u ct space. If not am end ed , these sam e policy changes
cou ld have a m ajor im pact u pon the ability of ind epend ents to offer prod u ct
throu gh the Internet and other d eveloping d igital platforms, inclu d ing the
rapidly approaching digital multi-cast channels.
Over the course of a d ecad e, the content aired on prim e tim e netw ork
television, TV synd ication, basic and pay cable channels, and theatrical
m ovies cam e to be d om inated by a hand ful of vertically integrated entities.
Dozens of ind epend ent entities that prod u ced vid eo content w ere replaced by
a hand fu l of firm s that ow n m ajor movie stud ios and television prod u ction
units, hold multiple broadcast licenses and own the dominant cable networks.
The role of ind epend ent prod u cers has been squ eezed across all d istribu tion
platforms.
Effects of the Vertically Integrated Oligopoly on the Television Market
Fifteen years ago, theatrical m ovie stud ios and broad cast television
w ere alm ost entirely separate w hile cable television w as just d eveloping as a
prim ary ou tlet. In each of these m arkets, there w as a su bstantial ind epend ent
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sector. Major studios provided about one third of product shown on network
prim e tim e television w hile the netw orks them selves accou nted for ju st 15%.
Non-major stu d ios, know n as “ind epend ents,” su pplied nearly one half. One
set of ind epend ents sold m ovies to broad casters. Another set sold series and
other program m ing. A few prod u ced and sold both. Vertical integration has
changed that situation.
The vertically integrated major studios and broadcasters now account
for over 75% of broad cast prim e tim e television programm ing w hile
ind epend ents accou nt for less than 20%. The few ind epend ents that get on
prim e tim e television prod u ce reality show s, not scripted program m ing. As
a resu lt, ind epend ents have been virtu ally shu t ou t of the lu crative
synd ication m arket, now accou nting for ju st 18% of all first ru n synd ication
program m ing hou rs and none of the p rogram ming hou rs for show s that have
gone into syndication over the last two years.
The econom ic terrain of cable television has also changed for
ind epend ents. The vertically integrated m ed ia com panies ow n 24 of the top
25 cable channels. The ind epend ents’ share of pay cable program m ing also
continu es to d ecline as a percentage of program m ing, d ropping by som e 15%
since the late nineties. Ind epend ent prod u ct w as also squ eezed ou t of
synd ication. Ind epend ent prod u ct is increasingly consigned to the far less
visible and less financially rew ard ing basic cable channels w here license fees
are mu ch low er and in m any cases inad equate to cover prod uction costs.
Ad d itionally, prod u ct placed on basic cable d oes not have the sam e potential
to realize foreign sales that pay cable product enjoys.
The bu siness practices u sed to accomplish this d ram atic shift in the
flow of content in the vid eo prod u ct space exhibit characteristics that clearly
fit the pattern of abu se of m arket. By controlling d istribu tion and vertically
integrating into prod u ction, five of the d om inant broad casters have becom e
gatekeepers w ho favor their affiliated content, restrict access of ind epend ents
to the m arket, and im pose onerou s term s and cond itions on ind epend ent
producers that have further shrunk the sector.
The key elem ents of the vid eo entertainm ent prod u ct space fit a
pattern that the literatu re on ind ustrial organization d escribes as the exercise
and abu se of m arket pow er. These elem ents inclu d e m arket structu res and
vertical integration that are cond u cing to and cond u ct that is ind icative of the
exercise of market power as sellers and buyers of video content.
Policy Implications of Consolidation and Integration
The sw ift and m assive horizontal consolid ation and vertical
integration in the ind u stry raises a num ber of concerns. The analysis of the
econom ic impact of horizontal concentration and vertical integration can be
fou nd across m any areas of econom ic activity, bu t the u niqu e natu re and role
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of vid eo entertainm ent raises ad d itional, perhaps even greater concerns in
non-econom ic areas. Television and m ovies, the form er in particu lar, are
fu nd am ental to d em ocratic d iscourse. Television is the d om inant m ed iu m in
term s of tim e spent on entertainm ent and new s and information gathering.1 It
is overw helm ingly the choice for national cam paign ad vertising.
Entertainm ent on television can be cu ltu ral, ed u cational or political.
Theatrical releases have a prom inent role in the pu blic d iscourse as w ell,
w hich film s su ch as Crash and The Passion of the Christ have d em onstrated in
recent years.
Television and m ovies play an im portant part in the m arketplace of
id eas. A nation that prid es itself on freed om of speech and d iversity w hile
simultaneously issuing exclusive licenses to private firms to broadcast content
faces a d ilem m a. The issuance of a hand fu l of broad cast licenses in each
m arket in Am erica creates a privileged class of speakers throu gh governm ent
action. Local governm ents issu e franchises to cable TV operators, w hich are
even m ore scarce than broad cast licenses on a city-by-city, cou nty-by-county
basis.
H ow one prom otes d iversity w ith su ch a sm all nu mber of electronic
voices, w ithou t d ictating w hat content broad casters should air, becom es a
m ajor sou rce of concern. If those very valu able and pow erfu l governm entgranted platform s for reaching the pu blic becom e the core of a tight oligopoly
that dominates other areas of expression, the concern is compounded.
If d ictating content is ru led ou t by First Am end m ent free speech
concerns, bu t policy m akers continu e to strive for d iversity, then the prim ary
option is to bu ild m ed ia m arket stru ctu res that d isperse the opportu nity to
speak as mu ch as possible w ithin the confines of the granting of licenses and
franchises. The principle on w hich this approach stand s is sim ple. By
ensu ring a w id er opportunity to pu t content before the pu blic, d iversity and
d iscou rse are stim u lated w ithou t d ictating the su bstance of the content
supplied.
Policies to Promote Diversity
For m u ch of the tw entieth centu ry, the Congress and the Fed eral
Com m u nications Com m ission pu rsued this goal of d iversity by
sim ultaneou sly d ispersing ow nership of prod uction, and d istribu tion of
content. The nu m ber of med ia ou tlets that cou ld be ow ned by a single entity
w as restricted both w ithin a m arket (the local television m ultiple ow nership
rule)2 and across the nation (a national cap) by the national television multiple
1

Cooper Mark, Media Ownership and Democracy in the Digital Information Age (Palo Alto:
Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society, 2003).
2
47 C.F. R. 73.355(b), the d u op oly ru le, lifted the ban on m u ltip le station ow nership ,
but 47 C.F.R. 73.658(g), the dual network rule, restricted the combinations of television
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ow nership rule.3 The am ou nt of content aired in prim e tim e that any given
netw ork could ow n w as lim ited as w ell by the Financial Interest and
Synd ication Rules (Fin-Syn) and the Prim e Tim e Access Ru les.4 Sim ilarly,
consent d ecrees in cases brou ght by the Departm ent of Ju stice m irrored the
Fin-Syn rules.5 Other FCC ru les prevented Broad cast license hold ers from
ow ning other types of m ed ia ou tlets – e.g. new spapers and cable TV system s
(cross-ow nership lim its)6 -- and restricted their ability to engage in crossm ed ia ow nership (e.g. rad io).7 The resu lt w as a su bstantial d ispersion of
ownership of content.
In the 1990s, the tw o p rim ary policies to prom ote d iversity of
ow nership of content in broad casting w ere eliminated or cu t back. The
Financial Interest and Synd ication Rules (Fin-Syn) that governed prim e tim e
program m ing w ere allow ed to expire and the consent d ecree w as also
vacated – allow ing broad casters to ow n as m u ch program ming as they
w anted . The limits on mu ltiple station ow nership w ere relaxed – allow ing
them to ow n tw o stations in the nation’s largest and m ost im portant m arkets.
A third policy also gave broad casters the right to carriage on cable system s
(must-carry/retransmission).8 The terrain of the Am erican m ed ia land scape
w as d ram atically altered by these policy changes as the broad casters m oved
quickly to use these three new sources of leverage in the video market.
Whether or not Congress anticipated the pow erfu l effect that the
policy changes of the 1990s w ould have on d iversity of ow nership of
program m ing is u nclear. Althou gh the FCC has created record s on these

stations, to d isallow d u al or m u ltip le netw ork ow nership that involves a com bination
betw een ABC, CBS, Fox, or N BC. Citations to the ru les are cu rrently being review ed ,
w hich generally relaxed the restrictions on cross ow nership in the 1990s and are the
latest in the evolving regulatory structure.
3
47 C.F. R. s 73.3555(e)
4
The tw o ru les have alw ays been closely linked see Am end m ent of Part 73 of the
Com m ission’s Ru les and Regu lations w ith Resp ect to Com p etition and Resp onsibility
in N etw ork Television Broad casting, 23, FCC 2d 282 (1970). Am end m ent of Part 73 of
the Com m ission’s Synd ication and Financial Interest Ru le, 47 FR 32959 (1982), as they
w ere in the cou rt case that led to their u ltim ate exp iration, see Shu rz Com m unication
Inc. v. FCC 982 F. 2d 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 1992).
5
Id entical consent d ecrees w ere entered against the three m ajor netw orks, w hich
follow ed the Fin-Syn ru les closely. These w ere vacated w hen in the early 1990s, as the
Fin-Syn rules were allowed to expire...
6
47 C.F. R. s 73.3555(d), cross-ownership of broadcast states and newspapers, prohibits
the com m on ow nership of a d aily new sp ap er and a broad cast station in the sam e
market.
7
47 C.F.R. 73.3555(c), the rad io-television cross –ow nership ru le, lim its the nu m ber of
TV and radio licenses that can be held within a market.
8
Cable Television Consu m er Protection and Com p etition Act of 1992, Pu b. L. N o. 102385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
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issu es in its proceed ings subsequent to the changes in policy, the cou rts have
rem and ed several of its ru les,9 leaving their regu latory statu s in flu x and
Congress has included a provision that requires frequent review of the rules.10
The FCC continu es to have the au thority to im plem ent restrictions on
m ed ia ow nership to accom plish the goals that Congress has set in legislating
media policy,11 with the exception of the national multiple ownership rule. To
the extent that Congress continu es to em brace the goal of d iversity, the
cu rrent situation and how the policy changes of the 1990s created it are w hat
m atters now .
Moreover, since Congress ord ered the FCC in the
Telecom m u nications Act of 1996 to period ically review its rules, the FCC
cou ld conclud e that the ru le changes it has im plem ented w ith agency
d iscretion have harm ed d iversity, a goal that Congress continu es to em brace.
The FCC could re-institu te those policies that su ccessfu lly promoted sou rce
d iversity in the past or it cou ld seek new policies that w ill prom ote sou rce
diversity in the future.
This paper show s that the cu rrent policies are not prom oting
ind epend ent prod u ction of vid eo content on the m ajor television platform s.
Und erstand ing the im pact of past ru le changes is the first step in the process
of re-examining the d ecline of sou rces d iversity on television. That is the
su bject of this paper. While the pu rpose of this paper is not to recom m end
specific policy changes, it is clear that if policymakers still believe in sou rce
d iversity, then a change in policy that d irectly alters the stru ctu re and
conduct of the vertically integrated oligopoly is necessary.
D EFINING THE PRODUCT S PACE A ND A NALYTIC A PPROACH
The Object of Study
This is a stu d y of the ind u strial organization of the vid eo
entertainm ent sector – theatrical m ovies, all form s of television and the sale
and rental of tapes and DVDs – in the United States. Becau se the sector is
com plex, I ad opt the follow ing d efinitions. The sector consists of six prim ary
channels for the distribution of content:
9

Ind eed , all of the m ajor stru ctu ral ru les w ritten in the late 1990s have been rem and ed
by the cou rt (broad cast m u ltip le station lim its, cable horizontal lim its, new sp ap er
cross ownership) or overridden by Congress (national cap).
10
The 1996 Act p rovid ed for a biennial review (Telecommunications A ct of 1996, Pu b. L.
N o. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). This w as later extend ed to fou r years (FY2004
Consolidated A ppropriations A ct (Pu blic Law 108-109, 118 Stat. 3 et seq. Section 629) and
prohibited the FCC from further reviewing the national cap.
11
As w ith the other ru les overtu rned by the cou rts, in the case of the Fin-Syn ru les,
w hile the cou rts rejected the sp ecific FCC ru le (Schurz Communications Inc. v. FCC 982
F. 2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1992), it d id not p reclu d e the w riting of an alternative ru le. To d ate,
the FCC has elected not to do so.
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theatrical movie releases,
prime time airing of movies and series on broadcast television,
syndication on broadcast television in non-prime time slots of
both movies and series,
movies and series aired on pay cable,
movies and series aired on basic cable networks,
Home Video – i.e. sale/rental of video for viewing on VCR and
DVD players.

I refer to the overall sector made up of the six distribution channels as
the video entertainment product space. The Internet has ju st begu n to be
u sed as a m eans of red istribu ting vid eo prod u ct that w as originally released
throu gh one of the other six ou tlets. While there are clear ind ications that it
w ill change the cu rrent terrain of the vid eo entertainm ent prod u ct space in
the long ru n, there are also clear ind ications that it w ill not d econcentrate the
sector.
Alread y, the netw orks are m ulticasting cu rrent prim etim e
program m ing throu gh their w ebsites and Internet protocol television (IPTV)
channels are com ing on line. Internet vid eo on d emand services (VOD), su ch
as Cinem a N ow and Movielink, are gaining visibility and subscribers as
broad band service penetrates d eeper into the consu m er m arket, but the sam e
content prod u cers d om inate. Broad casters are poised to receive a su bstantial
increase in their ability to d istribu te content w ith the transition to d igital
multicasting. The current single channel with be expanded by the granting of
rights to u se spectru m to broad cast up to six channels d igitally. As su ch,
there is grow ing concern that the sam e entities that d om inate the trad itional
channels of physical d istribu tion of vid eo entertainm ent prod u ct w ill extend
their dominance to the new Internet and digital distribution channels.
The natu re and relationship betw een these channels has changed
over tim e. Term s of art once applied have stu ck, even thou gh they m ay no
longer technically describe the distribution channel.
Theatrical d istribu tion of m ovies has been arou nd the longest, w ith
the com m ercial ind u stry stretching back to the early part of the 20th centu ry.
Television em erged in the 1950s and 1960s. Cable arrived in the 1970s and
1980s. Distribu tion of vid eo tapes began in the 1980s and explod ed w ith the
advent of DVDs in the early 2000s.
Trad itionally, television w as d ivid ed betw een broad cast and cable to
reflect the d ifferent m eans of d elivery. Broad casters sent signals over the air
from TV transm itters (stations) that w ere licensed by the FCC. Cable signals
were sent from a head end through a wire, the laying of which was franchised
by a local entity. Tod ay, although broad cast signals are still available overthe-air, m ost Am erican hou sehold s (80% to 90%) get the broad cast prod u ct
through the cable wire or from satellites.
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Prim e tim e on broad cast TV w as alw ays a focal point of policy
because of the hu ge au d ience and resou rces it comm and ed . Prim e tim e w as
controlled by the netw orks, w hich also held licenses to operate TV stations in
the largest m arkets. They created national netw orks by affiliating w ith
ind epend ent license hold ers in m arkets w here they d id not hold broad cast
licenses d irectly. The m ajor netw orks – ABC, N BC and CBS, reach virtu ally
every home in America. Fox is a national network as well, although it may be
available in somewhat fewer homes.
Althou gh cable has alw ays been a subscription service, it split into
tw o d ifferent d istribu tion channels w hen pay cable services, like H BO,
d eveloped the ability to charge a premiu m for program m ing and basic cable
becam e ad vertiser su pported , m im icking broad cast television. H istorically,
one could d raw a clear line betw een prod u ction of content by m ovie stud ios
and exhibition – the presentation to the pu blic of prod u ct – in theaters. The
d istinction breaks d ow n w ith live television – the broad cast is simu ltaneou sly
prod u ced and d istribu ted . Television also changes the natu re of the
exhibition from a pu blic space to a private space, althou gh it is still shared in
the sense that program m ing is w atched simu ltaneou sly, bu t separately, by
large nu m bers of people. The sale/ rental of vid eos (and the record ing of
program m ing) for hom e view ing (referred to as H om e Vid eo) extend ed the
change from a pu blic to a private experience by allow ing people to choose
when to watch.
A NALYTIC A PPROACH: S TRUCTURE, CONDUCT PERFORMANCE
The paper applies a framew ork of analysis know n as the stru ctu reconduct-perform ance parad igm (see Exhibit 1), 12 w hich has been the
d om inant approach to ind u strial organization analysis for over three-quarters
of a century. The premise is simple.
The analysis seeks to id entify the cond itions that d eterm ine the
perform ance of m arkets. 13 It starts w ith basic cond itions.14 On the su pplysid e these inclu d e factors su ch as technology, prod u ct d urability, bu siness
attitu d es and the legal fram ew ork. On the d em and sid e factors su ch as price
elasticity, cyclical/seasonal patterns, and purchasing methods are

12

Scherer, F. M. and David Ross, Ind u strial M arket Structure and Economic Performance
(Boston, H ou ghton Mifflin: 1990); Shep herd , William , G., The Economics of

Industrial Organization (Prentice Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, N.J., 1985).
13

Id ., p . 4.; Shep herd , William , G., The Economics of Industrial Organization (Prentice
Hall, Engelwood Cliffs, N.J., 1985), p. 5, presents a similar view.
14
Scherer and Ross, p. 5.
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Exhibit 1:
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm
BASIC CONDITIONS
Supply
Raw material
Technology
Unionization
Product durability
Value/Weight
Business attitudes
Legal framework
Price Elasticity

Demand
Price elasticity
Substitutes
Rate of growth
Cyclical and seasonal Character
Purchase method
marketing type

MARKET STRUCTURE
Number of sellers and buyers
Product differentiation
Barriers to entry
Cost structures
Vertical integration
Diversification

CONDUCT

PUBLIC POLICY
Taxes and subsidies
International trade
Regulation
Price Controls
Antitrust policy
Information

Pricing behavior
Product strategy and advertising
Research and innovation
Plant investment
Legal tactics

Performance
Production And Allocative Efficiency
Progress
Full employment
Equity

SOURCE: Scherer and Ross, F. M ., and David Ross, Industrial M arket Structure and
Economic Performance (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston, 1990), p. 5.
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included. These interact with characteristics of the market structure, 15 such as
the nu m ber and the size of sellers and bu yers, prod u ct d ifferentiation, cost
stru ctu res and vertical integration (the relationship of prod u ction and
d istribu tion), to d eterm ine the cond u ct of the m arket participants. The key
types of cond u ct inclu d e pricing behavior, prod u ct strategy and ad vertising,
and legal tactics. 16 Cond u ct d eterm ines perform ance, trad itionally m easu red
in term s of pricing and profits, bu t increasingly view ed as quality and the
nature and speed of innovation.
One of the key featu res of the stru ctu re-conduct-performance
parad igm is that it recognizes the im portance of pu blic policy. Policies, su ch
as antitrust enforcem ent, regulation, or taxation and su bsid ization, can
directly affect structure and conduct, thereby altering performance.
H ORIZONTAL M ARKET POWER
The characteristic of m arket stru ctu res that received m ost pu blic
policy attention is horizontal market pow er. The concern is that if m arkets
becom e concentrated – i.e. w here a few players have a large market share –
com petition is d u lled . Rather than com pete to prod u ce the best prod u ct at
the low est price, one large entity m ay be able to set prices u p or otherw ise
affect ou tpu t, w ithou t a su fficient response from others to d iscipline su ch
behavior. With sm all nu mbers of com petitors, they m ay accom plish the sam e
thing by consciou sly paralleling each other’s behavior. Thu s, the Departm ent
of Justice d efines m arket pow er as “the ability profitably to m aintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time… Sellers with market
pow er also m ay lessen com petition on d im ensions other than price, su ch as
product quality, service or innovation.”17
Pu re and perfect com petition is rare, bu t the competitive goal is
important.18 Therefore, pu blic policy pays a great d eal of attention to the
relative com petitiveness of m arkets as w ell as the cond itions that m ake
markets more competitive or workably competitive. Knowing exactly when a
m arket is “too” concentrated is a com plex qu estion. The Departm ent of
Ju stice calculates an ind ex called the H erfind ahl-H irschm an Ind ex (H H I) to
categorize markets. This ind ex takes the m arket share of each firm, squ ares it
and su m s it. It consid ers a market w ith an H H I above 1000 to be
concentrated . This is the equ ivalent of a market w ith few er than the
equivalent of 10-equ al sized firm s. It consid ers a m arket w ith few er than the

15

Scherer and Ross, p. 5.
Scherer and Ross, p. 4.
17
Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines (1997).
18
Scherer and Ross, p. 16-17.
16
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equivalent of approxim ately 5.5-equal sized firm s (H H I = 1800) to be highly
concentrated . Markets w ith an H H I betw een 1000 and 1800 are considered
moderately concentrated.
M ONOPSONY POWER
A second econom ic concept that plays an im portant part in the vid eo
entertainm ent prod u ct space is that of m onopsony pow er. Monopsony
power is the flip side of monopoly power. Monopoly power is the power of a
seller to d ictate prices, term s and cond itions as a seller of good s and services
to the pu blic. Monopsony pow er is the pow er of d ow nstream bu yers of
inpu ts to create prod u cts to sell to the pu blic and to d ictate the p rices, term s
and cond itions on w hich they bu y those inpu ts. If the u pstream su ppliers
lack alternatives, they m ay be forced to accept terms that u nd er com pensate
them or force them to bear extra risk.
The d ow nstream bu yers have m arket pow er over the u pstream
sellers of the prod u ct. This can result in the prod u ction of few er or inferior
products for sale downstream.
Many economists describe markets in terms of the market share of the
top fou r firm s. Shepherd d escribes these threshold s in term s of four-firm
concentration ratios as follows:19
Tight Oligop oly: The lead ing fou r firm s com bined have 60-100 p ercent of the
market; collusion among them is relatively easy.
Loose Oligop oly: The lead ing fou r firm s, com bined , have 40 p ercent or less of
the market; collusion among them to fix prices is virtually impossible.

Althou gh the overlap is not perfect, there is a close correspond ence
between these two approaches. A highly concentrated market is called a tight
oligopoly.20 A moderately concentrated market is called a loose oligopoly.
Although m onopsony has not been the focal point of m u ch antitru st
action, it is m ore likely in precisely the type of sector like the vid eo
entertainment product space, where inputs are specialized
Monop sony is thou ght to be m ore likely w hen there are bu yers of specialized
products or services. For example, a sports league may exercise monopsony (or
oligop sony) p ow er in p u rchasing the services of p rofessional athletes. An
owner of a chain of movie theaters, some of which are the sole theaters in small
tow ns, m ay have m onop sony p ow er in the p u rchase or lease of m ovies. Cable

19
20

Shepherd, p. 4.
Shepherd, p. 4.
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TV franchises m ay exercise m onop sony p ow er in p u rchasing television
channels that will be offered to their subscribers.21

V ERTICAL INTEGRATION AND LEVERAGE
A third key characteristic of m any ind u stries is the extent of vertical
integration. In m any ind ustries the act of prod u cing a prod u ct can be read ily
separated from its d istribu tion and sale. Prod u ction is referred to as the
u pstream, d istribu tion and sale are referred to as the d ow nstream . Vertical
integration occu rs w hen both activities are cond u cted by one entity. Because
vertical integration involves the elimination of a (presu mably market-based)
transaction betw een tw o entities it has been the focal point of a great d eal of
analysis. Econom ic efficiencies are frequ ently claimed for vertical integration
d u e to the elim ination of transaction costs. Others fear inefficiency and
potential abuse of the ability to leverage vertical m arket pow er that can result
from excessive or unjustified vertical integration.
The classic concern is that d istribu tors of content, w ho are also
prod u cers, favor their ow n content at the exp ense of the content of
u naffiliated prod u cers. Vertical integration may becom e the norm in the
ind ustry, m aking it d ifficult for u nintegrated prod u cers to su rvive. Vertically
integrated entities may captu re the m arket for inpu ts, making it d ifficu lt for
ind epend ent entities to obtain the factors of prod u ction necessary to prod u ce
prod u ct. Also, w ith vertically integrated entities d om inating a sector,
reciprocity and forbearance rather than competition may become the norm.
CONCLUSION
The rem aind er of this part d ocu m ents the em ergence of a vertically
integrated, tight oligopoly in the video entertainment product space. It shows
that w hen p u blic policies that prevented the exercise of m arket pow er w ere
relaxed or elim inated , the cond itions for the exercise of m arket pow er w ere
quickly created by m ergers and acquisitions and changes in behavior. The
ind ustry becam e a vertically integrated , tight oligopoly. Vertical leverage
w as u sed to elim inate ind epend ent prod u ction of prim e tim e content.
Monopsony pow er w as exercised to squ eeze ind epend ent film prod u ction
into a very narrow, niche space on basic cable channels.

21

Su llivan, Law rence and Warren S. Grim es. The Law of A ntitrust: A n Integrated
Handbook, Hornbook Series. West Group, St. Paul, 2000, p. 138.
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PUBLIC POLICY A ND THE EMERGENCE O F A V ERTICALLY INTEGRATED
O LIGOPOLY IN V IDEO ENTERTAINMENT
The Repeal of Financial and Syndication Rules Triggers Horizontal
Concentration and Vertical Integration
At the end of the 1980s, policies to d isperse ow nership in broadcast
television were in place. Though they had been debated intensely throughout
the 1980s, the policies remained to limit holders of broadcast licenses to one to
a m arket. These stations w ere know n as O&Os (ow ned and operated ).
Holders of broadcast licenses could have O & O stations that reached no more
than 25% of the nation’s television hou sehold s. The national broad cast
netw orks w ere restricted in the am ou nt of content that aired in prim e tim e
they could ow n and their participation in the synd ication of non-prim e tim e
program m ing (the Financial and Synd ication Ru le). The broad cast netw orks
filled ou t their national netw orks by entering into affiliation agreem ents w ith
stations they d id not ow n or operate. There w ere extensive rules that
governed the relationships between the affiliated stations and the networks.
Exhibit 2 id entifies the key policy changes (ovals) and the stru ctu ral
and cond u ct changes that follow ed (rectangles) in the 1990s. The prim ary
policy that triggered the vertical integration in the ind u stry w as the d ecision
of the FCC to allow the Financial and Synd ication Ru les to lapse, rather than
w rite ru les that w ou ld pass cou rt scru tiny (see Exhibit 2). In retrospect, it is
quite clear that the Financial and Synd ication ru les, w hich restricted the
amount of broadcaster-owned programming in prime time, had a major effect
on the d iversity of not only the broad cast television m arket, bu t television in
general. When the ru les w ere eliminated in the m id -1990s, broad casters
m oved to replace the lion’s share of ind epend ent program m ing w ith content
they produced. Self-dealing became the predominant mode of operation.
Ironically, the im pact w as m ore profound than the d irect effect on
prim e tim e. At the tim e that the Fin-Syn ru les w ere relaxed , restrictions on
vertical integration in the cable ind ustry w ere im plem ented . Cable operators
w ere restricted in the percentage of Ironically, the im pact w as m ore profou nd
than the d irect effect on prim e tim e. At the tim e that the Fin-Syn ru les w ere
relaxed , restrictions on vertical integration in the cable ind u stry w ere
im plem ented . Cable operators w ere restricted in the percentage of capacity
on their system s they could fill w ith program m ing they ow ned . In the Cable
Consu m er Protection Act of 1992 they w ere also requ ired to m ake their ow n
program m ing available to com peting d elivery system s (the program access
rules).

Exhibit 2: The Impact of Policy Changes on Independents in the Television Market

Independents
Independents have
have
access
access to
to prime
prime time
time
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Network dissuaded
dissuaded
from
from owning
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Studios
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cable
cable
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Independents have
have
product
product for
for and
and
access
access to
to syndication
syndication

Fin-Syn
Fin-Syn
Fin-Syn
Fin-Syn
Repealed,
Repealed,
1995
1995
Restriction
Restriction on
on
cable
cable vertical
vertical
integ.
integ. 1992
1992
Cable
Cable Act
Act

Independents
Independents
squeezed
squeezed out
out of
of
Syndication
Syndication

Independents
Independents driven
driven
out
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supply
supply cable
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Independents
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of Pay
Pay Cable
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As a result of the improved access to program m ing, satellite
com petition, w hich had been anticipated in the 1984 Cable Act, finally
increased its m arket share. Satellite w as a d igital technology w ith greater
capacity than cable. The cable ind u stry respond ed by d eploying its ow n
digital capacity. Thus, just as the broadcast space was closing, the cable space
opened for the m ajors and ind epend ents. The stu d ios, w hich had been
prevented from integrating w ith broad casters, fu nd ed and su pplied
program m ing for cable channels. Given their stru ctu re, they cou ld not
provid e nearly all the program ming that a 24/ 7 channel required . A
substantial market for independent movie production opened up.
Majors and ind epend ents w ere not the only beneficiaries of the 1992
Cable Act. The Act also gave the broad casters a w ed ge into the cable
platform, w ith the m u st carry/ retransmission rules. Cable operators need ed
to carry the m ajor broad cast netw orks to m ake their basic su bscription
packages attractive to the public. The Cable Act of 1992 gave the broadcasters
bargaining power over the cable operators. They could insist on a high fee for
their national netw orks or they cou ld negotiate for carriage of other
program m ing. Mu st-carry and retransm ission w ere government granted
rights of carriage, m eans of ensu ring access to au d iences. The broad casters
chose to bargain for m ore channels on cable systems, rather than charge for
their broadcast networks.
The 1996 Telecom m u nications Act reinforced this process. The Act
allow ed the FCC to lift the ban on horizontal concentration in the television
ind ustry. Broad cast licenses had been lim ited to one per entity in each
m arket. The 1996 Act allow ed the FCC to aw ard more than one license per
m arket after it had consid ered its im pact on the ind ustry. The FCC chose to
allow d u opolies in m arkets in w hich there w ou ld be at least eight “voices” in
the m arket after the m erger of tw o stations. Generally, the largest m arkets
w ere opened to d u opolies u nd er the reasoning that d iversity w ou ld be
preserved in those markets.
For ind epend ents that sold prod u ct into TV synd ication, this change
had the opposite effect. By allow ing the broad cast netw orks to ow n tw o
stations in the m ost im portant m arkets, especially N ew York, Chicago and
Los Angeles – a second m ajor ou tlet w as pulled into the tightening, vertically
integrated core. The new ow ners of the second station now had a great d eal
of content of their ow n since, over the cou rse of a d ecad e, every m ajor
netw ork acqu ired one of the m ajor stu d ios. Vertical integration became
com plete. Synd ication w as m ore d ifficu lt becau se access to the m ost
important markets became much more difficult.
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S TRATEGIC M OVES
These changes d id not take place instantaneou sly, bu t u nfold ed over
a nu m ber of years for several reasons. When a policy change takes place, it
frequ ently takes a period of tim e for regu lators to im plem ent legislated
requirem ents. Parties w ill frequ ently litigate su ch changes and m ove slow ly
u ntil the legal terrain is clear. Fu rther, existing bu siness relations m u st
unwind . Contracts ru n their cou rse and new m od els are d eveloped . Finally,
because m any of these policies are highly visible political d ecisions, m arket
participants try to avoid triggering a political reaction with extreme moves.
The 1990s policy changes triggered a series of acqu isitions and
prod u ct d evelopm ents over the cou rse of the d ecad e that created a vertically
integrated oligopoly in the television industry (see Exhibit 3).
Most d irectly, the netw orks cou ld m onopolize access to au d iences in
prime tim e broad cast television, foreclosing the stream s of revenu e that
su stain prod u ction of all form s of content. Within a d ecad e, the am ou nt of
program m ing on prim e tim e ow ned by the netw orks increased d ramatically,
from 15% to arou nd 75%. First the ind epend ents w ere exclud ed from prim e
time, and then the major studios were absorbed.
Each of the big three netw orks m erged w ith a m ajor stu d io and
acqu ired cable program m ing over the cou rse of the 1990s. Fox had taken a
d ifferent path to vertical integration. After being rebu ffed in an effort to
acqu ire Warner stu d io, N ew s Corp. acquired Tw entieth Centu ry Fox and a
number of television stations in major markets, both in 1985.
Each of the five also has su bstantial cable offerings. Ind eed 24 of the
top 25 cable channels, as measu red by hom es passed , are ow ned by these five
entities.
In term s of actual view ers, as opposed to hom es w here
program m ing is available, these five entities accou nt for the vast m ajority – as
much as 85 percent -- of prime time viewing.
Since the late 1970s, Tw entieth Centu ry Fox had been one of the least
active of the m ajor stu d ios in provid ing television program m ing. Fox’s focu s
throu gh the 1990s w ould not be on original program m ing as trad itionally
d efined for prim e tim e. It w ou ld focu s on sports in program m ing and
broadcast duopolies.
Interestingly, Fox w as vertically integrated bu t rem ained below the
threshold for being su bject to the Fin-Syn ru les. For the big three netw orks
w ho w ere subject to the ru les, the repeal of Fin-Syn m ad e m ergers betw een
networks and studios profitable, as self-supply was now allowed.

354

COOPER

Exhibit 3: Major 1990s Acquisitions and Launches Create the Vertically
Integrated Video Entertainment Oligopoly
Year

Disney/ABC

1993

Time Warner

Viacom/CBS

G.E-NBC

Fox

Turner acquires

Fox acquires

Castle Rock

NFL rights

& New Line
1994

Viacom acquires
Paramount

1995
1996

Time Warner

CBS launches

launchesWB

UPN

Disney

Time Warner

acquiresABC

acquires Turner

1999

CBS acquires

NBC acquires

King World

30% of Paxson

Viacom acquires
CBS
2001

Fox duopolies
LA, Minn. DC
Houston

2002

NBCacquires

Fox duopolies

Telemundo

Chic. Orl.

NBC duopolies
result
2003

GE acquires
Universal

Source: Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What, August 22, 2006.

THE CURRENT S TATE O F THE V IDEO PRODUCT ENTERTAINMENT S PACE
Vertical Integration
Within less than a d ecad e after repeal of Fin-Syn and the passage of
the 1996 Telecom m u nications Act, the process of vertical integration and
horizontal consolid ation w as com plete.
This paper d efines vertically
integrated entities at the core of d omestic vid eo entertainm ent as the five
firm s that, in the past d ecad e, have com e to ow n m ajor stu d ios, broad cast
netw orks and cable TV channels w hile hold ing television station licenses as
w ell (see Exhibit 4). The nam es are familiar to all, in both the television and
the theatrical m ovie space. All of the entities have a presence in each of the
m ajor vid eo entertainm ent areas – netw ork television, cable television and
m ovie prod uction. These firm s account for five of the seven stu d ios that
produce motion pictures – known as the majors.
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Exhibit 4: The Vertically Integrated, Video Entertainment Oligopoly
Parent
News Corp.

TelevisionProperty
35 TV Stations reach
39% of U.S. Households
9 duopolies – NY, LA, Chic.
Minn., DC, Dallas, Phoenix
Orlando, Houston

Cable/Satellite
Fox News, Fox Movie
FX, FUEL, Nat. Geog.
Speed, Fox Sports,
Regional Sports,
College, Soccer

FilmProduction
20th Century Fox,
Fox Searchlight,
Fox Television Studios,
Blue Sky Studios

DirecTV
Fox Network
General Electric 28 TV stations reaching
34% of U.S. households

CNBC, MSNBC, Bravo
Sci-Fi, Trio, USA

Universal

ESPN, ABCFamily,
Disney Channel,
Toon Disney
Soapnet, Lifetime
A&E

Walt Disney
Touchstone
Hollywood
Buenavista
Pixar
Miramax
Paramount
Paramount Home

6 duopolies through
Telemudo – NY, LA,
Chic., SF, Dallas, Miami

Disney

NBC Network
30% of Paxson
10 TV stations reaching
24% of U.S. households
ABC Network

CBS/Viacom

17 TV stations reaching
39% of U.S. households
CBS Network
CW
King World

Time Warner

CW Network

Showtime
MTV, Nickelodeon
BET, Nick at Night
TV Land, Noggin
Spike TV, CMT
Comedy Central, Flix
The Movie Channel
Sundance
HBO, CNN, CourtTV,
Road Runner
New York News 1
Time Warner Cable
14.5 million subscribers

Warner Bros. Studios
Home Video
Domestic Pay-TV
Telepictures,
Hanna-Barbera
Witt-Thomas

Source: Columbia Journalism Review, Who Owns What, August 22, 2006.

The d epiction and d ata in Exhibit 5 are for the early 2000s. While
there have been som e changes in the d irection of d eintegration that
m ovem ent is not com plete and its implications are not yet clear. CBS and
Viacom have becom e partially separated . They still share the same Chairm an
(Su m ner Red stone). Each of the tw o potential entities is vertically integrated
on its ow n, w ith d istinct prod u ction and d istribu tion facilities. Sim ilarly, Fox
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and Liberty rem ain precariously intertw ined by substantial ow nership of
shares, althou gh an exchange and separation of ow nership in Fox and
DirecTV may be in the offing. These evolving situations may change the
land scape som ew hat, bu t the d istribu tion arrangement m ad e by the separate
entities w ou ld still reflect the legacy of vertical integration. Thus, w e m ay see
these entities unwind toward truer deintegration and independence, although
the history of Liberty teaches that spin-offs and pu ll-backs are entirely
possible. Moreover, w hether these d evelopm ents w ill constitu te a true
opening of the field to ind epend ents, or w hether these entities w ill sim ply
su bstitu te contractu al relationships to d u plicate the integrated flow of
content, also rem ains to be seen. N or is it clear that the parts that have been
broken u p w ill not u se their rem aining partially integrated assets (prod u ction
and d istribu tion) to reintegrate across the entire space.784 The effects of any
real de-integration, if it comes about, will play out over time.
N ote that each of the entities has a presence in all of the key areas of
vid eo prod u ction and d istribu tion. Each ow ns stu d ios that prod u ce vid eo
prod u ct for both television and theatrical release. Each has su bstantial
ow nership of television d istribu tion. The fou r national broad cast netw orks
are represented here. The broad casters have su bstantial ow nership of TV
stations. The fifth entity, Tim e Warner, is a major cable operator. As a resu lt
of the recent Ad elphia acqu isition and exchange of cable system s w ith
Com cast, Tim e Warner d om inates the tw o entertainm ent centers in the U.S.,
New York and Los Angeles. It also has a share in the new broadcast network,
CW, to which its production operations are providing content.
Horizontal Concentration
Reflecting this concentration of su bscribers, view ers and facilities,
these five, vertically integrated entities have com e to d om inate the d om estic
U.S. vid eo entertainm ent prod u ct space (see Exhibit 5). They accou nted for
abou t three qu arters to fou r-fifths of the ou tpu t of the vid eo prod u ct in term s
of w riting bud gets, program m ing expend itu res, hours of prim e tim e content,
and domestic theatrical box office or video sales/rentals.

784

Grove, Martin A., “CBS’ Moonves Sm art to Eye Movies,” Hollywood Reporter.com,
July 7, 2006.
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Exhibit 5: Vertically Integrated Video Oligopoly Domination of
Television and Movie Production and Distribution
(Circa 2001-2003)
Television
Subscribers*
#
(million)

Fxox/Liberty
Time Warner
CBS/Viacom
ABC/Disney
NBC/Universal**
Subtotal
Total
HHI
Four Firm CR

1250
925
910
705
720
4315
6000

%

21
15
15
12
12
75
100
1179
63

Writing Budgets
$
(million)

236
206
45
132
159
772
1225

%

19
17
12
11
13
72
100
1084
61

Programming
Expenditures
$
(million)

3803
7627
9555
6704
3879
31568
43212

%

9
18
22
16
9
74
100
1226
65

Movies/DVD
(U.S. Rev)
Prime
Box
Video
Time Share Office
%

3
10
28
21
21
83
100
1775
70

%

%

11
22
8
20
12
73
100
1213
65

10
20
7
22
15
74
100
1258
67

Notes and sources: * Subscribers includes broadcast and cable homes passed. ** Universal added to NBC to
project post-merger market. Federal Communications Commission, In the Matter of Annual Assessment of
the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, CC Docket No. 00-132,
Seventh Report, Tables D-1, D-2, D-3, D-6, D-7; Television Market Report: 2001 (Washington, D.C.: BIA
Financial Network, 2001); Comments of the Writers Guild of America Regarding Harmful Vertical and
Horizontal Integration in the Television Industry, Appendix A. Federal Communications Commission, In
the Matter of Implementation of Section 11 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992; Implementation of Cable Act Reform Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 The
Commission’s Cable Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits and Attribution Rules Review of the
Commission’s Regulations Governing Attribution Of Broadcast and Cable/MDS Interests Review of the
Commission’s Regulations and Policies Affecting Investment In the Broadcast Industry, Reexamination of
the Commission’s Cross-Interest Policy, CS Docket No. 98-82, CS Docket No. 96-85, MM Docket No. 92264, MM Docket No. 94-150, MM Docket No. 92-51, MM Docket No. 87-154, January 4, 2002; Bruce M.
Owen and Michael G. Baumann, “Economic Study E, Concentration Among National Purchasers of
Video Entertainment Programming,” Comments of Fox Entertainment Group and Fox Television
Stations, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc. and Telemundo Group, Inc., and Viacom, In the
Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Cross Ownership of
Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio
Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, MB Docket No. 02-277, MM Dockets
02-235, 01=317, 00-244, January 2, 2003; Federal Communications Commission, Program Diversity and
the Program Selection Process on Broadcast Network Television, Mara Epstein, Media Ownership
Working Group Study 5, September 2002, pp. 26; David Waterman, Hollywood’s Road to Riches
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 21, 25.

In each case, the H H I is in the concentrated range and the fou r firm
concentration ratio is in the tight oligopoly range. The tw o potential changes
in the sector noted above w ou ld not change this basic find ing. Each of the
m easu res of concentration w ou ld likely remain in the concentrated tight
oligopoly range, but the identity of the leading firms might change a bit.
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The broad cast space at the core of the vertically integrated oligopoly
is extrem ely im portant to the overall m arket for vid eo prod u ct (see Exhibit 6).
Where a program or film is placed in television space strongly affects not only
its d om estic revenu es, bu t has a large im pact on w here it w ill be placed and
w hat revenues it can earn in the international arena. By foreclosing the
broad cast space, for both m ovies and series, the oligopoly core cripples
ind epend ent prod u cers and forces them into the cable arena, insofar as the
ind epend ents d esire to d istribu te over the television platform . The cable
space, thou gh, is a hostile environm ent as w ell, w herein the very sam e
entities ow n the m ost attractive d istribu tion channels in the space.
Ind epend ents are forced into the least attractive cable channels on the least
favorable terms.
THE CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF M ARKET POWER
Thu s, the basic cond itions for pu blic policy concern abou t the
potential exercise of m arket pow er are present. The em pirical analysis
demonstrates key economic characteristics of the video entertainment product
space. It is a m od erately to highly concentrated , tight oligopoly that is
vertically integrated in prod u ction and d istribu tion and exercises m onopsony
power – control and m arket pow er over the pu rchase of programm ing from
ind epend ents. The next stu d y presents evid ence that m arket pow er has been
exercised . In the process of creating the vertically integrated oligopoly, these
entities behaved in a manner that created their m arket pow er throu gh
m ergers, acqu isitions and prod u ct d evelopm ent and exploited their m arket
power through self-dealing, foreclosure of markets and imposition of onerous
term s and cond itions on su ppliers. The key elem ents of the vid eo
entertainment product space include:
Market structure and market power
Market shares that have risen to the level traditionally defined as a
source of concern about concentration setting the stage for the abuse
of market power.
Substantial barriers to entry in the industry.
A history of anticompetitive practices.
Vertical Integration
Barriers to entry increased by vertical integration.
The foreclosure of markets to unaffiliated producers through
favoritism of affiliated upstream production and the subsequent exit
of upstream, unaffiliated product suppliers from the market.
Parallelism and reciprocity among the dominant firms in the
oligopoly.
A rush to integrate and concentrate across the sector.

Exhibit 6: Location in the Domestic Exhibition Space Strongly Influences Prospects in Foreign Markets
DOMESTIC

FOREIGN
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Prime Time
Television
Syndication
Integrated
Studios

Internet
Pay Cable

DVD

Basic Cable

Theatrical
Movies

Independent Studios

Theatrical
Movies
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Monopsony Power
The imposition of prices that squeeze unaffiliated producers and
terms that shift risk onto those producers.
Indications of a decline of quality in product attendant on the abuse
of monopsony power.
Flooding of downstream outlets with integrated product.
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STUDY 24
DOMINATION OF THE VIDEO PRODUCT SPACE
MARK COOPER
The paper consid ers how the prod u ction and d istribu tion of movie
programming for cable and theatrical release w ere affected . By tw o w id ely
accepted econom ic m easu res of market concentration, the H erfind ahlHirschman Index (HHI) and the market share of the top four firms (the 4 Firm
Concentration Ration or CR-4), the vid eo m arket has becom e a concentrated ,
vertically integrated , tight oligopoly. As a resu lt, this oligopoly engages in a
nu m ber of pred atory bu siness practices that both limit com petition from
ind epend ents and d eprive the pu blic of new , fresh voices. They foreclose the
m arket to ind epend ents by leveraging their vertical m arket pow er and by
self-su pplying prod u ct. They exercise their market pow er as bu yers of
content (m onopsony pow er) w ith tw o practices that are especially d amaging
to com petition from ind epend ent prod u cers. The first is that netw orks often
d em and that they be given an equity participation in an ind epend ently
d eveloped television series in ord er for it to be placed on the prim etim e
sched ule. The second is that basic cable channels ow ned by m em bers of the
oligopoly will not pay license fees that are commensurate with the production
valu es and the scope of licensed rights they d em and in ind epend ently
produced TV movies.
While it is extrem ely d ifficu lt to assess the im pact of the changes in
the ind u stry on quality, there is no d oubt that the ind epend ent sector w as a
consistent sou rce of innovative and high qu ality content in both the TV series
and m ovies categories prior to the changes in policy. Measu red by both
popu larity and aw ard s, the ind epend ents m ore than hold their ow n w hen
given a chance to reach the pu blic. This quantitative evid ence reinforces the
celebrated anecd otal evid ence – show s like A ll in the Family and Cosby –
frequ ently offered abou t the im portance of ind epend ent prod u ction. It is
quite clear that the elim ination of ind epend ents from the high valu e TV
prod u ct spaces – prim e tim e and prem iu m cable – cannot be attribu ted to
poor quality of prod uct. It is m ore read ily attribu ted to changes in the
structure of the industry and the business practices of the dominant, vertically
integrated oligopoly.
PRIME TIME ON BROADCAST/NETWORK TELEVISION
The central em pirical fact at the core of the narrative of the 1990s is
the d ram atic and sw ift change in the ow nership of prim e tim e program ming
after the repeal of the Fin-Syn rules (see Exhibit 1). Stu d ies of prim e tim e
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program m ing ju st prior to the repeal of the Fin-Syn rules find that the
netw orks ow ned arou nd 15 percent of show s aired in prim e tim e. Major
stu d ios ow ned abou t one-third and ind epend ents accou nted for abou t a half.
Within five years, the role of the independents had been dramatically reduced
– to less than one-fifth of the programm ing. N etw orks had grow n to alm ost
40 percent. The m ajor stu d ios still accou nted for arou nd 40 percent. The
m ergers of the netw orks and stu d ios follow ed and the vertically integrated
entities cam e to d om inate prim e tim e, accou nting for over three quarters of
the program s. In 1989, fifteen entities prod u ced 2 percent or more of the
program m ing on prim e tim e. By 2002, that nu m ber had shru nk to five. The
program m ing prod u ced by ind epend ents in 2006 w as largely reality show s,
not scripted programming, as had been the case in the recent past.
Exhibit 1: Prime Time Market Shares
90
80
70

%ofM
arket

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Independent

1989

Unaffiliated
Majors
1995

2002

Networks &
Owned Majors
2006

Source: 1989-2002 calculated from M ara Einstein, M edia Diversity: Economics, Ownership
and the FCC (M ahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), p. 169; 2006 based on Baseline Research,
Fall Television Schedule: 2006-2007 Season.

Trad itional m easu res of m arket concentration used in econom ic
analysis reinforce this observation. As Exhibit 2 show s, the prim e tim e
m arket m oved very quickly from an u nconcentrated com petitive m arket
(CR4=34%; H H I=541) to a tight oligopoly (CR4=74%) w ell u p into the
moderately concentrated range (HHI=1596). If the calculations are based only
on series, i.e. exclu d ing movies, the concentration is even greater. Within a
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d ecad e after the repeal of Fin-Syn, the m arket w as a highly concentrated
(HHI=2070) tight oligopoly (CR4=84).
Exhibit 2: Concentration of Prime Time Programming

All Prime Time Hours

Series Only

Year

Four Firm
Concentration

HHI

Four Firm
Concentration

HHI

1989
1995
2002

35
47
74

541
776
1596

40
57
84

703
1165
2070

Source: Calculated from Mara Einstein, Media Diversity: Economics, Ownership and the FCC
(Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), p. 169.

N EW S HOWS AND PILOTS
Exhibit 3 show s the pattern of ow nership by the netw orks of prim e
tim e program m ing, new show s and pilots. We observe a m od est increase in
netw ork ow nership in the early 1990s, as the Fin-Syn rules w ere partially
repealed , d ebated and litigated . With final repeal of the ru les in 1995, w e see
a rapid and steady increase in network ownership.
The pattern has persisted , as an analysis of the 2006-2007 season
show s (see Exhibit 4). The netw orks get over half of their program m ing
internally. The four major netw orks also bu y program m ing from one
another. Overall, ind epend ents account for less than one-fifth of prim e tim e
program m ing. On the fou r m ajor netw orks, the ind epend ents accou nt for
abou t one-seventh. The ind epend ent program m ing is generally reality
shows, not scripted programming.
The pattern has persisted , as an analysis of the 2006-2007 season
show s (see Exhibit 4). The netw orks get over half of their program m ing
internally. The four major netw orks also bu y program m ing from one
another. Overall, ind epend ents account for less than one-fifth of prim e tim e
program m ing. On the fou r m ajor netw orks, the ind epend ents accou nt for
abou t one-seventh. The ind epend ent program m ing is generally reality
shows, not scripted programming.
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Exhibit 3: Network Ownership of Prime-Time Programming 1990-2002
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1991
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1995

Primet-time

1996

1997

Pilots

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

New Series

Source: Calculated from M ara Einstein, M edia Diversity: Economics, Ownership and the FCC
(M ahwah: Lawrence Erbium, 2004), p. 171; W illiam T. Bielby and Denise D. Bielby,
“Controlling Prime Time: Organizational Concentration and N etwork Television
Programming Strategies,” Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 47: 4 (2003), p. 588.

Exhibit 4: Primetime 2006-2007 Programming
(Percent of Hours)

SelfDealing

Internal
Big-5
Dealing

Sony

Independents

ABC-Touchstone

52

20

3

25

CBS-Paramount

57

38

0

5

NBC-Universal

67

14

5

14

FOX-20th Century

52

29

6

13

CW-Warner/Viacom

53

0

7

40

Total

57

21

4

18

Source: Baseline Research, Fall Television Schedule: 2006-2007 Season

DOMINATION OF VIDEO PRODUCT 365
S YNDICATION
Synd ication has been stud ied less than prim e tim e, bu t the available
d ata suggests a similar pattern (see Exhibit 5). Althou gh there is less selfdealing, the five networks dominate the syndication market because of a large
am ou nt of internal d ealing. Particularly interesting to note is the lack of
recent ind epend ent show s in synd ication. H aving been forced ou t of prim e
tim e, ind epend ents sim ply d o not have series to place as prod u ct in
syndication.
Exhibit 5: Self-Dealing and Internal Dealing in First-Run Syndicated
Programming (2004)

TYPE OF TRANSACTION
Self-Dealing
(Subsidiaries of Big 5 syndicating to themselves)

Hours
Shows Less
All Shows
Than 2
Years Old
32%

61%

41%

16%

18%

0%

Internal Dealing
(Subsidiaries of Big 5 syndicating to
Big 3 station groups)
Independents syndicating to Big 3 Station Groups

Sources and N otes: Calculated from Goro Oba and Sylvia M . Chan-Olmstead, “Self-Dealing
or M arket Transaction?: A n Exploratory Study of V ertical Integration in the U.S. Television
Syndication Market,” Journal of Media Economics, 19 (2), 2006, p. 113.
Big 3 station groups are CBS/Viacom, Fox and ABC
Big 5 syndicators are King W orld, Paramount, 20th Century Fox, Buena V ista, W B and
Universal. Other Major is Sony (Columbia). Independents are “other.”
There are 22.5 hours per week of first-run syndicated programming in the 9am to 8pm day part
analyzed (77 hours).

The foreclosu re of the broad cast/ netw ork television market,
particularly for 1st run series, is reinforced by a complete lack of pilots coming
from ind epend ents. Interview s w ith ind epend ent prod u cers d one for this
paper reveal that since there is little chance that they w ill get on the air, they
have abandoned this market.
I have noted that the d ecision to allow broad casters to hold m u ltiple
licenses in a single m arket contribu ted to the d ifficulties of ind epend ents
gaining access to the synd ication market. The netw ork ow ners w ou ld u se
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their internally prod u ced content on the television stations in the largest
m arkets, squeezing the space available to u naffiliated prod u cers. Abou t 75
d u opolies w ere created soon after the ban on hold ing m ultiple licenses w as
lifted . The national netw orks concentrated their d uopoly acqu isitions in the
top ten m arkets, even thou gh ow ning m u ltiple stations w ithin a m arket d id
not cou nt against the national cap on how m any hom es they w ere allow ed to
reach (see Exhibit 6). These markets account for about 30 percent of all the TV
hou sehold s in the cou ntry and alm ost 40% of all the TV revenu es in the
cou ntry. The big four netw ork’s m arket share in the top three m arkets w as
particularly high. These three m arkets alone accou nt for abou t 15 percent of
the population and almost 20 percent of TV revenues in the nation.
Exhibit 6: Big 4 Network Duopolies and Market Share in Top 10 Markets

Designated
Market Area
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Boston
Dallas
Washington D.C.
Atlanta
Detroit

Number of Big
4 Duopolies
2
3
2
1
2
1
3
1
0
1

Market Share of
Big 4 Duopolies
44
62
40
25
37
28
59
27
0
24

Total Market
Share of Big 4
77
79
73
57
56
42
59
52
24
42

Source: BIA Financial, Television Market Report, 2003

TV M OVIES, THE ROLE O F CABLE
The history of prim e tim e program m ing is primarily a story abou t
television series. While a sm all nu m ber of m ad e for TV m ovies appear in
prim e tim e, the overw helm ing m ajority of program m ing is series.
Interestingly, for ind epend ents, the grow th of cable in the late 1990s w as a
story about TV movies.
To analyze the changing patterns of TV m ovies, I exam ined all film s
aired in three four-year period s (see Exhibit 7). The first period w as before
the Fin-Syn ru les w ere in play (1985-1988). The second period w as the fou r
years after Fin-Syn w as repealed (1995- 1998). The third period w as after the
netw orks becam e integrated w ith stu d ios (2001-2004). I relied on the baseline
d atabase and inclu d ed only m ovies that w ere aired and for w hich a netw ork
and at least one prod u cer w as id entified . Where a netw ork w as listed as a
prod u cer, the m ovie w as consid ered to be prod u ced by the netw ork, even if
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other (u naffiliated ) prod u cers w ere id entified . This is the critical assumption
in the sense that I am assu m ing, im plicitly, that the m ovie w ou ld not have
been aired on the network, but for the network’s interest in the co-production.
Of lesser importance is the assu m ption that w here a netw ork and its m ajor
movie studio are both listed as producers, the studio was considered to be the
prod u cer. While these d istinctions cou ld be interpreted in other w ays, the
basic patterns in the d ata w ou ld not change mu ch. The key find ings abou t
independent producers are quite clear (as shown in Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 7: TV Movies Across All Distribution Channels

Percent of Movies
Broadcast Basic Cable Premium Cable
1985-1988 (n=47)
Independent
Network
Majors
1995-1998 (n=206)
Independent
Network
Majors
2001-2004 (n=634)
Independent
Network
Majors

39
47
9

0
2
0

2
2
0

33
18
11

13
1
0

16
5
2

7
5
5

41
20
5

9
7
1

Source: Baseline Beta Studio System Database.

In the m ost recent period , cable m ovies have becom e qu ite
prom inent. The nu m bers of m ovies prod u ced have increased d ram atically.
In the m id -1990s, ind epend ents aired abou t 120 m ovies, 95 of them on
broad cast and prem iu m cable. In the 2001-2004 period , they prod u ced over
100 m ovies on broad cast and prem ium cable, and over 260 on basic cable.
The apparent increase in prod u ction, how ever, is less significant than it
appears. There are tw o d ifferent sets of reasons that the expansion has not
helped ind epend ents greatly. One set has to d o w ith the natu re of the
business and the distribution channels.
First, broad cast and premiu m m ovies have m u ch higher bu d gets and
larger aud iences. Thu s, the 100 m ovies prod u ced by ind epend ents that aired
on broad cast and prem ium cable probably had a su bstantially larger total
budget and a larger audience than the 260 movies that aired on basic cable.
Second , w here stu d ios com pete for resou rces to m aintain a
prod u ction base, the relative ou tpu t is im portant. Whereas the ind epend ents
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grew by abou t 6 percent betw een the m id 1990s and the early 2000s in the
high value spaces, the networks and major studios grew by almost 60 percent.
As the netw orks grew larger and larger, they control m ore resou rces in the
sector.
Third , placem ent on basic cable m akes it m ore d ifficu lt to tap into
other revenu e stream s – DVD sales/ rentals and foreign television – w hich
have become vital to maintaining the program’s prominence.
The second set of factors that suggest the grow th of basic cable as an
outlet is less important than it appears, has to do with the market structure.
First, approxim ately 80 percent of the basic cable m ovies aired in the
2001-2004 period on netw orks is now ow ned by tw o of the vertically
integrated med ia corporations – ABC/ Disney (ABC fam ily, Disney Channel
and Lifetime) and NBC (Sci-Fi).
Second , the genres are highly specialized . These cable netw orks bu y
three genres, each w ith a respective d om inant buyer. ABC Fam ily/ the
Disney Channel buy fam ily/ child ren-oriented m ovies.
Lifetim e buys
rom ances. Sci-fi buys science fiction film s. This is a classic situation for the
exercise of monopsony power.
Third , the vertically integrated oligopoly that d ominates the other
vid eo ou tlet spaces also thorou ghly d om inates the TV m ovie space. The five
entities I have id entified as the vertically integrated oligopoly accou nt for
abou t three-quarters of the d istribu tion of m ovies: one-third throu gh
broad cast and prem iu m cable, a little over one-third throu gh basic cable, and
another handful on general networks (A&E, MTV, ESPN, FX, Spike).
A CCESS TO TELEVISION IS CRUCIAL TO THE H EALTH O F
INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS
Thu s, I have show n that the ind epend ents w ere largely eliminated
from prim e tim e broad casting and relegated to basic cable m ovies. This
places the ind epend ents at a severe d isad vantage because television and the
broad cast space at the core of the vertically integrated oligopoly remain
extrem ely important to the overall m arket for vid eo prod u ct. Exhibit 8
presents ord er of magnitu d e estim ates of the revenu es, expend itu res and
au d iences for d om estic m ovie prod ucers and the d om estic TV sector. It
contrasts cable and broad cast revenu es w ith sou rces of revenue for m ovie
prod u cers that are ‘ind epend ent’ of the d om estic TV sector – d om estic and
foreign theatrical releases and home video sales.
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Exhibit 8: The Importance of Television in the Video Product Space
(circa 2003-2004)

Movies
Television
Majors Independents
Broadcast Cable/Satellite
Ad Revenue/
Revenues (billions)
$35
$50
Subscription
Domestic
Box Office
Home Video
Subtotal
Foreign
Box Office
Home Video
Subtotal
Total
Programming
Budgets (billions)

$8.0
$11.0
$19.0

$1.0
$1.3
$2.3

$8.0
$8.0
$16.0
$35.0

$1.0
$0.8
$1.8
$4.1

$85

$7.0

$0.4

$40

Audience (hours per year)
Theatrical
Home Video
Total

13
80
93

Broadcast
Basic
Premium

780
830
180

Sources: U.S. Box Office and Programming budgets are based on M PA A , Theatrical M arket
Statistical Report, 2005. Programming budgets do not include marketing and assume 120
releases from the majors. Foreign Box Office, home video and TV revenues are from David
W aterman, Hollywood’s Road to Riches (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), Table
C.1. Independent programming budgets from A merican Film M arketing A ssociation, The
Economic Impact of Independent File Production, A pril 2003Cable Revenue is from Federal
Communications Commission, Twelfth A nnual Report in the M atter of A nnual A ssessment of
the Status of Competition in the M arket for the Delivery of V ideo Programming, M B Docket
No. 05-255, March 3, 2006, p. 19.

The revenu e from the TV sector is m u ch larger than the d om estic
revenu e sou rces for the movie ind u stry – abou t four tim es as large – even
when video sales/rentals are included. Total revenues from these sources are
over two times as large. Even if we were to factor in the domestic and foreign
TV revenu es of m ovie prod u cers, the d om estic TV sector w ould be alm ost
tw ice as large.1 Program m ing expend itu res of the d om estic TV sector are on
1

The sources cited in Exhibit IV-8 put this revenue at about $8 billion.
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the ord er of five to six tim es as large.
The extrem e im portance of TV in
term s of au d ience is also clear. Broad cast and cable pu ll alm ost tw enty tim es
the au d ience of m ovies, even com bining theatrical and hom e vid eo view ing.
Prem iu m cable (arguably sim ilar to m ovies since it is a pay service) alone has
a larger audience.
Althou gh basic cable and broad cast are abou t equ al in aud ience,
prim e tim e broad cast is still the d om inant exhibition space on TV. For
exam ple, the ad vance sales of ad vertising slots on the fou r national netw orks
– called the u p front sales – equ als the total annual Box Office of theatrical
releases in the U.S. Ad vertisers pay a rich prem iu m for this space because the
netw orks still aggregate m any m ore view ers than cable show s. As Mara
Einstein, the au thor of the m ost com prehensive analysis of the repeal of the
Fin-Syn rules noted, the gatekeeper role of the networks is essential since,
w hile the netw orks m u st d ecid e betw een best show versu s best bu y, they
rem ain acu tely aw are of their ability to p rovid e som ething that no other m ed ia
vehicle can, and that is the ability to create a valuable asset because no medium
can provide the kind of exposure and promotion that network television does.2

The netw orks are w ell aw are of their ad vantage. As Les Moonves
recently pu t it, “If you w ant 30 m illion people, you can’t get that anyw here
else.”3 The next section examines how that gatekeeper role impacted access to
distribution under the new policies adopted in the 1990s.
THE CRITICAL ROLE O F G ATE KEEPING IN THE V IDEO PRODUCT S PACE
At the center of the pictu re I have painted of vertical integration
follow ing the policy d ecisions of the 1990s stand the broad casters as
gatekeepers of access to au d iences. A key role in the process w as played by
the absorption of the m ajor stu d ios. Interestingly, David Waterman’s recent
econom ic history of the m ajor stud ios is based on the prem ise that the m ost
im portant featu re of the stu d ios is their role as distributors, and w e often refer
to them by that term . By controlling d istribu tion, the stud ios act as
gatekeepers: they decide which movies get produced and how they are made,
and they also largely d eterm ine w hen and at w hat price view ers get to see
them on which media.4
The key gate keeping role of d istribu tion in the vid eo entertainm ent
prod u ct space w as integrated and consolid ated w ith prod u ction in single

2

Einstein, Mara, M edia Diversity: Economics, Ownership and the FCC (Mahw ah:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), p. 192.
3
Fabricant, Gerald ine and Bill Carter, “A Tortoise Savors the Lead ,” N ew Y ork Times,
September 12, 2006, p. CC11.
4
Waterm an, David , H ollyw ood ’s Road to Riches (Cam brid ge: H arvard University
Press, 2005), p. 16.
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entities in the first 50 years of the m ovie ind u stry. While there is a d ebate
abou t the factors that shaped the role of the m ajor stu d ios, Waterman
pinpoints tw o critical issues that parallel the core of m y analysis of the vid eo
prod u ct space in the 1990s. One w as a policy d ecision that forced
deintegration.
Fox, MGM, Warner, Param ou nt, and RKO, know n at the tim e as the five
m ajors, w ere vertically integrated into p rod u ction and theater exhibition and
had consistently d om inated the ind u stry since the m id -1930s. The three others
– Universal, Colu m bia and United Artists, know n as “the m inors” at the tim e –
ow ned no theaters… All eight of these stu d ios w ere brou ght to trial by the U.S.
Ju stice Dep artm ent in the 1940s, and an eventu al Su p rem e Cou rt d ecision in
1948, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. et al., ru led that the eight
d istribu tors had violated the Sherm an Act and other antitru st law s… The
Cou rt ord ered the five m ajor d istribu tors to d ivest their extensive theater
hold ings… established a nu m ber of regu lations on contractu al relationship s
betw een d istribu tors and theaters that w ere incented to level the p laying field
for independent companies.5

The second factor that shaped the m arket for theatrical m ovies w as
the growth of television.
After the Paramount d ecision, the p rew ar stability of ind u stry stru ctu re am ong
the eight Param ou nt d efend ants began to cru m ble. Ind u stry p ositions of the
m ajors and the m inors converged , and the extent of ind ep end ent entry
increased . We argu e in the follow ing chap ter that the alm ost coincid ent
d iffu sion of television has m ore p rofou nd long-range effects on the m ovie
ind u stry than d id Paramount, bu t it is likely that ascend ance of all three of the
m inor stu d ios into the m ajors ranks, and p erhap s the rise of ind ep end ents in
the 1960s, were related to the Court’s intervention.6

Thu s, the policy of forcing d eintegration of prod u ction and
d istribu tion of theatrically released movies opened the d oor to entry, w hile
the ad vent of television created a w hole new channel for the d istribu tion of
video product. Waterman reckons that the technological factor played a large
part in shaping the vid eo entertainm ent space, althou gh not so m u ch in
d eterm ining concentration as in altering the types of prod u cts the sector
prod u ced and the m arketing patterns of those prod ucts. H ow ever, from the
point of view of the analysis in this paper, the critical point is that the
convergence of the same tw o factors – integration policy and m u ltiple
distribu tion platforms – that w orked to w eaken the gatekeeper role of the
stu d ios in the 1950s, w orked in the opposite d irection for the broad casters in
the 1990s. Rem oving the policy restriction on vertical integration opened the
d oor to reintegration of the prod u ction and d istribu tion of vid eo prod u ct and
the m erger of prod u ction (stu d ios) and d istribu tion (broad casting and cable).
5
6

Waterman, p. 30.
Waterman, p. 23.
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The lesson is clear: if given the chance, entities w ill m erge and integrate
vertically in order to dominate the sector by controlling distribution.
Mara Einstein, alread y d escribed above as cond ucting the m ost
thorou gh investigation of the Financial Interest and Synd ication ru les, notes
that before and after the policy limiting vertical integration the broad casters
used their control over access to aud iences to m onopolize ow nership of
network programming.
Before the Fin-Syn ru les w ere in place, netw orks asserted ow nership
over prime-time programming.
In the 1970s, what led the FCC to institute the financial interest and syndication
ru les w as a concern that the netw orks w ere becom ing both too p ow erfu l and
too d em and ing w hen it cam e to the [p rogram ] selection p rocess. Too p ow erfu l
in that they w ere the gatekeep ers of new s, inform ation, and entertainm ent for
the Am erican p u blic. This w as so becau se of the lim its of rad io sp ectru m …
Too demanding, because networks were requiring an equity stake in a program
before it w ou ld be accep ted as p art of the p rim e-tim e sched u le…. [T]he
netw orks had ow nership of m ore than 70% of their p rim e-tim e sched u le by the
mid-1960s, u p from only 45% the p revious d ecad e. The strong arm ing of
producers was a fundamental reason for the creation of fin-syn.7

The tim ing is informative. TV arrives on the scene in the 1950s and
becom es the d om inant m ed iu m by the early 1960s. In the early d ays,
broad casters lacked both prod u ction capacity and m arket pow er to selfsu pply content. Once television achieved ascend ance, the broad casters u sed
their resou rces and leverage to assert ow nership over prim e time
programming.
The broad cast netw orks also had a history of antitru st problem s in
their role as gatekeepers of access to the television aud ience. In 1978 they lost
an antitrust case that paralleled the Paramount case.
In the Unites States v. N ational Broadcasting Co., The governm ent sp ecifically
accu sed the N ational Broad casting Com p any (N BC) of restraint of trad e as it
related to p u rchasing p rogram s from ind ep end ent p rod u cers and of u sing its
netw ork p ow er to m onop olize p rim e-tim e p rogram m ing p rod u ction of show s
broad cast on the netw ork. The Dep artm ent also claim ed that N BC, w ith CBS
and ABC, w as trying to d evelop a m onop oly over the television p rogram m ing
market.8

After a tw enty-year period in w hich the netw orks w ere restrained by
the Fin-Syn ru les, the broad casters m oved to reassert ow nership in prim etime programming once the rules were repealed.

7

Einstein, Mara, M edia Diversity: Economics, Ownership and the FCC (Mahw ah:
Lawrence Earlbaum, 2004), p. 179
8
Einstein, p. 60.
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Since the ru les w ere rep ealed in 1995, the econom ic stru ctu re of the ind u stry
changed drastically. The television networks have become vertically integrated
institutions with the ability to produce programming through internal business
u nits.
Corp orate p arents p u t p ressu re on the netw orks to p u rchase
p rogram m ing internally to achieve synergies and , of course, increase profits.
Being p art of large m ed ia conglom erates, there is ad d ed p ressu re on the
netw orks to be p rofitable so that Wall Street m ay find the p arent com p any
appealing.9
The networks each have at least a 50% stake in the programming on the air and
som e have as high as 70% and even 90%.10 The netw orks cou ld never achieve
those kind s of ow nership nu m bers w ithou t requ esting a stake in the
p rogram m ing that ap p ears on their air. It is no secret to anyone that the
networks do this. 11

In the previou s section, I have noted the evolving pattern of behavior
by the broad casters in asserting ow nership of prim e tim e program m ing.
Bielby and Bielby have argu ed that netw ork behavior w as political, as w ell as
econom ic, and noted the evolving natu re of their rhetoric. At first the
broad casters argu ed that the ind epend ents w ou ld not be squ eezed ou t. Later
they argued that independents were irrelevant.
The netw ork execu tives’ initial p osition w as that ind ep end ent p rod u cers
w ou ld thrive in a d eregu lated ind u stry and that netw ork ow nership w as not a
threat to creativity and p rogram qu ality. Increasingly, in recent years, netw ork
execu tives and d eregu lation ad vocates have taken the p osition that their
op p onents’ p ositions are irrelevant, becau se they are ou t of tou ch w ith the
realities of the m arketp lace. In effect, they are saying, vertical and horizontal
integration w ere necessary for the ind u stry to su rvive in the face of rising costs
and increased competition from new technologies.12

As this process u nfold ed , the im pact w as felt in m ore than ju st access
to au d iences. The leverage that the vertically integrated core of the ind ustry
acqu ired also d ram atically changed the term s of trad e betw een the
ind epend ents and vertically integrated conglom erates. With a small nu m ber
of vertically integrated buyers and a large nu m ber of m u ch smaller prod u ct
sellers, the core oligopoly gains monopsony power. They can impose onerous
terms on the supplier, appropriating maximum surplus. With all of the major
d istribu tion channels u nd er their control, the vertically integrated oligopoly
can slash the amount they are willing to pay for independent product.
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M ARKET S TRUCTURAL IMPACTS OF H ORIZONTAL CONCENTRATION AND
V ERTICAL INTEGRATION
The pattern of behavior and structural changes in the industry should
raise red flags for pu blic policy. One major concern abou t vertical m ergers is
that the ind ustry u nd ergoes a ru sh to integration and consolid ation. Being a
sm all ind epend ent firm at any stage rend ers a com pany extrem ely vu lnerable
to a variety of attacks.
Oligop olies often settle d ow n into behavioral p atterns in w hich p rice com p etition atrop hies, even thou gh som e or all sellers su ffer from excess capacity.
Non-price rivalry then becomes crucial to the distribution of sales. One form of
nonp rice com p etition is the acqu isition of d ow nstream enterp rises, w hich all
else (su ch as p rices) being equ al w ill be p u rchased from their u p stream
affiliates. If acqu isition of this sort d eflects significant am ou nts of sales,
d isad vantaged rivals are apt to acqu ire other p otential cu stom ers in selfd efense, and recip rocal fear of foreclosu re p recip itates a band w agon effect in
w hich the rem aining ind ep end ent d ow nstream enterp rises are feverishly
sought.13
If there are 10 nonintegrated firm s and only one of them integrates, then little
affect on com p etition m ight occu r. Bu t if this action ind u ces the other 9 to d o
the sam e, the u ltim ate im p act of the first “triggering” m ove m ay be large. Any
increase in market power is magnified.14

A second , related concern abou t vertical integration that arises from
the observed behaviors is that it can create or reinforce barriers to entry into
the ind u stry. By integrating across stages of prod u ction, incum bents m ay
force potential com petitors to enter at both stages, m aking competition m u ch
less likely. “[V]ertical m ergers may enhance barriers to entry into the prim ary
ind ustry if entrants m u st operate at both stages in ord er to be com petitive
w ith existing firm s and if entry at both stages is su bstantially m ore d ifficu lt
than entry at one stage”.15
Capital m arket hu rd les are only one of the barriers to entry that
vertical integration and conglom eration can create. Su ch m ergers can also
foreclose input markets to competitors.
When all p rod u ction at a level of an ind u stry is “in-hou se,” no m arket at all
exists from w hich ind ep end ent firm s can bu y inp u ts. If they face im p ed im ents
or d elays in setting u p a new su p p lier, com p etition at their level w ill be
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red u ced . The clearest form of this is the rise in cap ital a new entrant need s to
set up at both levels.16

The experience in the vid eo prod u ct space over the tw o d ecad es in
w hich the vertically integrated oligopoly em erged suggests that vertical
integration increased barriers to entry into the television sector.
[B]ecau se the vertically integrated stru ctu re creates su ch a barrier to entry… it
is not necessary for these execu tives to collu d e…. The comp lexity has m ad e it
alm ost im p ossible for new p layers to enter the m arket, becau se they have to d o
so on so many levels – production, distribution, cable outlets, and so forth.17
Com p ared to record ed m u sic, p rod u ction costs in television are astronom ical,
creating su bstantial barriers to entry to new p rogram su p p liers and creating
incentives to the netw orks to d em and greater control over costs…. In the
increasingly d eregu lated bu siness environm ent, the enhanced m arket p ow er of
the corp orations that control access to channels of d istribu tion has m ad e it
m ore d ifficu lt for ind ep end ent su p p liers of new television series to su rvive in
the industry. Moreover, the high cost of producing episodic television makes it
extrem ely d ifficu lt to op erate throu gh channels of d istribu tion ou tsid e of
netw ork television, su ch as first ru n synd ication or cable (esp ecially w hen
those off-netw ork venu es are increasingly controlled by the sam e
corporations).18

Favoring Affiliates
The gatekeeper role translates into leverage becau se “w ith increased
vertical integration, ind epend ent prod u cers have less access to au d iences, or
they must align themselves with studios or networks to get their shows on the
air.”19 Einstein concludes that integration favors internally produced product.
Given vertical integration and the com bined netw ork/ p rogram m ing
d ep artm ents, all things being equ al, an internally p rod u ced show is going to
get an airing over one in which the network does not have an interest. It is also
m ore likely to get a better tim e slot and be kep t on the air longer. While it is
p ossible that som e show s of lesser qu ality are given p reference over those
produced by outsiders, this is a situation that is not likely to be sustained.20
Producers claim that with the demise of the Fin-Syn Rules, networks have used
their enhanced m arket p osition in several w ays to gain u nfair ad vantage over
ou tsid e p rogram su p p liers. First, they claim that w hen selecting series for the
prime-tim e sched u le and d ecid ing betw een a series from an ou tsid e p rod u cer
versu s one of com p arable or even less qu ality p rod u ced in-hou se by the
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netw ork or by a netw ork joint ventu re, the netw ork w ill favor the series in
w hich it has a financial interest. Moreover, m any p rod u cers p erceive that this
kind of favoritism has intensified in recent years.21

Exclusive and preferential d eals for the u se of facilities and prod ucts
compound the problem.
The first firm s to integrate into neighboring stages red u ce the nu m ber of
alternative sou rces for other firm s at either stage. This “thinning” of the
m arket can increase the costs of m arket or contractu al exchange. Su bsequ ent
integration by other firms then becomes more likely.22

Concerns arise that not only w ill the d om inant firm in the ind u stry
gain the leverage to profitably engage in anti-com petitive cond u ct, bu t also
the d ynam ic processes in the ind u stry w ill clearly shift tow ard cooperation
and coord ination rather than com petition. The issue is not sim ply collusion,
although that is clearly a concern.
The Guidelines d o recognize three m ajor com p etitive problem s of vertical
m ergers in concentrated ind ustries. First, forw ard m ergers into retailing m ay
facilitate collu sion at the m anu factu ring stage by m aking it easier to m onitor
prices or by eliminating a “disruptive buyer.” 23

Beyond collusion, a m u tual forbearance and reciprocity occu rs as
spheres of influence are recognized and honored betw een and am ong the
small number of interrelated entities in the industry.
N ow w e consid er the big p ictu re, rather than m arket-by-m arket effects.
Im agine an extrem e situ ation, w ith five big d iversified firm s extend ing into all
m ajor sectors. They coexist in p arallel, touching one another in hu nd red s of
markets. Whatever their effects on each m arket m ight be, they p ose a larger
problem of spheres of interest, or diplomatic behavior replacing competition …
Reciprocity is an exchange of favors. Reciprocal buying is one form of it. At its
simplest, firm A buys from firm B because of some purchase that B makes from
A…
Recip rocity: The large conglom erate m ay have nu m erou s op p ortu nities for
reciprocal buying arrangements.
Mu tu al forbearance: More generally (it is som etim es claim ed ) large firm s treat
each other w ith d eference, avoid ing com p etitive confrontation w henever
possible.24
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Einstein and others id entify a nu m ber of w ays in w hich vertical
integration affects the flow of programm ing. Clearly inferior show s are aired
prim arily because the vertically integrated m ed ia conglom erate ow ns them ,
although there is a difference of opinion on how prevalent this outcome is.
There are alread y m any exam p les of netw ork-p rod u ced p rogram s that have
failed miserably. Shows that were put on the schedule for no other reason than
the network studio produced them.25
There is d efinitely favoritism for internally p rod u ced show s over those
p rod u ced ou t of hou se… There are lim its to this…. To the extent that they
w on’t p u t on a bad show that’s p rod u ced internally over a good show that’s
not, bu t certainly if tw o show s are of equ al valu e the internally p rod u ced show
will get the nod.26
Ind eed , accord ing to one p rod u cer, a netw ork financial stake in a p rop osed
series “p ractically gu arantees” a slot in the p rim e-tim e sched u le… “Withou t
qu estion, if I know that I am gonna lose, I ju st w ant to know that at the end of
the d ay the show s that beat m e ou t d id so becau se they are better show s and
not just because they’re co-owned by the network.27

More generally, ow ned -program ming gets an insid e track and is
chosen when there are close calls.
[I]t appears the incentives introduced into the program selection process by the
rep eal of the Fin-Syn ru les have clearly affected the p rogram selection p rocess
w ithin broad cast netw orks. Sp ecifically, the netw orks have an incentive to
select p rogram s p rod u ced in-hou se becau se of both financial and p olitical
reasons. 28
[I] is im p ortant to note here that internally p rod u ced p rogram m ing has the socalled hom e cou rt ad vantage w hen it comes to being selected for the prim etim e sched u le…. ‘If you p u t the netw ork p erson in charge of both sid es of the
fence… It’s im p ossible to ask the netw ork p erson to have that m u ch
objectivity.29

Owned programming is given better time slots.
What is less known is that the networks are selling time periods, giving the best
time slots on the schedule to those who make the best deal with the network. 30

Owned programming is kept on the air longer.
Show s are also being m aintained on the sched u le for longer than they m ight be
if the network did not have an ownership interest in the show. 31
25

Einstein, p. 194-195.
Einstein, p. 217.
27
Bielby and Bielby, p. 581.
28
Einstein, pp. 180-181.
29
Einstein, p. 187.
30
Einstein, p. 217.
26

378

COOPER
Owned programming clogs syndication.

A new issu e has arisen in the synd ication m arket that is ad versely affecting
p rod u cers to the benefit of the netw orks and their p arent com p anies. Du e to
increased vertical integration, m ore and m ore com p anies are selling p rogram s
w ithin their ow n com p any rather than going ou t into the m arketp lace to sell a
show . For instance, a netw ork that has its ow n p rod u ction com p any w ill sell a
hit show to its cable netw ork at a below -m arket rate w ithou t op ening the show
to bid d ing by other ou tlets, cable or broad cast. Thou gh this is very lu crative
for the com p any, it is d etrim ental to the p rofit p articipants in the show —the
p rod u cers, the actors and so forth. If the vertically integrated com p any sells
the show internally, it is at a heavily d iscou nted p rice, w hich m eans that the
p rofit p articip ants are cheated ou t of their rightfu lly earned m oney. By selling
internally, the com p anies have alm ost created a new form of w arehou sing.
Rather than keep ing a show off the m arket, they are keep ing the show off the
market to competitors.32

The pattern of acqu isition of show s and m ovies d iscu ssed in the
previou s chapter also suggests that w hen the oligopolists are not selfsupplying, they engage in reciprocal dealing, buying shows from one another.
Interview s w ith ind epend ent prod u cers cond u cted in preparing this stu d y
ind icate that, w ith the vertical integration of stu d ios into the core of the
oligopoly, the problem afflicts the m ovie segm ent as w ell. The field is sim ply
not level.
The interview s w ith ind epend ent m ovie prod u cers su ggest that the
problem s that afflict ind epend ents in synd ication are som ew hat d ifferent for
prod u cers of series and movies. The literatu re on ind epend ent prod u cers of
series show s that w hen ind epend ents w ere squ eezed ou t of the prim e tim e
series m arket, they sim ply d id not have prod u ct to sell into synd ication, since
they w ere literally pu t out of bu siness. To som e extent, prod u cers of m ovies
w ere sim ilarly affected , since they d id not have larger bu d get m ovies to sell
into synd ication, thou gh they m anaged to rem ain in the m ovie bu siness.
Their theatrical releases w ere squeezed in the synd ication space as the
vertically integrated entities cam e to d om inate synd ication. The squ eeze w as
two-pronged : they fou nd it m ore d ifficu lt to get placem ent and the license
fees and other terms deteriorated.
Monopsony Power
The final area of concern id entified in the analytic fram ew ork is the
exercise of m onopsony pow er. The gatekeeper problem is at the core of
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m onopsony pow er concerns in the vid eo content ind u stry.33 The harm in the
exercise of m onopsony pow er is the red u ction of prices paid to su ppliers and
therefore a reduction of the quantity or quality of the product supplied.
By reducing its demand for a product, a monopsonist can force suppliers to sell
to it at a lower price than would prevail in a competitive market... If the price is
su p p ressed they w ill red u ce ou tp u t to a level that once again equ als their
m arginal costs. In any event, both p rice and ou tp u t w ill fall below the
com p etitive level w hen the bu yer is a m onop sonist. Som e p rod u ctive assets
w ill be assigned to p rod u cts that w ou ld have been the su p p lier's second choice
in a com p etitive m arket. As a resu lt, m onop sony allocates resou rces
inefficiently just as monopoly does. 34

This problem is evid ent in the TV vid eo space as w ell. Broad casters
have the leverage to extract equity shares for shows not developed internally.
[I] in recent years, the netw orks seem to have refined their strategy even
further – recognizing that w hen series w ith high p otential d o ap p ear from
ou tsid e p rod ucers, they can u se their m arket p ow er to extract an ow nership
stake after the pilot has been produced.
Second arily, if the show is not internally prod u ced , then the ability to have
equ ity ow nership in an externally p rod u ced show is exp ected for inclu sion on
the prime-time schedule. 35
Even shows in which the networks did not originally have an interest have had
their financing restru ctu red to allow the netw ork to become a financial p artner
for a show to stay on air, p articu larly in the ever-im p ortant fifth year….
“’Shaked ow n is p robably too strong a w ord , bu t they shou ld not have the right
to insist on ownership just to provide real estate on the airwaves.’”
Giving a p iece of the show to the netw ork has becom e a norm al w ay of d oing
bu siness since the rep eal of the Fin-Syn ru les, becau se access to the airw aves
depends on giving the networks a financial interest in the program. Sometimes
these requ irem ents are su btle, like requ esting that a p rod u cer create their show
w ith their stu d io’s p rod u ction facilities, and som etim es they are qu ite blatant –
your money or your show.36
Of even greater concern to these p rod u cers than the p erceived favoritism
tow ard s in-hou se p rod u ction and joint ventu res is an increasingly com m on
p ractice by the netw orks of com m issioning p ilots from ind ep end ent p rod u cers
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then d em and ing a financial stake as a cond ition of picking u p a series for the
prime time schedule.37

N etw orks gain m arket pow er to m ed d le w ith the content offered by
independents.
The argu m ent being ad vanced here is that the increase in in-hou se p rod u ction
follow ing the d em ise of the Fin-Syn Ru les created a conflict of interest as
business executives from the networks are placed in a position to meddle in the
creative p rocess. Und er the Fin-Syn Ru les, it is argu ed that ind ep end ent
p rod u cers and those affiliated w ith the m ajor stu d ios w ere insu lated from this
kind of interference.38

Interview s w ith the ind epend ent film prod u cers u nd erscore the
problem of m onopsony pow er. The pervasive control over d istribu tion
channels on TV allow s the integrated firm s to d ictate term s and cond itions
that squ eeze the ind epend ents. These inclu d e license fees that d o not cover
the costs, given the qu ality that is d emand ed , extrem ely long license period s,
and claims to back end -rights – hom e vid eo, foreign sales and d igital
distribution -- that limit the ability of ind epend ents to m ake u p for the
inad equ ate license fees. The exercise of this m onoposony pow er has gone so
far as to allow the bu yers to repu rpose content to “”higher” valu e”
d istribu tion channels w ithou t ad d itional com pensation for the ind epend ent
prod u cers. By taking a prod u ct that w as pu rchased at term s and cond itions
d esigned for a low er valu e ou tlet and re-u sing it on a m u ch higher valu e
ou tlet, the vertically integrated com pany extracts m uch greater valu e (profit),
without compensating the producer.
This exercise of m onopsony pow er is akin to a practice that the
vertically integrated com panies had applied in the series space. In that space,
the vertically integrated firms take a high value product and sell it at very low
prices to a low er valu e ou tlet, in essence u nd er stating the valu e of the
product, to which independent participants might have a claim.
A new issu e has arisen in the synd ication m arket that is ad versely affecting
p rod u cers to the benefit of the netw orks and their p arent com p anies. Du e to
increased vertical integration, m ore and m ore com p anies are selling p rogram s
w ithin their ow n com p any rather than going ou t into the m arketp lace to sell a
show . For instance, a netw ork that has its ow n p rod u ction com p any w ill sell a
hit show to its cable netw ork at a below m arket rate w ithou t op ening the show
to bid d ing by other ou tlets, cable or broad cast. Thou gh this is very lu crative
for the com p any, it is d etrim ental to the p rofit p articipants in a show – the
producers, the actors and so forth.39
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It shou ld be evid ent from these exam ples that the existence of
m u ltiple cable ou tlets d oes not alter the alread y restricted television
land scape because the netw orks have captu red a su bstantial hold over the
most important cable networks.
One w ay that netw orks are ensu ring a faster retu rn on investm ent is by having
a secondary distribution channel usually in the form of a general entertainment
cable channel. These channels are u sed as a second ary ou tlet throu gh w hich
they can d istribu te their p rogram s…. Each of these netw orks p resent
p rogram m ing on the broad cast netw ork that is then re-p resented (or
rep u rp osed ) on the second ary ou tlet. This w ill lead to m ore red u nd ant
p rogram m ing and less new content throu gh m ore ou tlets. N etw orks are also
m aking their p rim e tim e p rogram m ing available throu gh vid eo-on-demand
and DVD collections.40
Another increasingly p op u lar bu siness strategy im p lem ented by the big fou r
and em erging netw orks also offsets the im p act of exp and ing channels of
d istribu tion. “Rep u rp osing” involves exhibiting each ep isod e of a series on an
affiliated broad cast or cable netw ork im m ed iately after the initial netw ork
broadcast.41

THE D EBATE O VER Q UALITY
Qualitative Observations
The question of the relationship betw een vertical integration and
d eclining qu ality has been hotly d ebated . The exercise of m onopsony pow er
is clearly affecting the structure of the industry. Two effects have been noted.
First, the num ber of entities engaged in the process has been red u ced
sharply becau se the d istribu tion of risk and rew ard s has been shifted in favor
of the networks.
[T]he statistical p atterns su m m arized above inclu d e instances in w hich the
netw orks have u sed their enhanced m arket p ow er to negotiate ow nership
shares in series pilots brought to them by outside suppliers. In these situations,
the p rogram su p p lier, not the netw ork, absorbs d evelop m ent costs, w hile the
netw ork acqu ires a share of the back end p rofits if the series eventually
becom es a hit and goes into synd ication. From the p rogram su p p liers’
p ersp ective, the costs of d evelop m ent for new series rem ain the sam e, bu t to
reach the p rim e-tim e sched u le, the su p p lier has to agree to forgo a share of the
fu tu re revenu es. Accord ing to som e in the ind u stry, this revenu e squ eeze on
ind ep end ent p rogram su p p liers is the p rim ary reason that a nu m ber of them
have exited the business of prime-time series development.42
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So far, the m ost visible im p act of d eregu lation has been a red u ction in the
nu m ber of organizational settings in w hich those w ho create television series
are em p loyed , and an increase in corp orate control over the circu m stances
under which they practice their craft.43

The second effect is to elim inate the creative tension that once existed
between the producer and the distributor of product.
Vertical integration is seen as elim inating a valu able step in the d evelop m ent
process. First, developing programming is a creative process. When one entity
created the programming and another would select it, the two companies could
argu e and d isagree and ou t of those d iscu ssions, the show w ou ld often be
im p roved ... [T]he p rocess d id favor internal show s and elim inated m u ch of the
d evelop m ent process altogether. Prod u cers also stated that this p rocess w as
detrimental to the overall quality of network programming. 44

One aspect of the d ebate over qu ality that is intriguing bu t little
stu d ied is the potential relationship betw een integration, d eclining qu ality
and declining ratings. As Bielby and Bielby note:
In 1999, A dvertising A ge ed itorialized that ABC w as “auctioning” its most
d esirable p rime-tim e tim e slot to the p rogram su p p lier w illing to give the
netw ork a financial stake, p art of a trend that is m aking it “increasingly clear
the broad cast netw orks are m ore interested in financial d eals than p u tting the
best show s they can find on the air.” The trad e p u blication w arned that the
ratings d ecline exp erienced by the netw orks w ou ld accelerate if “financial
packages rather than program quality determine what gets on the schedule.”45

The ratings d ecline certainly d id continu e, as integrated ow nership of
program m ing increased . As is frequ ently the case in this sector, m any other
things w ere changing that cou ld accou nt for the d ecline in ratings, bu t the
correlation is notable.
Waterman sees som e evid ence of the latter effect on the stu d io sid e of
the business.
[E]xcessive movie bu d gets and an over reliance on sequ els or d erivative
m ovies have also been associated u nfavorably w ith conglom erate organization
and the mentality of the top executive in charge.46

Waterman also notes that the claim ed efficiency benefits of
conglomeration have come into question.
When m erger p lans are annou nced , ind u stry analysts often cite efficiencies,
su ch as w orkforce com binations, or m arketing ad vantages, su ch as the ability
to cross-p rom ote m ovies u sing television, magazines or other m ed ia assets also
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ow ned by the conglom erate. Also com m only m entioned are the ad vantages of
vertical integration, su ch as the ow nership of television or cable netw orks that
can serve as gu aranteed ou tlets for m ovies p rod u ced by the conglom erate’s
stu d io branch. A related benefit is the ability to consolid ate exp loitation of a
single story id ea or character throu gh books, m agazines, television shoes,
m u sic p u blishing, Internet w eb sites, or other m ed ia w ithin a single
corp oration. The econom ic ad vantages of su ch op erating efficiencies (often
called econom ies of scope) are p lau sible.
H ow ever, real m u ltim ed ia
exp loitation w ithin the sam e conglom erate is ap p arently infrequ ent and other
efficiency claim s have com e into recent d isrep u te – notably in the cases of
AOL-Time Warner and the ABC-Disney mergers.47

What w e m ay be left w ith are the m arket pow er ad vantages of a tight
oligopoly in the vid eo entertainm ent space, w hich d o not yield efficiency
gains while imposing a heavy price in terms of diversity and quality.
Quantitative Measures of Quality
Claim s that program ming d ecisions reflect the efficient choice of the
best available product are difficult to support in light of this description of the
changes in behavior as w ell as the patterns in the d ata. These changes and
patterns are m ore consistent w ith the argu m ent that the vertically integrated
oligopoly favors its own content and prefers to deal within the oligopoly.
Objective m easu res of qu ality in prod uct in the entertainm ent space
are notoriously d ifficu lt to com e by. In the m ovie space, analysts frequ ently
turn to the annual awards ceremonies. The Oscars and Golden Globe Awards
contrad ict the claim that ind epend ents su ffered som e sort of collapse in the
1990s. In fact, their share of aw ard s has been constant, if not rising (see
Exhibits 9, and 10).
Arguably, a second m easu re of quality is su ccess. For m ovies, box
office is the pred om inant m easu re, althou gh su ccess at the box office reflects
m any things beyond simple qu ality, su ch as the ad vertising bu d get. For
com parative pu rposes across tim e and d istribu tion channels, the m arket
shares in Exhibits 11 and 12 make a sim ple point. Ind epend ents held their
m arket share in the Box Office m u ch better than they d id in the other
distribution channels where vertical leverage was most directly exercised.
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Exhibit 9: Major Categories, Golden Globes and Oscars: Majors v.
Independents
Major Motion Picture Nominations for Independent Producers:
Best Film, Director, Actor/Actress and Supporting Actor/Actress
(5-year Moving Average)
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Exhibit 10: Oscar Nominations and Awards 2001-2005: Majors v.
Independents
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Nominations

Awards
Majors

Source: Box Officemojo.com

Independents

386

COOPER

Exhibit 11: The Shares of Independent Producers in Box Office, Video
Revenue and Prime Time Hours Late 1960s to Early 2000s
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Sources. Box Office and V ideo Revenue are five year averages from David W aterman,
Hollywood’s Road to Riches (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 21, 25, 86-90
and 01-03. Big Five M ajors are the studios that have been acquired by major TV programmers
– Disney/A BC; Fox/20th Century Fox; N BC/Universal; W arner Bros.; CBS/paramount. Other
majors (not shown) are MGM/UA and Columbia. Independents are what Waterman calls “the
residual.” Prime Time is percent of hours in 1989, and 2002 from M ara Einstein, Program
diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast N etwork Television (W ashington
D.C.: Federal Communications Commission, September 2003), pp. 26. First-run syndication
is from C. Puresell and C. Ross, “V ertical Integration and Syndication,” Electronic M edia,
22(1): 2003, for 1993 and 2002. It includes only vertical integration and not internal dealing
among the big 5.
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Exhibit 12: Growth of Big 5 Market Share and Vertical Integration in
Domestic Markets: Late 1980s to Early 2000s
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Sources. Box Office and V ideo Revenue are five year averages from David W aterman,
Hollywood’s Road to Riches (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 21, 25, 86-90
and 01-03. Big Five M ajors are the studios that have been acquired by major TV programmers
– Disney/A BC; Fox/20th Century Fox; N BC/Universal; W arner Bros.; CBS/paramount. Other
majors (not shown) are MGM/UA and Columbia. Independents are what Waterman calls “the
residual.” Prime Time is percent of hours in 1989, and 2002 from M ara Einstein, Program
diversity and the Program Selection Process on Broadcast N etwork Television (W ashington
D.C.: Federal Communications Commission, September 2003), pp. 26. First-run syndication
is from C. Puresell and C. Ross, “V ertical Integration and Syndication,” Electronic M edia,
22(1): 2003, for 1993 and 2002. It includes only vertical integration and not internal dealing
among the big 5.

Television
The quantitative analysis of the qu ality of television is even m ore
com plex. Ind epend ents w ere virtually elim inated from prim e tim e and have
little opportunity to bring new prod u ct to that space, so before and after
com parisons tell us little, other than the fact that they w ere exclu d ed .
Moreover, there is no box office to cou nt. The essential point here is that
given the opportu nity to appear in the exhibition space, ind epend ents held
their own.
Exhibit 13 com pares the sou rce origin of the top thirty show s for tw o
period s: 1985-1989, w hich is the base period I have been u sing for the Fin-Syn
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era, and 1995 to 2002 for the post Fin-Syn period . Ratings are the closest
equivalent to Box Office. I start w ith the popu larity m easu re because it tells
u s abou t the pattern of types of show s. I have includ ed all non-new s show s
that appeared in the top 30. I have u sed the sam e cod ing approach as in the
earlier analysis of all show s on TV. That is, w here a m ajor stu d io is listed in a
co-prod u ction, it is consid ered the prod u cer. Where the prod u cer uses both
the nam e of a netw ork and a major stu d io, it is cou nted as the m ajor. The
d etails of the cou nts m ight change somew hat w ith a d ifferent approach, but
the basic patterns would be clear.
Exhibit 13: Producers of Top 30-Rated TV Shows
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Source: Tim Brooks and Earle M arsh, The Complete Directory to Prime Time N etwork and
Cable TV Shows: 1946 – Present, (N ew Y ork: Ballantine, 2003), A ppendix 3; Beta Study
System database.

Prior to the repeal of Fin-Syn, ind epend ents and m ajor stud ios
dominated the top shows. The networks did not even pull their weight. They
w ere som ew hat u nd errepresented in these ratings. After the repeal of FinSyn, the vertically integrated oligopoly com pletely d om inates the space.
There are very few ind epend ents and no non-integrated m ajors in the top 30
show s. When the ind epend ents d o retu rn to the top 30 in the early 2000s, it is
with reality shows, not scripted entertainments.
I have included the category of Movies of the Week, although I do not
have the prod u cers for the actual m ovies for tw o reasons. First, as w e have
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seen, in the broad er market share analysis, these w ere almost always
ind epend ents and majors prior to the repeal of Fin-Sin; afterw ard s, they
alm ost entirely had vertically integrated m ajors as prod u cers. Second , the
natu re of prim e tim e m ovies changed . Movies of the Week w ere big events
w ith large bud gets and appeared in the top 30 show s consistently, accou nting
for abou t 10 percent of the total, u ntil the end of the 1990s. They then
d ropped quickly ou t of sight. This w as the period of the expansion of Basic
cable movies.
The pattern of popu larity helps to provid e backgrou nd for the
analysis of aw ard s – the Em m ys. There are a very large nu m ber of categories
across m any d ifferent types of show s. The categories also change over tim e.
A separate category for Mad e for TV Movies w as not ad d ed u ntil the 1990s,
so there is no baseline. For the pu rposes of this analysis, I focu s on the
Em m ys for Best Com ed y and Drama. These are series of scripted show s, for
w hich aw ard s w ere consistently given, m ost parallel m ovies and w ere
available to independents.
Over the course of the 1980s there were 20 such awards given for each
genre (see Exhibit 14). The d istribu tion of the aw ard s closely reflected the
m arket share of the d ifferent types of prod u cers. The point here is that if
these aw ard s represented an ind epend ent m easu re of qu ality, the
ind epend ents held their ow n. The vertical restriction d id not cause “inferior”
products to be aired. With the repeal of Fin-Syn, independents were banished
from these tw o categories of television entertainment and d isappeared from
the aw ard s. As I have noted , their presence in prim e tim e is now largely
restricted to reality show s. The pattern of aw ard s is sim ilar to the other d ata
w e have seen: as Fin-Syn w as u nd er attack in the early 1990s the
independents declined and were subsequently eliminated after repeal.

Exhibit 14: Emmys for Best Comedy and Drama
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Source: Tim Brooks and Earle M arsh, The Complete Directory to Prime Time N etwork and
Cable TV Shows: 1946 – Present, (N ew Y ork: Ballantine, 2003), A ppendix 3; Beta Study
System database.

The d ebate over the im pact of vertical integration on qu ality is
d ifficu lt to resolve, as m any factors w ere affecting the ind u stry. Still, the
pattern of d eclining ratings observed over a tw enty year period is consistent
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w ith the claim that self-dealing had an im pact (see Exhibit 15). The Exhibit
show s the average rating of the top 30 show s for each year. There are tw o
shifts d ow nw ard – one in the early 1990s, as the Fin-Syn rules cam e u nd er
attack; one in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the integration of major studios
took place. The correlation w ith the changing pattern of program acquisition
d iscu ssed earlier is clear. While the quantitative and qu alitative evid ence on
quality cannot prove that vertical integration w as the cu lprit in the d ecline of
quality, it makes a strong case that independents were eliminated not because
of an inability to prod u ce high quality and popu lar content, bu t rather as a
result of a poorly run marketplace for production.
Exhibit 15: Declining Ratings of the Top 30 TV Shows
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CONCLUSION: PUBLIC POLICY H AS U NDERMINED S OURCE D IVERSITY, BUT WILL
THE INTERNET CHANGE A NYTHING?
Vertical Integration Trumps Technology
This paper has show n that the policies ad opted by the FCC and
Congress in the 1990s lead to a d ram atic d ecline in sou rce d iversity on
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broad cast television. In the early and m id 1990s, the Broad cast netw orks
w ere given three hu ge ad vantages in the television vid eo prod u ct space.
First, they w ere given carriage rights on cable netw orks (1992). Second , the
Financial Interest and Synd ication Rules w ere repealed (1995). Finally, they
w ere allow ed to ow n m u ltiple stations in a single m arket (1996). They u sed
this leverage to extend their control over the vid eo content prod u ct space
vertically – by m erging w ith stu d ios – and horizontally – by self-supplying
content in broadcast prime time and expanding distribution on cable.
A tight, vertically integrated oligopoly now d om inates the broad cast,
cable and theatrical space in Am erica. Prom ises that prim e tim e w ou ld not
becom e d om inated by the netw orks, and theories that claim ed com petition
w ou ld prevent it, have proven m isgu id ed . H opes that cable and its
expand ing capacity w ould create vibrant com petition have been d ashed as
the incu m bent broad caster netw orks extend their reach over cable’s view ers
by d em and ing carriage and extend ing their brand control into the new space.
While the pu rpose of this paper is to d ocu m ent w hat happened and w hy, it is
clear that if policymakers still believe in sou rce d iversity, then a change in
policy to promote it would be in order.
Previou s technological changes have not been able to d econcentrate
the prod u ct space. It has taken policy changes to break the stranglehold on
d istribu tion. Whether theaters in the 1940s or broad casters in the 1970s, gate
keeping has long been a powerful force in the industry.
Becau se of the high cost of prod u cing m ovies and other vid eo
content, the aggregation of au d iences rem ains a critical fu nction. With su ch a
pow erful hold on all forms of vid eo d istribu tion, it w ill be extrem ely d ifficu lt
to d islod ge the d om inant players. They are the established brand s and
continue to gain momentum in the premium, large audience outlets.
The Internet and Digital Broadcast Platforms
While the history of the video entertainment product space is clear, as
is the basis for ad opting policies that prom ote sou rce d iversity, there is no
d ou bt that policymakers w ho contem plate ad opting su ch policies w ill be
bom bard ed w ith claims that, even thou gh the policies that affect the
trad itional vid eo d istribu tion channels have been d isastrou s, w e need not be
concerned because ‘the Internet changes everything.’
This claim shou ld be view ed w ith a great d eal of skepticism . In fact,
the m ore likely qu estion that policy m akers in this area should ask is “Do the
Internet and the new digital era change anything?”
The best assessm ent at present is that “only a few sm all experiments
in altering the movie-release paradigm have been conducted to date.”48 While
48
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the role of the Internet is cu rrently u nclear, one thing is certain. It is another
distribu tion platform that the vertically integrated conglom erates are m oving
to d om inate. Whether it w ill be able to d e-concentrate the vid eo exhibition
space d escribed in this section rem ains su bject to d ebate. H ow ever, w ithou t
su fficient regu lation that provid es equal access to all, the Internet w ill fall
su bject to the sam e fate as broad cast television, premiu m cable television, and
finally basic cable television: d om ination by the vertically integrated
oligopoly created by the regulatory changes of the last decade.
As w e have seen, in a w orld w ith limited shelf space, placem ent is
everything. If you cannot get on the shelf, the au d ience cannot find you . In a
world of infinite shelf space, placement is still everything. When there is such
a cacophony of ou tlets, the au d ience cannot find you u nless you have
prom inent placem ent. Whether it is sim u ltaneou s release on m u ltiple
platforms or w id espread d igital d istribu tion, the key challenge rem ains
“find ing a w ay to brand a m ovie.” In the end , says prod u cer Jim Stark,
“Nothing beats five weeks in a theater.”49
One need only review the critiqu e of the lau nches of new Internetbased d istribu tion platform s to see the problem in clear relief. The central
qu estions are: w hat d o their libraries look like? What are the m ajors d oing
w ith respect to the platform ? If the m ajors are not there, the platform is
d eem ed to have d im prospects. When the m ajors and netw orks are there,
they tend to get the best placem ent and the best d eals. Little has changed .
They are the m ost prom inent and have the resou rces to preserve that
prominence. This is clearly reflected in the reporting on the announcement of
Apple’s “video streaming gadget code-named ITV”50
Ap p le’s com p etition inclu d ed the m ovie stu d ios them selves p lu s m any other
am bitiou s firm s su ch as Am azon, w hich recently u nveiled its Unbox d ow nload
service.
TV shows are also starting to turn up the online service for Microsoft’s Xbox…
Apple pre-announced its ITV box in a bid to convince potential partners that its
ambitions are seriou s… it hop ed to bu ild “mom entu m ” and get m ovie m akers
and broad casters talking abou t p u tting content on the Ap p le service. For
exam p le, Am azon’s Unbox offers m ovie d ow nload s from 20th Centu ry Fox,
Param ou nt, Sony, Universal and Warner Bros. So far, only Disney m ovies are
available from Apple.51

The qu ote from Les Moonves of CBS above, w hich tou ted the
ad vantages that broad casters have, w as actually given in response to claim s
that the Internet w as d isplacing the netw orks. Respond ing to the claim that
broad cast share w ou ld shrink, Moonves said “If you w ant 30 m illion people,
49
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you can’t get that anyw here else…Television w ill hold and the Internet w ill
augment what we do.”52
Dana Wald en of 20th Century Fox TV echoes this view . “In the d igital
space, the extensions seem to com e after the fact. We’re trying to create
brand s on the (broad cast) netw orks that are enhanced by d igital
opportunities.”53
While the potential and prospects are u nclear, the reaction to a new
technology is pred ictable and the stu d ios and netw orks w ill seek to extend
their gatekeeper fu nction. Alread y, as one recent article observed , “stu d io
bu siness affairs execu tives now w ere insisting that this exclu sivity [in rights
to distribute] include the Internet as well.”54
Thu s, the Internet has not d one m uch to break the grip of the
vertically integrated oligopoly on the vid eo revenue stream s in the vid eo
entertainm ent prod u ct space. As the ind epend ent prod u cers em phasized in
the interview s, these firms control the TV ou tlets and synd ication, have the
ou tpu t d eals for d om estic and foreign theatrical releases, and have a huge
ad vantage in foreign TV d eals. They control the brand ing process w ith their
access to aud iences that is being leveraged into d om inance of com m ercial
distribution on the Internet.
Given the history of gate keeping in the ind u stry and these
observations on the im pact of Internet d istribu tion, the ad vent of d igital TV,
w hich w ill increase the nu m ber of channels the broad casters control as m u ch
as six fold , d oes not hold m u ch prom ise to d econcentrate the TV sector.
Broad casters, w ho have leveraged a series of favorable policies into
d om ination of the vid eo entertainm ent prod u ct space, w ill now have m ore
resources to strengthen their position, enrich their brands and repurpose their
content across another d istribu tion channel. Technological change and an
increase in d istribu tion capacity have repeated ly failed to restrict the gate
keeping power of vertically integrated entities in this product space.
If policymakers valu e sou rce d iversity, w hich they shou ld , stru ctu ral
restraints on the m arket pow er of the vertically integrated companies w ill
have to be imposed. These structural restraints will have to apply to both the
broad cast and cable d istribu tion channels because pu blic policy created the
leverage that broad casters have u sed to d om inate the cable d istribu tion
platform. The restraints should also apply to the Internet and all other
developing distribution technologies.
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STUDY 25:
MEDIA MARKET CONCENTRATION:
THE FCC’S ANALYSIS vs. A REASONABLE
APPROACH
M ARK COOPER
This stu d y presents a com parison betw een the FCC’s analysis of
m ed ia market concentration and a reasonable approach, as ou tlined by the
Prometheus cou rt. The rationale for this approach is as follow s: Three Cou rts
have told them to cou nt voice consistently. The Prometheus cou rt said the
FCC m u st w eight the m ed ia in a reasonable and consistent m anner, and take
audience into account in it counting of voices in order to avoid absurd results.
The Cou rt told the FCC to focus on new s and inform ation. N o one fou ght
abou t the m arket d efinition ad opted by the FCC. This paper show s that the
Cou rt’s ru ling can be im plem ented read ily and follow ing its reasoning lead s
to reasonable, realistic resu lts. There w ere tw o fu nd am ental flaw s in the FCC
analysis – improper m ed ia w eights and a failu re to inclu d e the au d ience of
outlets in the analysis. It turns out that the latter is far more important.
THE FCC’S U NREALISTICALLY LOW ESTIMATES OF
M EDIA M ARKET CONCENTRATION
Exhibit 1 show s the d ram atic d ifference betw een the FCC m easu re of
m arket stru ctu re and the m ethod ology ou tlined in the previous stu d y for the
ten m arkets that the FCC stu d ies in d etail. In contrast to the FCC’s find ings
that only one m arket is above the concentrated threshold and none are above
the highly concentrated threshold , w e find that every m arket is above the
concentrated threshold and eight of the ten are above the highly concentrated
threshold . The average H H I in the FCC analysis is just u nd er 760. In ou r
analysis, it is just over 2160, almost three times are high.
The extrem ely low levels of concentration estim ated by the FCC d o
not reflect reality, and a glance at the d etails of its rankings show w hy.
Exhibit 2 show s the rankings of the top five outlets/ ow ners in several
markets with substantial anomalies. It also shows the market share, since the
magnitude of the differences is as important has the ranking.
The exam ple that bothered the Cou rt of “a comm u nity college
television station m ak[ing] a greater contribu tion to view point d iversity than
a conglom erate that inclu d es the third -largest new spaper in Am erica”
provid es a reality check. The N ew York Tim es w as the 23rd m ost im portant
media outlet in the market, with a market share of about 1.4 percent. In our
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Exhibit 1: FCC V. CFA Base Cases
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analysis the conglom erate (N ew York Tim es) is ranked in a virtu al ties for
second and accou nts for abou t 13 percent of the N ew York med ia m arket.
The com m u nity college TV station accou nts for barely a speck. The ranking
that results from ou r analysis fits reality. N ew s Corp. w ith tw o TV stations
and a major d aily is ranked first (19 percent). Ad vance w ith fou r large
northern N ew Jersey new spapers is ranked second , in a virtual tie w ith the
N ew York Tim es, w ith the lead ing new spaper and a rad io station. N BC/ GE
is ranked fourth w ith tw o TV stations. ABC w ith a TV station and fou r rad io
stations is ranked fifth.
N ew York City is not the only place w here the FCC m ethod ology
prod u ces absu rd results. For exam ple, in Little Rock, Arkansas Ed u cational
Television, w ith three channels, bu t less than one percent of new s d ay part
view ers is ranked nu m ber three, w ith a m arket share of 7.2 percent, ahead of
several TV d u opolies that have betw een 50 and 100 tim es the aud ience. The
Log Cabin Daily, w ith a circulation of u nd er 50,000 ties for second m ost
im portant w ith the A rkansas Democrat Gazette, w ith a circulation alm ost three
tim es as large. Both papers are given a m arket share of 6.7 percent. The
highest ranked owner in Little Rock does not provide local news broadcast on
its TV station or list new s or information as one of its top three form ats on its
radio station.
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Exhibit 2: Absurd Rankings in Individual Cities
FCC RESULTS
Rank
NEW YORK
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CFA RESULTS

Market Share

Gannett
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Viacom
Advance
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5.8
5.2
4
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3.9
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New York Times

1.4

LITTLE ROCK AR
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10.6
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~0
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9.6

7
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2.7
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In ou r analysis, the A rkansas Democrat Gazette, is ranked first w ith a
m arket share of 39 percent. It is follow ed by the three com m ercial TV
broad casters that provid e local new s. With m arket shares of 5 to 20 percent.
The Log Cabin Democrat ranks seventh w ith a 1.4 percent m arket share. The
Arkansas Ed u cational TV stations ranks eighth, w ith a com bined m arket
share of 0.2 percent.
We find a sim ilar anom aly in Bu rlington Verm ont, w here pu blic
television tow ers over the m arket w ith a 13.5 percent m arket share, tw ice the
size of the three d aily new spapers, each of w hich has a m arket share of 6.7
percent. H ere too, w e find the anomaly w ithin the new spaper segm ent,
w here the St. Albans Messenger is ranked equ al to the Burlington Free Press,
even thou gh it has one-fifteenth the circulation. The highest ranked
com m ercial TV station com es in at 8th, w ith a 3.4 m arket share. In ou r
analysis, the Burlington Free Press ranks first w ith a m arket share of 34.3
percent. The leading TV station comes in second, with a share of 16.7 percent.
The Press Republican ranks third , w ith a share are 14.2 percent, follow ed by
three other TV stations w ith shares ranging from 5 to 9 percent. Verm ont
Public Television ranks seventh, with a market share of 2.7 percent.
U NDERSTANDING WHY THE FCC WENT S O FAR A STRAY
Because the FCC must analyze the market structure – count voices – it
is im portant to u nd erstand w hy it w ent so far astray. This section isolates the
problem by system atically varying the assu m ptions. We show that the
prim ary flaw , the one on w hich the Cou rt rightly focu sed , is the failu re to
take the audience into account.
Exhibit 3 contrasts ou r m ed ia w eight w ith those used by the FCC. In
one respect, there is a strong similarity. The FCC w eighted the trad itional
m ed ia (TV, d ailies, w eeklies and rad io) at 0.885. We ranked these fou r m ed ia
at 0.91. H ow ever, the w eights are very d ifferent across the trad itional m ed ia.
The FCC gave rad io a w eight of 0.249. We gave it a w eight of 0.11. The FCC
gave d ailies a w eight of 0.202, w e gave them a w eight of 0.32. The FCC gave
m u ch m ore im portance to the Internet that w e d o (0.125 versu s 0.03).
H ow ever, as w e show below , the FCC actu ally got the Internet exactly
backw ard s, assu ming it m ad e a major contribu tion to the concentration of
media markets.
Exhibit 4 show s the critical analysis. We apply the FCC’s m ed ia
weights to our audience analysis, keeping all else constant (i.e. our calculation
of the “eyeballs” and our treatment of the Internet). It is readily apparent that
the aud ience is the key. Instead of an average H H I of ju st u nd er 760, the H H I
w ith au d ience cou nted and FCC w eights is over 1800. This is m u ch closer to
our estimate of just over 2160. In fact, audience accounts for about three
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Exhibit 3: Media Weights

Medium

FCC

CFA

TV

33.8

33

Dailies

20.2

32

Weeklies

8.5

10

Radio

24.9

11

Traditional Subtotal

88.5

86

Internet

12.5

3

Other

N/A

11

Exhibit 4: FCC V. CFA with Audience in Both
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quarters of the d ifference betw een ou r estimate and that of the FCC.
Inclu d ing the au d ience also resu lts in categorizing the m arkets sim ilarly.
Seven of the eight m arkets w e categorized as highly concentrated are
categorized as su ch includ ing au d ience and the FCC w eights. N ew York,
w hich w e categorized as ju st above the concentrated threshold (50 points
above), is categorized as just below it (32 points below).
In fact, how ever, if the FCC had analyzed au d ience m arket shares
and treated the Internet as it d id , it w ou ld have com e even closer to ou r
analysis (see Exhibit 5). This is because the FCC treated the Internet in a
ridiculous fashion.
Exhibit 5: FCC v. CFA with Audience in Both and FCC Internet
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First, as noted above, it gave the Internet a very high w eight. Second ,
it then assum ed that the Internet w as highly concentrated – a d u opoly of
cable and telephone com panies. Thus, it rejected the notion that people cou ld
search the w eb for new s and inform ation. It assu med the Internet ad d ed 110
points to the H H I in every m arket. As a resu lt, in N ew York City, for
exam ple, the Internet accou nted for over one-quarter of the total H H I. In five
of the cities it accou nted for one-fifth to one-sixth of the total H H I. In fou r it
accou nted for abou t one-tenth. We took the opposite approach. Based on
su rvey evid ence (that focu ses on local new s and asked people w hich w eb
sites they go to), w e gave the Internet a m u ch low er w eight (about a qu arter
of the FCC’s). We also assu m ed that the Internet is atom istically com petitive.
It m ad e no contribu tion to the H H I. Rather, it d econcentrates the m arket.
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Thu s, it w as not inclu d ed in the nu m erator of the fraction, bu t w as inclu d ed
in the denominator.
Com bining FCC w eights, FCC treatm ent of the Internet and ou r
au d ience analysis m oves the estim ated H H I closer together. The average
H H I is over 1930, com pared to ou r estim ate of ju st over 2160. N ew York is
classified as above the concentrate threshold , so nine of the ten m arkets are
categorized similarly.
The cou rt suggested that, follow ing the reasoning on cable, the FCC
m ight exclu d e the Internet altogether because there is little local new s and
information and its penetration rate is sim ilar to that of cable. Exhibit 6
consid ers this possibility. It ad d s in tw o calcu lations – CFA w eights w ith
au d ience and no Internet, and FCC w eights w ith aud ience and no Internet.
Taking ou t the Internet from the d enom inator of the H H I has the effect of
increasing the estimated concentration. In the case of the FCC, this effect is
larger than the assu m ption that the Internet w as concentrated . We end u p
w ith perfect agreement, as the H H Is are both ju st above 2300. Every m arket
is categorized similarly. We believe that the Internet shou ld be inclu d ed , bu t
that it shou ld be given its proper w eight and assu m ed to d econcentrate
markets.
CONCLUSION
Exhibit 6 also u nd erscores the critical find ing of this analysis.
Measu ring the aud ience is the key to a realistic assessm ent of m ed ia market
stru ctu re. This shou ld not be su rprising, as market share has been at the core
of the analysis of market stru ctu re. The Prometheus Court u sed very harsh
w ord s to d escribe the FCC’s approach and d eserved ly so. For the FCC to
claim to be m easu ring m ed ia market concentration or analyzing m ed ia
m arket stru ctu re led to resu lts that w ere, in the Prometheus court’s w ord s
absurd, illogical and unrealistic.
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Exhibit 6: FCC v. CFA with Audience in Both, Internet Excluded
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STUDY 26:
THE IMPACT OF LIFTING
THE NEWSPAPER-TV CROSS-OWNERSHIP BAN
M ARK COOPER
GOALS
We start from the goals of antitrust merger policy and media policy to
answer these questions. Specifying goals is essential to evaluate the impact of
any changes in policy. Antitru st m erger policy is a usefu l starting point
because it is the pre-eminent area of public policy analysis of market structure
and m erger im pacts. H ow ever, w hile antitru st m erger policy provid es the
analytic tool, the Com m u nications Act and First Am end m ent ju rispru d ence
set the u ltimate goals for policy to set ow nership limits on m ed ia because the
m ed ia involve m u ch m ore than m erely com m ercial activities; they d eeply
affect the nature and quality of democratic discourse in our society.
What are the goals of antitru st analysis? The goal of the antitru st
law s is to protect com petition. In a m erger review , the Departm ent of Ju stice
and Fed eral Trad e Com mission (DOJ/ FTC) try to prevent the creation or
exercise of market pow er, w hich “is the ability profitably to m aintain prices
above competitive levels for a significant period of time… Sellers with market
pow er also m ay lessen com petition on d im ensions other than price, su ch as
product quality, service or innovation market power,”1
What are the goals of m ed ia policy? The goal of the Com m u nications
Act is m u ch broad er in both w hat it seeks to prom ote and p revent. The
Su prem e Cou rt has repeated ly ru led that the Comm u nications Act “rests on
the assu m ption that the w id est possible d issemination of inform ation from
d iverse and antagonistic sou rces is essential to the w elfare of the pu blic.” 2 In
Red Lion, the sem inal television case, the Cou rt ru led that “[i]t is the right of
the view ers and listeners, not the right of the broad casters, w hich is
paramount…the right of the pu blic to receive su itable access to social,
political, aesthetic, m oral and other id eas and experiences…[T]he ‘pu blic
interest’ in broad casting clearly encompasses the presentation of vigorous
debate of controversial issues of importance and concern to the public.”3
Lim its on m ed ia ow nership are based on the prem ise that
“d iversification of m ass m ed ia ow nership serves the pu blic interest by
prom oting d iversity of program and service view points as w ell as by
1

Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission, Merger Guidelines (1997).
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
3
Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 US 367, 390 (1969) (hereinafter Red Lion).
2
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preventing und u e concentration of econom ic pow er.”4 Moreover, “the greater
the d iversity of ow nership in a particu lar area, the less chance there is that a
single person or grou p can have an inord inate effect, in a political, ed itorial,
or similar programming sense, on public opinion at the regional level.”5
Thu s, m ed ia ow nership lim its are concerned abou t prom oting
d iversity of view point, and preventing u nd u e concentration of econom ic
pow er and inord inate influence over public opinion. There are other goals of
the m ed ia policy, as w ell, su ch as localism , racial or gend er d iversity, bu t this
analysis focuses on the concentration issue.
S TANDARDS
What is a concentrated m arket? The Departm ent of Ju stice and
Fed eral Trad e Com m ission analyze m arkets on the basis of the m arket share
of the firm s that sell prod u cts in the m arket. They u se the H erfind ahlHirschmann Index (HHI) to analyze markets on the basis of the market shares
of firm s. When there are few er than the equivalent of 10 equal sized
com petitors (an H H I of 1000), the m arket is consid ered concentrated . For the
DOJ, m ergers that increase concentration in these m arkets by as little as 10
percent (100 points) “raise significant com petitive concerns.” At this level of
concentration, m arkets are consid ered oligopolies.
Markets w ith the
equivalent of 5.5-equal sized firm s (H H I of 1800) are consid ered highly
concentrated and m ergers that increase concentration by as little as 3 percent
(50 points) are deemed to be “likely to create or enhance market power.”
Market structu re is also frequ ently d escribed in term s of the
com bined m arket share of the top fou r firm s in the m arket. When the top
fou r firm s have m ore than 40 percent of the m arket, the m arket is consid ered
to be an oligopoly.6 When the top four firms have more than 60 percent of the
market, it is considered a tight oligopoly.
For the pu rpose of this analysis, w e focu s on m arket stru ctu re.7 We
d escribe m ed ia markets in term s of the basic antitrust threshold s – w hether
they are concentrated or oligopolies and w hether m ergers w ould increase
concentration in excess of the M erger Guideline stand ard . Of cou rse, m any
4

FCC v. N at’l Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 780 (1978); Prom etheu s
Radio Project, et al. v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 383 (3rd Cir. 2004) (citing N at’l Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 780).
5
Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (qu oting FCC’s
1999 Local Ow nership Ord er, Review of the Commission' s Regulations Governing
Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, FCC 99-209 (rel. Aug. 6, 1999)).
6
William G. Shep herd , The Economics of Industrial Organization (Englew ood Cliffs, N J:
Prentice Hall, 1985), p. 4.
7
See Mark Coop er, Building a Reasonable M easure of M edia M arket Structure (McGannon
Communications Research Center, Fordham University, 2006).
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believe that becau se m ed ia ow nership affects d em ocratic d iscou rse so
profou nd ly, the stand ard shou ld be even higher. Moreover, there is no
gu arantee that com petitive m arkets achieve the other goals of the
Communications Act, such as localism, or ensuring minority ownership.
METHOD
To analyze w hether local new s and information sou rces are
concentrated, w e first calcu late the m arket share of the firm s in a particu lar
m arket. For d aily new spapers, w e cou nt the circu lation of all the d aily
new spapers sold in the area and calculate w hat percentage of the total each
paper gets. We d o the sam e for w eeklies and calcu late an average d aily
circulation. For TV, things are slightly more complicated, since news is only a
sm all part of w hat they d o. H ere w e look at the ratings of each TV station
d u ring the new s d ay parts. For rad io, w e cou nt only those stations that list
news, information, public affairs or talk as one of their top three formats.
What is the m arket w e are talking abou t? TV broad cast signals can
cover a large area, especially w hen they are d istribu ted over cable system s.
Rad ios cover a m u ch sm aller area. N ew spapers tend to have circulation
concentrated w ithin a sm all area, w hich is w hy they have the name of a city
or cou nty in their title. Weeklies generally serve even sm aller areas.
Economists refer to this as defining the geographic market. This analysis uses
the rad io market (Arbitron), w hich is generally associated w ith cities, as the
basic m arket. It inclu d es the d aily and w eekly new spapers that are based in
that m arket and all the TV stations available in the area (Designated Market
Area). Other types of m ed ia su ch as the Internet and m agazines are inclu d ed
as well, but the merger analysis focuses on newspapers and TV.
H ow d o w e com pare and com bine d ifferent m ed ia in a m arket to
d eterm ine market concentration? H ow d oes the d aily circulation of the
new spaper com pare to the average d aily view ership of new s show s? Do
people su bstitu te one for the other? Even if they d o, d oes a short spot on the
TV m orning new s have the sam e impact as a long piece in the m orning
paper? Weights in this stu d y are based on su rvey evid ence abou t w hich
m ed ia influ ence pu blic opinion. The evid ence show s that the m ost im portant
sou rces for local new s and information are local TV stations and local d aily
new spapers, follow ed by rad io and w eeklies. The survey reveals the relative
importance,8 or “w eight,” that the pu blic places on these local new s sou rces,
as follows: Television = .33, Newspapers = .32, Radio = .11, Weeklies = .10.
Market shares for the pu rpose of estimating m arket concentration are
then measured as follows:

8

See Mark Coop er, M edia Usage: Traditional Outlets Still Dominate Local N ews and
Information (Washington, D.C.: Media and Democracy Coalition, 2006).
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WITHIN MEDIA = AUDIENCE
ACROSS MEDIA = AUDIENCE X WEIGHT.

Which Cities are analyzed ? This stud y focuses on the ten sam ple
cities that the FCC chose to be representative of the nation. The su bsequent
stu d ies focus on states. To assess the cu rrent status of local m ed ia m arkets
and the potential im pact of lifting the cross m ed ia ban, w e have analyzed
three cities in the state to cover the range of possibilities: the largest city in
the state; the sm allest city in the state in w hich cross-ow nership w ou ld be
allow ed u nd er the FCC ru les, and the state capitol, w hich plays a special roll
in policymaking in the state.
What potential m ergers w ere analyzed ? We focu s on new spaper-TV
mergers. The FCC’s ru les that w ere rem and ed gave “no qu estions asked ”
approval to all m ergers in all m arkets w here m inimal safe harbor cond itions
held. Und er these circum stances and given m arket pressu res, w e w ou ld
expect each of the major firm s to try to bu ild the biggest conglomerate
possible.
To m od el the potential im pact of the green-lighted m erger, w e
consid er tw o scenarios . In the 1st + 1st scenario, the largest firm merges w ith
the largest available cross media firm. The 2nd largest unmerged firm merges
w ith the second largest cross m ed ia firm etc. In the 1st + 2nd scenario the
m ergers are flipped . The largest firm is assu med to m erge w ith the second
largest cross m ed ia firm available, w hile the second largest firm mergers w ith
the largest cross m ed ia firm available. In both cases, w here the largest firm
alread y ow ns a new spaper and a TV station, w e assum e it bu ys a second or
third TV station. We assum e m ergers take place until all significant d aily
new spapers have m erged w ith TV stations (papers w ith m ore than 5 percent
of the total m arket).9 Und er a “no qu estions asked ” approach, there is
nothing the agency cou ld d o to stop the m erger w ave. We d o not consid er
additional TV-TV mergers, which also would have been allowed by the FCC’s
remanded rules and would concentrate markets even more.
Why d o you analyze m ergers that cou ld happen? There are several
reasons. First, w hen a m ajor change in ow nership rules is proposed that
cou ld fu nd am entally alter m arket structu re, it is irresponsible to not exam ine
what could happen.
Second , the experience over the last d ecad e w ith similar changes
su ggests su bstantial m erger activity w ill take place.10 In less than a d ecad e
after the repeal of the Financial and Synd ication Ru les, the broad casters w ent
9

We assu m e that the largest m erger in each scenario takes p lace first and only the top
two mergers are flipped in the second scenario.
10
These trend s are analyzed in Mark Coop er, M edia Ownership and Democracy in the
Digital Information Age (Palo Alto, Stanford Law School Center for Internet and Society,
2003) Chapter VI.

LIFTING THE NEWSPAPER-TV CROSS OWNERSHIP BAN

409

from ow ning abou t one-fifth of the show s in prim e tim e to fou r-fifths. In less
than a d ecad e after the lifting of the national cap on rad io, the top four firm s
w ent form ow ning abou t 160 stations to ow ning over 2,000. In less than a
d ecad e after the relaxation of the d u opoly rule, over 75 d uopolies w ere
created.
Third , in looking at m ed ia ou tlets, it is clear that m any properties
w ou ld be in play. The TV stations that are not ow ned and operated by the
m ajor netw orks w ou ld certainly be targets. Properties ow ned by Tribu ne,
Belo, H earst, Med ia General and Fox w ou ld be in play, since all of the parent
corporations are alread y in both the TV and the new spaper bu siness. Only
the netw ork-ow ned and operated stations (O&O’s) in the largest m arkets
m ight be more d ifficu lt acquisition targets.
H ow ever, w ith increased
pressure from a wave of combinations, these stations too might find it hard to
resist assimilation into a cross-owned enterprise.
Fourth, m any of the m ergers cou ld take place by sw apping
properties, rather than w ith bu you ts. This w ould d im inish the am ou nt of
cash that would be needed to make the deals.
Finally, the issu e of m ergers and m ajor stru ctu ral changes in m ed ia
m arkets that they cou ld cause is a long-term concern. The qu estion is not
w hich m ergers w ill take place the w eek, m onth or year after the policy
change, but how it will evolve over a period of years.
In su m m ary, the possibility that a substantial amou nt of m erger
activity w ou ld take place is high. It is incu m bent u pon policymakers and the
public to understand what could happen in these very important markets.
RESULTS: FCC S AMPLE CITIES
This section d escribes the im pact of the m erger scenarios on the cities
that the FCC studied in detail in its Media Ownership Order. Exhibit 1 shows
the cu rrent statu s of the m ed ia markets in term s of the H H I and fou r firm
concentration ratios. Exhibit 2 show s the im pact of the m ergers on m ed ia
m arkets in term s of the increase in the Departm ent of Ju stice/ Fed eral Trad e
Com m ission (DOJ/ FTC) m arket-w id e concentration ind ex (H H I) and the
market shares of the dominant firms, i.e. how the merger increases the market
share controlled by one com pany in a single city. Exhibit 2 also su m m arizes
the effects of both m erger scenarios in term s of the M erger Guidelines and
leading firm market shares.

Exhibit 1: Current Status of Media Markets

CITY
New York
Kansas City
Birmingham
Little Rock
Lancaster
Burlington
Myrtle Beach
Terre Haute
Charlottesville
Altoona

Papers
1937
7121
7989
7988
9506
5070
9120
4532
9983
1000

DOJ/FTC HHI
TV Radio Combined
1786
3053
1050
2440
5709
1790
1897 3639
1914
2951 10000
2221
3335
3141
2717
2792 10000
1831
5103 10000
3192
4356
1000
1912
3967 5458
2538
3883 8384
2466

FOUR FIRM CONCENTRATION
Papers TV Radio Combined
83% 77% 95%
54%
90% 95% 100%
75%
99% 80% 100%
70%
99% 100% 100%
82%
100% 89% 100%
84%
99% 98% 100%
75%
100% 100% 100%
87%
99% 100% 100%
81%
100% 98% 100%
87%
100% 100% 100%
91%

Exhibit 2: Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers
City

Scenario

1 + 1 Scenario:
New York
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Kansas City
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Birmingham
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Little Rock
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Lancaster
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Burlington
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Myrtle Beach
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Terre Haute
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Charlottesville
1 + 2 Scenario:
1 + 1 Scenario:
Altoona
1 + 2 Scenario:

Market HHI
Before
979
979
1791
1791
1914
1914
2221
2221
2717
2717
1831
1831
3192
3192
1912
1912
2538
2538
2466
2466

After
1923
1911
3022
2765
2887
2847
3266
3810
4723
3635
3260
2971
5869
4274
3623
3466
4794
3559
4305
4068

Post Merger
Status
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Merger Guidelines Threshold Leading Firm Market Share
Four-Firm CR Top Firm
1 st Merger
2 nd Merger Before After Before After
Violated
Violated
57% 80% 19% 29%
Violated
Violated
57% 80% 19% 29%
Violated
Violated
75% 85% 33% 51%
Violated
Violated
75% 85% 33% 47%
Violated
Violated
70% 80% 38% 50%
Violated
Violated
70% 80% 38% 50%
Violated
Violated
82% 89% 39% 59%
Violated
Violated
82% 89% 39% 51%
Violated
Violated
84% 89% 45% 68%
Violated
Violated
84% 89% 45% 56%
Violated
Violated
75% 85% 34% 51%
Violated
Violated
75% 85% 34% 44%
Violated
Violated
90% 90% 48% 76%
Violated
Violated
90% 90% 48% 59%
Violated
Violated
81% 89% 32% 53%
Violated
Violated
81% 89% 32% 49%
Violated
NA (one daily) 87% 90% 37% 68%
Violated
NA (one daily) 87% 90% 37% 51%
Violated
NA (one daily) 91% 91% 36% 62%
Violated
NA (one daily) 91% 91% 36% 57%
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New York City
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, in N ew York the H H I for
new spapers and rad io is w ell into the highly concentrated range. TV is
concentrated . The overall m arket is just below the concentrated threshold .
The largest fou r firms in each of the ind ivid ual m ed ia have a m arket share of
75 percent to over 90 percent, m aking them all tight oligopolies. For the
overall m ed ia m arket, the fou r firm concentration ratio is below 60 percent.
Thu s, w hen w e com bine all of the med ia ou tlets into a com bined m ed ia
m arket, w e find that the overall market is right at the ed ge of the d anger zone
of concentration and tight oligopoly...
Impact of Mergers: Even in N ew York, the largest m arket in the
cou ntry and one of the least concentrated , any cross m ed ia m erger involving
the top newspaper and TV firms would increase concentration in excess of the
DOJ/FTC M erger Guidelines. As show n in Exhibit 2, u nd er both of the
scenarios consid ered , N ew York w ou ld become a concentrated , tight
oligopoly, with the HHI rising from just over 1000 to just over 1900. The four
firm concentration ratio would increase from under 60 percent to 80 percent.
The change in the New York Market that would result from a wave of
newspaper-TV m ergers is extrem ely trou bling. In the cu rrent situ ation w e
find a leading firm and a handful of smaller, but closely matched competitors.
Cross-m ed ia m ergers w ould allow a sm all grou p of firms to d om inate. The
top three firm s cou ld increase their m arket share from ju st u nd er one-third of
the m arket to over tw o-third s. The remaining firm s in the m arket w ou ld be
m u ch sm aller. If the d om inant firm s ad d ed m ore TV stations to their
hold ings, w hich w ould be allow ed u nd er the FCC approach, the situation
would become even more dangerous.
Kansas City
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, in Kansas City the H H I for all
the m ed ia is w ell into the highly concentrated range. The overall m arket is
ju st below the highly concentrated threshold . The largest fou r firm s have in
each of the ind ivid u al m ed ia has a market share of 90 to 100 percent, m aking
them all tight oligopolies. For the overall m ed ia market, the fou r firm
concentration ratio is just below 75 percent. Thus, when we combine all of the
m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined m ed ia m arket, w e find a tight oligopoly, close
to the highly concentrated threshold.
Impact of Mergers: Any cross m ed ia m erger involving the top
newspaper and TV firm s w ou ld increase concentration in excess of the
DOJ/FTC M erger Guidelines. As show n in Exhibit 2, u nd er both of the
scenarios consid ered , Kansas City w ou ld becom e a highly concentrated , tight
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oligopoly, w ith the H H I rising from ju st u nd er 1800 to over 2500. The fou r
firm concentration ratio would increase from 75 percent to 85 percent.
The lead ing firm w ou ld increase its m arket share from one-third of
the m arket to abou t one-half. The nu m ber tw o firm w ou ld be abou t onethird the size of the d om inant firm. If the d om inant firm s ad d ed m ore TV
stations to their hold ings, w hich w ould be allow ed und er the FCC approach,
the situation would become even more dangerous.
Birmingham
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, in Birm ingham the H H I for
new spapers and rad io is w ell into the highly concentrated range. TV and the
overall m arket are highly concentrated , as w ell, althou gh closer to the
threshold . The largest fou r firm s in each of the ind ivid u al m ed ia have a
m arket share of 80 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all tight oligopolies.
For the overall m ed ia m arket, the fou r firm concentration ratio is 70 percent,
making it a tight oligopoly as well.
Impact of Mergers: Any cross m ed ia m erger involving the top
new spaper and TV firm s w ou ld increase concentration in excess of the
DOJ/FTC M erger Guidelines. As show n in Exhibit 2, u nd er both of the
scenarios consid ered , Birmingham suffers a m ajor increase in concentration,
w ith the H H I rising from ju st over 1900 to ju st alm ost 2900. The fou r firm
concentration ratio increases from 70 to 80 percent. The lead ing firm grow s
from 38 percent to 50 percent. The second ranked firm would be less than one
half the size. If the d om inant firms ad d ed m ore TV stations to their hold ings,
which w ould be allow ed u nd er the FCC approach, the situation w ou ld
become even more dangerous.
Little Rock
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, the H H I for each ind ivid u al
m ed ia ou tlet ind icates a highly concentrated m arket. The com bined m ed ia
market is highly concentrated as w ell. Exhibit 2 show s the largest fou r firm s
have a com bined m arket share of 90 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all
tight oligopolies. When w e com bine all of the m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined
m ed ia market, w e find that the overall m arket is highly concentrated and a
tight oligopoly.
Impact of Mergers: As show n in Exhibit 2, und er both of the
scenarios consid ered , allow ing cross-ow nership in this m arket w ou ld have a
large im pact, w ith the H H I rising from abou t 2200 to a range of 3200 to 3800,
an increase of 1000 - 1600 points.
The four firm concentration ratio increases from 82 to 89 percent. The
lead ing firm ’s m arket share w ould rise from just u nd er 40 percent to alm ost
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over 50 percent if cross-ow nership w ere allow ed . The second ranked firm in
the m arket w ou ld be m u ch sm aller, w ith a m arket share of abou t 15 percent.
Together, the top tw o firms w ould have alm ost three qu arters of the m arket.
If the d om inant firm s ad d ed m ore TV stations to their hold ings, w hich w ould
be allow ed und er the FCC approach, the situation w ou ld becom e even m ore
dangerous.
Lancaster
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, the H H I for each ind ivid u al
m ed ia ou tlet ind icates a highly concentrated m arket. The com bined m ed ia
m arket is highly concentrated as w ell. Exhibit 2 show s the largest fou r firm s
have a com bined m arket share of 90 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all
tight oligopolies. When w e com bine all of the m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined
m ed ia market, w e find that the overall m arket is highly concentrated and a
tight oligopoly.
Impact of Mergers: As show n in Exhibit 3, und er both of the
scenarios consid ered , allow ing cross-ow nership in this m arket w ou ld have a
large im pact, w ith the H H I rising from abou t 2700 to a range of 3600 to 4700,
an increase of 1000 - 2000 points.
The four firm concentration ratio increases from 84 to 89 percent. The
lead ing firm ’s m arket share w ou ld rise from ju st u nd er 45 percent to 56 - 68
percent if cross-ow nership w ere allow ed . The second ranked firm in the
market would be much smaller, with a market share of about 10 to 20 percent.
Together, the top tw o firms w ould have alm ost three qu arters of the m arket.
If the d om inant firm s ad d ed m ore TV stations to their hold ings, w hich w ould
be allow ed und er the FCC approach, the situation w ou ld becom e even m ore
dangerous.
Burlington
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, the H H I for each ind ivid u al
m ed ia ou tlet ind icates a highly concentrated m arket. The com bined m ed ia
m arket is highly concentrated as w ell. Exhibit 2 show s the largest fou r firm s
have a com bined m arket share of 90 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all
tight oligopolies. When w e com bine all of the m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined
m ed ia market, w e find that the overall m arket is highly concentrated and a
tight oligopoly.
Impact of Mergers: As show n in Exhibit 3, und er both of the
scenarios consid ered , allow ing cross-ow nership in this m arket w ou ld have a
large im pact, w ith the H H I rising from abou t 1800 to abou t 3000, an increase
of 1000 points.
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The four firm concentration ratio increases from 75 to 85 percent. The
lead ing firm ’s m arket share w ou ld rise from ju st u nd er 34 percent to 45 - 50
percent if cross-ow nership w ere allow ed . The second ranked firm in the
market would be much smaller, with a market share of about 25 to 30 percent.
Together, the top tw o firms w ould have alm ost three qu arters of the m arket.
If the d om inant firm s ad d ed m ore TV stations to their hold ings, w hich w ould
be allow ed und er the FCC approach, the situation w ou ld becom e even m ore
dangerous.
Myrtle Beach
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, the H H I for each ind ivid u al
m ed ia ou tlet ind icates a highly concentrated m arket. The com bined m ed ia
m arket is highly concentrated as w ell. Exhibit 2 show s the largest fou r firm s
have a com bined m arket share of 90 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all
tight oligopolies. When w e com bine all of the m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined
m ed ia market, w e find that the overall m arket is highly concentrated and a
tight oligopoly.
Impact of Mergers: As show n in Exhibit 2, und er both of the
scenarios consid ered , allow ing cross-ow nership in this m arket w ou ld have a
large im pact, w ith the H H I rising from abou t 3200 to a range of 4200 to 5800,
an increase of 1000 - 2600 points.
The fou r firm concentration ratio is and w ould rem ain abou t 90
percent. The lead ing firm ’s m arket share w ou ld rise from ju st u nd er half the
m arket to 59 – 76 percent if cross-ow nership w ere allow ed . The second
ranked firm in the m arket w ou ld be mu ch sm aller, w ith a m arket share less
than half the size of the d om inant firm. Together, the top tw o firm s w ou ld
have almost over four-fifths of the market.
Terre Haute
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, the H H I for each ind ivid u al
m ed ia ou tlet ind icates a highly concentrated m arket. The com bined m ed ia
m arket is highly concentrated as w ell. Exhibit 2 show s the largest fou r firm s
have a com bined m arket share of 99 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all
tight oligopolies. When w e com bine all of the m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined
m ed ia market, w e find that the overall m arket is highly concentrated and a
tight oligopoly.
Impact of Mergers: As show n in Exhibit 2, und er both of the
scenarios consid ered , allow ing cross-ow nership in this m arket w ou ld have a
large impact, with the HHI rising from about 1900 to around 3500, an increase
of 1600 points.
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The fou r firm concentration ratio w ou ld rise from abou t 80 percent to
abou t 90 percent. The lead ing firm ’s m arket share w ou ld rise ju st over 30
percent to arou nd 50 percent, if cross-ow nership w ere allow ed . The second
ranked firm in the m arket w ou ld be mu ch sm aller, w ith a m arket share less
than half the size of the d om inant firm. Together, the top tw o firm s w ou ld
have almost over three-quarters of the market.
Charlottesville
Current Status: As show n in Exhibit 1, the H H I for each ind ivid u al
m ed ia ou tlet ind icates a highly concentrated m arket. The com bined m ed ia
m arket is highly concentrated as w ell. Exhibit 2 show s the largest fou r firm s
have a com bined m arket share of 98 percent to 100 percent, m aking them all
tight oligopolies. When w e com bine all of the m ed ia ou tlets into a com bined
m ed ia market, w e find that the overall m arket is highly concentrated and a
tight oligopoly.
Impact of Mergers: Cross-ownership mergers would not be allowed.
Altoona
Current Status: As show n in Exhibits 1 and 2, Altoona is highly
concentrated in each of the ind ivid ual m ed ia and across the entire m ed ia
m arket. Fou r firm concentration ratios are 100 percent for each med iu m and
the overall market is over 90 percent. A single firm d om inates the new spaper
market.
Impact of Mergers: Because of the d om inant position of the
new spaper and tw o d om inant television stations, any single m erger violates
the Guidelines by a w id e m argin. In both m erger scenarios, the single
com bination of the d ominant new spaper w ith a TV station yield s an increase
in the H H I of over 1500 points. Mergers w ou ld resu lt in a m arket that w ould
be d om inated by a single entity w ith a m arket share greater than 50 percent.
The nu m ber tw o firm w ou ld be half the size of the lead ing new spaper-TV
combination.
RESULTS: O THER CITIES
Ou r stu d y of the sm all num ber of sam ple cities exam ined by the FCC
su ggests that that m id d le and smaller m arkets are highly concentrated and
w ou ld be affected severely by new spaper-TV m ergers. The larger m arkets
are mu ch less concentrated , bu t w ou ld also be ad versely affected by these
m ergers. Ten of the top tw enty m arkets w ere inclu d ed in the FCC sam ple
cities and the states stu d ied . To explore these m arket, w here there m ight be
som e u ncertainty abou t the im pact of new spaper-TV m erger, this stud y

LIFTING THE NEWSPAPER-TV CROSS OWNERHSIP BAN 417
presents the results of the m erger analysis for all of the top tw enty m arkets.
This set of markets w as also id entified in ou r earlier analysis as d em and ing
closer scrutiny in deciding how to set merger policy.
LARGE M ARKETS
Exhibit 3 presents the H H Is and fou r firm concentration ratios for
each of the m ed ia as w ell as the com bined m ed ia in all 20 markets.
Newspapers and radio are highly concentrated, tight oligopolies even in these
large markets. The TV m arket tend s to be concentrated , tight oligopoly.
Three of the combined markets are just below the threshold for a concentrated
m arket. Three of the m arkets are w ell above the threshold for a highly
concentrated m arket (above 2000). The rem aind er are in the concentrated
range. For the four firm concentration ratios w e find five markets in the
fifties, nine in the sixties, six above seventy.
Exhibit 3: Current Status of Media Markets
City
New York
Los Angeles
Chicago
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Boston
Dallas
Washington D.C.
Atlanta
Detroit
Houston
Seattle
Tampa-St. Pete
Minneapolis
Cleveland
Phoenix
Miami
Denver
Sacramento
Orlando

Papers
1937
2827
2850
4142
3229
3257
4361
2712
2172
2959
9199
2066
2609
4612
6251
6753
5207
4250
6915
9175

DOJ/FTC HHI
Four Firm Concentration
TV
Radio Combined Papers
TV
Radio Combined
1786
3053
979
83
77
95
53
1681
2448
980
88
74
77
54
1656
2751
1041
90
71
92
58
2203
4879
1245
97
87
100
62
1684
3543
1156
97
76
100
59
2166
5376
1165
91
84
100
61
1652
3944
1590
94
77
100
64
1947
2174
2068
99
76
100
67
1960
5996
2227
92
73
100
68
2497
8694
1183
99
88
100
63
1569
6859
1519
82
88
100
60
2762
5139
934
81
88
100
51
1774
6527
1794
69
75
100
73
2066
8970
1636
95
89
100
72
2006
8970
1636
98
88
100
74
1772
3839
1511
99
76
100
71
1621
4224
1229
99
73
100
64
1745
6183
1481
97
76
100
69
2531
3793
1799
95
91
94
83
2525
9999
2297
97
91
100
82

There is also a tend ency even w ithin the top tw enty for the sm aller
m arkets to be m ore concentrated . Thus, the top five m arket have an average
H H I of just und er 1100. The bottom five m arkets have an average H H I over
1600. The average four firm concentration ratio among the top five markets is
57 percent. The average am ong the bottom five is 72 percent. The earlier
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find ings that concentration levels w ere m u ch higher in the m id d le ranked
cities (state capitols and FCC sample cities) is consistent with this finding.
Exhibit 4 presents the resu lts of the m erger scenario analysis as
d escribed in Stu d y 23. With the exception of Los Angeles and Seattle, all of
the post-m erger m arkets are highly concentrated . In Los Angeles, the postmerger m arkets are close to the highly concentrated threshold . In Seattle, the
post-m erger m arkets are w ell into the concentrated range. In all cases, the
ind ivid ual mergers violate the M erger Guidelines. Except w here the fou r firm
concentration ratios are alread y above 70 percent, w e observe large increases
as a resu lt of the m od eled m ergers, 15 to 25 percentage points. Post-merger,
the lead ing firm tend s to have betw een one-third and one-half of the m arket,
with the increase generally falling in the 10 to 20 percent range.
Exhibit 5 presents the resu lts of analyses of a num ber of cities of
various sizes across the nation. A dozen states were chosen and three cities in
each state w ere analyzed – the largest city in the state, the state capitol and
the sm allest city that w ou ld have been im pacted by new spaper-TV cross
ow nership mergers. Every m erger m od eled violates the gu id elines. With the
exception of the very largest cities, d iscu ssed above, m arkets are concentrated
or highly concentrated . The sm aller markets and many of the state capitols
are very highly concentrated . The largest firm in most of the m arkets w ould
have a d om inant position, w ith a post m erger market share of arou nd 50% or
higher. The fou r firm concentration ratios are w ell up into the tight oligopoly
range.
CONCLUSION
Mergers betw een new spapers and TV stations in the sam e m arket are
front and center in the ongoing m ed ia ow nership proceed ing at the Fed eral
Communications Commission for several reasons.
Television and newspapers are the two most important sources of local news
and information by far.
The ban on such mergers was the longest standing of the rules that the
Commission is considering.
The Commission proposed the most radical change in this rule – allowing
newspaper-TV combinations in virtually every city in America.
In rejecting the Commission’s cross-media limits, the Court devoted a great
deal of attention to the Commission’s faulty reasoning and flawed analysis of
media markets.

This paper has show n that m ergers betw een new spapers and TV
stations in the same market pose a grave threat to democratic discourse.
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In antitrust terms, these mergers result in increases in market concentration
that raise significant competitive concerns and are likely to create or enhance
market power.
In terms of the Communications Act and First Amendment jurisprudence,
the newspaper-TV combinations that result dominate the local market raising
concerns about undue economic concentration and inordinate influence over
public opinion.

H istorical evid ence and logic suggest that m any of the m ergers
analyzed in scenarios consid ered w ou ld take place. Policymakers and the
pu blic need to be aw are of these d ire consequences shou ld the ban on
newspaper-TV combinations be lifted.

Exhibit 4: Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers: Large Markets
City/Scenario

Market HHI
Before

NEW YORK
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
LOS ANGELES
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
CHICAGO
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
PHILADELPHIA
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
SAN FRANCISCO
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
BOSTON
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
DALLAS
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
WASH. D. C.
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
ATLANTA
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:
DETROIT
1 + 1 Scenario:
1 + 2 Scenario:

Post Merger Status

After

Merger Guideline Threshold
1st Merger

2nd Merger

Leading Firm Share
4 Firm Concentration
Top Firm
Before
After
Before
After

979
979

1821
1675

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

53%
53%

79%
79%

19%
19%

29%
23%

980
980

1788
1756

Concentrated
Concentrated

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

54%
54%

80%
80%

16%
16%

26%
24%

1041
1041

2090
1886

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

58%
58%

75%
75%

18%
18%

33%
29%

1245
1245

2297
2082

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

62%
62%

79%
75%

25%
25%

41%
34%

1156
1156

1926
1924

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

59%
59%

83%
83%

23%
23%

30%
30%

1165
1165

2108
2005

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

61%
61%

77%
74%

24%
24%

38%
34%

1590
1590

2525
2020

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

64%
64%

85%
73%

34%
34%

43%
39%

2068
2068

3054
3022

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

72%
70%

84%
84%

47%
47%

52%
51%

2277
2277

2683
2664

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

67%
67%

83%
76%

44%
44%

49%
49%

1183
1183

2307
2295

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

62%
63%

85%
85%

17%
17%

34%
24%

EXHIBIT 4 (continued): Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers: Large Markets
City/Scenario

Market HHI

Before
HOUSTON
1 + 1 Scenario:
1519
1 + 2 Scenario:
1519
SEATTLE
1 + 1 Scenario:
934
1 + 2 Scenario:
934
TAMPA-ST. PETE
1 + 1 Scenario:
1794
1 + 2 Scenario:
1794
MINNEAPOLIS
1 + 1 Scenario:
1665
1 + 2 Scenario:
1665
CLEVELAND
1 + 1 Scenario:
1636
1 + 2 Scenario:
1636
PHOENIX
1 + 1 Scenario:
1511
1 + 2 Scenario:
1511
MIAMI
1 + 1 Scenario:
1229
1 + 2 Scenario:
1229
DENVER
1 + 1 Scenario:
1481
1 + 2 Scenario:
1481
SACRAMENTO
1+ 1 Scenario:
1799
1 + 2 Scenario:
1799
ORLANDO
1+ 1 Scenario:
2297
1 + 2 Scenario:
2297

Post Merger Status

After

Merger Guideline Threshold
1st Merger

2nd Merger

Leading Firm Share
4 Firm Concentration
Top Firm
Before
After
Before
After

2262
2163

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

63%
63%

83%
79%

32%
32%

44%
42%

1774
1682

Concentrated
Concentrated

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

51%
51%

75%
75%

17%
17%

32%
26%

3381
2581

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

73%
73%

84%
84%

31%
31%

56%
34%

2890
2889

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

72%
72%

98%
94%

23%
23%

37%
35%

2585
2570

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

68%
68%

83%
83%

34%
34%

45%
45%

2750
2629

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

71%
71%

87%
82%

28%
28%

44%
40%

1981
1977

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

63%
63%

81%
79%

21%
21%

34%
34%

2484
2472

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

69%
69%

85%
81%

25%
25%

37%
34%

3157
2797

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

75%
75%

82%
82%

33%
33%

53%
47%

3769
3132

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated

82%
82%

89%
88%

41%
41%

59%
51%

Exhibit 5: Summary of Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers
State/City/Scenario

Market HHI
Before

ALASKA
1 + 1 Scenario:
Anchorage
Juneau
Fairbanks
1 + 2 Scenario:
Anchorage
Juneau
Fairbanks
ARKANSAS
1 + 1 Scenario:
Little Rock
Fayetteville
Fort Smith
1 + 2 Scenario:
Little Rock
Fayetteville
Fort Smith
CALIFORNIA
1 + 1 Scenario:
Los Angeles
Sacramento
Palm Springs
1 + 2 Scenario:
Los Angeles
Sacramento
Palm Springs

After

Final Post Merger
Market Status

Merger Guideline Threshold
1st Merger

2nd Merger

Leading Firm Share
4 Firm Concentration
Top Firm
Before
After
Before
After

2412
1976
3221

4508
3853
5011

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

NA (one daily)
Violated
NA (one daily)

81%
79%
83%

85%
88%
87%

39%
30%
54%

66%
58%
70%

2412
1976
3221

3273
3162
4006

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

NA (one daily)
Violated
NA (one daily)

81%
79%
83%

85%
88%
87%

39%
30%
54%

50%
37%
61%

2221
1294
1724

3810
2357
2887

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
Violated

82%
66%
78%

89%
89%
90%

39%
18%
28%

59%
36%
56%

2221
1294
1724

3263
2350
2816

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
Violated

82%
66%
78%

89%
89%
88%

39%
18%
28%

51%
25%
47%

980
1799
2401

1788
3157
3762

Concentrated
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
Violated

54%
75%
75%

80%
82%
84%

16%
33%
44%

26%
53%
59%

980
1799
2401

1756
2797
3279

Concentrated
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
Violated

54%
75%
75%

80%
82%
84%

16%
33%
44%

24%
47%
53%

Exhibit 5 (continued): Summary of Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers
State/City/Scenario

Market HHI
Before

FLORIDA
1 + 1 Scenario:
Miami
Tallahassee
Panama City
1 + 2 Scenario:
Miami
Tallahassee
Panama City
MAINE
1 + 1 Scenario:
Portland
Augusta
Bangor
1 + 2 Scenario:
Portland
Augusta
Bangor
MICHIGAN
1 + 1 Scenario:
Detroit
Lansing
Battle Creek
1 + 2 Scenario:
Detroit
Lansing
Battle Creek

After

Final Post Merger
Market Status

Merger Guideline Threshold
1st Merger

2nd Merger

Leading Firm Share
4 Firm Concentration
Top Firm
Before
After
Before
After

1229
2703
2894

1981
5081
4937

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

63%
81%
91%

81%
84%
91%

21%
43%
44%

34%
71%
67%

1221
2703
2894

1977
3174
4732

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

58%
81%
91%

79%
86%
91%

21%
43%
44%

34%
49%
65%

2796
2416
2580

4292
3885
4546

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

NA (one daily)
Violated
NA (one daily)

86%
82%
88%

88%
88%
89%

47%
43%
42%

63%
59%
65%

2796
2416
2580

4039
3674
3778

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

NA (one daily)
Violated
NA (one daily)

86%
82%
88%

88%
89%
89%

47%
43%
42%

61%
56%
56%

1183
2401
2371

2307
3863
3847

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

62%
81%
85%

85%
85%
90%

17%
42%
41%

34%
59%
59%

1183
2401
2371

2295
3817
3654

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

63%
85%
85%

85%
90%
92%

17%
42%
41%

24%
59%
57%

Exhibit 5 (continued): Summary of Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers
State/City/Scenario

Market HHI
Before

MONTANA
1 + 1 Scenario:
Billings
Helena
Great Falls
1 + 2 Scenario:
Billings
Helena
Great Falls
OHIO
1+1 Scenario
Cleveland
Columbus
Toledo
1 + 2 Scenario:
Cleveland
Columbus
Toledo
OREGON
1 + 1 Scenario:
Portland
Eugene
Medford
1 + 2 Scenario:
Portland
Eugene
Medford

After

Final Post Merger
Market Status

Merger Guideline Threshold
1st Merger

2nd Merger

Leading Firm Share
4 Firm Concentration
Top Firm
Before
After
Before
After

2963
3292
2900

5559
5693
5448

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

91%
90%
87%

91%
90%
91%

44%
51%
44%

74%
74%
73%

2963
3292
2900

4024
4586
3688

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

91%
90%
87%

91%
90%
91%

44%
51%
44%

56%
63%
53%

1636
2622
2474

2585
3260
4482

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
Violated

68%
75%
83%

83%
89%
89%

34%
48%
42%

53%
52%
65%

1636
2622
2474

2570
2975
3632

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
Violated

68%
75%
83%

83%
78%
89%

34%
48%
42%

45%
51%
53%

1531
1446
2849

2572
2463
4936

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

64%
64%
85%

83%
71%
89%

32%
30%
47%

45%
47%
69%

1531
1446
2849

2374
2006
3672

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

64%
64%
85%

83%
71%
89%

32%
30%
47%

42%
39%
55%

Exhibit 5 (continued): Summary of Impact of Newspaper/TV Mergers
State/City/Scenario

Market HHI
Before

PENNSYLVANIA
1 + 1 Scenario:
Philadelphia
Harrisburg
Erie
1 + 2 Scenario:
Philadelphia
Harrisburg
Erie
TEXAS
1+1 Scenario
Dallas
Austin
Abilene
1 + 2 Scenario:
Dallas
Austin
Abilene
VIRGINIA
1 + 1 Scenario:
Northern VA/DC
Richmond
Norfolk
1 + 2 Scenario:
Northern VA/DC
Richmond
Norfolk
WASHINGTON
1 + 1 Scenario:
Seattle
Spokane
Yakima
1 + 2 Scenario:
Seattle
Spokane
Yakima

After

Final Post Merger
Market Status

Merger Guideline Threshold
1st Merger

2nd Merger

Leading Firm Share
4 Firm Concentration
Top Firm
Before
After
Before
After

1245
2357
2362

2297
4246
3743

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
NA (one Daily)

62%
79%
85%

79%
89%
89%

25%
39%
36%

41%
62%
62%

1245
2357
2362

2082
3434
3693

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
NA (One Daily)

62%
79%
85%

75%
89%
89%

25%
39%
36%

34%
50%
57%

1590
2329
2728

2525
4081
4988

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

64%
83%
88%

85%
88%
90%

34%
40%
45%

43%
62%
65%

1590
2329
2728

2020
3354
4026

Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
NA (one daily)
NA (one daily)

64%
83%
88%

73%
87%
90%

34%
40%
45%

39%
53%
60%

2068
2200
1541

3054
3563
2721

Concentrated
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
NA (one daily)

72%
77%
70%

84%
84%
84%

47%
41%
30%

52%
57%
44%

2068
2068
1541

3022
3054
2660

Concentrated
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Na (one daily)
NA (one daily)

70%
77%
70%

84%
84%
84%

47%
41%
30%

51%
52%
42%

934
3214
2088

1774
4251
3357

Concentrated
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
NA (one daily)

51%
85%
75%

75%
90%
79%

17%
53%
40%

32%
61%
56%

934
3214
2088

1682
4251
2984

Concentrated
Highly Conc.
Highly Conc.

Violated
Violated
Violated

Violated
Violated
NA (one daily)

51%
85%
75%

75%
90%
79%

17%
53%
45%

26%
61%
51%
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STUDY 27:
THE IMPACT OF EASING MULTIPLE STATION
OWNERSHIP LIMITS ON MEDIA MARKETS
M ARK COOPER
INTRODUCTION
The previous analyses have inclu d ed only new spaper-television cross
ow nership mergers. The FCC also relaxed the lim itation on TV-TV m ergers.
Its ord er w ou ld have allow ed a single ow ner to hold three licenses in large
m arkets and it expand ed the nu m ber of m arkets in w hich ow ners w ou ld be
allow ed to hold tw o licenses. H ow ever, at the sam e tim e, it continu ed to ban
m ergers betw een tw o stations ranked in the top fou r, based on au d ience
shares.
It is also not clear how the Com m ission shou ld d efine the m arket for
pu rposes of evalu ating the effects of TV-TV m ergers. Althou gh the Sinclair
cou rt criticized the FCC’s d ecision for not treating voices consistently, it d id
not say the FCC cou ld not m ake the case that TV-TV m ergers should be
considered in the context of the television market only.
As a result, the analysis of the im pact of TV-TV m ergers becom es
quite com plex, d epend ing on w hat one assu m es abou t the policies that w ill
govern the m ergers and the m arket context in w hich it is view ed . There are
three variables – the statu s of new spaper-TV cross-ow nership, the status of
the top 4-exclusion, and the market perspective.
Exhibit 1 show s this complex analysis for the top ten m arkets and
fou r m id d le sized m arkets w hose Designated Market Areas rank betw een
roughly 40 and 100 (out of a total of 210), which were analyzed in detail in the
d iscu ssion of new spaper-TV cross-ow nership. It inclu d es tw o TV m erger
scenarios that parallel the new spaper-TV scenarios – 1+1 and 1+2. In the 1+1
scenario, the top TV station is assumed to merge with the largest available TV
station. In the case w here top-4 m ergers are banned , this w ou ld be the fifth
ranked TV station. In the case w here there is no ban on top-4 mergers, this
w ou ld be the second ranked TV station. The next largest, u nm erged TV
station is assu m ed to m erge w ith the second largest available TV station. In
the case where top-4 mergers are banned, this would be a merger between the
second and sixth ranked TV stations. In the case of w here there is no top-4
exclusion, this w ou ld be a m erger betw een the nu m ber three and nu m ber
fou r stations. N ote that in half the FCC sam ple cities the top-4 exclu sion
m eans no m ergers w ou ld be perm itted . In these m arkets, w hich are
extrem ely concentrated , if the top-4 exclu sion w ere lifted the impact of the
mergers would be severe.
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Exhibit 1: Status of TV-TV Mergers

City/Scenario

New York*
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Los Angeles*
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Chicago*
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Philadelphia
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
San Francisco
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Boston
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Kansas City
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Birmingham
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Norfolk
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Burlington
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Dallas*
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Washington D.C.
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Atlanta*
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario
Detroit
1+1 Scenario
1+2 Scenario

COMBINED MARKET
Top 4 Exclusion
With
Without
Newspaper-TV
Newspaper-TV
With more Without more With more Without more
1st
2nd
1st
2nd
1st
2nd
1st
2nd

TELEVISION MARKET

Top 4 Exclusion
With
Without
1st
2nd
1st
2nd

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
NV

NV
V

V
NV

NV
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
NV

NV
V

V
NV

NV
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
NV

NV
V

NV
NV

NV
NV

NV
NV

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

V
V

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

NV
NV

NV
NV

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V
V

V= ViolatesMerger Guidelines
, NV= Does not violate Merger Guidelines
,*= Existing newspaper-TV combination
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RESULTS
The resu lts are com plex, bu t broad conclu sions can be d raw n. If the
TV m arket view is taken, these m ergers u niform ly violate the Merger
Guidelines. If cross-ow nership m ergers take place and then these mergers take
place, they overwhelmingly violate the Merger Guidelines. The top-4 exclusion
prevents m any m ergers that w ou ld violate the M erger Guidelines. This is
particularly the case for the sm aller m arkets. As m arkets becom e sm aller, the
nu m ber of TV stations d eclines and the m arkets becom e m u ch m ore
concentrated . Und er the top-4 exclu sion the available TV stations have very
small market shares.
Exhibit 2 show s three exam ples of the m agnitud e of the im pact und er
variou s scenarios. We have chosen tw o from the top ten DMAs and tw o from
DMAs 90-100. We have inclu d ed one of the FCC sample cities in each. In the
top ten, w e have analyzed Boston since it cu rrently has no cross-ownership
situation and exhibited the smallest effects of TV-TV m ergers und er som e
scenarios. The ban on cross-ow nership and the ban on top-4 m ergers keeps
the com bined m arket effects relatively small. In the TV market, how ever,
even the top-4 Exclu sion fails to prevent a significant increase in
concentration. N ew spaper-TV m ergers have a m u ch larger im pact on
concentration. Within the TV market, the effects are larger.
In the larger m arkets, w ith a ban on cross-ow nership and a ban on
top-4 TV m ergers, the concentration ratios the com bined m arket H H Is rem ain
in the low er part of the concentrated range. H ow ever, the TV market
becomes highly concentrated in both cases.
This analysis reinforces the case against relaxing the cross-ownership
ban and u rges extrem e cau tion w hen it com es to relaxing the lim its on
multiple station ownership.
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Exhibit 2: The Effects of TV-TV Mergers
City

Merger Scenarios
TV

News-TV

Effect

COMBINED MARKET
TV POLICY SCENARIOS
XO
XO+
XO+
Before Merger TV w/ TV w/o
Only
top 4 X top 4 X

TELEVISION MARKET
TV POLICY SCENARIOS
Before

TV w/
top 4 X

TV w/o
top 4 X

New York
1+1
1+2
1+1
1+2

1+1
1+2
1+1
1+2

1+1
1+2
1+1
1+2

1+1
1+2
1+1
1+2

HHI
4 Firm CR
HHI
1+2
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
Boston
HHI
1+1
4 Firm CR
HHI
1+2
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
Birmingham
HHI
XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
Burlington
HHI
XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
HHI
NO XO
4 Firm CR
1+1

979
53
979
53
979
53
979
53

1793
80
1788
80
Ban
Ban
Ban
Ban

2601
87
2371
83
1202
61
1189
60

3266
83
3210
83
1491
68
1390
68

1786
77
1786
77

2676
95
2674
95

3558
95
3162
95

1165
61
1165
61
1165
61
1165
61

2108
74
2005
74
Ban
Ban
Ban
Ban

2227
78
2392
78
1282
65
1296
65

2982
81
2827
81
1550
73
1517
73

2166
77
2166
77

2604
84
2321
84

4934
95
4816
94

1991
70
1991
70
1913
70
1913
75

2887
80
2847
80
Ban
Ban
Ban
Ban

3586
90
3127
88
2103
77
2097
77

4423
90
3912
88
2310
84
2282
84

1897
80
1897
80

2703
97
2703
97

3586
97
3540
97

1831
75
1831
75
1831
75
1831
75

3260
85
2971
85
Ban
Ban
Ban
Ban

3919
91
3531
91
1921
78
1878
78

5777
93
3748
93
2153
80
2004
80

2792
78
2792
78

3376
84
3127
84

4864
100
3901
100
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